Nuclear Weapons Program

More than ten years of sanctions and the loss of much of Iraq’s physical nuclear infrastructure under IAEA oversight have not diminished Saddam’s interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

· Iraq’s efforts to produce tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength of aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that this tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.

Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that focused on building an implosion-type weapon using highly enriched uranium. Baghdad was attempting variety of uranium enrichment techniques, the most successful of which were the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge programs. After its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq initiated a crash program to divert IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet and French-supplied reactors, but onset of hostilities ended this effort. Iraqi declarations and UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process revealed much of Iraq’s nuclear efforts, but Baghdad still has not provided information on all aspects of its nuclear weapons program.

· Iraq has withheld important details to its nuclear program, including procurement logs, technical documents, experimental data, accounting of materials, and foreign assistance.

· Baghdad also continues to withhold other data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq security services in concealing its nuclear facilities and activities.

· In recent years, Baghdad has diverted goods contracted under the Oil-for Food program for military purposes and has increased solicitations and dual-use procurements - outside the Oil-for-Food process – some of which almost certainly are going to prohibited WMD and the other weapons programs. Baghdad probably uses some of the money it gains through its illicit oil sales to support its WMD efforts.

Before its departure from Iraq, the IAEA made significant strides toward dismantling Iraq’s past nuclear activities. In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstructing its nuclear program – unraveling the IAEA’s hard-earned accomplishments.

Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians, its program documentation, and sufficient dual-use manufacturing capabilities to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad’s continued interest in reviving a nuclear program.

Iraq’s expanding international trade provides growing access to nuclear-related technology and materials and potential access to foreign nuclear expertise. An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program.

· The acquisition of sufficient fissile material is Iraq’s principal hurdle in developing a nuclear weapon.

· Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons-grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last of this decade. Baghdad could produce a nuclear weapon within a year if it were able to produce weapons-grade fissile material abroad.

Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon.