Dear readers,

During this research work I came across lots of materials- articles, reviews and analytical surveys about Iran nuclear program and its capability- in literature, newspapers and internet. Iran theme attracts me with its current varying state of affairs, compared with Libya and South Africa which have decided this very problem.

Iran Nuclear issue applies to lots of nations including Russia. The last offers uranium enriching on its territory. Lots of articles in Russian press and TV bulletins give contradictory information at times, but it made me do essay starting from the history of Iran nuclear program up to the prospects for the future.

I hope this work will help anybody use the material, which I have sorted out and worked up among lots of Mass media information.

Yours Kate Kuzmenko

The revelation in 2002 that Iran had a secret nuclear program propelled its case to the center stage of world politics. The Tehran government has persistently claimed that its nuclear program is designed solely to meet the country's civilian energy needs. Since the controversy broke, it has tried to negotiate a solution with the European Union and to avoid a confrontation with the United States.

However, Iran's secrecy has aroused suspicion. Americans and Europeans fear that Iran is planning to acquire nuclear weapons, because the same technology used for civilian power generation can produce weapons as well. As a European nuclear expert has remarked, some aspects of the Iranian programs are "highly troubling" because they appear to have gone "well beyond normal civilian activities." The Bush administration has accused Tehran of using its civilian program as a subterfuge to develop nuclear weapons secretly.

Although the United States, Britain, France, and Germany share common goals, they have not found any agreement over the past three years on the best way to stop Iran from proceeding with its program. Their ability to work together has been hampered by sharp disagreements over the war in Iraq, which has become a stumbling block for any meaningful cooperation on Iran.

Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran's nuclear program began in the mid-1970s with help from the West. Iran was a key ally in the US strategy to contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East and avoid Soviet threats to the supply of oil to the West. According to the National Security Decision Memorandum 292 dated 22 April 1975, the Ford administration agreed to provide Tehran "with material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own reactors." It also offered to sell the shah of Iran a reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, the power behind the deal, supported this stance because it would generate significant new business for corporate America, including Westinghouse and General Electric. The justification was that Iran needed "to prepare against the time—about fifteen years in the future—when Iranian oil production is expected to decline sharply." Recently, Kissinger has reversed his stance. He wrote in the Washington Post on 8 March 2005 that "for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources."

Kissinger was not the only member of the Ford team to change his mind. Vice President Richard Cheney is now the leading figure in the Bush administration trying to prevent Iran from acquiring the same nuclear technology that he had endorsed thirty years earlier. As he put it, the Iranians are "already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure why they need nuclear power as well to generate energy." One of the reasons for this shift is that Iran is no longer an ally. Another is Iran's new status as a "rogue nation," accused of supporting militant groups in the Middle East and of having vehement opposition to Israel.

The overthrow of the shah in 1979 brought to a halt the nuclear cooperation between the United States and Iran and put the two countries on a collision course. In November 1979, militant students had stormed the American Embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats as hostages for 444 days. Events surrounding the embassy takeover have continued to shape the relationship between the two countries. Since then, the United States has been in a tense standoff with Iran, with no diplomatic or economic ties. Republican and Democrat administrations alike have tried to isolate Iran from the rest of the international community. As Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has noted, "All US presidents since 1979 had sought to overthrow Iran's ruling establishment, but failed one after the other."

Due to continuing US hostility, the Islamic regime sought help from Russia to jumpstart its civilian nuclear program. Beginning in 1995, Moscow has assisted Tehran in the completion of a nuclear reactor at the gulf port of Bushehr, which hadbeen started with West Germany's expertise in the 1970s. The United States strongly opposed the completion of Bushehr and has lobbied Russia to discontinue its nuclear collaboration with Iran. Having failed to persuade Russia, Washington scrutinized Iran's nuclear activities for possible breaches of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sets guidelines for member-states on developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The first break came in August 2002, when an exile group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, reported on its country's secret nuclear facilities. Despite this report, the Bush administration initially put Iran on the back burner because of its preoccupation with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. By late March 2003, however, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control, announced that "in the aftermath of Iraq, dealing with the Iranian nuclear weapons program will be of equal importance as dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons program."

Iranian officials defended the secrecy under which they had been working, explaining that they feared that the United States and Europe would try to stop them. In March 2005, at a conference on nuclear energy in Paris, former president Hashemi Rafsanjani blamed the US sanctions and European trade restrictions for his country's going to the black market to purchase what it needed in nuclear materials. He pointed out that Americans and Europeans had reneged on a deal to build twenty power plants and to supply nuclear technology after the overthrow of the shah.

