Benchmark 3

Vladimir Zverev

Sarov, Russia

             In the third part of my work I attempted to understand: whether it is possible to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the planet or if it is fatal inevitability. In other words: whether it is possible "to close" something once already "opened"?

           

Part 1. International treaties

             As it was already shown in the second part of my work, practically all regarded countries attempted to become the owners of WMD in this or that measure.

             It was possible practically completely to Israel, India and Pakistan, in less measure Š to Iraq and Syria, and it was not possible at all to Jordan and Lebanon.

             Despite international efforts on arms control the leading states of the region continue to consider different kinds of WMD as the main arguments of force. Anthony Х. Kordeman, the manager of the faculty in the Center of strategic and international studies of Arlie E. Burk thinks that "Éintensity in the Persian Gulf and South Asia and intensity connected with Arabian-Israeli conflict cooperate in that way that it is quite capable to make all large powers of the Middle East continue attempts on acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons ".

             How is it possible to be opposed to this?

             In the plain there are three opportunities.

             The first opportunity is voluntary entry of the states possessing WMD, into the system of international treaties on control over WMD and their strict fulfilment.

              The second opportunity is entry of the states into the system of treaties and their fulfilment under the pressure of international public opinion and under the threat of economical sanctions.

             The third opportunity is compulsion to refusal from WMD with the help of military force.

             Elaboration of different international treaties on control over WMD is carried on for almost 100 years.

             The most important of them are presented in table 1.

 


 

Table 1

Place and date of signing

 

Treaty

 

 Number of countries-participants

Geneva,

June 17, 1925

Protocol

on the Prohibition of Use on the War Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other gases and Bacteriological Technicques of Warfare

(Geneva Protocol)

 

 

131

Moscow,

August 5, 1963

Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests in  Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater

 

 

132

Geneva,

July 1, 1968

 

Treaty

 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT)

 

 

187

Moscow Š London Š Washington,

February 11, 1971

 

Treaty

on the Prohibition of Placing of Nuclear and other types of WMD at the Bottom of Seas and Oceans and in its Bowels

 

 

92

Moscow Š London Š Washigton,

April 10, 1972

Convention

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction

(BWC)

 

 

133

Paris,

January 13, 1993

Convention

on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Cemical Weapons and their Destruction

(CWC)

 

 

174

New York

September 24, 1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT)

 

 

142

 

             The limited volume of the work does not allow to pay attention to different measures of conrol and compulsion consolidated by international treaties.

              The most typical example of such measures in the regarded region is Iraq. After the termination of the Gulf war the special commission of the United Nations (UNSCOM), which aim was to look for and destruct WMD has been working in Iraq for eight years.

             At the same time hard economical sanctions acted regarding Iraq.

             Now the third opportunity of WMD destruction is taken place in Iraq.

             Another way reducing danger of WMD proliferation and application is strengthening of confidence measures between neighbouring states.

             There is small experince of confidence measures strengthening between the states of separate regions regarding nuclear weapons in the international practice. IÕm going to speak about creation of zones, free from nuclear weapons.

             The list of the treaties on this subject is presented in table 2.

 

             Table 2

 

Place and date of signing

 

Treaty

 

Number of countries-participants

Mexico,

February 14, 1967

Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the

Latin America and the Caribbean basin

(Treaty of Tlatelolko)

 

36

Raratonga,

August 6, 1985

Treaty

on the South Pasific Ocean Nuclear-Free Zone

(Treaty of Raratonga)

 

15

Bangkok,

December 15, 1995

Treaty

on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Free Zone

 

Came into force in 1997

Cairo,

April 11, 1996

Treaty

on the Africa Nuclear-Free Zone

(Treaty of Pelindab)

 

45

 

             As practice shows, the most successful examples of regional measures on control over WMD are connected with the creation of such zones. Zones, free from nuclear weapons, are real opportunity to answer the anxiety of the non-nuclear states regarding their safety and to strengthen their decision to refrain from acquisition of nuclear weapons by that.

             The nuclear states see advantages in zones, free from nuclear weapons, that they promote reduction of geographic area of nuclear preparations and consolidate non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons.

 

Part 2. Efficiency of international treaties

             Effectiveness of international treaties, excepting good will of their participants, essentially depends on control measures over their fulfilment and measures of effect on "slack" participants.

             The control measures in the different treaties essentially differ. It depends on time of their signing and kind of WMD, on which the treaty is extended.

