Lesnoy
School №76
ŇNuclear Weapons
and Non-ProliferationÓ
Lesnoy, school №76, 10 ŇBÓ grade
Teacher: Valieva Rezeda
Lesnoy, school №76
Benchmark II
Objective I – Current Regions of Interest
In
this part of Benchmark II we will do research to understand where current
Ňstable spotsÓ and Ňtrouble spotsÓ are in the world in terms of nuclear
proliferation/non-proliferation. We will develop an understanding why these
areas are considered problems.
Present days the world pays attention the east
countries trying to possess nuclear weapons, and that is not strangely. Iran,
North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel are the actively developing states, the
level of their economics, industry and peopleŐs life is far from the perfect,
however, and the rate of developing is very high. The desire of governments of
east countries to possess WMD is the sign of the achievement of certain
results, which make these countries strong enough to step on the new stage of their
developing, when the military needs are priority (the same situation was in
USSR and USA in the second half of the 20th century, when the big
sums of money were spent on military development).
Organized by Pentagon ŇCountry N ProjectÓ (1964-1966) has shown that two scientists with surface knowledge of nuclear physics can make the full document on creating nuclear bomb, which will be working. The results of the project were rather interesting, the construction of the bomb was simple enough, but obtaining fissile material was much harder. And now even student of school can get a lot of information about creating nuclear bomb, to say nothing about terrorists or non-nuclear states.
Before we start talking about North Korea and Iran,
some words should be said. ItŐs not bound with nuclear weapons, but however,
weŐd like to say some words. We must understand that the cartoon published in
the Danish newspaper is not the reason of mass-meetings and a wave of
aggression towards Europe in Eastern countries; itŐs just a cause. And the real
reason is long-term opposition of two religions, two different ways of living.
The cartoons make people from Eastern countries express all accumulated
feelings. In the second part of 20th century, the World War III was
likely to be between two regimes: capitalism and communism; but now itŐs likely
to be between Christianity and Islam, and it sounds much more terrible. Herewith,
neither Christians nor Moslems are guilty; they are able and want to be at
peace, the real fault lies on intolerant people (from the ŇWestÓ countries) and
fanatics (from the ŇEastÓ countries).
The people in the world can speak a lot of good or bad things about Iran, but
the new war must be stopped. Will Iran use nuclear weapons? Iranian government
is certain to understand that if they use nuclear weapons, their country will
be destroyed in a few hours without mercy. There is no need in war in such a
situation. But what country will be right, if USA attack Iran? Trying to stop a
possible aggression, we will provoke a real aggression. One more war will
definitively split the world community into two peacesÉ
Iran. As
one of the other states trying to possess nuclear weapons Iran aspire to become
dominant power in the region. Tehran was always saying that they will use
nuclear technologies only in energy sphere, but it seems to be untrue. Iran has
a rich oil resources and that means it wonŐt have any energy problems in the
nearest years. But on the other hand, Iran is willing to provide itself with
energy, when the oil goes off. The cooperation with Russia is one of the concerning
points. Russia has mastered a nuclear weapons production and its help in
building atomic energy plant in Bushier can be help in the nuclear weapons
development. But this information is not confirmed and looks doubtful.
In June 2005, IAEA
Deputy Director Pierre Goldschmidt stated that Iran admitted to providing
incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran
claimed all such research ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests show
experiments took place as late as 1995 and 1998. In early July, Iran asked the
IAEA if it could break UN seals and test nuclear-related equipment, stating the
testing would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities.
At the end of July, an official letter was submitted to the IAEA stating that
the seals at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would be removed.
The IAEA requested that it be given 10 days to install the necessary
surveillance equipment. On 1 August, Iran reminded the EU-3 that 3 August would
be the last opportunity for a proposal to be submitted to continue
negotiations. A few days later, the European Union submitted the Framework for
a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran. The proposal specifically called on
Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately rejected the
proposal as a negation of its inalienable rights. On 8 August, nuclear
activities resumed at the Isfahan UCF and two days later, IAEA seals were
removed from the remaining parts of the process lines with IAEA inspectors
present.
In the days leading
up to Iran's resumption of nuclear activities, several countries called on Iran
to cooperate with the IAEA and to re-establish full suspension of all
enrichment related activities. Additionally, some European countries and the
United States threatened to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Once again,
Iran rejected any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities,
but stated they were ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe
there was any legal basis for referral to the UN Security council and believed
it was only a political move. Iran also threatened to stop all negotiations,
prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear facilities, suspend the
implementation of the Additional Protocol, and withdraw from the NPT, if it was
referred to the UN Security Council.
In August 2005, the IAEA announced that most of the
highly enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations
in Iran was found to be of foreign origin. The IAEA concluded much of the HEU
found on centrifuge parts were from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than
from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran.
In late August, Iran began announcing it would be
resuming nuclear activities in Natanz and that Tehran would be willing to
negotiate as long as there were no conditions. In August, Iran refused to
comply with a resolution from the IAEA to halt its nuclear program, stating
that making nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the NPT. The European
Union believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear energy under
Article 4 of the NPT, it had lost that right because it violated Article 2 of
the NPT - "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear related weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On 24,
September 2005, the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance of the NPT. The
resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions, and one opposing
vote. Russia and China were among those that abstained from voting and
Venezuela was the only country to vote against the resolution. The resolution
stated Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and breaches" over
nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN Security
Council.
In the beginning of the 2006 the Iran got to the focus
of attention. The situation changes every day, the possible war becomes more
inevitable. ItŐs hardly to say what will be in a few weeks. Only question mark
can be written hereÉ
North Korea. The attention to
the North Korean nuclear program became far less than in 2004-2005 ŇthanksÓ to
Iran, but sometime North Korea will be in the center of world news again. The behavior of the government of that state is on the
brink of understanding. Some reports say that North Korea doesnŐt have
nuclear weapons and wonŐt develop it, another says opposite opinions; N. Korean
government can admit the way of cooperation and refuse it. There are some
suggestions that North Korea doesnŐt have any nuclear weapons, and all reports
were false. But even if North Korea doesnŐt possess nuclear weapons (itŐs a
point of controversy), it will obtain this weapons sometime, but the biggest
part of all information about North Korean nuclear program is the proof that
there are nuclear weapons in North Korea. Approximately it has 1-5 nuclear
warheads, but no one can say what the exact amount of North Korean nuclear
bombs is. During 2003, North Korea likely reprocessed the
plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage
facility in the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. This reprocessed spent fuel would
provide about 25-30 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, or enough for about five to
six nuclear weapons. North Korea has also been operating a 5 MW (e) reactor in
Yongbyon since late February 2003. This reactor can produce enough plutonium
for about one bomb per year. However, there is no evidence that North Korea has
shut down the reactor to discharge the spent fuel and reprocess it into
plutonium. North Korea has two larger nuclear reactors (50 MW (e) and 200 MW
(e)) that were under construction but frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework.
These reactors, if completed, could provide enough plutonium for about 37-50
nuclear bombs per year. North Korea also has a uranium enrichment program, but
there is no evidence that North Korea has a large-scale uranium enrichment
facility in operation. In the 1980s, North Korea began to acquire dual-use
items that could be applied to a uranium enrichment program, but North Korea is
probably still years away from operating a full-scale uranium enrichment
facility, even though it can apparently produce uranium hexofluoride. North
Korea appears to have pursued its uranium enrichment program more aggressively
in the late 1990s after becoming dissatisfied with the implementation of the
Agreed Framework. The intelligence community is divided over whether North
Korea has assembled its fissile material into nuclear bombs, and it is
uncertain whether North Korea has miniaturized any weapons that could be loaded
onto a North Korean delivery vehicle. If miniaturized into nuclear warheads,
North Korea could deliver its bombs with Hwasŏng-5, Hwasŏng-6,
Nodong, and Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1) ballistic missiles.
North Korean Ballistic Missiles
|
NK Name |
Range |
Payload |
Inventory Estimate |
|
Hwasŏng-5 |
300 |
987-989 |
27 TELs* (total) |
|
Hwasŏng-6 |
500 |
770 |
27 TELs (total) |
|
Unknown |
700 |
500 |
27 TELs (total) |
|
Unknown |
1,000 |
700 |
At least 10 TELs |
|
Paektusan-1 |
2,200 |
? |
<10 in underground silos? |
|
Unknown |
|
|
Under development |
North Korea might
transfer nuclear weapons and fissile material to states or terrorists, and
thatŐs the major concern of the United States and its allies. Such problems
always become Ňthe first to solveÓ, because state, possessing nuclear weapons,
can be controlled by treaties or international sanctions, but terrorists canŐt
be controlled, and the one of the great dangers for mankind is nuclear
terrorism. But first, North Korea's
current stockpile of fissile material is relatively small and extremely
valuable if the North Korea leadership is convinced it needs a nuclear
deterrent. Second, the risk and cost of exposure after transferring nuclear
weapons or materials would be high, and North Korean leaders are unlikely to
accept these risks or potential costs. Third, North Korea has renounced
terrorism and has not engaged in terrorist activities for almost two decades.
Critics argue that terrorist groups have acquired North Korean conventional
arms, but Pyongyang is more likely to hold onto its small number of nuclear
weapons for its own defense. Therefore, the probability of transfer is low, but
cannot be completely discounted, and contingency plans should be available for
such a development. There are two main ways of solution of ŇNorth Korean
QuestionÓ: military (destruction of all facilities) and diplomatic (the
Six-Party Talks were unsuccessful regrettably, cause North Korea refused to
take part in the negotiations, but there are still some ways of diplomatic
solution).
![]()
Military
Diplomatic


Locating all nuclear weapons increasing diplomatic pressure
and/or facilities and fissile material against Pyongyang
stocks
that could be used in a
nuclear weapons program A UN Security Council resolution
![]()
Imposing economic sanctions
Having
the capability to
destroy these targets Increasing counter-proliferation
activities aimed at Pyongyang
(Such
as stopping and boarding
Preventing full-scale North Korean North Korean ships,
conventional retaliation, further as set forth in the U.S.-
escalation, or the use of chemical, led Proliferation Security Initiative)
biological, or nuclear weapons
against U.S military bases in the
region or against U.S. allies
USA. USA is the only one state that has been used nuclear weapons against its enemy. In August of 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki were completely destroyed. The current arsenal is about 10 000 nuclear warheads. Almost 8,000 of these are active or operational; nearly 2,700 inactive. In addition to intact warheads, about 5,000 plutonium pits and 5,000 canned subassemblies (thermonuclear second) are stored as a "strategic reserve" at Pantex and Oak Ridge, respectively. Another 7,000 pits at Pantex, from warheads dismantled during the Bush senior and Clinton administrations, have been declared excess.
The United States deploys
nuclear weapons at eight bases in six European NATO countries. According
to the May 2002 Treaty of Moscow (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or
SORT) between the United States and the Russian Federation, both countries are
required to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200
operationally deployed warheads by 2012. The review states that the United
States will reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and depend more heavily on
conventional weapons and missile defense to ensure national security. Most of
the reduction however, will involve merely shifting warheads into storage,
where they could quickly be reactivated.
The
Bush administration has rejected U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, but calls for a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. The
2001 Nuclear Posture Review calls for a reduction in the amount of time needed
(now 18 months as mandated by Congress, but this could be reduced to as little
as 12 months) to test a nuclear weapon, suggesting that the United States might
decide to resume nuclear testing, although Bush administration officials deny
that this is currently planned and explain the shortening of test-site
readiness time as a logical extension of the U.S. decision to maintain a
testing option.
Nuclear
weapons are located in 14 states of the USA: New Mexico, Georgia, Washington,
Nevada, and North Dakota are the top five and account for about 70 percent of
the total arsenal. The other nine are Wyoming, Missouri, Montana, Louisiana,
Texas, Nebraska, California, Virginia, and Colorado. The number of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe has shrunk dramatically, from over 6,000 of many types in the
early 1980s to some 150 B61 bombs at ten air bases in seven countries (Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) by the end
of 1997. The United States is the only country with nuclear weapons deployed
outside its borders.
USA
is one of the recognized states under the NPT. But itŐs hardly to deny that the
United States will never use nuclear weapons against some country again.
Considering the fact that US government has the list of ŇenemiesÓ, itŐs no
doubtful that using nuclear weapons will be one of the ways of Ňthe battleÓ
with enemies. But itŐs also impossible to deny the role of the United States in
nuclear non-proliferation. And again itŐs one more ambiguous situation in
considering nuclear non-proliferation and current situation in the world.
