Benchmark
I
In the following papers students
are faced with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and give explanation of
different weapons of mass destructions work and their effects. To make our work
more convenient we have divided it into three parts. The first part is devoted
to biological and toxin weapons, the second one to chemical weapons and the
last one to nuclear and radiological weapons.
Part
I
Biological
and Toxin Weapons
Biological and toxin weapons are a kind of mass
destruction weapon, the action of which is based on using of pathogenic
microorganisms and other biological agents and toxins. In the international
practice the single term "the biological weapon" is frequently used.
It is understood, that the biological weapons are ammunitions, loaded with
biological means, intended for mass destruction of people, animals or plants.
Under the biological means are understood the specially prepared biological
preparations, containing microorganisms and other biological agents, as well as
components, intended for conservation of biological agents properties during
their storing and use.
The biological agents are specially selected microorganisms (bacteria, viruses,
rickettsia, fungi, etc.), as well as infectious materials, extractive from
them, capable cause mass diseases of human beings, animals and plants. (Note: There is no
term definition of "the biological weapon" recognized at
international level.)
Historical
Perspective
Biological warfare is not a
twentieth century development; it has been an effective combat weapon for
centuries. As early as 1346 A.D., Tartars held the walled city of Kaffa under
siege and catapulted plague-infested bodies into the city.1
Were the Tartars successful in using disease as a means to break the siege?
Yes. Not only did illness cause Kaffa to capitulate, but some medical
historians speculate this event resulted in the bubonic plague epidemic that
spread across medieval Europe between 1347 and 1351, killing 25 million people.2
Three
hundred years later, during the French and Indian War, the English offered
blankets to Indians holding Fort Carillon. The English suspected the Indians
were loyal to the French and exposed the blankets to the smallpox virus before
their apparent altruistic overture. The Indians began to fall ill, and after an
epidemic spread through the fort, the English attacked, defeating the
incapacitated force. The British gained control of Fort Carillon and renamed it
Fort Ticonderoga.3
Throughout
history, many examples may be found illustrating the use of natural diseases in
war to place an adversary in a position of disadvantage. For example, dumping
bodies into water supplies has been fairly common for centuries. Two thousand
years ago, Romans fouled many of their enemies’ water sources by throwing the
corpses of dead animals into the wells.4
During the American Civil War, Confederate soldiers shot horses and other farm
animals in ponds in an effort to contaminate the water supply of the Union
forces.5
While there
was some evidence of biological warfare in World War I, the interwar years saw
a new interest in the use of disease as a weapon. Paradoxically, probably the
two most active programs started as a result of an international initiative to
ban biological warfare agents. Both Japan and the United Kingdom recognized
that since biological warfare was horrifying enough to outlaw, it probably
would make an effective weapon. Both countries had very robust programs as
early as 1932 and 1934, respectively.6
There is
evidence that Japan tested biological warfare agents on prisoners of war and
that they actually used them on the population of China.7To
spread the plague, they dropped flea-infested debris over 11 cities in mainland
China. The result was a bubonic plague epidemic in China and Manchuria.8While these attacks caused casualties,
the weapons did not function reliably and ultimately resulted in very little
strategic impact that affected the war.9
When the
Britain learned of the Japanese biological warfare program, they put
significantly more emphasis toward developing their own BW capability. Most of
their testing was conducted on an island called Gruinard off the northwest
coast of Scotland. They concentrated their development and testing efforts on
the lethal effects of anthrax. Scientists used sheep as victims to evaluate the
effectiveness of the disease, and they infected literally thousands of animals.
As a result of the huge amount of anthrax agent dispersed on the island and the
large number of sheep infected, the British could not effectively decontaminate
the island after they stopped the testing program. Consequently, Gruinard is
still considered contaminated and is off limits, demonstrating the persistence
of anthrax as a biological weapon.10
The British
soon combined their biological weapons development efforts with Canada and the
United States. Even though there were Allied operational plans to employ
biological weapons during World War II, there is no evidence to indicate they
were actually used on a large scale. There is, however, strong evidence that
Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Nazi security service, was assassinated with a
grenade that had been contaminated with biological warfare agents (typhoid
fever).11
Table
1 Characteristics
and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological Weapons Agents (1)
|
Agent Type |
Name of Agent |
Rate of Action |
Effective Dosage |
Symptoms/Effects |
|
Bacteria |
Bacillus anthracis Causes anthrax |
Incubation: 1 to 6 days Length of illness: Extremely high mortality rate |
8,000
to 50,000 spores |
Fever and fatigue; often followed by a slight
improvement, then abrupt onset of severe respiratory problems; shock; pneumonia
and death within 2 or 3 days |
|
Yersinia pestis Causes plague |
Incubation: 2 to 10 days Length of illness: Variable mortality rate |
100 to 500 organisms |
Malaise, high fever, tender lymph nodes, skin lesions, possible
hemorrhages, circulatory failure, and eventual death |
|
|
Brucella suis Causes
brucelosis |
Incubation: 5 to 60 days 2% mortality rate |
100 to 1,000 organisms |
Flu-like symptoms, including fever and chills, headache, appetite
loss, mental depression, extreme fatigue, aching joints, sweating, and
possibly gastrointestinal symptoms. |
|
|
Pasturella tularensis Causes tularemia Also known as rabbit fever and deer fly fever |
Incubation: 1 to 10 days Length of illness: 1 to 3 weeks 30% mortality rate |
10 to 50 organisms |
Fever, headache, malaise, general discomfort, irritating cough, weight
loss |
|
|
Rickettsiae |
Coxeilla burnetti Causes
Q-fever |
Incubation: 2 to 14 days Length of illness :2 to 14 days 1% mortality rate |
10 organisms |
Cough, aches, fever, chest pain, pneumonia |
|
Viruses |
Variola virus Causes smallpox |
Incubation: average 12days Length of illness: several weeks 35% mortality rate in unvaccinated individuals |
10 to 100 organisms |
Fever, headache appear first, followed 2 or 3 days later by lesions,
malaise, vomiting, Highly infectious |
|
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus |
Incubation: 1 to 5 days Length of illness: 1 to 2 weeks Low mortality rate |
10 to 100 organisms |
Sudden onset of fever, severe headache, and muscle pain Nausea, vomiting, cough, sore throat and diarrhea can follow |
|
|
Yellow-fever virus |
Incubation: 3 to 6 days Length of illness: 1 to 2 weeks 5% mortality rate |
1 to 10 organisms |
Severe fever, headache, cough, nausea, vomiting, vascular
complications (including easily bleeding, low blood pressure) |
|
|
Toxins |
Saxitoxin Produced by blue-green algae commonly ingested by shellfish,
mussels in particular |
Time to effect: minutes to hours Length of illness: Fatal after inhalation of
lethal dose |
10 microorganisms per kilogram of body weight |
Dizziness, paralysis of respiratory system, and death within minutes |
|
Botulinum toxin Causes botulism Produced by Closrtidium botulinum bacterium |
Time to
effect: 24 to 36 hours Length of illness: 24 to 72 hours 65% mortality rate |
.001 microgram per
kilogram of body weight |
Dizziness, weakness, dry throat and mouth, blurred vision, progressive
weakness of muscles Interruption of neurotransmission leading to paralysis Abrupt respiratory failure may result in death |
|
|
Ricin Derived from castor beans |
Time to
effect: few hours Length of illness: 3 days High mortality rate |
3 to 5 micrograms per kilogram of body weight |
Rapid onset of weakness, weakness, cough, fluid build-up in lungs,
respiratory distress |
|
|
Staphilococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) Produced by Staphilococcus aureus |
Time to
effect: 3 to 12 hours Length of illness: up to 4 weeks |
30 nanograms per person |
Fever, headache, cough, nausea, chills, vomiting and diarrhea |
The
Biological Warfare Threat
With the public expose of
active Russian and Iraqi biological warfare programs, the threat of these
weapons looms large on the horizon. There are official, open-source estimates
that between 10 and 20 countries either have, want, or are thinking about
starting a biological weapons capability.12
However, there is more to the threat than just countries that have the
capability. What types of agents are a threat and how will they mature given
new technology? And, does the insidious nature of biological agents pose a
threat?
BW
Nation States
Some of the countries
suspected in open sources of having or wanting a biological warfare program
include Russia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Cuba,
Taiwan, China, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, and South Africa.13 There are real concerns with this list.
First, some of these nations have been associated in the past with
state-supported terrorism. This fact raises the probability of a biological
warfare terrorist attack.
