Lesnoy

School №76

“Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation”

Student: Fedorovskiy Pavel

Lesnoy, school №76, 10 “B” grade

Teacher: Valieva Rezeda

Lesnoy, school №76

2006

Benchmark I

Objective I – Motivations

In this part of Benchmark I we are to produce an overall analysis and definition that drive current decisions being made by leaders in nations of the world to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.

Each weapon (from gun to bomb) has only two ways of using: to attack or defend. Nuclear bomb is the mightiest and the most dangerous weapon, after gaining the nuclear bomb country also gains the great power, ability to enlarge its influence in the world, to make other countries fear and reckon with its forces.

But we should also consider the defense role of each weapon. If you have a good profit from your business or you always succeed in your projects, it will be better to have weapons or bodyguards because envy of your opponents or even friends can lead to unpleasant results. In that case possession of weapons is justified – protection of your family or property must be provided. And that’s ambiguity of weapons makes a lot of difficulties in attempt to judge people deeds. But talking about nuclear weapons, the leaders’ desire to defend their countries is not always on the first place.

We are going to analyse nuclear programs of China, India and Pakistan. We tried to compare conditions/driving factors that made these countries to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.

	CHINA	INDIA	PAKISTAN
Conditions/Driving factors	Soviet Union has been assisting China in developing nuclear weapons until 1960. China had all capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. China has consistently been the most powerful and advanced society in the world for 3500 years.	India had war conflicts with China and Pakistan. Also at that time China already had nuclear weapons, so it was problematic to have any advantages against China. Status of “Great Power” was very attractive for India government. Assistance from some countries in developing nuclear weapons	The loss in the war with India and the danger of using nuclear weapons from the India’s side. Assistance from China. Moratorium of nuclear test in present
Current arsenal (approximately)	400 warheads China was the fifth state that created nuclear weapons, now it has the biggest arsenal after USA (10455 warheads) and Russia (8400 warheads)	40-90 warheads 30-50 warheads The nuclear status of that states are defined, but there are lots of questions about their nuclear doctrine (see “The India-Pakistan rivalry”)
Motivations	The aspiration not to lose all positions that China already had.	The aspiration to become the “global player”.	The aspiration to become independent and strong state in the Middle-East region

Combining the reasons of three countries for starting developing nuclear weapons we can make the conclusion that the real motivation of having nuclear weapons is ambitions of leaders/government of these countries to play the global important role in the international relations. And we can say it about each country that already had nuclear weapons or trying to get it.

India and Pakistan rivalry can involve in war, neither India nor Pakistan has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But some reports and facts make the world believe that India will not use nuclear weapons against Pakistan:

India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence."

But an Indian foreign ministry official told Defense News in 2000 that a "'no-first-strike' policy does not mean India will not have a first-strike capability." Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons. The words of Indian and Pakistani governments don’t make confidence in no-using nuclear weapons against each other. The worst prediction is the nuclear war between India and Pakistan. China with it’s giant army and nuclear weapons will be able to stand on the Indian or Pakistani side – after that the conflict will start growing and becoming the World War III. But it’s only an unpleasant prediction.

Accepting nuclear weapons policy makes many changes in state life. It’s difficult to say something about attitude of ordinary citizens to the nuclear weapons. Accepting decision about developing nuclear weapons the government of a country usually hides it from the people and reports about obtaining nuclear weapons become news even for citizens of that country. People’s attitude to the possession of nuclear weapons is divided and not so many persons can give the ambiguous answer about nuclear weapons. But some people try to “wake up” others and make them pay attention to the situation in the world.

The world community doesn’t seem to make common statement about possession of weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons is the deterrence factor that can stop the war between two countries, prevent the death of thousands of people, maybe it sounds doubtful, but when one of two enemies has weapons and another doesn’t have it, the death of defenseless person is inevitable, and when both of enemies have weapon, the chance of using it lower. That is the hidden motivation of possession nuclear weapons. But when both two enemies are defenseless, the using of weapons is impossible. So the question “To have or not to have?” in terms of weapons is more philosophical than political or social.