In February 2003, with its uranium enrichment secret revealed, Iranian officials promised to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to disclose all of its nuclear work. They also pointed out that neither the United States nor Israel had any proof to support claims that Iran is making a bomb. In fact, United Nations inspectors had found no evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the country.

Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, contends that his country's enriched uranium will be used solely to generate electricity. Iranian officials also have made it clear that they are not willing to give up their right to develop a nuclear program for peaceful applications. They point out that their country is on the verge of an environmental disaster. Its urban areas are suffering from air pollution because of substantial increases in energy consumption over the past two decades. Millions of old cars are still on the road, causing carbon emissions to nearly triple during the same period. On 21 February 2005, Fortune magazine reported that Tehran's air was "so thick with car fumes that schools were shut in early January when the pollution index hit 168 (compared with 52 that day in Manhattan)." Iran's environment is further threatened by pollution from the rapid development of oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian Sea. The Iranian leadership has been struggling to improve air quality and needs to take bold steps to avert an impending environmental disaster. Aside from taking tough measures to curtail gas consumption, development of an alternate source of energy is considered to be urgent if they are to meet the needs of a growing population, which has doubled in the past thirty years. Nuclear fuel is seen as a much better source of energy than oil because it is clean and reduces the greenhouse effect. In 2002, Japan, for instance, decided to build new nuclear reactors to meet the Kyoto Protocol's targets for reducing emissions. The United States had not opposed Japan's move.

Iran also argues that it needs to develop alternative energy sources because its oil resources are depleting, a prospect the United States had agreed on back in the 1970s. The country is wasting valuable resources to satisfy the internal demands for gasoline consumption at home. It already spends over $2 billion a year to import oil products (mainly gasoline), which is not produced locally. It also provides an annual subsidy of $3 billion to keep domestic oil prices down. In April 2004, the parliament decided to curtail that subsidy by more than doubling the domestic price of gas. A few months earlier, the government announced that it might have to start gasoline rationing.

The Iranian leadership recognizes that it has to lessen its dependence on oil. Its oil and gas should be reserved for export, as they are Iran's largest source of foreign exchange earnings (80 percent of total export earnings) and account for nearly half of the budget. In their view, developing nuclear energy is a logical step, both to satisfy the increasing demand for home consumption and to free more oil and gas for sale overseas, generating more revenue.

Iran also asserts that, under international treaties, it is entitled to develop its nuclear industry as long as it is used strictly for civil purposes. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (article 4), member-states have "the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." The treaty also calls for individual or collective cooperation for "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

Iranian officials believe that their country must be self-sufficient in the nuclear fuel cycle because it has been isolated as a result of the US sanctions. They stress that they are not doing anything different from what other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories have done. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States have their own uranium enrichment facilities. They are developing nuclear technology as a secondary source of energy to meet their population demands and to deal with environmental problems. Notably, the United States, which has huge untapped oil reserves, already generates 20 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Over the past thirty years, Washington has been developing alternative energy sources in order to lessen its reliance on foreign oil and to prevent the depletion of its own oil resources.

In March 2005, Mohamed El Baradei, director general of the IAEA, reported that thirty countries are using nuclear power to produce electricity. Today, there are 441 nuclear plants in operation around the world and another 27 are under construction. This number will certainly go up as the demand for energy rises to meet population growth in many countries, especially in Asia.

Iran has sought to use diplomacy as a way to reduce tension. It has been responsive to the EU's initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the controversy and has cooperated with the IAEA. Its main goal is to avoid a confrontation with the United States.

Summary

International policy options for the Iranian nuclear crisis do not exist in a vacuum. Desired US national security goals and global nonproliferation goals will be impossible to fulfill if the interests, perceptions, fears, and ambitions of the “target state,” Iran, are not duly considered and incorporated into US decision making.

Since the inception of the nuclear controversy, the Bush administration has been convinced that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will upset the balance of power in the region, possibly pushing Saudi Arabia and Egypt to acquire such weapons. There are already three other nuclear states in the area: Israel, India, and Pakistan. None of them allows international inspection of their nuclear facilities, because they are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. An unstated factor in US hostility to Iran is that, after 9/11, the Bush administration has opposed radical Islamists, especially in countries viewed as hostile to the United States or Israel. He has used preemptive war against Afghanistan and Iraq and he is now threatening Iran and Syria, which he has accused of interference in US-occupied Iraq.Bush has repeatedly warned both countries that meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq "is not in their interest."