Russia. Russian nuclear forces are really strong, the system of using nuclear weapons works
perfect at present, thatŐs why Russian nuclear arsenal seems to be very
dangerous and many people in the world are worried about it. Russian government relies on
nuclear weapons, because the military vehicles of Russian army have powerful
weapons but itŐs not very effective, because itŐs too old, the renovation of
vehicles and weapons is a terribly long process because of low financing, but nuclear
weapons and all related systems are kept in good condition. But what make many people really anxious are
strategic nuclear forces of Russia, only few minutes are necessary for replying
enemy attack. Detecting attack takes 3 or 4 minutes, the high level decision
can be made in 4 or 5 minutes and some more time for the launch. Russian
nuclear doctrine cause many contradictions in the world. The launch on warning confirms
that Russia will use nuclear weapons, if someone attacks Russia, but in
official declarations said that the replying attack will be directed to the
enemy strategic objects only to destroy the important enemy structures, but not
to kill thousands of people (however, the victims will be). The safety of nuclear weapons in Russia is a
question too. But at the other hand, Russia signed many treaties, which lead to
the disarming and lowering reliance on nuclear weapons.
Russia
has made dramatic reductions in its nuclear forces since the end of the Cold
War, a major limiting factor in the pace of reductions has been the funding to
destroy systems. Russia has taken control of all nuclear weapons stationed in
the former-Soviet republics, particularly the strategic weapons formerly
deployed in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. For economic reasons, Russia's
strategic nuclear arsenal is likely to decline to fewer than 2,000 warheads by
2015, according to U.S. intelligence estimates. The START
II treaty limits Russia and the United States to 3,500 strategic, deployed
warheads. In November 2000, agreement with Bush, Russian President Vladimir
Putin agreed to reduce Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,500 and
2,200 - a change fiscal necessity would likely have caused even without U.S.
cuts. This reduction may be imperiled by the U.S. plan to move most of the
nuclear weapons taken out of the active stockpile into a reserve stockpile,
where they could easily be rearmed. The START treaties do not restrict tactical
or reserve weapons. Russia will likely retain approximately 3,000 tactical
warheads, in addition to an unknown number of reserve weapons.
UK. The United
Kingdom is a nuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The UK's current stockpile is thought to consist of less than 200
strategic and "sub-strategic" warheads on Vanguard-class
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The Strategic Defense
Review of July 1998 called for major changes in the United Kingdom's nuclear
weapons program. Air-delivered weapons were removed from service, leaving the SSBNs
as the United Kingdom's only nuclear deterrent. The Review mandated that only
one submarine be on patrol at a time, with its missiles retargeted and with a
reduced number of warheads (maximum of 48). On May 1, 2004, the Nuclear
Safeguards Act went into effect in the United Kingdom, providing necessary
legislation for the enforcement of the "additional protocol" designed
to provide greater protection against nuclear non-proliferation. This protocol
built on existing nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The United
Kingdom ratified the NPT in November 1968 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
in June 1998.
France. France
maintains approximately 350 nuclear warheads on 60 Mirage 2000N bombers, four
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and on carrier-based
aircraft. From the time it detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1960 until its
final test on January 26, 1996, France conducted 200 tests at sites on Pacific
atolls and in the Sahara. In 1996, President Jacques Chirac introduced reforms
for the country's nuclear forces, including scaling down its SSBNs from five to
four, withdrawing aging Mirage IVP bombers from service, reducing its number of
launchers by 50%, and dismantling its Plateau d'Albion land-based ballistic
missile system. It dismantled its nuclear test facilities in the Pacific and
ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
France ceased production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in 1992 and
1996, respectively, and, in 1998, began to dismantle the Marcoule reprocessing
plant and the Pierre latte enrichment
facility. The French Navy operates about 80% of the total nuclear arsenal.
About China, India and
Pakistan was
told a lot in Benchmark I. The real situation shows that the new conflicts
between India and Pakistan are possible, but itŐs hard to say, whether
governments of those countries dare to use nuclear weapons. The Indian
government released a proposed nuclear doctrine in 1999. This document calls
for the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack - in other
words a no first use policy - and says that ultimately, India's nuclear forces
will be based in a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based
forces. The doctrine states that India intends, through a combination of
redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception, to heighten the
survivability of its nuclear arsenal. Despite its ambition to deploy a nuclear
triad, today India can deliver nuclear weapons only by missile or aircraft. India
has two types of missiles: the Prithvi and the Agni, each of which has several
variants. The Prithvi missiles have ranges under 500 kilometers and are
liquid-fuelled. In January 2002, India test fired a solid-fuel Agni missile.
With a range of 700 kilometers, it bridges a gap between shorter-range Prithvi
missiles and longer-range variants of the Agni. Versions of the Agni with
ranges up to 5,000 kilometers are being developed. Though India seeks nuclear
self-sufficiency, its ballistic missile programs are largely dependent on
Russian components and expertise. India is also likely to develop a global
positioning system to upgrade its missile guidance systems.
Little solid information is available regarding the Pakistani arsenal,
but it is widely estimated to consist of 24 to 48 nuclear weapons. The nuclear
program uses highly enriched uranium, but Pakistan is developing facilities to
produce plutonium. According to U.S. intelligence, Pakistan relies heavily on
its ballistic nuclear missiles to counter India's conventional advantage. It
has depended on North Korean and Chinese assistance to help develop its
missiles but aims for more indigenous know-how. Like India, Pakistan is
generally believed to keep its nuclear missiles in components. That is, delivery
vehicles are likely kept separate from warheads. However, the escalation of
conflict along the line of control in Kashmir may have led Pakistan to assemble
some of its nuclear weapons.
China
joined the policy of non-proliferation after the end of Cold War and signed the NPT and CTBT
(under ratification) and admits all IAEA decisions. But also China always
modernizes its military forces, and nuclear weapons are not an exception. China joined the IAEA in 1984 and acceded to the NPT
in 1992 as a nuclear weapon state. China provided nuclear reactors and
technology to several countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, including design
information and fissile material that reportedly helped Pakistan develop
nuclear weapons. Since the early 1990s, China has improved its export controls,
including the promulgation of regulations on nuclear and nuclear dual-use
exports and has pledged to halt exports of nuclear technology to un-safeguarded
facilities. In 2002 China ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, the first and
only nuclear weapons state to do so.
ItŐs worth saying that all of the five recognized
nuclear weapons states under the NPT have the great influence in the world now,
and all five countries admit the non-proliferation principles. These states
were the first to produce nuclear weapons and now they try to prevent its
proliferation. ItŐs rather interesting and paradoxical, but itŐs much better
for the community. Time is what makes us change: the using of nuclear weapons
is possible, but the disarming seems to be much more inevitable, so it means
mankind can avoid the nuclear war.
Israel. Israel refuses to confirm or
deny the widespread belief that it has the nuclear weapon capabilities. Israel is believed to possess
the largest and most sophisticated arsenal outside of the five declared nuclear
powers and it has the most advanced nuclear weapons program in the Middle East. The secrecy with which Israel
shrouds its nuclear arsenal renders estimates of its size highly unreliable.
Generally, however, it is estimated that Israel has between 100 and 200 nuclear
warheads.
Israel developed
nuclear weapons with French help in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite refusals to
comment on the issue by the Israeli government, the Israelis clearly have a
sizeable nuclear arsenal. It is believed that Israel might not keep its nuclear
weapons fully assembled - keeping them "a screw away" from
completion.
The highly capable
and well-equipped Israeli Air Force would more than suffice in the nuclear
weapons delivery role, particularly with U.S.-supplied aircraft such as the
F-4E and F-16. However, Israel has also produced ballistic missiles. The
Jericho I can strike Syria, and the Jericho II brings the entire Middle East
under Israel's range, particularly Iran. Israel may also have some tactical
nuclear weapons. The Shavit spaclaunch booster could be adapted for a
long-range nuclear delivery role, and given the decision, Israel would be able
to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
The Israeli arsenal
will likely remain stable in the years to come. Though Israel signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will likely not reduce or eliminate its
nuclear arsenal of 100-200 weapons. It is possible that Israel possesses an
unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons. The center of Israel's weapons
program is reported to be the Negev Nuclear Research Center near the desert
town of Dimona.
Israel's possession
of nuclear weapons and its policy of declaratory ambiguity have led to
increased tensions in current Middle East peace discussions and arms control
negotiations. In July 2004, however, Israel accepted a visit from International
Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei. Israeli officials continue
assert that they will address disarmament only after a comprehensive Middle Eastern
peace is obtained, and to deny international inspection of the Dimona nuclear
complex.
The obvious
opposition of Israel and Iran and a conflict between India and Pakistan make
the situation in Asia really dangerous. All four states have nuclear weapons;
any provocation can cause an open confrontation. The mechanism of starting the
war is very simple.
Denuclearized
nations are particularly former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus or
Kazakhstan. After the ruining of USSR the problem of sharing the military
facilities and others became rather important. All nuclear warheads, which have
been kept in the territory of former republics, have been given to Russia. The
remainders of the former Soviet military arsenal are spread on the big
territories of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and others.
á Ukraine - signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Ukraine inherited about 5,000 nuclear weapons
when it became independent from the USSR in 1991, making its nuclear arsenal
the third-largest in the world. By 1996, the Ukraine had voluntarily disposed
of all nuclear weapons within its territory, transferring them to Russia.
