C R I T I C A L I S S U E S F O R U M

SCHOOL 125 IN SNEZHINSK, RUSSIA

Student-participant – Ivan Drokin

Teacher-consultant – Larisa Zlokazova

BENCHMARK 3

For convenience Benchmark 3 is divided into 6 parts:

Part 1 Why should we care? The threat of terrorism.

Part 2 A timeline of treaties, agreements and regimes in controlling WMD.

Part 3 Methods, by which nations can avoid compliance with a treaty, agreement or regime.

Part 4 The use of sanctions, counter-proliferation or military counter-measures to control the use of WMD.

Part 5 Confidence and security building measures in the Middle East.

Part 6 Abbreviations and Bibliography.

In Benchmark 1 we defined and introduced weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In Benchmark 2 we named Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs), defacto NWSs and potential NWSs; introduced the most dangerous area of the world related to WMD – Mideast – and showed in details historical events and reasons, which led Israel to acquire WMD.

Now we are going to discuss how to solve the problem connected with WMD. The problem is:

what should we do with all these weapons?

BENCHMARK 3

PART 1

Only nuclear weapons (NW), which exist now on the Earth is enough to destroy our planet and to kill all living beings 48 times and to kill every human being 178 times.

Besides, there are biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents, the use of which can kill some generations and nations.

The events of September 11, 2001 focused attention on the possibility of terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (WMD). The attacks made it clear that the threat of terrorist or other sub-state groups bent on causing mass destruction is not hypothetical but real. An objective definition of terrorism has proven elusive and the subject has therefore become prone to subjective manipulation by political actors, leading to the aphorism that “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”.

Walter Laqueur, a leading academic on the subject, defines terrorism as "the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change. "

Bruce Hoffmann, another scholar of terrorism, concludes that terrorism is "ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent-or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and [is] perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity".

American Heritage Dictionary considers terrorism to be ''the political use of violence or intimidation.” Even more central to an understanding of terrorism is the aspect of terror. This can be explained as “fear referred back to ourselves”.

Terrorism is hardly a recent phenomenon. Covert attacks have been recorded since biblical times. The term “terrorism was first used to describe the reign of terror perpetrated by the government of post-revolutionary France. Terrorism in modern times seems to have made its first widespread appearance in the anarchism present in Europe. The Irgun campaign against the British in Israel in the 1940s can be classified as another example of terrorist tactics.

The end of the Cold War not only ushered in prospects of renewed terrorist violence, there is also a positive aspect to the international structural adjustment- with the disappearance of superpower antipathy, prospects for multilateral, or perhaps even international collaboration to combat terrorism have become greater, presuming that enough governments can agree with the definition and whole understanding of what a terrorist is.

Chemical or biological agents are easier to acquire than nuclear counterpart. All these agents present some difficulties for weaponization. Actually disseminating chemical, biological or radiological agents effectively in order to cause mass casualties can often be just as tricky as putting together a workable nuclear bomb from fissile material. Terrorists do not have the same demands as the military (friendly force protection or limited strike capability) in their use of such weapons. They employ far more primitive delivery methods. For example, sarin gas used in the Tokyo subway attack was dispersed by poking holes in plastic bags filled with sarin solution.

Many of the materials for building these weapons (I mean chemical or biological) have both commercial and industrial (not only military) applications. This dual use nature of many chemical, biological and sometimes even radiological substances increases terrorist access to their acquisition.

Countries, which acquire WMD must prove and guarantee the whole of the Mankind that they are capable to keep in safety, safeguard against accidental use, and stop the spread (proliferation) of WMD to additional countries and terrorist organizations or sub-state groups.

Improving relations between countries – making friends out of enemies – can reduce the risk of war. This, ultimately, is the best way to reduce the risk of WMD use, particularly in the following global relationships: - Iraq and the United States (USA);

· South Africa and its neighbors;

· North Korea and the USA;

· The Mideast;

· Israel and Palestine.

Measures for limiting the use of WMD must address 1) existing WMD capabilities: 2) future increases in such capabilities; 3) proliferation of WMD to additional countries and terrorist organizations or sub-state groups.

The basic approaches for limiting the use of WMD are:

q reducing tensions between countries;

q adopting prohibitions on the possession and use of WMD, including measures to limit or eliminate existing WMD stockpiles;

q using diplomacy, sanctions, reward to discourage countries from acquiring or using WMD;

q using export controls on transfers of WMD technology, equipment, and materials, to slow countries from building or acquiring WMD;

q pursuing cooperative threat reduction efforts to eliminate existing WMD and prevent WMD technology transfer to states of concern;

q deterring a potential adversary by demonstrating that the costs of an attack would be too great and would outweigh any potential gains;

q employing military measures to address WMD threats.

BENCHMARK 3

PART 2

The nuclear powers have tested over 2,400 nuclear weapons and explosive devices since the Trinity test in 1945.

People all over the world are eager to live in peace, to feel themselves in safety, to admire the beauty of nature and not to be afraid about the future of their children and grandchildren. Who can care or guarantee?

On October 24, 1945, the United Nations (UN) Charter entered into force and the new international organization was founded.

In 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded. 19 states became its members (later France and Greece parted).

West European Union (WEU) was founded in 1955. It is closely connected with NATO.

In 1957 to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established by the United Nations (UN).

Some other regional organizations, Councils and associations were founded (there are about 65 international political, economic, military and social organizations) to influence and solve problems and conflicts in the world.

Besides, a lot of summits are held rather often to discuss a lot of international questions and to solve different problems related to international safety and peace, to stop arms race and WMD proliferation.

A series of multilateral treaties with wide membership restrict the possession and/or use of WMD. The most important are:

¨ 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare;

¨ 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear weapon Tests in the atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty – PTBT) prohibits nuclear testing in outer space, in the atmosphere, and underwater.

¨ 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), which prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or WMD in orbit around the Earth. The Outer Space Treaty is usually thought of as a nuclear arms limitation treaty.

¨ 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) controls the spread of nuclear weapons, prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that had not detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967. It commits five nuclear-weapon states (the countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968) to nuclear disarmament and requires all other countries to forego nuclear weapons. The Treaty is the foundation of the non-proliferation regime.

¨ 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), prohibiting the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons. The BWC calls for the destruction of all members’ biological weapon stockpiles and prohibits the development, production, acquisition or retention of biological agents, as well as the development of delivery systems of such agents. Member states are currently negotiating a stronger verification and compliance regime for the Treaty. Key signatories include: Russia, China, United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, and France.

¨ 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons (CW), and requires the destruction of current stocks and chemical weapon production facilities. Key signatories include: Russia, China, United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France and India.

¨ 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is not a treaty but rather a voluntary agreement among countries. It seeks to stop the transfer of the delivery system of weapons of mass destruction. These systems include missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload a distance of at least 300 kilometers. Currently 32 countries participate in the MTCR.

To reduce the risk of WMD two great powers – USA and Russia – signed some important Treaties:

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in 1991, entered into force in 1994; START is reducing the number of US and Russian land-based long-range missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, warheads for strategic land- and sea-based missiles, and heavy bombers. START I limits each country to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and approximately 6,000 “accountable” deployed strategic warheads.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) was signed in 1993, US Senate approved ratification in 1996, Russian Duma has not ratified yet. Under START II, both the United States and Russia must reduce the total number of their deployed strategic warheads to 3,500 each by December 31, 2004. Multi-warhead land-based long-range missiles are banned. No more than 1,750 warheads may be deployed on submarine-based missiles.

Formal negotiations on START III have not yet begun, and the United States has been unwilling to begin them until Russia ratifies START II. In 1997, the two countries agreed to a START III framework that would limit each country to no more than 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each by December 31, 2007.

BENCHMARK 3

PART 3

An ideal nonproliferation treaty would describe how to punish countries that violate the treaty. That is, the treaty would have clear and effective compliance and enforcement provisions.

A treaty would have provisions describing the following:

Ø when it becomes effective or enters into force(for example, after a certain group or number of countries have joined);

Ø its duration – whether it will last for a fixed amount of time or forever;

Ø how it can be amended;

Ø how a country can withdraw after joining (a step usually permitted after a declaration that its supreme national interests would be threatened if it remained in the treaty).

But only few treaties live up to these ideals. For example, the Geneva Protocol does not ban countries from possessing CW and BW, but only from using them. The NPT is not a universal ban on possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, it allows US, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China to retain their nuclear arsenals because they had detonated nuclear devices before the treaty was negotiated. The BWC bans possession of these weapons but contains no inspection arrangements. Negotiations to establish a legally binding inspection system failed in July 2001 when the US backed out. The CWC probably comes closest to the ideal, with strong provisions covering all of the points just described.

Let’s have a look at some articles of the Treaties:

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (signed at Moscow May 26, 1972):

…Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

634 UNTS 326
entered into force April 22, 1968.
Signed at Mexico City February 14, 1967

Article 30 : Duration and denunciation
1. This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties.

2. The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

Chemical Weapons Convention.

Article XVI

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

 (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

BENCHMARK 3

PART 4

In analyzing the impact of multilateral treaties, it is important to note the following:

Ø which countries have not joined particular treaties;

Ø whether some countries have signed but not ratified, putting them in legal limbo with respect to the treaty obligations;

Ø whether countries that have joined have done so with “reservations”, for example, allowing them to use a prohibited WMD in retaliation if another country uses it first against them;

Ø whether the treaty applies equally to all parties or whether some countries are exempted from some of the treaty’s provisions;

Ø whether the treaty has effective verification and compliance provisions to deter cheating;

Ø whether the treaty has entered into force.

Signing a treaty, any country and all countries undertake to act in compliance with the treaty. Well-known military conflicts and wars in the XX century and at the beginning of the XXI century show how reality can be changed and become dangerous.

The most important wars of the XX century’s second half were:

¨ Korean war in 1950-1953;

¨ Vietnam war in 1959-1975;

¨ Mideast wars between Israel and Arabian states in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982;

¨ English-Argentinean war in 1982;

¨ War in Afganistan in 1979-1989;

¨ War in Persian Gulf in 1990-1991;

¨ NATO aggression in Serbia in 1999.

The XXI century shows that the lessons of the XX century have not taught us and we have forgotten all the mistakes.

The century has begun with new conflicts and wars in the Middle East.

What sanctions can be used to punish those Parties or Regimes, which break the International Law or the Treaty and develop, produce WMD, or proliferate WMD ?

If a WMD activity in any country violates an International Treaty, the United Nations or/and other international organizations or a country (for example, the USA) can try to have the treaty enforced. For example, if a country that is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) appears to be secretly producing chemical weapons (CW), it can be demanded a challenge inspection. This inspection would be conducted by a multinational team under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The inspection might reveal that the country was indeed violating the treaty. If the violator did not stop, it would cease to enjoy the benefits of the CWC, such as access to trade in certain treaty-controlled chemicals. In addition, CWC member-countries could agree to refer the issue to the UN Security Council, whose mission is to ensure international security. The UN security Council could vote to punish the treaty violator by halting trade or ending economic assistance programs. Measures that impose penalties on countries pursuing activities that other countries oppose are known as economic and military sanctions. History shows that such measures are the most resultative.

If a country is punished for developing WMD or for helping others to do so, the sanctions can also hurt some or even all members of the process. The profits of many companies, for example, come from selling products that are manufacted cheaply in China (or some other developing country). These products appear in the shops of the USA, Russia, former Soviet republics, the UK, France, Germany and other countries. If any (or all together) Party – member of a treaty – were to cut off trade with China to punish it for selling missiles to Iran, businesses of the countries would also suffer. Moreover, many times sanctions do not work because the target country continues its WMD activities despite the sanctions.

For many years, the United States banned american companies from trading with Libya, but Libya has not ended its CW Program, although Libya’s announcement in November 2001 about joining the Chemical Weapons Convention may indicate a change.

From Chemical Weapons Convention:

ARTICLE XII

MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, INCLUDING SANCTIONS

1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2,3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering action pursuant tothis paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.

2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.

3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under this Convention, in particular by Article 1, the Conference may recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity with international law.

4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

Compliance with a treaty, agreement or regime guarantees people of the world to live in peace, to grow up their children, plan the future according to their own wish.

Ideally, no one is allowed to break the law. United Nations must be the world’s highest department or center, whose decisions and resolutions are certain.

BENCHMARK 3

PART 5

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other challenges to international nonproliferation regimes emerging from the Middle East have global as well as regional consequences. The patterns of WMD acquisition and regime nonproliferation in the Middle East restrict the scope and effectiveness of the NPT and BWC, and even more so of the CWC and MTCR

Treaties on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Country	N P T	C T B T
Egypt	February 26, 1981	Signed October 14, 1996
Iran	February 2, 1970	Signed September 24, 1996
Iraq	October 29, 1969	-
Israel	-	Signed September 25, 1996
Libya	1975	-
Saudi Arabia	March 3, 1988	-
Syria	September 24, 1969	-
Turkey	April 17, 1980	Signed September 24, 1996
Yemen	May 14, 1986	Signed September 30, 1996

Chemical Weapons Convention	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Egypt refuges to sign	Egypt acceded in 1972
Iran ratified in 1997	Iran ratified in 1973
Iraq refused to sign	Iraq ratified in 1991
Israel signed but not ratified	Israel refused to sign
Libya refuses to sign	Libya acceded in 1982
Syria refuses to sign	Syria signed in 1972

The Middle East has endured many destructive wars in recent decades, has been the focus of repeated threats to wage war with WMD, and includes most of the world active chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs. The region includes one of only four states in the world that refuse to join the NPT, most of the states that refuse to sign the CWC, and eight states armed with SCUD-B or longer – range ballistic missiles.

As an interrelated security complex, the region encompasses North Africa, the Middle East proper (including Turkey), and the Persian Gulf. But states in these three sub-regions are not the only actors shaping the prospects for nonproliferation. Non-state actors such as Islamic Jihad and Al Qaiida have threatened to employ biological and chemical weapons. Moreover, nonproliferation in the region is affected by the military forces and political influence of such external powers as Britain, France, the United States and Russia.

Four types of challenge in this region threaten international nonproliferation regimes:

· nonparticipation,

· subversion,

· defiance,

· and what can be called “demonstration effect”.

Nonparticipation

- Israel is the only state in the region and one of only four around the entire globe that refuses to sign the NPT.

- Algeria, Israel, and the Sudan have not signed the BWC. Egypt and Syria signed the accord in 1972, but they have declined to ratify it.

- Egypt, Eritrea, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, and Syria are among the very few states in the world that have failed to sign the CWC. Jordan has acceded to the treaty, while Israel, the UAE, and Yemen have signed but not rayified the accord. In these respects, nonparticipation in the CWC is greater in the Middle East and North Africa than in any other region of the world.

Subversion

- Iraq deliberately subverted the purpose of the NPT by ostensibly complying with the accord while it secretly engaged in a vast nuclear weapons production program.

- Iran may be likewise subverting the purpose of nonproliferation accords, if warnings by US and Israeli intelligence sources are correct. It may be difficult to unequivocally confirm possible transgressions by Iran.

- The nuclear weapons states have made only limited progress toward fulfilling their NPT Article VI commitments.

- Implicit reliance by the United States on nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological and chemical weapons against its military forces and allies legitimates the possession of nuclear weapons, and contravenes US negative security assurances to non-nuclear NPT signatories.

Defiance

- Iraq has endured the sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands of its citizens, tens of billions of dollars, and prospects for normalized international relations in its determination to prevent implementation of UN Security Council resolutions mandating verification of its full disarmament of WMD.

- The vexing example of persistent Iraqi defiance of its international commitments has limited prospects for building political coalitions to provide security or economic inducements or to generate political or military pressures on other states to conform to international nonproliferation norms.

