Benchmark II

Pupil: Ksenia Kurenykh,10 form,

school № 76, Lesnoy.

Teacher: Olga Romanova, school № 76,

Lesnoy.

Objective 1

Space law

Space law is an area of the law that encompasses national and international law governing activities in outer space. International lawyers have been unable to agree on a uniform definition of the term "outer space," although most lawyers agree that outer space generally begins at the lowest altitude above sea level at which objects can orbit the Earth, (approximately 100 km). The inception of the field of space law began with the launching in October of 1957 of the world's first satellite, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's Sputnik. In 1958, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev each asked the United Nations to consider the legal issues associated with space activity. The U.N. subsequently created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS"). COPUOS in turn created two subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee has been the primary forum for discussion and negotiation of international agreements relating to outer space.

International treaties

Five international treaties have been negotiated and drafted in the COPUOS: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty"), the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Rescue Agreement"), the 1973 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"), the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention"), and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Moon Treaty"). The Outer Space Treaty is the most widely-adopted treaty, with 98 parties. The Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention all elaborate on provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. U.N. delegates apparently intended that the Moon Treaty serve as a new comprehensive treaty which would supersede or supplement the Outer Space Treaty, most notably by elaborating upon the Outer Space Treaty's provisions regarding resource appropriation and prohibition of territorial sovereignty. The Moon Treaty has only 12 parties, and many consider it to be a failed treaty due to its limited acceptance.

Consensus

The COPUOS operates on the basis of consensus, i.e. all committee and subcommittee delegates must agree on treaty language before it can be included in the final version of a treaty, and the committees cannot place new items on their agendas unless all member nations agree. One reason that the U.N. space treaties lack definitions and are unclear in other respects, is because it is easier to achieve consensus when language and terms are vague. In recent years, the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee has been unable to achieve consensus on discussion of a new comprehensive space agreement, and it is also unlikely that the Subcommittee will be able to agree to amend the Outer Space Treaty in the foreseeable future. Many spacefaring nations seem to believe that discussing a new space agreement or amendment of the Outer Space Treaty would be futile and time consuming, because entrenched differences regarding resource appropriation, property rights and other issues relating to commercial activity make consensus unlikely.

1998 agreement

In addition to the international treaties that have been negotiated in the United Nations, the nations participating in the International Space Station have entered into the 1998 Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (the "Space Station Agreement"). This Agreement provides, among other things, that NASA is the lead agency in coordinating the member states' contributions to and activities on the space station, and that each nation has jurisdiction over its own module(s). The Agreement also provides for protection of intellectual property and procedures for criminal prosecution. This Agreement may very well serve as a model for future agreements regarding international cooperation in facilities on the Moon and Mars.

National law

Space law also encompasses national laws, and many countries have passed national space legislation in recent years. The Outer Space Treaty requires parties to authorize and supervise national space activities, including the activities of non-governmental entities such as commercial and non-profit organizations. The Outer Space Treaty also incorporates the U.N. Charter by reference, and requires parties to ensure that activities are conducted in accordance with other forms of international law such as customary international law (the custom and practice of states). The advent of commercial space activities beyond the scope of the satellite communications industry, and the development of many commercial spaceports, is leading many countries to consider how to regulate private space activities. The challenge is to regulate these activities in a manner that does not hinder or preclude investment, while still ensuring that commercial activities comply with international law. The developing nations are concerned that the spacefaring nations will monopolize space resources.

The future of space law

While this field of the law is still in its infancy, it is in an era of rapid change and development. Arguably the resources of space are infinite, and limited only by our ability to use them in a manner that is fair and equitable to all nations. If commercial space transportation becomes widely available, with substantially lower launch costs, then all countries will be able to directly reap the benefits of space resources. In that situation, it seems likely that consensus will be much easier to achieve with respect to commercial development and human settlement of outer space.[1]

Table № 1: Emerging and existing space powers and their brief characteristics.

Emerging space powers	Their brief characteristics	Existing space powers	Their brief characteristics
India	1) Launch capability (1980); 2) Focus on “space for development” - remote sensing for argiculture; - telemedicine: - tele-education. 3) Exploration (resent) (Chandrayan-1).	France	1) Launch capability (1965); 2) Largest space budget; 3) Increasing use of micro-satellites.
Brazil	1) Developing a launching capability; 2) Collaboration with China; 3) Desire to be the lead space actor for South America.	Germany	Largest funder of ESA
South Africa	Total number of states who have owned a satellite is 44 (out of >180)	Italy
Nigeria		The UK	Launch capability (1971 – only 1 launch)
Malaysia		ESA	1) Second larget space budget; 2) Extensive scientific satellite capability.
South Korea		EU	1) Emerging space actor; 2) Dual use space capabilities (Galileo and GMES).
Iran		Japan	1) Launch capability (1970); 2) Extensive space exploration missions; 3) Traditionally no military space but recent change.
Saudi Arabia		Ukraine	1) Inherited many space capabilities from the USSR including launch capabilities; 2) Launch capability through sea launch (1999).
		Israel	Launch capability (1988)
		Russia
		China

China's space program aims at peaceful use of space resources

China's successful launch of its second manned spacecraft Shenzhou-6 on Oct. 12 has drawn worldwide applause in recognition of the technological advances to become the world's third nation capable of putting a man into space.

It is widely believed at home and abroad that the latest progress made by China will surely improve national cohesiveness and make the country's 1.3 billion people more confident in their future in terms of social and economic progress.

However, some people in and outside China describe China's manned space program as a prestige project which yields little economic benefit.

They argue that billions of US dollars spent on the decade-old space program may be better used for poverty relief and education as millions of Chinese still have a poor living and many children cannot afford basic schooling.

Qi Faren, who took part in developing the country's first satellite launched in 1970 and acted as the chief designer of China's first five Shenzhou spaceships, said mankind needs to make use of space resources for sustainable human development.

Space technology has become increasingly important for the exploration and peaceful use of space resources due to the shrinking reserve of natural resources on the Earth, said the grey-haired scientist in his 70s.

He estimated that the lunar reserve of isotope helium 3 is sufficient for human need for about 10,000 years, which is attractive to the mankind being troubled by high oil prices and limited oil reserve.

Experts say China has benefited from the dividend of its investment in space sector. Space technology has become an indispensable part of people's daily life, such as weather forecast, telecommunications, disaster reduction, and resources prospecting.

Striving hard to feed its 1.3 billion people and more in the future, China has been developing improved species of crops on thebasis of space technology, mostly through recoverable satellites and spacecraft.

Gu Yidong, chief designer of the spacecraft application system of China's manned space program, said the information obtained from Shenzhou-3 and Shenzhou-4 in Earth observation has been used for maritime pollution control and desertification control projects, which is useful for China and other parts of the world.

Experiments in new materials, pharmaceutical products and life sciences have been conducted as part of manned space programs in many countries, said Xu Dazhe, deputy general manager of the China Space and Technology Group, developer of China's spacecraft and Long March carrier rockets.

Zhang Qingwei, a rocket expert and deputy commander-in-chief ofChina Manned Space Program, described a manned space program as a highly complicated project and the most challenging one of space technology.

"It is the indication a country's comprehensive national strengthen and scientific and technological capability as a whole," he said.

Hu Shixiang, deputy commander-in-chief of China Manned Space Program, told Xinhua on the eve of Shenzhou-6's launch that China's manned space program is designed to make peaceful use of space resources, which "will eventually benefit the world."

Bearing that notion in mind, China has been open to international cooperation.

"Different countries should work with each other in manned space projects as space programs are too costly for a single nation, and it will be economically and technological beneficial if countries join together in space projects," he said.

Each scientific and technological achievement China has made inits manned space program will help promote the world's scientific and technological development. And once commercialized, the beneficiaries will be both the Chinese and people in the whole world at large, he said.

China's economic reform and opening-up during the past 27 years have helped reduce the poor population from 250 million in 1978 to about 20 million, according to a World Bank report.

China has pinned high hopes on the advancement of science and technology, including space technology, for its sustainable socialand economic development, as its stunning economic progress featuring intensive input of resources is challenged by the shortage of energy and raw materials.

China's economy has been growing at an average 9.4 percent annually in the past 27 years since 1978.

China has listed space technology and information technology among the country's seven high-tech fields in its national high-tech research and development program initiated in 1986.[2]

Developing Nigeria Embarks on Space Program

ABUJA, July 4 (Reuters) - Nigeria, one of the world's poorest countries, is to launch its own space program in the form of an agency that will develop rocket and satellite technology, Transport Minister Ojo Madueke announced on Wednesday.