á Belarus – Belarus had 81
single warhead missiles stationed in their territory after the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991. They were all returned to Russia by 1996. Belarus signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
á Kazakhstan – Kazakhstan
inherited 1,400 nuclear weapons from Soviet Union, returned them all to Russia
by 1995. Signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
á South Africa – Produced six nuclear weapons in the 1980s but
disassembled them in the early 1990s, and is thus the only nation known to have
willingly given up nuclear status after developing their own weapons. Possibly
tested a low yield device in 1979, perhaps with Israel, over the southern
oceans in the Vela Incident. Signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
NWFZ. A Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zone or NWFZ is defined by the United Nations as an agreement, generally by
internationally recognized treaty, to ban the use, development, or deployment
of nuclear weapons in a given area. Additionally, this agreement has mechanisms
of verification and control to enforce its obligations. NWFZs are conceived as incremental measures toward total
nuclear disarmament, and have steadily grown in number since the first,
governing Antarctica. To date, there are six recognized
zones, which have been achieved or are in the process of acceptance:
á
The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean NWFZ),
á
The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone),
á
The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia NWFZ),
á
The Treaty of Pelindaba (African NWFZ),
á
The Antarctic
Treaty, for the Antarctic territory,
á
Mongolian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Status, covering Mongolia.
The
Pelindaba Treaty has not yet entered into force. In addition to these NWFZ
treaties, other agreements, including the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon
Agreement, and the Seabed Treaty denuclearize and demilitarize specific areas of
the globe, as well as outer space.
There
are also a number of proposed agreements, covering the Middle East, the Korean
Peninsula, Central Asia, Central Europe, and South Asia. A difficulty with the
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone concept is defining suitable zone areas, such that
zone neighbours are not considered nuclear threats. For example it is reported
that no African Arab state will ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba until Israel,
which is just outside the zone, renounces its nuclear weapons program.
Early discussion of the
possibility of NWFZs emerged in the 1950s, in June 23, 1961 the first treaty
entered into
force, thereby prohibiting nuclear explosions, radioactive waste disposal, and
military deployments in the Antarctic Treaty Area (ATA). In April 26-28, 2005 A
three-day international conference on NWFZ was held in Mexico City bringing together for
the first time all states parties to the four existing NWFZ. States parties
argued that the lessons learned from negotiating and establishing NWFZ should
be used to further the nonproliferation and disarmament goals under the NPT.
The issue of legally-binding negative security assurances was one of the main
topics discussed.
Non-nuclear nations. There are rejecting,
denuclearized nations and nations belonging to NWFZ amongst non-nuclear
nations. The most of these nations even donŐt think about possession of nuclear
weapons. Only 8 states (and possibly, North Korea and Iran) in the world
possess nuclear weapons, and the hundreds of other nations donŐt have it and
most of them try to stop proliferation of WMD, so the world is not ŇcrazyÓ yet,
all of us should believe that the worst things will never happen.
Objective II – Treaties and other Agreements
We
will develop an understanding of the implications of international treaties
dealing with the proliferation/non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their
verifications processes. We will examine these treaties from the perspective of
one nation in each of the categories in Objective – 1.
Treaties
between the United States and Russian Federation/USSR
The first negotiations between two powerful states
started many years ago, Caribbean crisis became the line, which divides the
history of USA and USSR/Russia into two parts. Understanding of need to
cooperate in terms of nuclear weapons took some
years, but finally, two countries tried to find the common language. The first
treaties covered the strategic arms, missiles and the like, and it obliquely related to the nuclear weapons.
Using of strategic systems in delivering nuclear warheads and exploding it was
a very attractive perspective for US and USSR, because of long range and
ability to use remote control in operating missiles. SALT and START treaties,
INF treaty, ABM treaty were signed for limitation or elimination of missiles
and other strategic weapons. On May 23rd 2002 Presidents Bush and Putin signed
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the US and the Russia. It
commits them both to reduce their current arsenals of strategic nuclear
warheads from around 6000 each down to between 1700 and 2200 each by 2012. But
this treaty is not ideal: 1700-2200 warheads is still ŇdeadlyÓ amount, and
total amount of US and Russia warheads will not be far from the total amount of
warheads of the rest of the nuclear states, so there will be enough weapons to
destroy everything in the world. Also only strategic weapons are covered by the
treaty, but not tactical (both countries have large numbers of tactical
weapons). The SORT has some more concerning points, so we should hope that
treaty wonŐt be the last between USA and Russia. On the one hand these treaties
limit the number of weapons, on the other hand that limitation is not full.
