Student:
Timofey Nazarenko
Teacher: Elena
Nekrasova
Benchmark II
Working on the Benchmark II my aim was to
investigate some questions concerning weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Here is a chart of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Capabilities in the Middle East.
|
|
Nuclear |
Biological |
Chemical |
|
Algeria |
Research |
Research |
Development? |
|
Egypt |
Research |
Development? |
|
|
Iran |
Development |
Development |
Deployed (Used in
1984-88) |
|
Iraq |
Weaponizaton |
Stockpiled? |
Stockpiled? (Used in
1983, 1987-88) |
|
Israel |
Deployed |
Production
capability |
Production
capability |
|
Libya |
Research |
Development? |
Deployed |
|
Saudi Arabia |
None? |
None |
None? |
|
Sudan |
None |
None |
None? |
|
Syria |
Research |
Development? |
Deployed |
|
Turkey |
Research |
None |
None |
|
United States |
Deployed |
Terminated |
Dismantling |
|
Yemen |
None |
None |
None? |
Keeping in mind the latest news on Iraq, I’ve
made up my mind to explore Iraq’s WMD capabilities and programs.
IRAQ 
Introduction
In the decade before the Second Gulf War (Desert
Storm), Iraq invested more resources into nuclear,
biological,
chemical,
and missile
programs than any other developing country. Baghdad
conceives of its nonconventional weapons as serving a spectrum of military and
political missions, ranging from tactical warfighting to strategic deterrence.
In turn, these missions are integrally linked with Saddam Hussein's personal
and strategic ambitions: to remain in power, and to dominate the Persian Gulf
and the Arab
Iraq began limited efforts in the civilian nuclear
field in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, Baghdad began a "bomb
program" under direct orders from then Vice-President Saddam Hussein.
Plans called for first developing a civilian fuel cycle and related expertise;
the weapon program was to parallel and build off these efforts. Accordingly,
Baghdad acquired a French nuclear reactor in 1975. A number of clandestine
uranium enrichment and other facilities were ultimately located at the same
site in Tuwaitha, although Israel destroyed the reactor itself in a June 1981 air strike. By
the time of Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq had a robust, covert nuclear weapon
program, with a completed, though untested, nuclear weapon design. At the onset
of the war, Baghdad was perhaps one to three years away from building a nuclear
weapon. From 1991-1998, UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors worked to uncover the
program. As part of that effort, inspectors destroyed facilities and relevant
equipment. The IAEA is now confident that most of the program has been exposed,
although inspectors found definitive evidence that Baghdad has kept nuclear
teams together, particularly engineers and scientists formerly involved in
weapon design. Iraq is a member of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT).
Biological weapons
Iraq began an offensive biological weapon (BW) program
in 1985. By 1990, this program had produced 25 missile warheads and 166 400-pound
aerial bombs that were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin.
Further, Iraq acknowledged production of approximately 20,000 liters of
botulinum toxin solution, 8,425 liters of anthrax solution, and 2,200 liters of
aflatoxin. Baghdad also admitted to having researched the weapons potential of
the camelpox virus, human rotavirus, enterovirus 17, and the toxin ricin. Since
December 1998, when UN inspectors left the country, there has been no
verifiable information about the status of Iraq's BW program. In May 2000, the
United Kingdom estimated that Iraq could rebuild its BW program within months.
As a condition of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire agreement, Iraq ratified the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
Chemical weapons
Iraq made substantial use of chemical weapons (CW)
during the Iran-Iraq War and, in 1988, Iraq mounted a massive chemical attack
against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing 5,000 civilians. Before Desert
Storm, Iraq produced the blister agent mustard, as well as the nerve agents:
tabun, sarin, and VX. Iraq declared to UN inspectors that between 1982 and 1990
it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents and more than 125,000 filled and unfilled
"special munitions," the latter mostly stored at the Muthana State
Establishment, Iraq's major CW production, filling, and testing facility. By
mid-1995, inspectors had largely completed verification and destruction of
Baghdad's chemical stocks, munitions, and relevant production facilities and
equipment. Nevertheless, the United States believes Iraq is secretly storing a
significant quantity of CW agents, particularly nerve agents, and that Iraq has
rebuilt much of its chemical weapons production infrastructure. Baghdad has
neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Missile
Beginning in the early 1970s, Iraq purchased
considerable numbers of short-range Scud missiles and launchers from the Soviet
Union. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad extended the range of the
Scud to 650 km; many of these modified missiles (known as the al-Husayn) were
used during that war and, later, in Desert Storm. With extensive assistance
from foreign companies, Iraq pursued a variety of other missile projects; these
efforts were largely halted by UN weapon inspections that began in 1991. Since
that time, and under the proscriptions contained in the UN cease-fire
resolution, Iraq has been working on various types of ballistic missiles with
ranges less than 150 km, including the Ababil and Al Samoud. Iraq has tested
the latter missile eight times and continues to seek foreign support for its
missile program.