Demonstration effects

Widespread acquisition of WMD by states in the region and unequivocal evidence of significant instances of the use of chemical weapons compounded by international non-action in the face of acquisition and use motivates and legitimates further acquisition of WMD capabilities.

Acquisition

- Israel possesses a relatively sophisticated nuclear arsenal, there is significant risk that Iraq and Iran may acquire nuclear weapons in the medium to long term.

- UNSCOM, IAEA inspectors have been unable to verify that Iraq possesses agents and production capabilities for biological weapons. There are also unverified reports that Egypt, Iran, and Israel may have BW programs.

- Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria have all produced chemical weapons.

- Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates have all acquired ballistic missiles with range/payload exceeding MTCR objectives.

Use

- Since 1945 Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have carried out chemical weapons attacks on neighbors in the region. During the Iran-Iraq war in 1980-1988, Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons, provoking Iran to follow suit. Iraq also wreaked deadly CW attacks on unarmed Kurdish civilians within its territory in 1988.

- Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen have used ballistic missiles in the region. During their “War of the Cities” in 1988, Iraq and Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles in indiscriminate attacks on perspective urban areas.

- Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and the United States have used cruise missiles in the Middle East conflicts.

Application to Middle East:

1. The peace process – a series of bilateral relationships

· Israel versus Palestinians (stalled)

Sharm El Sheikh, October 2000

Mitchel Report, April 2001

Tenet Cease-fire Plan, June 2001

· Israel v. Syria (stalled)

· Israel v. Lebanon (stalled)

· Israel v Jordan (Peace Treaty in 1994)

· Israel v. Egypt (Peace Treaty in 1979)

2. Unofficial contacts

· Scientific, military (usually retired), intellectual, and cultural exchanges

3. Multelateral - regional

· Working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), 1991-1995 Participants: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinians, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania

· Treaty on Pelindaba – African NWFZ (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone), Libya and Egypt signed in 1996

· Regional Economic Development Working Group

· The Environment Working Group

· The Refugee Working Group

· The Water Resources Working Group

From “Repairing the Regime (preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction)” (Edited by Joseph Cirincione; ROUTLEDGE; New York, London

“Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Dilemmas”

(by Benjamin Frankel, Ariel Levite, Khidhir Hamza, Bruce Jentleson):

“…Turning to the region in general, it is extremely important (and this was the basis for the Madrid process and for the ACRS working group) that even if Israel and the Palestinians achieve an agreement, even if Israel and Syria achieve bilateral agreement, even if the Iraq and Iran issues are solved today, there still is a need for a broader regional security process. This process could begin to create the norms, procedures, institutions, and relationship to deal with the proliferation, arms control, and broader security issues that affect the region. The Middle East should become no different than any other region in which these processes are becoming increasingly important in the post – Cold War world. The proliferation issue, in thes connection, cannot really be addressed effectively outside the context of regional security. One cannot surgically extract or totally hone in on the WMD issues on a broad regional basis without dealing with the other dimensions of regional security.”

BENCHMARK 3

PART 6

Abbreviation

ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security working group is one of five multilateral groups formed shortly after the opening round of the Middle East Peace Process in Madrid in October 1991

BW Biological Weapons

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CW Chemical Weapons

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

NWS Nuclear Weapons States

PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UAE United Arab Emirates

UK United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

UN United Nations

US United States (of America)

USA United States of America

UNSCOM United Nations Special Comission on Iraq

WEU West European Union

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Bibliography

1. Chemical Weapons Convention, found at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc

2. The Years of Discoveries, found at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/discovery.html

3. Treaties and Agreements, found at http://www.state.gov./www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html

4. CNS-Challenges in the Middle East to Nonproliferation Regimes, found at http://cns.miis.edu/iicp/cnsdata?A…tta%2C+%3Cthesaurus%3E+tarzi%29%29

5. Limiting Use of WMD, found at http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411

6. Repairing the Regime (preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destructions); edited by Joseph Cirincione; ROUTLEDGE; New York, London

7. The Choice of the Century, by Boris Kuzyk; Institute of Economic Strategies, 2000