Treaty
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) is one of the great success stories of arms control. It has made major
contributions to global security and economic well being. It has been
remarkably successful in achieving its main goals and (with nearly 190 parties)
has become the most widely-adhered to arms control treaty in history. The NPT
is an indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The
organization for NPT is International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was
evident from the first days of the nuclear era. Many predicted that the nuclear
club could grow to 20-30 countries within two decades. It rapidly became clear
that if the many peaceful uses of nuclear technology were to be developed,
states needed credible assurances that nuclear programs would not be diverted
to military applications. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly approved
a resolution sponsored by Ireland calling on all states to conclude an
international agreement that would ban the acquisition and transfer of nuclear
weapons. In 1965, the Geneva disarmament conference began consideration of a
draft nonproliferation treaty. Negotiations were completed in 1968 and, on July
1 of that year, the NPT was opened for signature. On March 5, 1970, the NPT
entered into force. The United States, United Kingdom, and the former Soviet
Union were among the 43 original parties. Over time, the many benefits of the
NPT became clear. The NPT establishes a political and legal barrier to the
spread of nuclear weapons. That fact alone offered to many states a compelling
rationale for joining. The growth in Treaty membership toward universality has
been steady over the years. From 43 original parties in 1970 the number grew to
96 in 1975, 132 in 1985, 177 in 1995, and stands at nearly 190 today. Israel,
India and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty. North Korea joined the NPT in
1985, but in January 2003 announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty;
2006 is likely to become the year of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded
in 1957, is the primary mechanism for verifying that parties to the NPT are
complying with its terms. The implementation of IAEA safeguards is further
evidence of the way in which the NPT strengthens international security.
Safeguards under the Treaty, including international inspections, help to deter
the use of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes, and thus are an
important confidence-building measure. In the early 1990s, the members of the
IAEA have taken measures to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. These
include a reaffirmation of the IAEA's right to conduct special inspections and
the use of new tools for the detection of clandestine nuclear facilities. In
1997, the IAEA adopted a model protocol for existing safeguards agreements
under the NPT that is designed to give the IAEA a stronger role and more
effective tools for conducting worldwide inspections.
The NPT's role in
checking nuclear proliferation also is critical to reducing existing nuclear
arsenals. A vast array of actions has been taken in recent years that meet the
objectives of NPT Article VI, which calls for effective measures relating to
nuclear disarmament.
Since the fall of
the Berlin wall, the United States and the former Soviet Union have taken many
dramatic steps to reduce Cold War stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Today, the nuclear arms race
between the United States and Russia is over. They have agreed on further
reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and on taking other
steps to reduce their nuclear weapon infrastructures.
The NPT creates a vital and
irreplaceable framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation by providing
assurances that non-nuclear-weapon state NPT parties will devote their nuclear
programs exclusively to peaceful purposes. However, it is important that this
Article IV benefit not be abused by NPT parties and that any peaceful nuclear
program fully conforms to the NPTŐs nonproliferation principles.
The world is
emerging from the Cold War, a period marked by costly and spiraling nuclear
competition. As the international community moves into a new era, the NPT will
remain critical in a world where security is defined increasingly by the
absence of nuclear weapons programs, rather than by their presence, and by the
sharp reduction, not expansion, of existing nuclear arsenals. The NPT is vital
for security, arms control and disarmament, and economic and social development
throughout the world. By rededicating themselves to the NPT, its parties can
ensure that this Treaty will play an even more vital role in the new
millennium.
The brief
contents of the NPT
á Under Article I,
the nuclear weapon states undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist encourage
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
á Under Article II,
each non-nuclear-weapon state pledges not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive assistance in their manufacture.
á Article III
obliges each non-nuclear-weapon state to accept comprehensive international
safeguards through agreements negotiated with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). The intent of these safeguards is to deter and detect the
diversion of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes.
á Under Article IV,
parties may engage in peaceful nuclear programs in a manner consistent with
Articles I and II and are expected to assist the nuclear programs of other
parties, with special attention to the needs of developing countries.
á Article VI
obligates all parties to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures
relating to ending the nuclear arms race at an early date, to nuclear
disarmament, and to achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.
