Teacher: Elena Nekrasova
Student: Timophei Nazarenko
BENCHMARK III
The main persuaded purposes of our work in the
Benchmark III were getting acquaintance with Organizations connected with
nonproliferation of WMD and investigation of major issues in contemporary arms control and treaties
attached the given topic. This chapter moves the discussion from general
concepts of security to the specific issue of arms control on Iraq (Resolution 1441).
The Cold War background
During the Cold War most arms control was about
regulating the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. The
key reference point was managing the deterrent relationship between these two
antagonistic superpowers. Deterrence was seen as the key to stability; it was
considered the best way of preventing World War Three. Moreover, according to
orthodox wisdom, deterrence relied on large numbers of nuclear weapons - so
large that many people referred to it as 'overkill'. For arms controllers,
overkill was less of a problem than allowing force-levels to drop to such low
levels that deterrence became weakened. It was assumed that deterrence required
terrible threats and risks, not experimenting with drastic cuts. This is not to
say that arms controllers approved of everything that the military wanted. Far
from it; they wanted to establish limits on the numbers and types of weapons
deployed. The fact remains, however, that these constraints were rather
permissive. Ceilings were introduced for force-levels, but these were usually
so high as to allow a steady increase in firepower.
Arms control was not about transcending the reliance
on military power; it was about its 'rational' management. Good arms control
was seen as a complement to defense planning, not as a substitute for it. Thus
it was that arms control became seen as very different from disarmament.
This picture changed in the late 1980s. The principal
reason for this change was the New
Thinking introduced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev accepted many
of the themes associated with common security. The first tangible manifestation
of this turn-around came with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (INF) treaty of 1987. This treaty eliminated all Soviet and American
land-based missiles with ranges of between 500 km and 5,500 km. Moreover, most
of these missiles were among the most advanced weapons developed by Moscow and
Washington. The INF treaty set a highly significant precedent. It was followed
by the enormously ambitious Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty of 1990
which, amongst other things, slashed the numbers of tanks, artillery guns, and
armed helicopters allowed on the Continent. It seemed that arms control was
converging with partial disarmament.
Contemporary arms control: categories
Today arms control takes many forms and is geared to
the achievement of a range of objectives. Most arms control can be discussed
under three headings: containing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), enhancing co-operative security, and ameliorating
humanitarian concerns.
Efforts to contain the proliferation of WMD predate
the end of the Cold War but have since come to dominate the arms control agenda
as never before. These efforts center around the following treaties:
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a
landmark multilateral treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament
and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding
commitment by the nuclear-weapon States at the multilateral level to the goal
of nuclear disarmament. Opened for signature on 1 July 1968, the Treaty entered
into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 188 States have joined the Treaty,
including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT
than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the
Treaty's significance.
Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) The
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions, for
military or civil purposes. After
three years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the CTBT was
adopted on 10 September 1996 by the United Nations General Assembly and opened
for signature on 24 September 1996.
The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by
the 44 States that are identified in Annex II to the Treaty and that possess
nuclear power or research reactors.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) After 12 years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September 1992. The CWC contains a mechanism for verifying compliance by States with the provisions of the Convention that is unprecedented in scope and in the stringency of its verification regime. The CWC opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The CWC is the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control.
Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons
Convention) As a result of prolonged efforts by the international community
to establish a new instrument that would supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral disarmament
treaty banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons, was
opened for signature on 10 April 1972. The BWC entered into force on 26
March 1975. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to
monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention.
The NPT, CWC and BTWC are complemented by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This arrangement, which has not been codified
in the form of a treaty, has its origins in Western efforts to prevent or slow
down the acquisition of ballistic missiles by Third World states. The MTCR is
closely associated with efforts to control the proliferation of WMD because
ballistic missiles are considered the most threatening way of firing (or
'delivering') chemical, biological and nuclear warheads.
In addition to measures dealing with WMD, and often
overlapping with them, some arms control is aimed at enhancing cooperative
security. Here a particular focus is heading-off or managing the 'security
dilemma'. This dilemma describes a situation in which one state's efforts to
reinforce its defenses has the effect of posing a threat to neighbours. These
neighbours respond by strengthening their own military capabilities. The
consequence is a spiral of mutual suspicion and arms racing. One way of dealing
with this problem is to cultivate 'confidence-building measures' (CBMs) which
enhance transparency and reassurance.
The most extensive CBM regime to date has been
established in Europe, partly as an extension of the verification regime
established by the CFE treaty. In addition, a 'co-operative threat reduction
regime' has been established to facilitate US arms control assistance to
Russia; here a key focus has been on the safe transport and storage of Russian
nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material. The exploration of
opportunities for CBM regimes in places like the Middle East, East Asia, and
South Asia has provided a wide canvas for many people seeking to ameliorate
security dilemmas in these regions.
Here are some works of the 8th
grade students which they’ve made
within the framework of the project "Youth Against Nuclear Threat"
Sources:
1.
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/
2.
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical