Ballistic Missile Program
Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq’s inventory at war’s end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of it Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.
Most of approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the ranger to 650 km.
Baghdad was developing other longer-ranger missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900 km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Bard-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.
· Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad’s declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.
Iraq continues to work on UN-authorized short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) – those with a range no greater than 150km – that help develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce longer-range missile systems. The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM and Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively are in early deployment. Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles.
· The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility is Iraq’s principal site for the stating testing liquid propellant missile engines. Baghdad has been building a new test stand there that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. The only plausible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles prohibited under UNSCR 687.
· The Al-Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq’s Badr-2000 solid-propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded in recent years. The al-Mutasim site supports solid-propellant motor assembly, rework, and testing for the UN authorized Ababil-100, but the size of certain facilities there, particularly those newly constructed between the assembly rework and static test areas, suggest that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN.
· At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure inspectors, have rebuild structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant.
· Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuild two structures used to a “mix” solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings – about as large as the original ones-are ideally situated to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.
Iraq has managed to rebuild and expand its missile development infrastructure under sanctions. Iraq intermediaries have sought production technology, machine tools, and raw materials in violation of the arms embargo.
· The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq’s solid propellant missile program. Ammonium perchlorate is a common oxidizer used in solid propellant missile motors. Baghdad would not have been able to complete this facility without help from abroad.
· In August 1995, Iraq was caught trying to acquire sensitive ballistic missile guidance components, including gyroscopes originally used in Russian strategic nuclear SLBMs, demonstrating that Baghdad has been pursuing proscribed, advanced, long-range missile technology for some time. Iraqi officials admitted that, despite international prohibitions, they had received a similar shipment earlier this year.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft
Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents. Immediately before the Gulf war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with MiG-21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraft – manned or unmanned is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area.
· Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable releasing up to 2,000 liters of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivering by helicopters.
· Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unnamed platforms. Iraq’s use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platform might harder to detect therefore more survivable. This capability presents a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors and to international military forces in the region.
· Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agent, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.