             For example letÕs investigate control measures, stipulated by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

             ItÕs difficult enough to elaborate control measures over observance of BWC and CWC because it is practically impossible to distinguish production of both battle biological and chemical agents from investigations and production of similar matters for peaceful purposes by "exterior" methods.

             In particular, there are no rules in BWC about the mechanism of effective international control over discharge of states-participants. Actually the whole system is built on principle of self-control. The international check of biological weapons stockpiles is not stipulated. The participants of BWC do not have to inform each other about destruction of biological weapons (BW). There is no mention of biological objects inspection in BWC.

             CWC, elaborated more than twenty years later, contains more modern methods of control (notices, inspections, regular account to international organizations, interviews with employees of chemical firms etc) and the mechanism of sanctions (limitations of international trade by chemicals with law breakers etc)

             However it is impossible to consider these measures perfect.because of chemical weapons (CW) production features

             Business with the treaties on control over nuclear weapons is slightly better.

             For example it is possible to investigate CTBT. It is one of the fundamental modern treaties, which gives hope of nuclear weapons full destruction because itÕs difficult enough to improve and elaborate NW without nuclear-weapons tests even to the veterans "of nuclear club", and it is practically impossible to the states trying to create it for the first time.

             Being based on nuclear-weapons tests features, the international control regime over CTBT was created. It includes:

- International monitoring system on the base of four methods: seismic, ultra-sound, radionuclide and hydroacoustic;

- International data center, which collects all information, processes it and gives it to all states-participants;

- Mechanism of consultings and explanations;

- Measures of confidence strengthening regarding widescale chemical detonations;

- Inspection of questionable event place without the right of refusal.

Besides CTBT stipulate sanctions for its non-fulfilment. In cases, when any state-participant does not fulfil the demands of the Treaty, the decision to limit or to hold up the realization of state-participant rights and privilegess on the Treaty can be accepted.

            In cases of more serious infringements of the main treaty obligations collective measures proper to international law can be attempted.

There is one more fundamental treaty on control over WMD - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wearpons (NPT), which was investigated enough in the first part of my work.

How do these treaties act in the investigated countries? The attitude of some of them to NPT and CTBT is presented in table 3.

 

 Table 3

 

 

Treaty

 

                              Country

 

 

Israel

 

 

Syria

 

 

Iraq

 

 

India

 

 

Pakistan

 

 

NPT

 

Not

Signed

 

 

Signed

 

 

Signed

 

Not

signed

 

Not

signed

 

CTBT

 

 

Signed

 

Not

signed

 

Not

signed

 

 

Signed

 

 

Signed

 

Obviously, that Syria and Iraq will not have nuclear weapons at any circumstances. On the contrary, we donÕt have any doubts, that Israel, India and Pakistan have it.

Frankly speaking there is one small difference between these three countries.

The fact is that India and Pakistan, as the states which have officially tested nuclear weapons, according to NPT can not become its participants because according to article 9 of NPT the official nuclear states are only those, which have tested nuclear weapons until             January 1,1967. The rest of NPT participants should be non-nuclear states.

In this case Israel is in a unique situation. Nobody doubts that Israel has nuclear weapons, but as it is officially considered, that it didnÕt test nuclear weapons, Israel, at desire, can become the participant of NPT.

Everything, said earlier, testifies: the observance of the international treaties on control over WMD depends on greatly free will of states-participants. As practice shows, it is possible to be the participant of many treaties, but to break them"quietly".

And in this case, the most effective method of treaty observance, especially by unstable countries, is international inspections.

UNSCOM is a good example. Inspite of doubts in efficiency of its activity, nobody found WMD in Iraq till now.

The "experiment" of power solution variant of disarmament problem is taken place in Iraq. WeÕll know the results soon.

It is impossible to underestimate the efficiency of non-state international organizations in the activity of control over WMD. Here are only some of them:

CWPO - Chemical Weapons Prohibition Organization, stipulated by CWC;

IAEA Š International Atomic Energy Agency, created until the concluding of NPT;

Tsanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group etc, created after the concluding of NPT.

They are all successful in their activity.

 

Part 3. What to do?

As practice shows, there is no enough hope on voluntary and conscientious fulfilment of the treaties on control over WMD in unstable regiones.

             Practically all countries of the investigated region are the participants of these Treaties, and at the same time, we have the information about chemical and biological weapons elaboration carried on by these countries.

             On all visibility, it is inevitable until the confidence regime between countries becomes stronger.

             One of possible ways of confidence strengthening is the creation of a zone, free from nuclear weapons, in the Middle East. However now it is considered to be improbable.

             "The difficult fate" of the treaty in the South Asia which has not come into force till now confirms it.

             It is necessary to note that recently the official nuclear states began to make the guarding statements. In the second part of my work the expressions of the Israeli officials were presented.

             The "Daily Telegraph" from March 21, 2002 published the Minister of Defense of Great Britain words: " Great Britain is ready to inflict nuclear strikes on countries like Iraq, if they use WMD against the British armed forces É "

             On February 22 in the interview to the "Washington Times" the substitute of the state secretary of the USA John Bolton said, that the USA is not going to adhere to obligations not to inflict the first nuclear strike on countries which donÕt possess nuclear weapons.

             There are expressions, that the military operation in Iraq, which is carried out now, will only make situation worse.

             Thus, in the opinion of director of International Safety Problems Institute, a former substitute of the minister of defense of Russian Federation Andrey Kokoshin "Éa cruel lesson, which the USA gives to Saddam Hussein, will become a signal for many countries to strengthen their own military potential ". He thinks that Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, Northern Korea and, even, Japan are the countries which can force their nuclear programs.

             Intensity and lack of confidence in the investigated region in many respects are a consequence of global confrontation between two super-powers in the 20th century.

             Thus, the Iranian professor of chemistry Abu Nahid, who has been living in Sofia since 1985, has a reliable information that two nuclear centers were built in Iraq in 1970-1972: one - with the help of the USSR, another Š with the help of France.

             25 chemical concerns helped Iraq in the attempts of CW creation, from which 17 were from Germany. Since 1983, after visiting Iraq by the assistant of the president Reagan, the present minister of defense D. Rumsfeld, help as CW components began to come from the USA.

             As for BW, the Center of control over BW at the government of the USA exported bacterias of malignant anthrax to Iraq in 1985.

             It guards that such facts continue to take place nowadays. So, in the interview of Alexander Rumyantsev - the Minister of nuclear energy of Russian Federation and Sergey Ivanov - the Minister of defense of Russian Federation Š itÕs reported that in Iran the IAEA inspectors detected a centrifugal complex intended for receiving of highly enriched uranium. There is information, that Anglo-Dutch Company "URENCO" concerns it.

             And nevertheless hope exists. Nowadays, after the termination of "the cold war" and " the double standards" policy, comprehension of new hazards, which are dangerous to mankind and creation of global antiterroristic coalition, the unique opportunity to solve problems of the Middle East has appeared.

             After solution of Iraq problem, there will be only one point of intensity in the region - Arabian-Israeli conflict. International community must apply maximum efforts to its solution. After cancelling of intensity between Israel and Palestine it will be possible to hope for IsraelÕs refusal from nuclear weapons. This suggestion is not such Utopian. There are several countries in the world, which have already voluntarily refused from nuclear weapons or its elaboration. These countries are South Africa, Brasil, Argentina, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan.

             After IsraelÕs refusal from nuclear weapons it will be necessary to work over creation of a zone, free from nuclear weapons, in the Middle East. With strengthening of confidence measures between the states of the region their necessity to carry out illegal investigations in the field of biological and chemical weapons elaboration will disappear.

Naturally, that such script of event development in the Middle East is possible only if the states, constant members of the United Nations Security Council, and especially Russia and the USA, will act in co-ordination and one direction.

  


Sources

1. Disarmament and safety. 1997-1998: Russia and international monitoring system above arms: progress or disintegration. А. Arbatov, О. Bykov, А. Kalyadin etc. - М.,: Science, 1997

2. Anthony Х. Kordeman. Weapons of mass destruction: new strategic frameworks. The electronic magazine "Exterior policy of the USA", 2002

3. А.Kokoshin. In a nuclear ring. "Arguments and facts", №11, 2003

4. V. Kremenyuk. Bush and Hussein are enemies forever. "Arguments and facts", №12, 2003

5. Interview of the Minister of nuclear energy of Russian Federation and the Minister of defense of Russian Federation to mass media during their visit in Sarov. The newspaper "TownÕs courier", №13, 2003

6. V.Gakov. The ultimatum: nuclear war and the non-nuclear world in fantasy and reality.-M.: Politizdat, 1989

7. Robert Ayson. Management, Abolition, and Nullification: Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies in the 21st Century. The Noprolifiration Rewiew/Fall-Winter 2001.