Second,
many of these countries reside in regions of historical instability or emerging
instability. And third, with the economic distress in the former Soviet Union,
there is a possibility that its biological warfare weapons experts will look
for more prosperous employment by building biological warfare programs
elsewhere for the highest bidder. Fortunately, as of early 1994, the CIA had no
indication that this biological warfare brain drain is occurring.14
Biological
Terrorism
In 1984, the French
authorities made a startling discovery that demonstrates how vulnerable the
world is to biological terrorism. The Paris Police raided a residence suspected
of being a safe house for the German Red Army Faction. As they conducted their
search, they found documents that revealed a strong working knowledge of lethal
biological agents. As the police continued the search to the bathroom, they
came across a bathtub containing many flasks filled with what turned out to be
Clostridium Botulinum, the microorganism that produces botulism, one of the
most lethal biological substances known to man.15
On 20 March
1995, the Tokyo subway system was attacked with chemical warfare agents by,
allegedly, a cult called the Aum Shinri Kyo, or the Supreme Truth. This
incident killed at least 11 people and injured as least 5,500 others.16 Five different subway cars
were struck simultaneously by individuals leaving canisters dispersing a
Nazi-developed nerve agent called Sarin.17
This is an exceptionally significant event because it strikes at the core of
society with furtive lethal gases, exposing glaring vulnerabilities and
fomenting terror among the population. As one victim of the subway attack said,
“We’re just innocent, ordinary people. It frightens me to think how vulnerable
we are.”18
On the 28th of March, Tokyo police also found large quantities of the biological warfare agent Clostridium Botulinum during one of several raids on Aum Shinri Kyo facilities.19 This discovery clearly demonstrates that a terrorist organization had the resolve, the biological agent, and the wherewithal to conduct a horrendous biological attack against an unprotected population. As Time magazine said, “. . . garden-variety madness had got access to weapons of terror.”20(1)
Part II
Chemical Weapons
1-1. Classification of Chemical
Agents
Chemical
agents are classified by either their physiological action or their military use.
1-2.
Diagnosis of Injury from Chemical Agents
a.
Odor. Some agents have odors which may aid in their detection and
identification, but many are essentially odorless. The odor of a chemical agent
delivered by an explosive shell may be concealed by the odor of the burning
explosive. Vomiting agents may be mixed with more lethal agents to induce
vomiting and irritation of the respiratory tract. This mixture forces the
affected individuals to break the seal of their masks in order to vomit,
exposing them to the more toxic agents in the environment. Detection of a
chemical agent odor is one indication for immediately putting on the mask and
wearing it until the Òall clearÓ signal is given. However, odor alone must not be relied on for
detection or identification of a chemical agent. Some chemical agents are not
perceptible by smell even on initial exposure. Continued exposure dulls the
sense of smell. Even harmful concentrations of an odor-producing chemical agent
may become imperceptible. Standard detection devices are the most reliable
means of identifying a chemical agent, but users should remember that detection
devices indicate concentrations in their immediate area only. They may not
cover large areas and should not be the sole means on which to base conclusions
on the presence or absence of chemical agents.
b.
Signs and Symptoms. A chemical agent that has produced signs and
symptoms in exposed personnel can usually be identified from all of the
following.
·
· A brief history bringing out the symptoms that
have occurred and their progression.
·
· Physical examination of the eyes (pupils,
conjunctivae, lids) and skin.
·
· Observation of respiration, color of mucous
membranes, and general behavior. However, if a mixture of agents has been used,
identification of the agents may not be possible. Full descriptions of the signs and symptoms produced by
specific chemical agents are given in the chapters that follow.
Nerve
Nerve
agents are considered the most dangerous of the chemical warfare agents. Nerve
agents can cause loss of consciousness and convulsions within seconds and death
within minutes of exposure. The most common nerve agents, Tabun, Sarin and Soman, were
originally developed as pesticides by Germany in the 1930s. Great Britain
developed another type of nerve agent, VX, in the 1950s.
Although
many of the nerve agents are called gases, they actually are oily liquids,
which can be released as an aerosol spray or mixed with other liquids.
A
nerve agent signals glands in your body to "turn on." However, the
glands no longer can turn themselves off. As a result, the body produces
copious secretions, runny nose, watery eyes, excess saliva. The nerve impulses
cause uncontrollable muscular movement and in the final stages, seizures and
convulsions.
Transmission
Exposure
to nerve agents can occur via inhalation (breathing), skin contact or ingestion
(digestive tract). All nerve agents are readily absorbed through the skin and
eyes in liquid form. In vapor form, they are readily absorbed into the
respiratory tract and eyes. Ingestion is rare, but deadly.