He said the government had allocated three billion naira ($26.7 million) for the program and that the agency will receive 2.5 billion naira ($22.4 million) annually in the next three years with the aim of becoming self-financing.

Although Nigeria is the world's sixth largest oil exporter, it has an external debt of $28.5 billion, according to government figures, and is struggling to provide its citizens with roads, education and basic health services.

With a per capita annual income of $300, it is one of the world's 20 poorest countries, according to World Bank figures.

President Olusegun Obasanjo will head the National Council on Space Science Technology, which will oversee the program, and Vice President Atiku Abubakar will be deputy chairman.[3]

Malaysian National Space Agency

Malaysian National Space Agency or in Malay, Agensi Angkasa Negara (ANGKASA) was established in 2002. It is responsible in providing leadership in space education and research as well as assisting the Malaysian government in formulating national policies on space. The first and current director general of the agency is Dr. Mazlan Othman.

Manned space program

As part of a transaction whereby the Malaysian government bought 18 Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighter jets, the Russian Federal Space Agency has agreed to take a Malaysian astronaut into space in 2007.

Angkasa has also announced plans to send astronauts to the Moon by 2020.

In April of 2006, Angkasa sponsored a conference of scientists and religious authorities, addressing the issue of how the circumstances of space travel would affect the obligations faced by Muslim astronauts (for instance, how can one face the qibla while orbiting the Earth). The Agriculture and Agro-based Industry Ministry parliamentary secretary Datuk Rohani Abdul Karim said that the Malaysian astronaut will spin a top, play with five stones, paint a 'batik' motif and make 'pulled' tea (commonly called 'teh tarik' in Malaysia). She further said that the outcome of the experiments would be studied on earth with the hope that it would unravel the mysteries in science, education and medicine (Bernama, 2006).

Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor was selected on September 4, 2006 to be the first Malaysian Angkasawan in space.

Criticism

The cost of sending a single Malaysian angkasawan into space has been estimated at RM $95 million (approximately USD $26 million). The entire Malaysian space program has been criticized as a severe waste of money for a developing nation that could ill afford such indulgences. It is noted that Malaysia would basically be using foreign space programs as a "taxi service" to transport its angkasawan to play what are essentially childrens' games and other trivial activities in space.[4]

Missile Programs of South Africa

In October 1989, NBC News reported that a missile produced by ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) was launched on July 5, 1989, and flew 900 miles southeast over the Indian Ocean. (1) It was subsequently reported that "knowledgeable U.S. officials" confirmed the NBC report that an intermediate-range missile "was constructed and flown by South Africa July 5 using technology acquired from Israel." (2) The "apparently successful test is regarded by U.S. experts as the first of several needed for the white-minority government of South Africa to have a reliable missile force." (3) The missile was launched from a facility named Arniston by the CIA, but locally known as the "RSA" from its Overberg test site at the southern tip of Africa.

Reportedly this first test was followed by a second on 19 November 1990. A third test-firing of South Africa's intermediate-range missile was expected in the spring of 1991 but was never reported to have occurred. The South Africa government’s official statement was that the missiles were booster rockets for a peaceful space program.

South Africa's large industrial and scientific base indicates that indigenous production of ballistic missiles would not be difficult to achieve. The possible mission of such a weapon, however, was somewhat of a mystery, as South Africa enjoyed a vast military superiority over its neighbors. The ascribed 1,450 km/1,000 kg capability of the Aniston would enable the South African armed forces to hit targets in all the "front-line states": Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. There was little doubt that South Africa had the technical capability and experience to produce nuclear warheads as well: On March 25, 1993, Prime Minister P.W. DeKlerk announced that six of a planned seven atomic bombs had been built, but then dismantled in 1990. (4) This is the first case of a country voluntarily scrapping its nuclear weapons. (Later examples are Belarus, Kazahkstan, and Ukraine.) South Africa signed the NPT in 1991. With the advent of the Mandela government, the Arniston has been cancelled, nuclear weapons development has been repudiated, and South Africa has joined the MTCR in October 1995. In February 1999, South Africa's first satellite, Sunsat was launched into space on board a US Air Force Boeing Delta II rocket.[5]

Israeli Missile Defense Systems: The US-Israeli Connection

There are two options to deal with the problems of nuclear weapons and their missiles proliferated and deployed in the Middle East. Peace movements and forces consider steps leading to disarmament, particularly the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles - the way to achieve security for all peoples of the region. The second option is to concentrate on building up military forces as the road to security. Missiles and nukes acquired in the region are used as a pretext to build up national military forces in order to implement the policies of the relevant states. Consequently an open-ended wave of arms races will be triggered blocking the road to peace.

The book Israeli Missile Defense Systems: The US-Israeli Connection focuses on the first option.

The first and second chapters discuss the problem as a historical phenomenon. The consequences of the US-Soviet nuclear and missile race after Word War II lead to the dangerous threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). To prevent the actual use of nuclear weapons and their missiles, this process was crowned by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. It prohibited the deployment of any nation-wide ABM system in any of the two countries. Thus, MAD remained intact and "strategic stability" was maintained.

New Areas of Nuclear Confrontations

However, this strategic stability could not continue unabated due to the worldwide contradiction between the US and the Soviet Union. Either the contradiction would be gradually resolved conducive to zero nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles or it would escalate leading to the collapse of the strategic stability.

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, intensive competition between both super-powers erupted, mainly in three areas: the nuclear confrontation between them as a result of the deployment of their medium range missiles in Europe, East and West; their sharp competition in the Third World Countries, each seeking to entrench its influence; and the manipulation of regional crises particularly in the Middle East.

In the course of these developments the US established its Rapid Deployment Force to project power on any hostile state, created "freedom fighter" groups and Special Units to deal with low intensity conflicts in developing countries of Asia and Africa, and initiated the famous "Star Wars" project to deploy missile defense systems and weapons in space. By the year 1983, when President Reagan announced this project, strategic stability with the Soviet Union neared collapse.

Various ballistic missile "defense" systems are examined, mainly the Reagan, Clinton, and Bush projects with special emphasis on those tested or deployed after the end of the Cold War. Four main conclusion are drawn:

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems are now deployed in many regions.

National or Global Missile Defense system will be produced with the aim of deploying weapons in space.

US efforts have been made to warm its relations with Russia.

While not excluding possible rivalry between the US and Russia, the main targets are now countries hostile to US policies in any region, including China.

Thus the areas of nuclear and missile confrontation have been mainly shifted from Europe and the US in the North to regions in the South and East.

The US-Israeli Connection

Before this background, the third chapter examines nuclear and missile deployment in the Middle East. The central point of this survey is the US-Israeli connection. President Reagan declared that Israel is a "strategic asset", and a memorandum of strategic understanding was signed by US and Israeli Defense Ministers at the time of his presidency allowing the latter to join the "Star Wars" project.

Consequently technical assistance was provided to develop Israeli missiles, satellites, and space technology. In addition, Israel acquired US TMD systems (Patriot-3), produced the Arrow system jointly with the US, and even conducted tests with the US in order to develop laser systems - the main future space weapon. A decision to this effect was taken by President Clinton. To counter these threats, other countries of the region seek all means to acquire more missiles to compensate for the effect of US-Israeli TMDs.

Also, the integration of all US weaponry systems, land, air and sea, together with the interrelationship among US military strategies, is discussed in the book. Among the latter are the counter proliferation strategy to use force combined with effective nuclear deterrence against countries which may try to acquire WMDs and missiles, the projection of power by the nuclear capable Rapid Deployment Forces against any country hostile to US policies, and the use of special units in secret operations. Most alarming is the integration of all these systems and strategies with ballistic missile defense systems, produced by the US and Israel, a step which will create a variety of intensive and very effective deterrence leveled by their conventional and non-conventional weapons.

Thus, the countries of the region face two deadly threats: Israeli nuclear weapons threats and US military threats if any of them will try to acquire WMD and missiles to counter Israeli nuclear weapons.

The Alternatives

Alternatives to all these grave threats are examined in the fourth chapter, and the author heavily draws on papers and conclusions of the panels of the INESAP project "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" (MBMD). These conclusions are adapted to reflect the Middle East conditions.

Instead of banning missile tests in order to prevent the deployment of missile defense systems (as called for at a MBMD meeting in Santa Barbara in early 2001), a call for banning development (R&D), test, and deployment of these systems in the Middle East is endorsed because TMDs have already been deployed in the region.

Also, the transformation of the Middle East into a zone free of WMD - nuclear, chemical and biological - including delivery vehicles is highlighted as the best option to put an end to the threats of all these weapons, to ban all missile defense systems and to prevent US counter proliferation strategies and its policies against the so-called rogue states.

Finally, the political conditions to implement the alternatives are briefly examined. Among them are the necessity of socio-economic and human development as the assured base to secure national security; the elimination of the root causes of conflicts to be pursued instead of conflict management, the transformation of civil society into human society, and other appropriate conditions which ensure the implementation of the alternatives.[6]

Space use and ethics

Practical everyday life has been vastly changed by space technolgy. Whether they are aware of it or not, every TV viewer, every Internet surfer, every telephone user, as well as every consumer of weather forecasts benefits from this modern technology. We also need space technology in order to better recognize, assess, and more accurately amend problems like ozone layer damage, desert growth, and soil erosion - problems that we have created ourselves with our natural science progress. Space technology has become a vital part of life.

This is one of its sides. On the other side, it contributes to more efficient military actions, often using the same technology and equipment that serve civilian life. This dual-use potential raises questions of conscience for many people. In addition, new space-based defense and attack systems are being developed - at high financial stakes and with little public debate. Further, as space activity grows, the question of related risks gains in importance, ranging from space junk to plutonium-based energy systems.

Finally, how should we view the visions of some genetic researchers and space experts wo want to create new, permanent living space for future human generations on space stations, planets, and asteroids? At least in connection with this last picture of the future, the question emerges of how we really want to live and what future we want to preserve or provide for our descendants. The questions of what we want cannot be separated from the ones of what we should do or what we can responsibly do.[7]

The US and the USSR in space

U.S.-Soviet civilian and military uses of space has become a complex and contentious issue, bringing into play numerous balances or imbalances of international scientific and technological cooperation.

The shape of future cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a delicate balance of two competing objectives. On one side is the scientific and practical benefits of the two countries sharing their separate knowledge for a more complete understanding of the whole. The other side is the advertent or inadvertent transfer of sensitive technology from one country to the other. The trade off is difficult to assess, especially in light of the history behind the decision to be made, both with the U.S. and with France. Since both countries' space programs are heavily military and strategic, international cooperation in space has been difficult. Early joint ventures began on an interagency level, then on to an intergovernmental level. The most significant joint venture was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project

in May of 1970. While certainly a landmark in international cooperation, the resulting technology transfers made some question the wisdom of continuing along this line. Also questionable is the amount of reciprocity the Soviets have

provided in these exchanges. France has continually maintained a working relationship with the Soviet Union on a limited space agenda. The French definition of militarily sensitive technology differs from the U.S. definition, making wide ranging policy implications between the two countries inevitable.

However, the U.S. has been able to gain information about the Soviet program through the French that otherwise would have been difficult to acquire.

The key issue revolves around several important questions. While a few deal with the aspects of research opportunities and cost effectiveness, the most important ones deal with who receives the most benefit from the exchange and to

what end the exchange is pursued. The final debate remains on whether the advances made from technological and scientific cooperation in space will offset the technological and scientific losses the U.S. will experience in such an exchange.

United States-Soviet Union cooperation in space has existed since the late l950’s on a somewhat limited basis. This relationship in space has essentially been as unpredictable as all other endeavors of cooperation with the Soviets. It is comprised of a combination of scientific, foreign policy, and national security issues and is influenced by a background of strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous relations between the two countries. U. S.-Soviet civilian and military uses of space has become a complex and contentious issue, bringing into play numerous balances and imbalances of international scientific and technological cooperation.

The shape and magnitude of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space will be determined by balancing four competing objectives, of which this paper will primarily focus on the first two. These objectives are as follows:

* the scientific and practical benefits that can be gained from space cooperation;

* the potential transfer of sensitive military technology and know-how between the two countries;

* the effect of space cooperation on foreign policy;

* perceptions about Soviet motivations and behavior and the course of U. S.-Soviet relations overall.

Experience also suggests that from a scientific and practical point of view, space cooperation can lead to significant gains in some areas of space research. In addition, it may provide the U.S. with a much better understanding of the Soviet space program. Past experiences further suggest that the possibilities of technology transfer from the U.S. to the Soviets will continue to be a countervailing concern for any future space cooperation. Should the U.S. continue to seek cooperation in space with the Soviet Union, it will have to come to terms with these concerns. The issue is not the transfer of military sensitive technology. Most people agree that we need to restrict its flow. The issues are, what is considered military sensitive technology, who is authorized to make that decision, and how do we protect potentially sensitive military technology in any exchange programs?

All our past experiences in space cooperation with the Soviets suggest this will be a difficult and controversial challenge. Further, the Soviets' aggressive campaign to acquire Western technology and know-how in space related areas aggravates the issue and provides motivation for limiting U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space. Because of many conflicts and the multiplicity of views about East-West cooperation in space, the shape, size, scope, and effectiveness of any potential space cooperation between the two will be determined by how these viewpoints are reflected in policy.

U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space has been limited. For the most part, the two countries have developed two extensive programs in almost complete isolation from each other. In principle, both have been committed to the ideal of international cooperation in space. But, because, both countries having space programs heavily military and strategic in nature, this has not happened.

The Soviets'early approach to space on was characterized by efforts to score propaganda points and beat the U.S. in all facets of space exploration. The U.S. has been favorably disposed toward cooperation in space with the Soviets. The U.S. not only viewed cooperation as a means to promote peace, but also as a means of pooling technical knowledge, placing the use of space under some degree of control, and increasing itsinternational prestige. However, the early U. S. overtures, for the most part, were rejected or ignored.

Formal development of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has benefited from general growth in U.S.-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation. This cooperation has occurred on a number of levels: on a bilateral intergovernmental basis, in multilateral forums, and through more informal scientist-to-scientist exchanges. In 1959, cooperation began on a bilateral basis with the signing of agreements between the Soviet Academy of Science and NASA. In addition, the U.S. and the Soviets have signed agreements to cooperate in space on four other occasions.

The first two of these were at the interagency level in 1962 and 1971 between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Science. The latter two occasion were at the intergovernmental level, when an "Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purpose" was signed in 1972 and reviewed in 1977. On the multilateral front, U.S.-Soviet cooperation has expanded through numerous international projects and organizations such as the World Weather Watch and the International Maritime Satellite system. The U.S. and Soviet Union have also signed numerous U.N. agreements concerning the peaceful uses of outer space.

Despite these early attempts at cooperation in space, the road has been an uneven one marked by intermittent hopes, occasional accomplishments, and many disappointments. This path of cooperation is due to a number of factors: high level secrecy surrounding Soviet space activities, the inability of both countries to separate the issues of U.S.-Soviet military and political competition on earth from the pursuit of cooperation in space, the United States' unwillingness to share its space technology, and the perceived space race which began in October 1957 with the launching of Sputnik.

In tracing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, it is easy for one to see that the decades of the 50's and the 60's were ones of frustration. Cooperation actually reached a high point in the 1970's at the height of detente, with the Apollo-Soyuz test project. Soon afterwards, in the late 1970's cooperation began to decline to low levels, with the collapse of the 1972 cooperation agreement in 1982. The mid-1980's found a new drive for the U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space. The most prolific statement was the signing of Public Law 98-562 in Qctober 1984, which supported the renewing of space cooperation with the Soviet Union, and th subsequent proposals for prospective U.S.-Soviet joint ventures.

The most recent attempt was on November 11, 1986 with the signing of the Space Cooperation Pact, which established sixteen cooperative programs. This new agreement specifically limits the transfer of technology and know-how in both directions. The primary focus of this new agreement centers instead on the coordination of certain projects and the exchange of data. Some of the primary projects where cooperation could take place are:

* Mars mission cooperation;

* Sharing data from the Soviet Phobos probe (for the study of Mar's moon);

* America's Mars Observer to be launched in the early 1990's;

* U.S. Magellan probe to Venus.

As a whole, this agreement is viewed as entirely more specific than the earlier ones, which culminated in the joint Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project is the first and only large scale joint adventure in space where the U.S. and the Soviets have cooperated. It is also probably the first attempt at cooperation in space where there was a significant chance for the

ransfer of any important technology or know-how.

In May 1970, the U.S. put forth a proposal to develop a common docking mechanism for manned spacecraft and space stations. This proposal was based on the belief that there was the need for each country to have reciprocal rescue capabilities to enhance astronaut safety.

It is not entirely clear why the Soviets chose this time to cooperative with the United States in space, but many believe it was primarily based on Soviet technological requirements. In 1968 a manned Soyuz 3 approached the unmanned Soyuz 2 apparently with the intentions of docking, but did not do so. In October 1969, a tandem flight of three manned spacecraft took place. Two of these were expected to dock, but again did not do so. Both of these missions were presumed to be failures. Due to the lack of success the Soviets have had in their attempts at docking in space, the U.S. offer of cooperation in this particular area of space technology was seen as an incentive for the Soviets to agree to the joint adventure.

Despite the dramatic hopes this adventure represented, the project gradually became the most visible and controversial product of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space. Many believe that the mission was wasteful and a bad choice for the use of limited space dollars. These same individuals believed that the U.S. had also financed the opportunity for the Soviets to present themselves as technological equals to the United States. They further pointed out that it was totally unrealistic to believe that the United States' space technology had not been passed. The Soviets ended up with the docking mechanism, which as of that time they were sorely lacking.

Other transfers of technology are believed to have taken place during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. This transfer is primarily believed to have taken place during the experimental phase of the in-flight mission. The first example of significance was the experiment utilizing the U.S. material research oven to melt metals and then resolidify them in order to study the effects of weightlessness and conviction. Another possible area of concern is the transfer of thruster technology. The Soviet spacecraft of this generation were not highly maneuverable, and had to rely on the Apollo spacecraft to do the maneuvering when an experiment required it.

As for the passing of technology and know-how from the Soviets to the U. S., there is not any of significance to note. The main benefit that the U.S. derived from this project was the break in secrecy surrounding the Soviet space program as a whole and probably a fair understanding of the level of their space technology in 1975.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project brings to the front the main question as to what extent will the Soviets go to gain access to militarily sensitive technology and technical know-how through U.S.-Soviet space cooperation? The issue of "technology transfer" is part of a much larger debate, and at the head of this debate are two very important national interest issues: "the importance of minimizing the use of American scientific and technological expertise in the building up of Soviet military strength, and the importance of maintaining and promoting open communication in science and technology. "

Few would argue against cooperation in space with the Soviets as long as it was a two way street. However, they would suggest that the cooperation remain strictly controlled. The assumption behind this is that the Soviets are making important military gains through the acquisition of Western technology. Intelligence reports have even shown that one of the primary acquisition targets of the Soviet Union is Western space technology. Therefore, it is believed that cooperation in space with them will only facilitate an already extensive Soviet program for the acquisition of space related technology. To further aggravate the debate over U. S. -Soviet cooperation is the issue of defining what technology is really militarily sensitive. The issue of defining what is sensitive has proven to be an exceedingly ambiguous exercise. Numerous regulatory mechanisms have been established to control the transfer of militarily sensitive technology, but these mechanisms have themselves became the subject of enormous controversy. Therefore, the issue of sharpening the definition of what maybe militarily sensitive in space without stifling scientific inquiry will be a major challenge if U.S.-Soviet space cooperation is to exist.

If a realistic definition of militarily sensitive technology cannot be determined, the issue then becomes how we can actually use sensitive technology and information in cooperative projects with the Soviets. There is the belief that at certain times, it may be in the United States' interest to allow some potentially sensitive technology to be utilized. It is felt that the soviets have limited capabilities for absorbing this sensitive Western technology and applying it successfully to improve their production know-how. However, by allowing the Soviet Union access to this technology the U.S. could conceivably acquire valuable information on Soviet capabilities as they existed atany given time. But, we must caution ourselves against underestimating the Soviet capacity for absorbing technical information, copying Western technology, and incorporating particular items of technology into their military effort even without the ability to reproduce them. This too will be an important issue if U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is to exist.

Looking at the Soviet approach to cooperation in space, we generally find that it is quite different from our own. Space cooperation is an integral part of Soviet foreign policy and its objectives extend beyond a desire for peace to competition as well. The Soviets view their relations with the United States not only as competition between two military or space programs but between two political and social systems as well. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine expresses an incompatibility between the Socialist and non-Socialist countries. The Soviets consistently use their space program to pursue foreign policy objectives which are more competitive and confrontational in nature. They believe in using space as a propaganda tool to enhance their national prestige and influence worldwide opinion while weakening that of the United States. They continually resist linking cooperation in space with other political events, yet they have no qualms linking the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative with future U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The implication of all of this is that the Soviets more closely tie their willingness for cooperation in space with the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

An alternate perspective to U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is how other western countries, most notably France has dealt with the issue of space cooperation with the Soviets and the possible implications of technology transfer. French cooperation in space with the Soviets dates back to 1966 when Charles de Gaulle visited Moscow and signed an "Intergovernmental Accord o Scientific/Technical and Economic Cooperation." Within this agreement was a large segment that dealt with French-Soviet cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space that provided the framework for formal cooperation in space activities. This accord provided for the establishment of an organization called the "Grande Commission, " comprised of both French and Soviet scientists. The purpose of this organization was to assess on-going programs and initiate new ones. The main agency in France that was responsible for national space policy and programs was CNES. It also had the responsibility of developing international cooperation on both bilateral and multilateral bases.

France's commitment to cooperation in space on all levels is reflected in CNES' annual budget. It was almost 600 million dollars of which half was budgeted toward bilateral andmultilateral cooperation.

While most of this was directed toward the European Space Agency, at least 10%, or 51 million francs was directed toward cooperation with the Soviets. In contrast, the French budgeted 83 million francs toward cooperation with the United States.

France's cooperation with the Soviets is significant, however, it is concentrated in a relatively small number of areas. These range from the exchange of data and information to a joint flight in 1982. The main areas of cooperation as outlined by CNES as late as 1984 are:

* astronomy;

* solar system exploration;

* materials processing in space;

* life sciences.

The French perspective toward cooperation with the Soviets is somewhat different than that of the U.S. Therefore, the issues concerning French-Soviet cooperation are also different.

Typical examples of these differences are found in the responses of the U.S. and France toward the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas the U. S. let cooperation in space lapse, the French decided such cooperation should be sustained. While the key issue in the U.S. today is whether space cooperation should be renewed, the key issue in France is the degree to which this cooperation should be maintained. This is not to say that the issue of French-Soviet cooperation in space is without controversy within France. Opposition, though, has generally stemmed from humanitarian concerns rather than ones of strategic or national interest.

In light of France's desire to continue and expand cooperation with the Soviets, the question concerning the possible transfer of militarily sensitive technology becomes important. It is also one of the possible dangers that greatly concerns the U. S. within the framework of U.S.-French cooperation in space. France concedes that the Soviets are aggressively seeking access to Western technology and know-how, and that they are undoubtly acquiring technical capabilities from France beyond those they already possess. The scope of the Soviets' mission to acquire western technology and know-how was highlighted in 1983 by the expulsion of 43 Soviet technological spies. Additionally, French intelligence leak in 1985 Soviet documents which provide further proof of the breath of Soviet industrial espionage in the West, especially in the aeronautical field.

The question in the French mind, though, is just how much value are these new capabilities to the Soviets. This is where the French and U.S. policy differ most markedly. At the core of this difference lies the definition of "militarily sensitive technology. In the case of the French, their definition is not as stringent as that of the U.S. Even with this difference, the French believe that they have adequate controls in place to the avoid the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviets. To avoid this transfer, the French, like the U.S., have a Missile Technology Control List of sensitive technologies. They also have an interministerial group of specialists who examine every new project for the potential of sensitive technology transfer. Thus, each project is evaluated for its technology transfer potential.

France's policy of cooperation with the Soviets in space has had policy implications for the United States. It has made the U. S. much more reluctant to cooperate with the French on space exploration, when that cooperation might lead to a transfer of technology that the U.S. deems sensitive. The difference in the definition of "militarily sensitive technology" has been the subject of numerous heated debates in COCOM and other forums. It has caused much concern in the Western Alliance which the Soviets have freely used to their advantage in the foreign relations arena. Even with these policy differences the U.S. has been able to gain useful information and insight about the Soviet space program from the French, which they might have had difficulty acquiring otherwise.

The final key issue revolves around the question of just how valuable cooperation in space with the Soviets is to the United States, either from the standpoint of gaining access to data and information or from a cost saving perspective. One can look at that statement and break it down into three primary questions which are:

1) Does it open up more research opportunities than we could gain from our programs alone?

2) Can it provide opportunities for cost savings through removal of duplication?

3) And do the Soviets gain far in excess of what the U.S. would?

Many believe that it would be naive on our part to answer these questions in the negative. There could be substantial gains for the U.S. in many areas such as life and planetary sciences. As with any view there is always a counter one and in this case it is strong, supported by many including the past administration. This group feels that the U.S. is so far ahead of the Soviets that little could be gained by cooperation. They also believe that while cooperation might provide benefits in specific areas of research, it would hardly be worth the enormous amount of effort, time, money, energy, and frustration involved in acquiring it. Finally, it is believed that what we did learn would be far out of balance with what the Soviets would gain.

In conclusion, what emerges from the arguments about U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is twofold: while it is clear that scientific and technological benefits can be gained from this cooperation, the degree to which the gains may be offset by scientific or technical losses is still a matter of debate. In addition, there are several factors to be considered, of which, the gains of cooperation and the risks of technology transfer, disagreement over the relative importance of scientific and practical benefits, and foreign policy objectives are but a few. There will, however, always be a multiplicity of views about East-West cooperation in space. The ways in which these viewpoints are reflected in official policy will determine the size, shape, scope, and effectiveness of any future potential space cooperation with the Soviets.[8]

Objective 2

Possible Elements of a Space Weapons Treaty

I. Possible Name of Such Agreement

Treaty on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects

II. Preamble

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and plays an ever-increasing role in its future development.

There exists a potential danger of an armed confrontation and combatant activities being extended to outer space.

The prevention of the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space becomes a pressing task facing the international community.

The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions on peaceful use of outer space and prevention of an arms race in outer space, which have provided a prerequisite and basis for the prevention of the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space.

The existing agreements on arms control and disarmament relevant to outer space, including those bilateral ones, and the existing legal regimes concerning outer space have played a positive role in the peaceful use of outer space and in regulating outer space activities. These agreements and legal regimes should be strictly complied with. However, they are unable to effectively prevent the deployment of weapons and an arms race in outer space.

For the benefit of mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and it shall never be allowed to become a sphere of military confrontation.

Only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects can eliminate the emerging threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the security for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world peace.

III. Basic Obligations

Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.

IV. National Measures for the Implementation of the Treaty

Each State Party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional process, take any measures necessary to prevent or prohibit any activity contrary to this Treaty on its territory, or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.

V. The Use of Outer Space for Peaceful and Other Military Purposes

This Treaty shall not be construed as impeding the research and use of outer space for peaceful purposes or other military uses not prohibited by this Treaty.

Each State Party to the Treaty shall carry out activities in outer space in accordance with the general principles of international law and shall not violate the sovereignty and security of other States.

VI. Confidence Building Measures

To enhance mutual trust, each State Party to the treaty shall promulgate its space programme, declare the locations and scopes of its space launch sites, the property and parameters of objects being launched into outer space, and notify the launching activities.

VII. Settlement of Disputes

If a suspicion arises against any State Party to the Treaty that it is violating the Treaty, the suspecting State Party, or a group of the suspecting State Parties to this Treaty shall conduct consultations and cooperate with the suspected State Party to this Treaty in order to settle down the aroused suspicion. Each suspecting State Party to this Treaty shall have the right to request clarification from the suspected State Party to this Treaty, whereas the suspected State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to provide requested clarifications.

If consultations or clarification fail to settle down the dispute, the suspicion that has aroused shall be referred to the executive organization of the Treaty for consideration together with relevant arguments.

Each State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to cooperate in the settlement of the suspicion that has aroused by the executive organization of the Treaty.

VIII. The Executive Organization of the Treaty

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall hereby establish the executive organization of the Treaty, which shall:

a) receive for consideration inquires by any State Party or a group of States Parties to the Treaty related to the suspicion, which has aroused by the violation of this Treaty by any State Party to the Treaty;

b) consider matters concerning the compliance with the obligations taken by the States Parties to this Treaty;

c) organize and conduct consultations with the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to settling down the suspicion that has aroused against any State Party to the Treaty concerning its violation of this Treaty;

d) take necessary measures to end violation of this Treaty by any State Party to the Treaty.

IX. Amendments to the Treaty

Any State Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment to this Treaty shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments who shall promptly circulate it to all the States Parties to the Treaty. Upon the request of at least one third of the States Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference to which all the States Parties shall be invited to consider the proposed amendment.

Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all the States Parties to the Treaty in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

X. Duration of the Treaty and Withdrawal from the Treaty

The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each State Party to the Treaty shall, in exercising its state sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the Depository Governments of the decision adopted six months in advance of the withdrawal from the Treaty. Such a notification shall include a statement of the extraordinary events, which the notifying State Party to the Treaty regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

XI. Signature and Ratification of the Treaty

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State, which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force, may accede to it at any time.

The Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their constitutional process. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary Governments.

This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

XII. Entry into Force of the Treaty

This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty States, including all Permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

XIII. Authentic Texts of the Treaty

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.[9]

Table № 2: The most important treaties (agreements), its purposes and dates of signing and ratification.

A treaty/ an agreement	Its purpose	The date of signing, ratification
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the US – the USSR)	Prohibits the development of nation-wide defenses against long-range missiles. Bans the development, testing, or deployment of space-based missile defense components.	Signing - Moscow May 26, 1972; ratification - August 3, 1972.
The Outer Space Treaty	Bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies, or stationed in space in any way. Bans military installations or fortifications and weapons testing on celestial bodies. Bans claiming ownership of territory in space and on celestial bodies. Requires prior notification in case of planned harmful activities in space.	1967
The Limited Test Ban Treaty	Forbids the test explosion of any nuclear weapons in outer space, the atmosphere, and under water.	1963
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects	Requires that a state pay compensation for any damage its space objects cause to another state’s space assets on Earth, in flight, or in space.	1972
The Convention on the Registration of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space	Requires international notification of the function and orbit of all space launches.	1976
The Moon Treaty	Bans weapons of mass destruction on, in orbit around, or on a trajectory around the Moon. Bans military installations, fortifications and weapons testing on the Moon. Requires that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the Moon be carried out for the benefit and interest of all countries irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.	1979
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I Interim Agreement	Allows the use of satellites (national technical means of verification) for treaty verification and forbids interference with these satellites.	The US – the USSR 1972
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	Forbids interference with satellite treaty verification measures.	The US – the USSR 1987
The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) I	Forbids interference with satellite treaty verification measures.	The US – the USSR 1991

The Outer Space Treaty

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is based on "the common interest of all mankind in the ... use of space for peaceful purposes". The treaty forbids the orbiting or stationing in space of weapons of mass destruction and prohibits the use of the moon or other celestial bodies for other than peaceful purposes. The treaty contains four explicit references to the peaceful use of outer space.

This language points to the fact that, during the thirty-year existence of the Outer Space Treaty, a powerful norm has emerged against the weaponization of space, for keeping armed conflict out of space, and for ensuring the peaceful use of space. This conclusion is documented by UN General Assembly resolutions each year for the past 21 years calling for maintaining peaceful uses of space and opposing its weaponization. Most of these resolutions have been unanimous and without opposition, although the United States and a few other governments have abstained.

In the most recent version of December 2001, the General Assembly once again passed, by 156 votes to zero opposed, a resolution calling for negotiation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. This time, there were four abstentions to the resolution. The now customary trio of the United States, Micronesia, and Israel was joined by a fourth state, Georgia. The resolution asks all treaty parties to refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calls for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament on multilateral agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

These repeated, nearly unanimous resolutions, against which even the United States does not vote, are not only evidence for the existence of a norm against the weaponization of space. They also indicate a very widespread desire to expand existing multilateral agreements to make explicit a prohibition against all weapons in space.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It also prohibits the testing and, I would argue, the deployment of any kind of weapon on the moon or other celestial bodies. There is no provision for verification. As is well known, the 1967 Treaty does not prohibit the orbiting in space of weapons other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

However, the Outer Space Treaty is not without useful features relevant to the possible weaponization of space. Article VII makes treaty parties that launch objects into outer space liable for damage to the property of another treaty party - this is spelled out in the Liability Convention of 1972.

The Liability Convention foresees the establishment of a Claims Commission to determine the extent of liability for damage by the space objects of one country to the space objects or property of another state. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty provides for consultations if any treaty party believes an activity planned by another treaty party would cause "potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space".

Beyond this, the General Assembly could by majority vote request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice if either the peaceful uses language of the 1967 Treaty or these two articles on liability and consultation come under dispute as the space-based component of the missile defense system advances. In fact, requests for consultation under Article IX, or also a General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, can and should come now to make world opinion aware of this issue before the damage has been done, and to motivate the United States government to study the issue seriously, including the possibility of rules of the road. The request for consultation under Article IX can come from any party or group of parties to the 1967 Treaty.

In addition, George Bunn and John Rhinelander point out in a letter to the editor in the June 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, that parties to the Treaty could convene and issue an interpretation that the US testing or orbiting of space weapons was contrary to the peaceful uses language of the Treaty, in effect amending it to preclude any weaponization. The General Assembly could pass a resolution endorsing this interpretation.

Presumably, Russia, or the United States, or any state party to the CFE Treaty could also take legal action based on treaty provisions prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification. Legal action could also be taken in US courts by US commercial users of space satellites if these satellites were endangered by US space weapons. In theory, legal action might also be taken by private corporations at the Hague Court of Arbitration if the defendant state is willing to permit this. In short, existing space law provides numerous opportunities to remind the United States that weaponization of space could be a complex and difficult process, to make it worthwhile for the US government to negotiate on confidence-building measures, or, if necessary, to block early weaponizing measures.

It is relevant to this subject that there have been press reports that the US Defense Science Board has expressed interest in re-examining the possibility of using nuclear warheads with missile interceptors. Explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or in space is explicitly forbidden by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Action by the Defense Department to carry out this idea would be a violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and would in addition lead to a multitude of suits and injunctions under the Liability Convention. The same applies to the GALOSH missile defense system around Moscow, which continues to be armed with nuclear warheads.[10]

Table № 3: Countries of the Outer Space Treaty.

Country	Date of Signature	Date of Deposit of Ratification	Date of Deposit of Accession
Afghanistan	01/27/67	03/21/88
Antigua and Barbuda			01/01/81
Argentina	01/27/67	03/26/69
Australia	01/27/67	10/10/67
Austria	02/20/67	02/26/68
Bahamas, The			08/11/76
Bangladesh			01/17/86
Barbados			09/12/68
Belgium	01/27/67	03/30/73
Benin			06/19/86
Bolivia	01/27/67
Botswana	01/27/67
Brazil	01/30/67	03/05/69
Brunei			01/18/84
Bulgaria	01/27/67		03/28/67
Burkina Faso	03/03/67	06/18/68
Burma	05/22/67	03/18/70
Burundi	01/27/67
Byelorussian S.S.R.2	02/10/67	10/31/67
Cameroon	01/27/67
Canada	01/27/67	10/10/67
Central African Republic	01/27/67
Chile	01/27/67	10/08/81
China, People's Republic of			12/30/83
China (Taiwan)	01/27/67	07/24/70
Colombia	01/27/67
Cuba			06/03/77
Cyprus	01/27/67	07/05/72
Czechoslovakia	01/27/67	05/11/67
Denmark	01/27/67	10/10/67
Dominica			11/08/78
Dominican Republic	01/27/67	11/21/68
Ecuador	01/27/67	03/07/69
Egypt	01/27/67	10/10/67
El Salvador	01/27/67	01/15/69
Ethiopia	01/27/67
Fiji			07/14/72
Finland	01/27/67	07/12/67
France	09/25/67	08/05/70
Gambia, The	06/02/67
German Democratic Republic	01/27/67	02/02/67
Germany, Federal Republic of	01/27/67	02/10/71
Ghana	01/27/67
Greece	01/27/67	01/19/71
Grenada			02/07/74
Guinea-Bissau			08/20/76
Guyana	02/03/67
Haiti	01/27/67
Holy See	04/05/67
Honduras	01/27/67
Hungary	01/27/67	06/26/67
Iceland	01/27/67	02/05/68
India	03/03/67	01/18/82
Indonesia	01/27/67
Iran	01/27/67
Iraq	02/27/67	12/04/68
Ireland	01/27/67	07/17/68
Israel	01/27/67	02/18/77
Italy	01/27/67	05/04/72
Jamaica	06/29/67	08/06/70
Japan	01/27/67	10/10/67
Jordan	02/02/67
Kenya			01/19/84
Korea, Republic of	01/27/67	10/13/67
Kuwait			06/07/72
Laos	01/27/67	11/27/72
Lebanon	02/23/67	03/31/69
Lesotho	01/27/67
Libya			7/03/68
Luxembourg	01/27/67
Madagascar			08/22/68
Malaysia	02/20/67
Mali			06/11/68
Mauritius			04/07/69
Mexico	01/27/67	01/31/68
Mongolia	01/27/67	10/10/67
Morocco			12/21/67
Nepal	02/03/67	10/10/67
Netherlands	02/10/67	10/10/69
New Zealand	01/27/67	05/31/68
Nicaragua	01/27/67
Niger	02/01/67	04/17/67
Nigeria			11/14/67
Norway	02/03/67	07/01/69
Pakistan	09/12/67	04/08/68
Panama	01/27/67
Papua New Guinea			10/27/80
Peru	06/30/67	02/28/79
Philippines	01/27/67
Poland	01/27/67	01/30/68
Romania	01/27/67	04/09/68
Rwanda	01/27/67
Saint Christopher-Nevis			09/19/83
Saint Lucia			02/22/79
San Marino	04/21/67	10/29/68
Saudi Arabia			12/17/76
Seychelles			01/05/78
Sierra Leone	01/27/67	07/13/67
Singapore			09/10/76
Solomon Islands			07/07/78
Somalia	02/02/67
South Africa	03/01/67	09/30/68
Spain			11/27/68
Sri Lanka	03/10/69	11/18/86
Swaziland			10/22/68
Sweden	01/27/67	10/11/67
Switzerland	01/27/67	12/18/69
Syria			11/19/68
Thailand	01/27/67	09/05/68
Togo	01/27/67
Tonga			06/22/71
Trinidad and Tobago	07/24/67
Tunisia	01/27/67	03/28/68
Turkey	01/27/67	03/27/68
Uganda			04/24/68
Ukrainian S.S.R.	02/10/67	10/31/67
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	01/27/67	10/10/67
United Kingdom	01/27/67	10/10/67
United States	01/27/67	10/10/67
Uruguay	01/27/67	08/31/70
Venezuela	01/27/67	03/03/70
Vietnam			06/20/80
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of (Aden)			06/01/79
Yugoslavia	01/27/67
Zaire	01/27/67
Zambia			08/20/73
Total	91	62	36

[11]

Monitoring and verification with treaties

Monitoring of space activities is a key element in all scenarios and control options. However, in the first unrestricted scenario monitoring will have a clear warfighting role which makes it undesirable for other states. In scenario II monitoring and information exchange will be a confidence-building measure in itself. The degree of cooperation increases with the partial arms control measures and above all the comprehensive arms control agreements. In both scenarios some form of sharing and internationalization of monitoring systems will be required.

Outer space is permeable for all parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and thus well suited for various kinds of monitoring at long distances, with systems looking from earth into space (tracking) and systems in space (satellites) looking towards earth. Accuracy is close to 10 cm in both directions. Especially testing is often visible.

The more capable the systems are, the more costly they become which speaks in favor of cost sharing. Since remote sensing sometimes can only provide an indication of suspected treaty violations but not absolute certainty, some form of on-site inspections is required, largely on the ground (e.g. at production and space launch facilities) but also in space by use of inspection satellites. These however should be maintained by international bodies to prevent their use in an ASAT role.

In this regard one can refer to previous proposals for international monitoring organizations such as the International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA), a Regional Satellite Monitoring System (RSMA) or a UNITRACE system for space tracking.

Another concept is the creation of an agency to control space activities and organize cooperation in space (such as the old idea of a World Space Organization). Whether both tasks are to be merged or kept separate needs to be assessed in light of the experience with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some form of institutionalization is probably indispensable to build a cooperative international security and control regime that makes outer space or part of it a sanctuary against warfare.[12]

Treaties and Global Security

These actions reflect an increasing resistance to participation as an equal under the international rule of law; the United States is rejecting the traditional bargains necessary to reach cooperative agreements in favor of reliance on military defenses. Senator John Kyl, for example, argued that "a more successful and realistic strategic posture for the United States would rely less on the goodwill of bad actors than what we ourselves can control - our own defenses".[6] This argument might have merit if most countries were habitual violators of their security treaty commitments, yet most countries do obey international law. And while there are violations, legal regimes are not abandoned because some actors do not comply.

One influential member of the Bush Administration, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, has expressed his belief that international law is not really law: "There may be good and sufficient reasons to abide by the provisions of a treaty, and in most cases one would expect to do so because of the mutuality of benefits that treaties provide, but not because the United States is 'legally' obligated to do so".[7] This desire to marginalize treaties is rooted in fear that they infringe on US sovereignty and national security interests. Also, critics such as Bolton do not have confidence that treaties contain adequate mechanisms to enforce compliance by all parties.

With respect to the concern that treaties unnecessarily restrain US actions, including threatening sovereignty, this argument ignores the benefits that international law, like domestic law, provides. Government is instituted among individuals to provide a means to restrain any one person or group of persons from trampling on the rights of others, and in the case of such transgression, to secure redress. In return, in a democracy, people willingly give up certain freedom of action. The balance between freedom of action and restraint is struck to increase common security. These principles of security and cooperation as governed by law apply on a global plane as they do within individual countries.

The question of enforcement of treaties is a valid concern but it is by no means a justification for non-participation. Various enforcement mechanisms are in place to address non-compliance of treaty commitments. A range of sanctions is available, including withdrawal of privileges under treaty regimes, embargoes, travel bans, reductions in international financial assistance or loans, and freezing of state or individual leader assets. Sanctions can be applied by individual states, groups of states, states parties to treaty regimes acting collectively, or the Security Council. Issues of non-compliance may also be taken up by the UN Security Council or the International Court of Justice.

While mechanisms to enforce treaty compliance do exist, they need to be strengthened. But in many cases, the United States and others are undermining enforcement mechanisms. The refusal to join the ICC is one example. Also, enforcement requires monitoring and detection, which in many cases means the establishment of verification and transparency arrangements. Yet the United States has attempted to exempt itself from transparency and verification arrangements in the case of the CWC. It has rejected a treaty that has strong verification provisions, namely the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and refused to agree to any inspection protocol in the case of the BWC. Other states are resistant to US demands for near perfect knowledge of their compliance when the US shields itself from similar scrutiny.

There is a final argument underlying the US opposition to treaties, and that is the implicit belief that the United States is an "honorable country" that does not need treaty limits to do the right thing. This view assumes that the US actions are intrinsically right, recalling the ideology of "Manifest Destiny," and allows the United States to exercise its power accordingly. This is at odds with the very notion that the rule of law is possible in global affairs. If the rule of power rather than the rule of law becomes the norm, especially in the context of the present inequalities and injustices around the world, security is likely to be a casualty, along with freedom.

International security can best be achieved through coordinated local, national, regional, and global actions and cooperation. Treaties like all other tools in this toolbox are imperfect instruments. Like a national law, a treaty may be unjust or unwise, in whole or in part. If so, it can be amended. But without a framework of multilateral agreements, the alternative is for states to decide for themselves when action is warranted in their own interests, and to proceed to act unilaterally against others when they feel aggrieved. This is a recipe for the powerful to be police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. It is a path that cannot but lead to the arbitrary application and enforcement of law.

For the United States, a hallmark of whose history is its role as a progenitor of the rule of law, to embark on a path of disregard of its international legal obligations is to abandon the best that its history has to offer the world. To reject the system of treaty-based international law rather than build on its many strengths is not only unwise, it is extremely dangerous. It is critical that the United States join with other countries in making global treaties crucial instruments in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century.[13]

Objective 3

Space-based defense

We will consider space-besed defense on an example of the USA.

National Missile Defense

The objective of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program is to develop and maintain the option to deploy a cost effective, operationally effective, and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty compliant system that will protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World threats.

The primary mission of National Missile Defense is defense of the United States (all 50 states) against a threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation. Such a system would also provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from more nuclear capable states. The means to accomplish the NMD mission are as follows:

· Field an NMD system that meets the ballistic missile threat at the time of a deployment decision.

· Detect the launch of enemy ballistic missile(s) and track.

· Continue tracking of ballistic missile(s) using ground based radars.

· Engage and destroy the ballistic missile warhead above the earth’s atmosphere by force of impact.

The National Missile Defense Program was originally a technology development effort. In 1996, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, NMD was designated a Major Defense Acquisition Program and transitioned to an acquisition effort. Concurrently, BMDO was tasked with developing a deployable system within three years. This three-year development period culminated in 2000, and the Department of Defense began a Deployment Readiness Review in June 2000. Using that review, President Clinton was to make a deployment decision based on four criteria: the potential ICBM threat to the United States; the technical readiness of the NMD system; the projected cost of the NMD system; and potential environmental impact of the NMD system. Rather than make a decision, President Clinton deferred the deployment decision to his successor. The White House in choosing this action cited several factos. Among them were the lack of test under realistic conditions, the absence of testing of the booster rocket, and lingering questions over the system's ability to deal with countermeasures. The deployment decision now rests with President George W. Bush, who is reexamining the Clinton NMD system along with a variety of other proposals. In the meantime, work is continuing on technology development for the NMD system.

The NMD system would be a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defense system with a space-based detection system, consisting of five elements:

· Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs)

· Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3), which includes:

· Battle Management, Command, and Control (BMC2), and

· In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS)

· X-Band Radars (XBRs)

· Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR)

· Defense Support Program satellites/Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

All elements of the NMD system would work together to respond to a ballistic missile directed against the United States.

[14] [15]

[16]

[17]

The Ground Based Inteceptor is the “weapon” of the NMD system. Its mission is to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside the earth’s atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the impact. During flight, the GBI is sent information from the NMD BMC2 through the IFICS to update the location of the incoming ballistic missile, enabling the GBI onboard sensor system to identify and home-in on the assigned target. The GBI element would include the interceptor and associated launch and support equipment, silos, facilities, and personnel. The GBI missile has two main components: an EKV and solid propellant boosters. Each GBI site would be adequate in size to initially accommodate 20 interceptor missiles, with expansion possible to as many as 100 interceptors. The GBI would be a dormant missile that would remain in the underground launch silo until launch. Launches would occur only in defense of the United States from a ballistic missile attack. There would be no flight testing of the missiles at the NMD deployment site.

The NMD Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2), a subelement of the BMC3 element, is the “brains” of the NMD system. In the event of a launch against the United States, the NMD system would be controlled and operated through the BMC2 subelement. The BMC2 subelement providesextensive decision support systems, battle management systems, battle management displays, and situation awareness information. Surveillance satellites and ground radars locate targets and communicate tracking information to battle managers, which process the information and communicate target assignments to interceptors. The BMC2 subelement operations would consist mostly of data processing and management functions associated with the NMD system and function as the centralized point for readiness, monitoring, and maintenance

The NMD In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) is a subelement of the BMC3 element and would be geographically distributed ground stations that provide communications links to the GBI for in-flight target and status information between the GBI and the BMC2. Up to 14 IFICS (7 pairs) would be required to support the NMD system. The IFICS would consist of a radio transmitter/receiver enclosed in a 5.8-meter (19-foot) diameter inflatable radome adjacent to the equipment shelters. The IFICS site would require no permanent onsite support personnel. Personnel would only be required when the IFICS needs maintenance.

The X-band / Ground Based Radars (XBR) would be ground based, multi-function radars. For NMD, they would perform tracking, discrimination, and kill assessments of incoming ballistic missiles. The radars use high frequency and advanced radar signal processing technology to improve target resolution, which permits the radar to more accurately discriminate between closely-spaced objects. The radar would provide data from earlier phases of a ballistic missiles trajectory and real-time continuous tracking data to the BMC2. The site would include a radar mounted on its pedestal and associated control and maintenance facility,a power generation facility, and a 150-meter (492-foot) controlled area. The radar would be radiating during a ballistic missile threat, testing, exercises, training, or when supporting collateral missions such as tracking space debris or a Space Shuttle mission.

The Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) are phased-array surveillance radars used to detect and track ballistic missiles targeted at the United States. Software upgrades to these existing early warning radars would provide the capability to support NMD surveillance requirements.

Existing Defense Support Program satellites provide the U.S. early-warning satellite capability. The satellites are comparatively simple, inertially fixed, geosynchronous earth orbit satellites with an unalterable scan pattern. Space Based Infrared System would replace the Defense Support Program satellites sometime in the next decade. NMD would use whichever system is in place when a deployment decision is made and can use a combination of the two if the transition is still in progress. SBIRS would be an element that future NMD systems would utilize. SBIRS is currently being developed by the Air Force independently of NMD as part of the early warning satellite systemupgrade which would replace the Defense Support Program satellites. For the NMD program, the SBIRS constellation of sensor satellites would acquire and track ballistic missiles throughout their trajectory. This information would provide the earliest possible trajectory estimate to the BMC2 subelement.