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs
|
Nuclear |
|
|
Biological |
|
|
Chemical |
|
|
Ballistic missiles |
|
|
Cruise missiles |
|
|
Other delivery systems |
|
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
Key
Judgments
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions restrictions. Baghdad
has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess
of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon
during this decade.
Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s
WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war demonstrate the extensive efforts by Iraq to deny information.
Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq
has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and
invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
·
Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases
Baghdad’s capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and
goods have more than quadrupled.
·
Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons
facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and expanded its chemical and
biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
·
Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its
ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which
allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely chemical
warfare agents.
·
Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons
or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.
How lucky Iraq will obtain its first
nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material.
·
If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade material from
abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
·
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not
able to make a weapon until the last half of a decade.
- Iraq’s aggressive
attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant
concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons
and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most
intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe
that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
- based on tubes of
the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges
would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of
weapons per year.
Baghdad has begun renewed production of
chemical warfare agents, probably including
mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.
Its capability was
reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited than it was
at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life
probably have been improved.
·
Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of chemical warfare (CW) agents.
·
The Iraqis have an experience in manufacturing CW bombs,
artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM
warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range
Scuds.
All key aspects – R&D, production,
and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are
active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the
Gulf war.
·
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is
capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents,
including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert
operatives, including potentially against US Homeland.
·
Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and
concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities;
these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the
production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.
Iraq maintains a small missile force
and several development programs, including for UAV that most analysts believe
probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
·
Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam
retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs, which are
capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150 km range limit.
·
Baghdad’s UAVs – especially if used for delivery of
chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents – could threaten Iraq’s neighbors,
US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or
into, the USA Homeland.
·
Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile
capabilities, largely through foreign
assistance in building specialized facilities.
Discussion
In April 1991, the
UN Security Council enacted Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to declare, destroy,
or render harmless its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and production
infrastructure under UN or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
supervision. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 also demanded that Iraq
forgo the future development or acquisition of WMD.
Baghdad’s
determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents,
equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN
inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive
concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material
that precluded resolution of key issues to its WMD programs.
·
Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass
several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its
obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and
unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect.
·
Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation,
Iraqi officials frequently denied or substantially delayed access to
facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical
information about Iraq’s WMD programs.
Successive Iraqi
declaration on Baghdad’s pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more
accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN
sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections
facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never
has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and
has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons
stockpiles and production infrastructure.
·
UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes
destroyed most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era
chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of
extended-range Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed
stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.
·
Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the
infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has that
capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and
sophistication in some areas.
Since December 1998,
Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the
Security Council resolutions. Technical motoring systems installed by the
UN at known and
suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad
prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraq facilities
by UN aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA
inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small
number of sites to safeguard Iraq’s
stockpile of uranium oxide.
In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad’s
already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has
increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting
prohibited programs. Baghdad’s vigorous concealment efforts have meant that
specific information on many aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs is yet to be
uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive
efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.
·
Limited
insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used
the absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated
missile development facilities and t6o increase its ability to produce WMD.
Procurement in Support of WMD Programs
Iraq has been able to import dual-use, WMD-relevant equipment and material through procurements both within and outside the UN sanctions regime. Baghdad diverts some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support the military and WMD programs instead. Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance its WMD programs. Over the last four years Baghdad’s earnings from illicit oil sales have more than quadrupled to about $3 billion this year.
Sources:
1.http://cns.miis.edu/
2 http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/Action
Team/
3.http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html
4.http://www.nci.org/iraq511.html
5.http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf
6.http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm
7.http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian_sep_2001.htm
8.http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm
9. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guige/iraq/missile
10.http://www.cdiss.org/images/tabled.htm
11.NTI: Country Overviews: Iraq.
12. Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,
October 2002