American officials do not believe that Iran needs nuclear energy because of its massive oil and gas resources. They have also rejected its claim that it has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. As Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, explained, "That is why the International Atomic Energy Agency got so involved, why the Russians have been careful about providing fuel for the new reactor at Bushehr, and why the EU sent their foreign ministers in to get the Iranians to stop."

Altogether, several different reasons are being offered for why other countries should support the US opposition to Iran's nuclear program:

1. Iran concealed its nuclear program for eighteen years. Failure to notify the IAEA was a breach of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If Iran intended only to generate electricity, it could have done it openly because the treaty allows its members to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
2. Iran did not disclose to IAEA all uranium enrichment facilities in the country. One of the facilities is underground and has reinforced walls and roof to withstand air raids.
3. IAEA inspectors discovered traces of highly enriched uranium far above the level needed for civilian usage. The Bush administration rejected Iran's explanation that contamination could have happened abroad because the equipment was bought in the black market.
4. Iran is also building the infrastructure for nuclear weapons production. A heavy-water reactor, being built near Arak, can produce plutonium and is similar to the ones used in earlier years by the United States, France, and Russia to produce nuclear weapons.19
5. American officials fear that if Iran makes nuclear weapons, they might fall into terrorist hands and threaten the United States and other countries. They accuse Iran of destabilizing the region and of supporting terrorism to derail the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.20

Recommendations Based on These Iranian Perceptions and Domestic Realities

· Grant to Iran a Minimal Level of “Existential” Security.

· Do not carry out preemptive or preventive military strikes on (suspected) Iranian nuclear weapons facilities.

· Pursue a realistic, feasible solution to the nuclear crisis that relies on the demonstrated historical US ability to manage thorny conflicts of interest over long periods of time.

· Work closely with US friends in the Gulf to coordinate and integrate their interactions with Iran, including increased Arab investment in Iran’s faltering economy

· Reduce the fears of existential destruction that Israel and Iran harbor toward each other.

Conclusion

Pursuing Détente by Focusing on Common Interests

The Iranian nuclear crisis is inherently a slowgoing affair, and any positive solution will take months or years of hard work to construct and implement. Throughout this timespan, the United States should emphasize the common threat perceptions and international security interests shared between the United States and Iran, and make progress on mitigating these shared fears while dealing with major disagreements in a separate bilateral track. For instance, there is a cold, hard fact that has gone unreported by the Western media: although Iran aids vehemently anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon and the West Bank who use terrorist methods, it utterly fears the very transnational, anti-globalization, anti-US, Sunni terrorist groups that Washington is battling on the global scene. Al Qaeda and its virulent variants around the globe are every bit as much an ideological enemy of Shiite Iran as they are of the United States. Geopolitically, Iran and the United States also share an interest in stable oil supplies and prices, curbing the regional drug trade, and stemming the flow of arms and extremists across borders from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. For instance, in the past 25 years, more than 3600 Iranian border agents and drug enforcement officers have lost their lives in the never-ending battle against the illicit drug and arms trade emanating from Iran’s eastern neighbors. The United Kingdom is already a close partner with Tehran through direct financing of Iran’s antidrug efforts; the United States could also help Iran stem the tide of drugs and transnational extremists currently infiltrating the Greater Middle East, easing Iran’s burden and simultaneously increasing the domestic security of US friends such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

These are all common factors that would allow a more strategic, long-term, cooperative approach to the Iranian nuclear crisis. The end result would be an outcome much more positive for US national interests than the simplistic solution of military strikes. While the United States pursues this strategy of détente, it should not become oversold on either a “grand bargain” addressing all outstanding issues or an “issue-by-issue” approach based on incremental, tactical, overlapping interests on specific issues. The United States should hold out either approach as a goal to Tehran. The main thing is engagement. Iran has a cluttered, messy, complicated, and factionalized domestic system that involves a great deal of what might be called pseudodemocratic debate. It is not up to the United States to decide how détente or rapprochement may occur. Rather, it is up to the United States, as the much stronger power holding most of the cards, to express a willingness to cooperate tactically on key common issues such as squelching the drug trade in volatile areas surrounding Iran such as Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the United States should hold out the possibility of a more strategic compromise on multiple issues. Or, put another way, until the messy domestic debate occurs in Tehran on US recommendations, it is impossible to tell what will work better: full, comprehensive solutions or tactical bargains. In the end, both will probably have to occur simultaneously, and both will be negotiated against a background of confidence-building measures such as diplomatic statements foreswearing the first use of force by one party against the other.