It
varies according to the agent:
- Sarin
is generally non-persistent and evaporates at approximately the same rate
as water.
- Tabun
is persistent from one to six days depending on the temperature and
evaporates 20 times more slowly than water. It persists twice as long in
seawater.
- Soman
can last from one to two days under average weather conditions.
- VX is
very persistent, especially in cold weather, and can last for months.
Yes, they are clear, colorless and tasteless liquids
that mix in water. They are difficult to detect when mixed, as they are almost
odor free. In their pure form, Soman and Tabun have a slightly fruity odor and
Sarin and VX are odorless.
Blister
Description
Blister
agents, also called vesicants, are chemical agents that cause red skin
(erythema), blisters, irritation, eye damage, respiratory damage and
gastrointestinal damage. Mustard is one of the commonly used blister agents.
Blister agents, specifically mustard have been a
military threat since first introduced in World War I. Italy allegedly used
mustard in the 1930s against Abyssinia. Egypt used mustard in the 1960s against
Yemen. Iraq used mustard against Iran and against the Kurds.
Transmission
Mustard
in its pure liquid form is colorless and odorless; however, weapons grade
material is yellow to dark brown or black. Mustard's odor is described as
similar to horseradish, onions or burning garlic.
Symptoms
The
effect of blister agents is similar to that of a corrosive chemical like lye or
a strong acid.
Blood
Description
Blood
agents are toxic industrial chemicals such as cyanide. Pure weaponized forms of
these agents are gases, but many cyanide compounds are found as solids, powders
or in liquid form.
The United States chemical industry manufactures over
300,000 tons of hydrogen cyanide annually. Cyanides are used in electroplating,
mineral extraction, dyeing, printing, photography and agriculture, and in the
manufacture of paper, textiles and plastics.
Transmission
Exposure can occur by contact with either liquids or vapors.
Although
it is a colorless gas or liquid, some victims report an odor of bitter or burnt
almond or peach kernels.
Symptoms
These chemicals can cause rapid respiratory arrest and death by blocking the
absorption of oxygen to the cells and organs through the bloodstream.
Choking
Description
Choking
(pulmonary) agents are toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine and
phosgene.
Historically, both sides in World War I used chlorine
and phosgene. The U.S. military no longer stockpiles these agents.
Inhaled chlorine mixes with the moisture in the lungs
and turns to hydrochloric acid. The acid causes fluid build-up in the lungs,
which impedes oxygen transfer and causes the victim to drown. This condition is
often called "dry-land drowning."
Transmission
Exposure
to these agents is through inhalation (breathing) of vapors or skin contact.
In its pure form, chlorine is a greenish-yellow gas
with a pungent odor. Phosgene is a colorless gas with the odor of mowed grass
or hay.
Symptoms
The
primary effect of choking agents is pulmonary edema – water in the lungs. Other
symptoms may include eye and airway irritation, shortness of breath and chest
tightness, nausea, vomiting, choking, severe coughing and dry-land drowning.
1-3.
Routes of Entry
Chemical agents
may enter the body by several routes. When inhaled, gases, vapors, and aerosols
may be absorbed by any part of the respiratory tract. Absorption may occur
through the mucosa of the nose and the mouth and/or the alveoli of the lungs.
Liquid droplets and solid particles can be absorbed by the surface of the skin,
eyes, and mucous membranes. Chemical agents that contaminate food and drink can
be absorbed through the gastrointestinal tract. Finally, wounds or abrasions
are presumed to be more susceptible to absorption than the intact skin.
1-4.
Military Employment of Chemical Warfare Agents
a.
Chemical agents dispersed by modern weapons can be tactically used anywhere
within the range of current delivery systems.
b.
Chemical agents can be used in conjunction with other weapons systems or by
themselves. Chemical agents may produce temporary incapacitating effects,
serious injury, or death. Chemical agents also have the potential for use by
saboteurs and terrorists in rear areas against key targets and civilian
populations. The scope of CW is broad since it aims at groups rather than
individuals and could be directed against civilian populations. Vapors of
chemical agents may penetrate vehicles, ships, aircraft, fortifications, and
buildings. Special design of such equipment and/or structures can prevent
chemical agent penetration.
c.
The presence or threat of CW operations can create psychological
or physiological problems, adversely affect morale, and reduce military or
civilian efficiency.
d.
Chemicalfires may be employed with smoke. Therefore, friendly
forces must be prepared for chemical attacks when the enemy is employing smoke
munitions or production equipment.
e.
All service members must take every precaution against becoming
chemical casualties. Each service member must apply the principles of first aid
and decontamination contained in this manual to increase their chances for
survival and recovery. Medical personnel must apply the principles of first
aid, treatment, and decontamination contained in this manual to increase their
and their patientsÕ chances of survival. (2)
Part III
Nuclear and Radiological Weapons
(“From Warfare Atom To
Peaceful” one of the kids’ works devoted to 100 anniversary of Kurchatov )
Description
There
are two different types of radiological weapons used by terrorists – nuclear
explosives (bombs) or Radiological dispersal devices (RDD).
- Nuclear
bombs use the splitting of atoms to create an explosion.
- Radiological
dispersal devices (RDD) use a conventional explosive device to disperse
radioactive material. These are commonly called dirty bombs.
A blast or explosion is a rapid release of a large
amount of energy within a limited space. There are five basic differences
between nuclear and conventional blasts:
- Nuclear
explosions result from the splitting of atoms. Conventional explosions are
caused by chemical reactions.
- Nuclear
explosions can be millions of times more powerful than the largest
conventional explosion. The resultant shock wave from a nuclear explosion
can destroy buildings and other structures for miles around. This shock
wave is accompanied by high winds.
- Nuclear
explosions create much higher temperatures and brighter light flashes, to
the extent that skin burns and fires can occur at considerable distances.
The temperatures at the center of a nuclear explosion can reach tens of
millions of degrees.
- Nuclear
explosions are accompanied by highly penetrating and harmful radiation.
- Nuclear
explosions spread radioactive debris over very large areas. Small
particles may travel many miles in the atmosphere before settling to the
ground as fallout. Potentially harmful radiation exposure from the debris
is possible long after the explosion.
Radiation is the movement of energy through space and
material. Radioactive materials produce a form of radiation we know as nuclear
or ionizing radiation. Both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation are part of our
natural environment.
- Light,
heat, sound, radio waves and microwaves are examples of non-ionizing
radiation. In extreme doses, this radiation can heat tissues and cause
burns.
- Ionizing
radiation has enough energy to break chemical bonds and disrupt the
function of living cells and tissues.
Nuclear Fusion
Nuclear energy can
also be released by fusion of two light elements (elements with low atomic
numbers). The power that fuels the sun and the stars is nuclear fusion. In a
hydrogen bomb, two isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium and tritium are fused to
form a nucleus of helium and a neutron. This fusion releases 17.6 MeV of
energy. Unlike nuclear fission, there is no limit on the amount of the fusion
that can occur.
.
The Hydrogen Bomb: The Basics
|
A fission bomb,
called the primary, produces a flood of radiation including a large number of
neutrons. This radiation impinges on the thermonuclear portion of the bomb,
known as the secondary. The secondary consists largely of lithium deuteride.
The neutrons react with the lithium in this chemical compound, producing
tritium and helium.
This reaction
produces the tritium on the spot, so there is no need to include tritium in
the bomb itself. In the extreme heat, which exists in the bomb, the tritium
fuses with the deuterium in the lithium deuteride. |
The Hydrogen Bomb: The Secret
|
The question facing
designers was "How do you build a bomb that will maintain the high
temperatures required for thermonuclear reactions to occur?" The shock
waves produced by the primary (A-bomb) would propagate too slowly to permit
assembly of the thermonuclear stage before the bomb blew itself apart. This
problem was solved by Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam.
To do this, they
introduced a gamma-ray absorbing material (styrofoam) to capture the energy
of the gamma radiation. As gamma radiation from the primary is absorbed,
radial compression forces are exerted along the entire cylinder at almost the
same instant. This produces the compression of the lithium deuteride.
Additional neutrons are also produced by various components and reflected
towards the lithium deuteride. With the compressed lithium deuteride core now
bombarded with neutrons, tritium is formed and the fusion process begins. |
The Hydrogen Bomb: Schematic
The yield of a
hydrogen bomb is controlled by the amounts of lithium deuteride and of
additional fissionable materials. Uranium 238 is usually the material used in
various parts of the bomb's design to supply additional neutrons for the fusion
process. This additional fissionable material also produces a very high level
of radioactive fallout. (2)
Radiological
Weapons
Radiological weapons are generally
felt to be suitable largely for terror, political, and area denial purposes,
rather than mass killings. Unlike nuclear weapons, they spread radioactive
material contaminating personnel, equipment, facilities, and terrain. The
radioactive material acts as a toxic chemical to which exposure eventually
proves harmful or fatal. Radiation is energy that comes from a source and
travels through some material or through space. Light, heat, and sound are types
of radiation. Atom-derived radiation is called iodizing radiation because it
can produce charged particles (ions) in matter. Ionizing radiation is produced
by unstable atoms. Unstable atoms differ from stable atoms because they have an
excess of energy or mass or both. Unstable atoms are said to be radioactive. To
reach stability, these atoms give off, or emit, the excess energy or mass.
These emissions are called radiation. The kinds of radiation are
electromagnetic (like light) and particulate (i.e., mass given off with the
energy of motion). Gamma radiation and X-rays are examples of electromagnetic
radiation. Beta and alpha radiation are examples of particulate radiation.
Ionizing radiation can also be produced by devices such as X-ray machines.
Three types of radiation-induced injury can occur: external irradiation,
contamination with radioactive materials, and incorporation of radioactive
material into body cells, tissues, or organs. External irradiation occurs when all or
part of the body is exposed to penetrating radiation from an external source.
During exposure, this radiation can be absorbed by the body or it can pass
completely through. A similar thing occurs during an ordinary chest x-ray.
Following external exposure, an individual is not radioactive and can be
treated like any other patient. External radiation does not make a person
radioactive. The second type of radiation injury involves contamination with
radioactive materials. Contamination means that radioactive materials in the
form of gases, liquids, or solids are released into the environment and
contaminate people externally, internally, or both. An external surface of the
body, such as the skin, can become contaminated, and, if radioactive materials
get inside the body through the lungs, gut, or wounds, the contaminant can
become deposited internally. A person is externally contaminated if radioactive
material is breathed in, swallowed, or absorbed through wounds. The environment
is contaminated if radioactive material is spread about or uncontained. The
third type of radiation injury that can occur is incorporation of radioactive
material. Incorporation refers to the uptake of radioactive materials by body
cells, tissues, and target organs such as bone, liver, thyroid, or kidney. In
general, radioactive materials are distributed throughout the body based upon
their chemical properties. Incorporation cannot occur unless contamination has
occurred. The three types of exposure can happen in combination and can be
complicated by physical injury or illness. In such a case, serious medical
problems always have priority over concerns about radiation (such as radiation
monitoring, contamination control, and decontamination). Gamma radiation is
able to travel many meters in air and many centimeters in human tissue. It
readily permeates most materials and is sometimes called GÇ-penetrating
radiation. GÇ- Gamma rays represent the major external hazard.
Radioactive materials that emit gamma radiation and X-rays constitute both an
external and internal hazards to humans. Dense materials are needed for
shielding from gamma radiation. Clothing and turnout gear provide little
shielding
from penetrating radiation. Gamma radiation is detected with survey
instruments, including civil defense instruments. Low levels can be measured
with a standard Geiger counter (such as the CD V-700). High levels can be
measured with an ionization chamber (such as a CD V-715). Gamma radiation
frequently accompanies the emission of alpha and beta radiation. Instruments
designed solely for alpha detection (such as an alpha scintillation counter)
will not detect gamma radiation. Pocket chamber (pencils) dosimeters, film
badges, thermoluminescent, and other types of dosimeters can be used to
measure
accumulated exposure to gamma radiation. Beta radiation may travel meters in
air and is moderately penetrating. It can penetrate human skin to the
GÇ-germinal layer, GÇ- where new skin cells are produced. If
beta-emitting contaminants are allowed to remain on the skin for a prolonged
period of time, they may cause skin injury. Beta-emitting contaminants may be
harmful if deposited internally. Most beta emitters can be detected with a
survey instrument (such as a CD V-700, provided the metal probe cover is open).
Some, however, produce very low energy, poorly penetrating radiation that may
be difficult or impossible to detect. Examples of this are carbon-14, tritium,
and sulfer-35. Beta radiation cannot be detected with an ionization chamber
(such as the CD V-715). Clothing and turnout gear provide some protection
against most beta radiation. Turnout gear and dry clothing can keep beta
emitters off of the skin. Alpha radiation travels a very short distance through
the air and is not able to penetrate the skin. Alpha-emitting materials can be harmful
to humans if the materials are inhaled, swallowed, or absorbed through open
wounds. A variety of instruments have been designed to measure alpha radiation.
Special training in the use of these instruments, however, is essential for
making accurate measurements. An ionization chamber (such as a CD V-700) cannot
detect the presence of radioactive materials that produce alpha radiation
unless the radioactive materials also produce beta and/or gamma radiation.
Instruments cannot detect alpha radiation through even a thin layer of water,
blood, dust, paper, or other material, because alpha radiation is not
penetrating. Alpha radiation cannot penetrate turnout gear, clothing, or a
cover on a probe. Turnout gear and clothing can keep alpha emitters off of the
skin. There are two types of radiological weapons. A radiological dispersal
device (RDD) includes any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive
material upon detonation. Any improvised explosive device could be used by
placing it in close proximity to radioactive material. A Simple RDD spreads
radiological material without the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material
(including medical isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner. The main
potential sources of such weapons GÇô barring covert transfer from
outside the US GÇô are hospital radiation therapy (Iodine-125,
Coblat-60, Cesium-137), radiopharmaceuticals (Iodine-131,
Iodine-123, Technetium-99, Thalium-201, Xenon-133), nuclear power plant
fuel rods (Uranium-235), universities and laboratories and radiography and
gauging (Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Iridium-192, and Radium-226). Such materials
can be delivered by a wide variety of means, including human agents, the
destruction of a facility or vessel containing radioactive material, shipments
or remote control devices that explode and disseminate the agent, placement in
facilities or water supplies, or using aircraft, missiles, and rockets.
Radiological dispersal weapons (RDWs) can also be used to contaminate
livestock, fish, and food crops. The effectiveness of such weapons is
controversial, and the impact can vary sharply because of the time require to
accumulate a disabling or significant does of radiation through ingestion,
inhalation, or exposure. According to US military reporting on their effects,
notes that, GÇ£ There
are no official casualty predictions for radiological dispersal weapons (RDWs).
Because of the nature of the weapon, verification of the use of the weapon may
prove difficult. GÇ¥ Other findings of the Department of Defense
provide important insights into the potential effectiveness of RDWs: Such a
weapon would not produce a nuclear yield; but would spread contamination. While
such weapons would produce far less immediate damage than devices that result
in nuclear detonations, radiological weapons have enormous potential for
intimidation. Targeting a nuclear reactor in an antagonist's territory to
produce an accident releasing nuclear material would be another option. There
are hundreds of nuclear reactors and many more nuclear sources throughout the
world, such as radiological materials used in hospitals. Both
international and national measures
control these items and associated materials and thereby contribute to
proliferation prevention. However, post-war investigations in occupied Iraq
showed that at least some of these control regimes could be circumvented, even
by a state that was a nominal adherent to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Near-term concerns include the accumulation of large quantities of plutonium
from reactors that is intended for reprocessing and/or storage, and the status
of nuclear materials in the New Independent States that previously comprised
the Soviet Union. The Practical Chances of Using Radiological Weapons A
December 1999 report by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction drew the
following conclusions about the ability of terrorist groups to use radiological
weapons: In the view of some authorities, theft of a nuclear device or building
a weapon "in house" are the least- probable courses of action for a
prospective nuclear terrorist. Far more likely-for all the reasons cited
above-is the dispersal of radiological material in an effort to contaminate a
target population or distinct geographical area. The material could be spread
by radiological dispersal devices (or RDDs)-i.e. "dirty bombs"
designed to spread radioactive material through passive (aerosol) or active
(explosive) means. Alternatively, the material could be used to contaminate
food or water. This latter option is, however, considerably less likely given
the huge quantities of radioactive materialú that would be required. The fact that most
radioactive material is not soluble in water means that its use by a
terrorist would be unlikely and impractical, if the purpose is to contaminate
reservoirs or other municipal water supplies, because the radioactive material
will settle out or be trapped in filters. Those factors, coupled with the fact
that any radioactive material will present safety risks to the terrorists
themselves, collectively indicate the serious difficulties for any adversary
attempting to store, handle, and disseminate it effectively. Radiological
weapons kill or injure by exposing people to radioactive materials, such as
cesium-137, iridium-192, or cobalt-60. Victims are irradiated when they get
close to or touch the material, inhale it, or ingest it. With high enough
levels of exposure, the radiation can sicken and kill. Radiation (particularly
gamma rays) damages cells in living tissue through ionization, destroying or
altering some of the cell constituents essential to normal cell functions. The
effects of a given device will depend on whether the exposure is
"acute" (i.e., brief, one time) or "chronic" (i.e.,
extended). There are a number of
possible sources of material that
could be used to fashion such a device, including nuclear waste stored at a
power plant (even though such waste is not highly radioactive), or radiological
medical isotopes found in many hospitals or research laboratories. Although
spent fuel rods are sometimes mentioned as potential sources of radiological
material, they are very hot, heavy, and difficult to handle, thus making them a
poor choice for terrorists. Other sources, such as medical devices, might be
much easier to steal and handle. These materials, however have a lower specific
activity than the materials in reactor fuel rods (although large unshielded
sources are quite dangerous). Presumably, terrorists could steal a device (either
in transit or at the service facility or user location) and remove the
radioactive materials. Radioactive materials are often sintered in ceramic or
metallic pellets. Terrorists could then crush the pellets into a powder and put
the powder into an RDD. The RDD could then be placed in or near a target
facility and detonated, spreading the radiological material through the force
of the explosion and in the smoke of any resulting fires. Of course, the larger
the radioactive material dispersal area, the smaller the resulting dose rate.
Although incapable of causing tens of thousands of casualties, a radiological
device, in addition to possibly killing or injuring any people who came into
contact -with it "could be used to render symbolic targets or significant
areas and infrastructure uninhabitable and unusable without protective
clothing." A combination fertilizer truck bomb, if used together with
radioactive material, for example, could not only have destroyed one of the New
York World Trade Center's towers but might have rendered a considerable chunk
of prime real estate in one of the world's financial nerve centers indefinitely
unusable because of radioactive contamination. The disruption to commerce that
could be caused, the attendant publicity, and the enhanced coercive power of
terrorists armed with such "dirty" bombs (which, for the reasons
cited above, are arguably more likely threats than terrorist use of an actual
fissile nuclear device), is disquieting. At the same time, a Department of
Defense study notes that, GÇ£ Iraqi and Russian separatists
Cechnya have already demonstrated practical knowledge of RDWs. The availability
of material to make RDWs will inevitably increase in the future as more
countries pursue nuclear power (and weapons) programs and radioactive material
becomes more available. GÇ¥ The Practical Risks and Effects of Using
Radiological Weapons There is no question that small amounts of radioactive
materials can be used to attack, threaten, and contaminate, and that the risk
of radiation poses a serious psychological problem. Covert attacks might
produce slow radiation poisoning, and agents might be deliberately designed to
make cost-effective decontamination difficult, time-consuming, or impossible.
The limited use of small amounts of radiological weapons present the problem
that there are no reliable criteria for determining what dose is dangerous or
lethal, particularly if effects like long-term increases in the cancer rate are
included. Responders also differ sharply in terms of their use of sophisticated
radiation detectors, and most responders are far more concerned with evacuation
than the difficult problems of dealing with medical and decontamination
aftermaths. In broad terms, however, these effects are somewhat similar to those
of using a chemical weapon. They are not catastrophic, and even the
contamination of most critical facilities could be dealt with GÇô
at the cost of interruptions in service and efficiency. The large-scale
weaponization of radiological materials presents a different issue. The above
comments made some relatively casual assumptions about how easy or difficult it
is to obtain and convert radioactive materials into a form that could be
broadly disseminated over a wide area. These comments may be valid, but they
also may not. There are significant disputes over how easy it is to grind up
radioactive materials and spread them over an area larger than a single
facility, and the unclassified literature seems to be based on generalizations
rather than detailed technical analysis. This does not mean that such attacks
are not possible, but it does mean that considerably more evidence is needed as
to what can and cannot be done. One possible option is a systematic attack on a
nuclear power plant. This would require considerable expertise, access to the
basic design of the plant and ideally to a full set of plans, and either an
exceptionally efficient saboteur or a trained team. In most cases, it would
require considerable time and effort to bypass safeguards and controls. The
possible venting or overload of a reactor could then act as a radiological
weapon, however, and cover hundreds of square kilometers as well as have a
major potential affect on regional power supplies and some aspects of the US
military nuclear program. Alternatively, an attacker might seize significant
amounts of radioactive material from spent fuel storage, or during the nuclear
fuel cycle, which involves milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication,
and disposal of waste GÇô as well as reactor operations. A seizure
of spent fuel would be particularly dangerous during the first 150 days after
the downloading of the reactor because Iodine-131 and Iodine-123 are present,
is extremely volatile, and affects the thyroid.(3)
Bibliography