All states are equal in its rights, so every country can have the nuclear weapons if there is no threat of using it against other countries. It’s impossible to forbid some country to have weapons and aggression directed on that country won’t solve problem and will bring more difficulties – so the best decision is to carefully control proliferation of nuclear weapons and make countries possessing it at least sign NPT.

Objective II – Physical and Intellectual Resources

In second part of Benchmark I we are to produce an overall analysis and definition of the physical infrastructure, the scientific and technological knowledge needed to develop nuclear weapons.

In spite of nuclear bomb is far from the most complex device, it takes a lot of resources and time to build a bomb. The first problem is material required for nuclear bomb development, to put it more exactly, fissile material. Nuclear reaction contains nucleus fission under the interaction of nucleus and neutron.
Using nuclear energy in nuclear explosion is capable of existence of elements with nucleuses capable of fission under the interaction with neutrons with any amount of energy. Materials with such characteristic are called fissile materials. Different fissile materials can be used in nuclear bomb development, but only uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are practically used.

But before selecting fissile material for the bomb scientists must define what construction and type of bomb it will be. All nuclear bombs are explosive devices and they include:

Missiles Gun-type Weapons

Bombs

Artillery shells Nuclear Weapons Implosion Weapons

Mines

Torpedoes Thermonuclear Weapons

There are primarily two different ways a nuclear bomb operates. Either through fission or fusion. Bomb explosion based on fission can be executed if the critical mass of fissile material reached. Within critical mass reached the material goes to the supercritical condition, the growing chain reaction (the process of nuclear fission in which the neutrons released trigger other nuclear fission reactions at the same or greater rate. In a nuclear weapon, an extremely rapid multiplying chain reaction causes an explosive release of energy) starts and the result of that process is the explosion. In order to achieve criticality and thus create an explosion from the fission of atoms, an uncontrolled chain reaction must be generated by compressing the fissile material so that the atoms are close enough for the released neutrons to continue to hit. Such compression can be obtained through a gun method or an implosion method. The implosion weapons will work if the density of the fissile material rapidly increases under the evenly portioned action of the ordinary explosion, but it needs complex arrangements of explosives (a sphere of fissile material is surrounded by conventional high explosives, which are detonated simultaneously). The first way is more simple than second, but it’s less perfect and reliable. In general the construction of gun-type bomb is too simple; any scientist who knows physics and engineering well can create the project of gun-type nuclear bomb without any difficulties. The thermonuclear bomb is much more complex to build, because it needs one or more ordinary nuclear explosion for reaching the high temperature for the fusion of the nucleuses of the hydrogen isotopes (deuterium, tritium) or lithium. In fusion bombs, deuterium and tritium are fused together to create heavier atoms. This is the same reaction as occurs in the centre of the sun. Fusion can only happen at very high temperatures and pressures. In a nuclear weapon these are created through using a fission explosion (i.e. an atom bomb) to trigger the fusion reaction. There is no theoretical limit to the explosive force of a fusion weapon. Typically, fusion weapons are 10 - 100 times as explosive as the fission bombs which nearly destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Obtaining material for the nuclear explosion makes more obstacles in the process of creating the thermonuclear bomb.

Uranium. Natural uranium contains only 0.7% of uranium-235 (isotope of natural uranium), the rest is the uranium-238 that’s not capable of using in nuclear bomb. The complex process of isotope division is required for obtaining uranium-235 from natural uranium. Highly enriched uranium (contains 94% of uranium-235) is receiving after that process and can be used in the nuclear bomb. Uranium enrichment is very durable and difficult process.

Plutonium. The best way of obtaining plutonium-239 is to get it from the nuclear wastes. If you have atomic energy plant with reactor working on natural or poorly enriched uranium all you have to do is to make the chemical reprocessing of the nuclear wastes. ₀n¹ + ₉₂U²³⁸ -> ₉₂U²³⁹ -> _-1e⁰ + ₉₃Np²³⁹ -> _-1e⁰ + ₉₄Pu²³⁹ – it’s the way of receiving plutonium-239 from uranium-235. That way of gaining fissile material was using by some countries, which have the fully legal and coordinated atomic energy program. That’s the simplest way of using atomic energy products for nuclear weapons. But usually special reactors for gaining weapon plutonium are built.

Bomb development is a very expensive and long process. The government of the country decided to possess nuclear weapons must think about tests, delivery systems, education, building factories, military bases, energy plants, etc.

Uranium

Plutonium *

Tritium, deuterium, lithium

Concept

Nuclear Calculation nuclear

Weapons Tests

Needs Delivery systems non-nuclear

Warhead assembly

Full assembly (assembly of the bomb, which is ready for using)

Specialists and experts (education, salary, etc.)

* Full process of obtaining weapon material. The minimum requirements for bomb are uranium or plutonium, there is no need in all five materials.

The very hard problem is the environment. Even if government exerts every effort for protecting the nature, the tests will damage big territories, which recovering will take many years, and the storages of the wastes are not always as safe as it must be. The consequences of posession the nuclear weapons cause more problems, for instance, problems of foreign policy. The present situation (Iranian nuclear program) perfectly illustrates it. The problems of foreign policy cause difficulties in foreign economic relations and so forth. People reaction on obtaining nuclear weapons can lead to the instantly deterioration of government’s prestige. Also the government of the country possessing nuclear weapons must provide the safety and the guarding of all materials. The collapse of the USSR, first of all, threatens unsafe storage of nuclear weapons, the danger of stealing the weapons was high, and that’s why the uncontrolled (and controlled) proliferation of nuclear weapons is the problem of the globe.

Social problems

The consequences Ecology harming

of possession of Foreign policy problems

Nuclear weapons Big expenses

Big RESPONSIBILITY

Aftermath of tests

- Blast -

- Thermal radiation (light and heat) -

- Electromagnetic pulse -

- Direct nuclear radiation -

- Fallout –

- Effects of radiation on humans and nature –

In spite of power of nuclear weapons and status which country gain with the nuclear weapons many countries that have the possibility to develop it, deny to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Understanding of danger of nuclear weapons is more important for some leaders than the motivations that drive other leaders to have weapons. Herewith, governments of countries that have nuclear weapons are responsible for safety of people of any part of the world. That’s why the treaties, agreements and activity of organizations, which aim to prevent war and proliferation of nuclear weapons, are very valuable currently.

Application (Benchmark I)

The history and characteristics of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs

Studying this material takes a lot of time, each of chosen states came it’s own way of developing nuclear weapons, there is some similar facts in the history of nuclear programs of that countries, are some facts are really different. We’ve learnt that developing nuclear weapons is a very long process (now we can see it on some real examples after studying theory of developing nuclear weapons), even simplicity of the less perfect gun-type weapon can’t make weapon developing fast, to say nothing of implosion and thermonuclear weapons. And the problems of developers are not only technical but also political, social and environmental.

CHINA

Given the People's Republic of China's size in terms of geography (third in the world, only slightly behind Canada), population (number one), and economy (second largest in the world by 1999 CIA equivalent purchasing power estimates, with current growth rates in the high single digits), it seems inevitable that China (also called the PRC) will become the dominant power in the world within a few decades. China's leaders are acutely aware of this fact, and are also acutely aware that except for the last few centuries, China has consistently been the most powerful and advanced society in the world for 3500 years. They undoubtedly intend that China will have military capabilities commensurate with this once and future status.

Over the years China has certainly invested a much smaller amount of resources (although not necessarily a much smaller proportion of its resources) to developing and deploying nuclear weapons than either of the two superpowers. The exact size and composition of its nuclear forces is very difficult to determine however due to strict secrecy. Force structure estimates consequently are rather uncertain, and published estimates are even a bit mysterious. It is hard to assess the ultimate source or reliability of the data provided.

Since the cut-off of aid to its nuclear weapons program in 1960 by the Soviet Union, most of the technology used on the program has been developed indigenously. There has been (and continues to be) considerable concern in the West about the export of this technology to non-nuclear powers interested in acquiring these weapons. China is known to have given Pakistan considerable assistance, possibly including actual warhead designs. Recent concern has focused on Chinese deals with Iran. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has turned its interest to obtaining more advanced nuclear technology from the successor to its old mentor. Nihon Keizai Shimbun has reported that China bought computer simulation technology for nuclear warheads from Russia during the mid-90s.

To date China has conducted many fewer nuclear tests than the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia (less than 5% as many as either) and this discrepancy accounts for China's initial reluctance to sign on to a permanent ban of all nuclear tests at the CTBT negotiations, although these reservations have now been overcome since the conclusion of China's final test series

The final test series concluded in the spring and summer of 1996. According to Japanese government sources (reported in Nihon Keizai Shimbun), the penultimate underground Chinese nuclear test on 8 June 1996 (calculated at 20 to 80 kilotons) was actually a simultaneous detonation of multiple warheads (a common practice by both the U.S. and USSR). It was said to be part of a program to produce smaller warheads for submarine-launched and multiple-targeted missiles. Overall, the yields since 1990 have suggested that two warheads have been in development: one in the 100-300 kt range, and one in the 600-700 kt range.

China's last nuclear test was detonated at 0149 GMT (9:49 p.m. EDT) on 29 July 1996. According to the Australia Geological Survey Organization in Canberra its yield was 1 to 5 kilotons, with a seismic magnitude of Mb 4.3. This was China's 45th test, and its 22nd underground one.

It is believed that with the conclusion of this series, China has completed development of a range of warheads similar to the state of the art weapons developed by the other major nuclear powers. These would be miniaturized hardened thermonuclear warheads with yields in the tens to hundreds of kilotons, as well as warheads with variable yield options, and enhanced radiation ("neutron bomb") warheads.

The subject of China's neutron bomb capability has been the subject of considerable public attention over the last several years. China reportedly conducted a successful test of a neutron bomb on 29 September 1988; in March 2000 a Chinese military newspaper threatened to use neutron bombs to capture Taiwan if it declared independence. But most of the attention has centred on alleged connections with the theft of nuclear secrets from the United States.

Allegations have circulated for over 20 years that U.S. nuclear weapon technology has been leaked to China. CIA Director George Tenet reported in the 1999 "Intelligence Community Damage Assessment" on Chinese spying, that China "obtained information on a variety of U.S. weapon design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb."

As was reported by Dan Sober in the 13 April 2000 San Jose Mercury News, in 1981 Gwo-Bao Min, a nuclear weapons engineer in the D-Division at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was forced to resign form the laboratory due to suspicions about having provided China with information about U.S. neutron bomb technology from the W-70 warhead. According to Sober:

Exactly how the government discovered the loss of neutron bomb secrets to China and what led investigators to Min remain a secret. Sources outside the FBI say the agency is protecting its source, which could be a spy or the clandestine interception of an electronic communication.

Min continued to be investigated after his resignation by an FBI operation known as "Tiger Trap". Sober interviewed a number of officials familiar with the case:

"We did not design nuclear warheads (in D-Division), but we had access to all that stuff," said one of Min's co-workers. "They're classified documents and you go down and check them out. There's a classified library and you sign your name to show what you checked out."

"If the information was compromised, (the damage) could have been quite severe," said Houston T. Hawkins, an expert on Chinese nuclear weapons who is the top intelligence official at Los Alamos. Hawkins directs the group that wrote the "damage assessment" in the wake of the Tiger Trap case".

Although no prosecution ever developed from Tiger Trap, a December 1982 phone call between Min and Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee emerged as an important piece in the infamous case against Lee two decades later.

Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb reported in stories published in the Washington Post on 8 April and 9 May 1999 that in 1997 another Chinese-American scientist named Peter H. Lee had been arrested and pled guilty to verbally passing classified nuclear weapons information to Chinese scientists while he was employed as a physicist at Los Alamos. Like Wen Ho Lee (who is unrelated), Peter Lee is a naturalized citizen born in Taiwan. The 1985 incident for which he was convicted involved a briefing Lee gave seven or more top Chinese nuclear scientists for two hours in a small conference room at another Beijing hotel. According to Pincus and Loeb;

"He talked about laser fusion and even discussed problems the United States was having in its nuclear weapons simulation program. He drew diagrams and supplied specifications. He explained test data. And he described at least one portion of a classified paper he had written, knowing that his disclosures violated the law.