Prospects for the Future

The crisis began when Iran's secret nuclear program became known abroad. The secrecy of its actions raised questions about its claim that the nuclear program is designed to produce electricity, not to make bombs. The core issue in the conflict is whether Iran should continue to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, which could be used to make atomic weapons. Although IAEA inspectors have not found nuclear weapons in Iran, the United States and the EU suspect that Tehran might be seeking to acquire such weapons. They both agree that Iran must abort its nuclear weapons program altogether. Because of this strong Western opposition, the Iranian leadership is trying diplomacy to avoid giving the United States an excuse to launch military strikes against Iran.

During Bush's first term, the Americans and Europeans could not agree on whether to use a stick or a carrot in dealing with Iran. As a result, they went their separate ways. Britain, France, and Germany pursued diplomacy, while the United States used threats and intimidation. European efforts were successful in getting Iran to suspend uranium enrichment temporarily. However, Iran resisted European demands to make the suspension permanent or to cease all work on nuclear fuel.

After Bush's successful reelection in November 2004, pragmatism has persuaded him to modify his stance. He is now working with European allies and backing their diplomatic efforts. He has finally agreed to offer Iran economic incentives in return for abandoning its nuclear ambitions. As Vice President Cheney put it at the end of March 2005, "It is important to make clear to the Iranians that they need . . . to give up any aspirations they might have had to acquire nuclear weapons." He also made it clear that other actions will be taken if Tehran does not comply with Western demands.

Iranian officials insist that their program is designed to produce electricity to meet the energy needs of an increasing population and expanding economy. They argue that it is more efficient for the country to enrich uranium than to import it. In March 2005, Sirus Naseri, an Iranian negotiator, commented, "Now that we can produce our own nuclear fuel, to give it up and rely on others to provide it would be ludicrous." He then asked, "Would the United States do it? Or France, Germany, Britain, or the Netherlands?" The Tehran government is unwilling to give up Iran's right, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to have enrichment technology for peaceful purposes. It has offered to allow the IAEA to monitor their facilities around the clock to ensure that its activities do not move toward nuclear weapons.

In early March 2005, El Baradei urged Iran "not just to play by the book, but to be more transparent, to allow us to do everything we want to do." He also reported that his agency "was making progress, particularly with regard to the uranium enrichment program."

Iran's position is clear, but it will be difficult for the Europeans to come to an agreement without US cooperation. Because the success of negotiations depends on how far the Bush administration is willing to go in return for Iran giving up its nuclear program, the United States needs to come to the negotiating table where concessions are discussed and deals are made. While the United States has joined the six-nation nuclear talks with North Korea, it has refused so far to sit down with Iran. Staying away from the bargaining sessions has left the United States with few cards to play.

Recent events in the Middle East suggest that the US reliance on threats can be counterproductive. There is no indication that they will persuade Tehran to cooperate, and several new realities have changed the Middle Eastern landscape. First, Shiite Muslims are becoming a new political force. The democratically elected government in Baghdad, dominated by Shiites, will have close ties with Iran. Also, Hezbollah is expected to play a major role in Lebanese politics as the country emerges from an era of Syrian dominance and moves toward a true democracy. The United States might need Iran's cooperation to stabilize both countries. Second, if the Iran issue is taken to the UN Security Council, there is no guarantee that punitive measures can be approved. Iran can rely on Russia and China to support it in the Security Council, and Washington is not likely to persuade Moscow or Beijing to break ranks with Tehran. Both countries now have lucrative business with Tehran. In fact, China is overtaking the West as Iran's major trading partner. In October 2004, the two governments signed a $70 billion deal, providing China with more than 270 million tons of natural gas over the next thirty years. Under these circumstances, the United States might need to solicit help from China and Russia to persuade Iran to move toward a solution. It is not in their own interests to see their investment and trade go up in flames if Bush decides on the military option.

Is the use of force an option? A failure to obtain Security Council action will make it possible for the United States or Israel to take military action. Both governments have openly stated that, if talks fail, force might be used to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran's foreign minister has warned that his country can strike back because its missiles can reach Israel as well as American bases in the Persian Gulf. It is suspected that Iran has the technical know-how to make an atomic bomb, but it is not there yet.