á Article VII recognizes the
right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties ensuring the total
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
ItŐs sad, but we suppose that
there are some ŇholesÓ in the NPT. The exchange of peaceful nuclear
technologies is permitted by the NPT, and a smart using of that permission can
provide the possibility to transfer some technologies from one country to
another. However, the NPT is a strong tool of controlling proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military
or civilian purposes. States signed the treaty lose the ability to counduct
nuclear tests, it means that development of the new types of nuclear weapons is
nearly senselessly, because of impossibility to test it. ThatŐs why some
recognized (and not) nuclear states havenŐt signed the CTBT, it cuts the
ability to improve nuclear weapons, make it more deadly, the CTBT limits
nuclear weapons development even more than NPT, so itŐs not strangely that the
CTBT is not ratified yet.
The Treaty was opened for
signature in New York on 24 September 1996, when it was signed by 71 States,
including five of the seven then nuclear-capable states. The CTBT had been
later endorsed by one hundred seventy five states parties and been ratified by a
hundred twenty. India and Pakistan did not sign; neither did North Korea.
Additionally, to enter into force, the treaty has yet to be ratified by China,
Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the U.S.A. and Vietnam, but itŐs
inlikely to happen in the near future.
Before the CTBT, the
Partial Test Ban Treaty has been signed (1963), which banned nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, underwater and in space. France and China didnŐt sign the PTBT.
Given the political situation prevailing in the subsequent decades, little
progress was made in nuclear disarmament until 1991. Parties to the PTBT held
an amendment conference that year to discuss a proposal to convert the Treaty
into an instrument banning all nuclear-weapon tests; with strong support from
the UN General Assembly, negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty began
in 1993. One of the largest issues was the priorities of the different
countries. The Non-aligned movement countries were highly concerned with vertical
proliferation (more and more bombs, new bomb technology) while the Nuclear
Powers were focusing on horizontal proliferation (nuclear bombs being produced
by states other than themselves). Intensive efforts were made over the next
three years to draft the Treaty text and its two annexes, culminating in the
adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 10 September
1996 by the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
Geophysical and other
technologies are used to monitor for compliance with the Treaty: seismology,
hydroacoustics, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring. On Site Inspection is
provided for where concerns about compliance arise.The Preparatory Commission
for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), an international
organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria, was created to build the
verification regime, including establishment and provisional operation of the
network of monitoring stations, and development of the On Site Inspection
capability. At December 2005, around 65 percent of monitoring stations are
operational.
The leadership of nuclear weapons among WMD was obvious for many years, but new types of WMD will appear in next few years. Some scientists intend that the tsunami in Indonesia and Thailand (December, 2004) was caused by unknown WMD, we canŐt say is it true or false, but using WMD in such ways is not a fantasy. The new types of WMD are lasers, infra sound, geophysical, genetic and informative weapons, and some of them are much more effective than nuclear weapons. ItŐs hard to detect that the cause of catastrophe was weapon and itŐs very difficult to say who used weapon. Perhaps, nuclear weapons will lose its ŇprestigeÓ in near future. But itŐs not important what will be the instrument of destroying, conflicts in the world will never be finished and people must find the way to reduce the possibility of conflicts, and treaties and agreements are not the only way.
First of all, we must change
ourselves. The confrontation we were talking about in the beginning of
Benchmark II wasnŐt cause by territorial discords, the reason is
incomprehension and intolerance. Of course, itŐs wrongly to justify activity of
fanatics, which say that their religion requires aggression towards the
unfaithful. Islam or any other world religion doesnŐt propagandize cruelty, but
the branches of world religions may be very dangerous. The representatives of
Christianity were very cruel in the periods of crusaders and inquisition.
Conflict of ŇWestÓ and ŇEastÓ (in contemporary
understanding) is fatally dangerous for whole mankind. The mutual mistrust and
contempt are the first signs of forthcoming war. Nuclear weapons will be able
to make this war the last in the mankind history, because of collapse of
civilization. The attitude to nuclear weapons should be very careful: if we
wonŐt prevent weapons proliferation, the situation in the world will be
uncontrolled; and if the pressure on some countries will be too heavy, that
countries will rise against others. In all situations the best solution is somewhere
ŇbetweenÓ, in the middle of all possible actions.
A lot of ways of controlling
proliferation of weapons exist; and treaties are likely to be the most humane
and effective way. But there is one more concerning point: critical situations
may happen, and leaders of countries trying to destroy their enemies may forget
that using nuclear weapons are able to destroy whole mankind. For what should
we wait? The future is always nearÉ