"In December 1997 -- more than 12 years after the events, and after a six-year FBI investigation that included agents tapping his phones for months, reading his e-mail and his personal diaries, trailing him to China and conducting a polygraph -- Lee finally confessed and pleaded guilty. He was not paid by the Chinese for information, receiving only some travel expenses in 1997, and there was no evidence he disclosed classified information other than what he, himself, had described".

Ironically even though Peter Lee pled to passing classified defence information to unauthorized recipients (for which he was sentenced in March 1998 to a five-year prison term, suspended in favour of 12 months in a halfway house, a $20,000 fine and 3,000 hours of community service), by the time of his arrest much of the information on laser fusion had been declassified (in 1993). But a DOE impact analysis of Lee's disclosures completed in February 1998 held that the information "was of significant material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons development program, ... This analysis indicates that Dr. Lee's activities have directly enhanced the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. national security." Lee had also revealed current classified information to Chinese scientists in 1997 about his work at TRW involving space radar imaging of submarines.

By far the most celebrated case of actual and alleged Chinese-American nuclear espionage involved the case against Los Alamos nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. This saga grew out of a strange incident in 1995, in which a Chinese intelligence agent walked in to a U.S. diplomatic office unannounced and handed over a collection of highly classified Chinese documents, which included a 1988 Chinese document that made reference to design features of America's miniaturized nuclear warheads. The CIA later concluded that, for unknown reasons, this "walk-in" had acted at the direction of Chinese intelligence.

Of particular interest were some design details of the W-88 warhead, America's most sophisticated design. The details fell far short of evidence that China had obtained anything close to a complete design however, a fact that was often ignored in the later controversy, and it transpired could have been obtained from documents about the warhead distributed at many sites around the country and accessible to thousands of people. Nonetheless, because the warhead design had originated at Los Alamos, an FBI investigation focused there, and because Wen Ho Lee was the only Chinese-American employed in the X-Division, he quickly became the focus of the investigation. Lee's early appearance in Tiger Trap essentially clenched him as the prime (and sole) suspect in the eyes of Department of Energy investigator Notra Trulock.

The Wen Ho Lee investigation was kicked into hyper drive when the Cox Committee, organized to investigate the transmission of space and missile technology to China, got wind of it and hastily added a sensationalized section on nuclear weapon espionage to the committee’s final report in December 1998. Virtually no attention was paid to Chinese nuclear spying allegations until a front-page 6 March 1999 New York Times story about the investigation. DOE Secretary Richardson fired Wen Ho Lee two days later. During the next 18 months circumspection was rarely seen in pronouncements made politicians, pundits, and officials. The extravagant claims made about Lee and supposed intelligence compromises led to Lee's arrest, extended imprisonment in solitary confinement, threats of capital punishment, and sworn testimony by government witnesses that were later admitted to be false. In the end the espionage case utterly collapsed with no evidence of spying by Lee ever having been found. Finally a plea agreement was reached on 13 September 2000 in which Lee pleaded guilty to one count of improperly handling classified information and was released.

As far as can be determined from publicly available information, there appears to be no real evidence of China obtaining actual nuclear warhead designs from the U.S. At most the information seems to have been information about warhead design and technology, possibly quite sketchy that would help guide Chinese research and development down the most productive tracks. Without detailed designs of warheads ("blueprints"), Chinese weapons would necessarily be based on indigenous designs even if they incorporated design features and concepts derived from U.S. systems.

China's nuclear delivery system programs have traditionally proceeded very slowly. This has resulted in the deployment of forces that have been one to two decades behind the other nuclear powers in technology (although cause and effect may be reversed, lack of advanced technology may have been the cause of such tardy deployments). It is believed that fewer than 250 ballistic missiles have ever been deployed (with only the first cryogenic liquid fuel missile having been retired). The vast majority of China's arsenal is not capable of reaching the United States, and thus seems geared towards deterring (or threatening) its immediate neighbours.