The British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, believes that it is "inconceivable" for the United States or Israel to use a military option. Preemptive military strikes against Iran are problematic because Iran's nuclear facilities are dispersed across the country and well protected. Unlike Iraq, Iran is far from Israel. This means that Israel would need permission from Turkey or Saudi Arabia to use their airspace to get to Iran. Since such permission is unlikely, Jordan becomes the wild card. Even with its permission, the Israelis would still have to use Iraq's airspace, which is controlled by the United States. American complicity in the attack will be widely criticized by the international community and might get some governments to reconsider their involvement in the war on terrorism.

A war is not feasible at this time because Iran is not Iraq. First, Iran has a larger population and is much stronger militarily than Iraq. Its nuclear sites are defended by a Russian missile defense system. Second, American military forces are spread very thin due to the continuing battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States cannot readily widen the scope of its area of active conflict. Third, there is a big risk in undertaking a military action against Iran. It will likely kill some Russian scientists and technicians at Bushehr's nuclear reactor, leading to worsening the already troubled relations with Moscow. It might turn Iraq's Shiite majority against the US occupation and provoke clashes at a time when American forces are facing a deadly insurgency across the country. It could ignite rage among the substantial Shiite minorities in the Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, inflaming anti-Americanism and destabilizing the pro–United States governments. This development would give extremists a boost throughout the Muslim world and result in further reprisals against Americans.

A significant factor too is that the United States lacks human intelligence on the ground to identify all locations of the Iranian nuclear facilities. It is certain that a preemptive strike will not destroy all facilities, some of which are hidden underground. It will only slow down the program. A negative consequence is that the Iranians will be even more determined to have nuclear weapons to defend their country against external threats. They may pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, put an end to IAEA inspection, and [speed up the process of developing nuclear weapons. Lastly, an attack on Iran might disrupt oil supplies to the West and to Japan, pushing oil prices even higher and negatively impacting the world economy. Thus, if the United States is interested in continuing to have unhindered access to Middle Eastern oil, its relationship with Iran must be improved.

The Bush administration needs to rethink its strategy. If it is serious about a diplomatic solution, it must make every endeavor to help the EU deal with Iran. The Europeans believe that they are in a no-win situation as long as the United States does not participate in the talks. The United States needs to hear and address Iran's security and economic concerns. Tehran has good reasons to feel threatened by the United States. The latest warnings about regime change make the Iranian leaders rightly nervous, particularly when American troops are present in large numbers on both sides of Iran's borders. They are aware that the Bush administration has already equipped Israel with bunker-busting smart bombs in preparation for a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear reactor. In their view, having nuclear weapons could serve as a deterrent to discourage other nations from violating Iran's sovereignty. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, warned that if the United States doesn't join the talks, "Iran may not have any incentive to change its strategic calculations about why it needs nuclear weapons."

The Bush administration must also deal with Iran's economic needs because unilateral US sanctions have had severe effects on the Iranian economy. For twenty-five years, Iran's oil and gas industries have suffered from a lack of access to the latest American technology and advanced oil-production equipment. Its aging oil infrastructure could benefit greatly from doing business with the United States, and renewed American investment could create a bonanza for both Iran and the United States. If it chose to do so, the Bush administration would have a lot to offer to entice Iran away from its nuclear program.

The talks have reached a critical stage. Iran's patience is running thin because, in an election year, the government has shown no tangible benefits from two years of talks. In May 2005, Iranian officials announced their intentions to restart a uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan if an agreement was not reached soon. In response, British, French, and German foreign ministers warned that they would back US efforts to take the matter to the UN Security Council. As they put it, "The consequences could only be negative for Iran." The crisis was averted because Iran had not yet set a date for the resumption of uranium enrichment.

After decades of mutual hostility and distrust, some steps must be taken to create proper conditions for a compromise. The Bush administration can turn things around by joining the ongoing talks or by starting direct negotiations with Tehran. A lifting of the US sanctions, tied to Iran's curbing of its nuclear program and ceasing its support for militant groups, might work if the two governments are willing to put past differences behind them. Reaching a diplomatic solution will depend on whether the EU and the United States can offer Iran enough guarantees to ensure its security and economic well-being in return for giving up sensitive parts of its nuclear program.