China has placed little emphasis on aircraft as a strategic weapon carrier. The Hong-6 and Qian-5 are short-medium range, light payload aircraft suitable more for tactical or regional-strategic operations. The main bomber, the Hong-6, is based on the Tu-16 Badger which entered Soviet service in 1955 and first flew in China on 27 September 1959. This plane was used to drop two live nuclear weapons in tests: a fission bomb in May 1965 and a megaton-range thermonuclear bomb in June 1967.

The Xian Aircraft Company has been developing the Hong-7 (FB-7), a supersonic fighter-bomber, for over 10 years, but no date has been given for its deployment. The most attractive possibility for modernization of the air arm is simply to purchase advanced fighter bombers from Russia (where they are readily available on easy terms) and modify them to carry Chinese nuclear weapons. China has already purchased 24 Su-27SK and 2 Su-27UBK Flankers (in 1992). Russia has also sold production rights for the Su-27 to China, and an assembly plant has been set up at Shenyang. The first two Chinese-made SU-27s flew in December 1998. China plans to build at least 200 SU-27s over the next 15 years. There is no information available to indicate that they have been assigned a nuclear role however.

China has had a rather unsuccessful ballistic missile submarine program. China has only one operational ballistic missile submarine, the Xia (No. 406). This 6500 ton nuclear-powered boat was laid down in 1978 and launched in April 1981 from the Huludao Shipyard and Naval Base on the northern Bohai Gulf but achieved operational status only with great difficulty. The first attempt to fire a missile from the Xia failed in 1985, and it entered service only after a successful test launch was conducted on 27 September 1988. It was deployed to the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base, where the nuclear warheads for the missiles are believed to be stored, in January 1989. A second submarine was reportedly launched in 1982, but is not now in service. Unsubstantiated reports claim it was lost in a 1985 accident. The Xia underwent a modernization refit beginning in 1995. It has never sailed beyond China's regional waters and is believed incapable of deployment to distant areas. The submarine is armed with the Julang-1 (Giant Wave, or Tsunami) two-stage solid fuel missile, which was first test fired 30 April 1982. The Julang-1 was adapted to land service as the DF-21 (CSS-5). There will very probably be no more submarines of this class. A new design (Type 094) submarine, to be equipped with the longer range three stage Julang-2, a variant of the DF-31, is been under development for several years but probably won't see deployment for several more.

Much less is known about Chinese tactical nuclear weapons, which are believed to comprise a large part of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. The neutron bomb claimed by China is strictly a tactical weapon (designed for use against armoured vehicles). China has conducted a number of low yield tests that may have been tactical weapons, and a large military exercise incorporating simulated nuclear weapons was held in June 1982. China's M-family of tactical ballistic missiles, the M-9, M-11 and M-18, are believed to be nuclear capable. Taiwanese officials have said that over the last four years the number of M-family missiles in China's three southern provinces nearby, have increased from 30-50 to 160-200 today. Estimates of Chinese tactical warheads range from 100 to 200, with yields from a few kilotons to hundreds of kilotons.

INDIA

Background

India's nuclear weapons program was started at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Trombay. In the mid-1950s India acquired dual-use technologies under the "Atoms for Peace" non-proliferation program, which aimed to encourage the civil use of nuclear technologies in exchange for assurances that they would not be used for military purposes. There was little evidence in the 1950s that India had any interest in a nuclear weapons program, according to Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program, India acquired a Cirus 40 MWt heavy-water-moderated research reactor from Canada and purchased from the U.S. the heavy water required for its operation. In 1964, India commissioned a reprocessing facility at Trombay, which was used to separate out the plutonium produced by the Cirus research reactor. This plutonium was used in India's first nuclear test on May 18, 1974, described by the Indian government as a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, India began work on a thermonuclear weapon in the 1980s. In 1989, William H. Webster, director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that "indicators that tell us India is interested in thermonuclear weapons capability." India was purifying lithium, producing tritium and separating lithium isotopes. India had also obtained pure beryllium metal from West Germany .

Testing

After 24 years without testing India resumed nuclear testing with a series of nuclear explosions known as "Operation Shatki." Prime Minister Vajpayee authorized the tests on April 8, 1998, two days after the Ghauri missile test-firing in Pakistan.

On May 11, 1998, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. The nuclear tests carried out at 3:45 pm on May 11^th were claimed by the Indian government to be a simultaneous detonation of three different devices - a fission device with a yield of about 12 kilotons (KT), a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 KT, and a sub-kiloton device. The two tests carried out at 12:21 pm on May 13^th were also detonated simultaneously with reported yields in the range of 0.2 to 0.6 KT.

However, there is some controversy about these claims. Based on seismic data, U.S. government sources and independent experts estimated the yield of the so-called thermonuclear test in the range of 12-25 kilotons, as opposed to the 43-60 kiloton yield claimed by India. This lower yield raised scepticism about India's claims to have detonated a thermonuclear device.

Observers initially suggested that the test could have been a boosted fission device, rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear device. By late 1998 analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had concluded that the India had attempted to detonate a thermonuclear device, but that the second stage of the two-stage bomb failed to ignite as planned.

TEST	DEVICE	DATE	YIELD claimed	YIELD reported
	Fission device	18 May 1974	12-15 kiloton	4-6 kiloton
Shakti 1	Thermonuclear device	11 May 1998	43-60 kiloton	12-25 kiloton
Shakti 2	Fission device	11 May 1998	12 kiloton	??
Shakti 3	Low-yield device	11 May 1998	0.2 kiloton	low
Shakti 4	Low-yield device	13 May 1998	0.5 kiloton	low
Shakti 5	Low-yield device	13 May 1998	0.3 kiloton	low

India's Nuclear Arsenal

Though India has not made any official statements about the size of it nuclear arsenal, the NRDC estimates that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35 nuclear warheads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials. Joseph Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimates that India has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for 50-90 nuclear weapons and a smaller but unknown quantity of weapons-grade uranium. Weapons-grade plutonium production takes place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which is home to the Cirus reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium separation facility.

According to a Jan. 2001 Department of Defense report, "India probably has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week." A 2001 RAND study by Ashley Tellis asserts that India does not have or seek to deploy a ready nuclear arsenal.

According to a report in Jane's Intelligence Review, India's objective is to have a nuclear arsenal that is "strategically active but operationally dormant", which would allow India to maintain its retaliatory capability "within a matter of hours to weeks, while simultaneously exhibiting restraint." However, the report also maintains that, in the future, India may face increasing institutional pressure to shift its nuclear arsenal to a fully deployed status.

Doctrine

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only." The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s).'"

According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. But an Indian foreign ministry official told Defense News in 2000 that a "'no-first-strike' policy does not mean India will not have a first-strike capability."

India has not signed the CTBT or the NPT. India is a member of the IAEA, and four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

Despite promoting a test ban treaty for decades, India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on September 10, 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favours any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests."

PAKISTAN

A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.

India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.

In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.

Nuclear Tests

On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.

On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.

Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.

DEVICE	DATE	YIELD [announced]	YIELD [estimated]
[boosted device?]	28 May 1998	25-36 kiloton	total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device	28 May 1998	12 kiloton
Low-yield device	28 May 1998	sub-kiloton	--
Low-yield device	28 May 1998	sub-kiloton	--
Low-yield device	28 May 1998	sub-kiloton	--
Fission device	30 May 1998	12 kiloton	4-6 kiloton
Fission device	not detonated	12 kiloton	--
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.

According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.

These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.

Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.

Nuclear Infrastructure

Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactors at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafe guarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.

Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.

Nuclear Arsenal

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.

Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferate of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.

Foreign Assistance

In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.

In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.

According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.

China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.

According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.

Intermittent US Sanctions

On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.

Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has not signed the NPT or the CTBT. According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."

Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.

Aside from these public declarations, Pakistan has not issued an official nuclear doctrine. The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the National Command Authority (NCA) established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise Gen. Musharraf on the development and employment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for wartime command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Research Corporation under the control on of one Nuclear Defense Complex.

Resources:

www.nti.org

www.nuclearweaponarchive.org

www.india-defense.com

www.fas.org

www.globalsecurity.org

www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca

www.nuclear-weapons.nm.ru

www.temadnya.ru

www.arms.ru

www.nuclearfiles.org