[18]

To meet the Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) requirements, the NMD Joint Project Office (JPO) at BMDO has created a program to develop a defensive system that will evolve through three levels of capability:

· Capability 1 satisfies CRD Threshold requirements against unsophisticated threats. The Administration and the Congress want the option of fielding this capability within three years of a deployment decision. The system provides the required performance against an unsophisticated rogue-state threat at the Threshold level. The Threshold threat, the details of which are classified, is said to consist of an attack of five single-warhead missiles with unsophisticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus chaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

· Capability 2 provides the required performance against any authorized, unauthorized, or accidental attack by sophisticated payloads at the Threshold level. The Threshold threat, the details of which are classified, is said to consist of an attack of five single-warhead missiles, each with either a few (about four) credible decoys that could not be descriminated [and would have to be intercepted], plus chaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

· Capability 3 satisfies the CRD Objective. The system provides the required performance against any authorized, unauthorized, or accidental attack by sophisticated payloads at the Objective level. The Objective, the details of which are classified, is said to consist of an attack of twenty single-warhead missiles, each with either a few (perhaps as many as five) credible decoys that could not be descriminated [and would have to be intercepted], or a larger number of less sophisticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus chaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures.

The relationship between these Capability performance requirements and the Capability system architectures continues to evolve. The 1999 Welch Report noted that the 2005 deployment, which with 100 interceptors would appear to be the C2 Architecture, was in fact focused on addressing the far less stressing C1 threat. The cost for the land-based NMD Capability 2 architecture with some 100 interceptors based in Alaska is about $13B to $14B for the post-FY97 RDT&E, procurement and military construction.

As of early 2000 the NMD program goes beyond the original Capability 1, or "C1," architecture by developing an "Expanded C1" architecture to be capable of defending all 50 states against threats larger than the initial C1 architecture was designed to handle. The Expanded C1 deployment option builds on revised program guidance announced in 1999 year by the Secretary of Defense. For planning purposes, the Expanded C1 system will incorporate 100 ground-based interceptors based in Alaska and an advanced X-Band radar based at Shemya Island, also in Alaska. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the C1 architecture, consisting of 20 interceptors, will take place in 2005. The full 100 can be deployed by Fiscal Year 2007. This represents a two year delay from the plan outlined in 1999, under which the first 20 interceptors could have beend deployed by 2003, with 100 interceptors becoming operational by 2005.

Testing

[19]

The NMD program is conducting a series of Integrated Flight Tests [IFT] to progressively demonstrate system capabilities. The target system is built by Sandia National Labs to replicate decoys that might be seen in threat systems Integrated Flight Tests 3 and 4 were originally planned to be conducted in 1998.

· IFT-1, on 17 January 1997, did not take place as planned when the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) carrying the EKV failed to launch from Kwajalein Missile Range. A a data-link malfunction between the PLV launcher and the ground control system which led to the ground control system aborting the launch prior to liftoff of the kill vehicle. A Multi-Service Launch System (MSLS) carrying target objects for the sensor test was successfully launched from Vandenberg AFB prior to the EKV launch abort, though no intercept of a target was to be attempted for the test.

· IFT-1A, on 07 July 1997, was a repeat of IFT-1 which BMDO claimed proved the ability of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) sensor to identify and track objects in space. An intercept was not intended for this mission, which used a candidate infrared sensor built by Boeing. The claimed results of this test have been disputed by many experts.

· IFT-2, on 15 January 1998, proved the ability of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle sensor to identify and track objects in space. An intercept was not intended for this mission, which used a candidate infrared sensor built by Hughes (now Raytheon).

· IFT-3, on 02 October 1999, successfully demonstrated "hit to kill technology" to intercept and destroy the ballistic missile target. The target was simplied to include a single decoy, rather than the multiple decoys used in the two previous fly-by tests. Despite a failure in the star tracker, the inertial measurement unit [IMU] of the interceptor oriented the EKV [built by Boeing], which detected the decoy and based on this detection subsequently detected the target warhead, which was destroyed on impact. Critics noted that in this test the decoy paradoxically made it possible for the kill vehicle to detect the warhead, whereas in a combat situation decoys would make detection of the warhead more difficult. The intercept used representatives or prototypes of other elements in a "shadow" mode. They did not provide information to the interceptor as they would during a full system test or during an actual missile attack.

· IFT-4, on 18 January 2000, failed to intercept the target due to a failure of the EKV infrared homing sensors' cooling system [built Raytheon / Hughes] a few seconds before the planned intercept. This was the first test that integrated other elements of the NMD system into the actual test scenario.

· IFT-5, on 7 July 2000, was the first Integrated System Test featuring all NMD elements in the initial capability except for the interceptor booster. The test failed when the EKV did not separate from the surrogate booster used. As well, the test decoy failed to inflate.

· IFT-6, which was originally supposed to happen before the Deployment Readiness Review, is now scheduled shortly thereafter. The planned test in late July 2000 slipped to the Fall of 2000 and is now scheduled for late 2001. This test will be the second Integrated System Test of all NMD elements in the initial capability except for the interceptor booster.

· IFT-7 was scheduled for early 2001. This test was initially scheduled to bes the first test in which the operational Ground Based Interceptor booster can be used to launch the EKV. However, as of mid-2000 this event had been slipped to the following test, IFT-8.

· IFT-8 was scheduled for mid-2001. As of mid-2000 this test is the first test in which the operational Ground Based Interceptor booster can be used to launch the EKV, replacing the stand-in Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) used in earlier tests.

· IFT-9 is scheduled for late 2001.

· IFT-10 is scheduled for early 2002.

· IFT-11 is scheduled for mid-2002.

· IFT-12 is scheduled for late 2002.

· IFT-13 is scheduled for early 2003. This test is the first test in which the operational Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) can be used.

· IFT-14 is scheduled for mi-2003.

· IFT-15 is scheduled for 2003.

· IFT-16 is scheduled for 2004.

· IFT-17 is scheduled for 2004.

· IFT-18 is scheduled for 2004.

· IFT-19 is scheduled for 2005.

In mid 1993, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) to select the strategy, force structure, and modernization programs for America's defense in the post-Cold War era. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the threat to the U.S. homeland from a deliberate or accidental ballistic missile attack by states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was judged to be highly unlikely. In addition, the ability of Third World countries to acquire or develop a long range ballistic missile capability in the near future was considered uncertain. As a prudent approach for responding to this uncertain threat, the Department pursued a technology readiness strategy for National Missile Defense (NMD) to develop and maintain the ability to deploy ballistic missile defenses for the United States should a threat emerge.

Following the 1994 elections, some in the new Congress began to call for the rapid acceleration of national missile defense development, leading to deployment of a capable defense system as soon as possible. This shift toward early deployment reflected a general sense that the risk of the rapid emergence of a ballistic missile threat to the United States by determined rogue actors was becoming increasingly acute. BMDO responded by creating a "Tiger Team" to develop an NMD architecture capable of being deployed at the earliest possible date to counter the developing rogue nation ballistic missile threat. The threat scenario addressed by the Tiger Team was the acquisition of SS-25-like technology by Libya. The Tiger Team considered a number of NMD alternatives, including options to deploy a system as early as possible, if required. The initial architecture the Tiger Team considered was 20 Minuteman ICBMs -- retrofitted with kinetic kill vehicles -- at Grand Forks AFB, ND, supported by a network of existing Early Warning Radars (EWRs) operating with software upgrades to provide the necessary track information as an emergency response system.

In February 1996, the Department completed a comprehensive Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review that addressed changes that have occurred in the ballistic missile defense environment since the 1993 BUR. For the NMD program, the findings of this review resulted in an adjustment to the goal of the NMD program and a corresponding adjustment to the Future Years Defense Program which includes additional resources in FY96-FY98 for NMD. The revised goal of the NMD program is to develop, within three years, elements of an initial NMD system that could be deployed within three additional years after a deployment decision. This approach is commonly referred to as the NMD “3+3” program.

To achieve this goal, BMDO has initiated an NMD Deployment Readiness Program. In April 1996 the USD(A&T) initiated steps to designate NMD as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program and in July 1996 the program successfully completed its first Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) review. The intent of the NMD Deployment Readiness Program is to position the U.S. to respond to a strategic missile threat as it emerges by shifting emphasis from technology readiness to deployment readiness. This approach focuses on demonstrating an NMD system level capability by FY99, and being able to deploy that capability within an additional three years, if required to do so by the threat. If no threat materializes at the end of the three year development period, evolutionary development will continue on a path towards an objective system capability and the program will continue to maintain the ability to deploy within three years after a decision is made to do so.

The NMD system is composed of several elements which are required to perform the key functions involved in a ballistic missile defense engagement. The Ground Based Radar (GBR) and the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low component (previously known as the Space and Missile Tracking System) provide the dual sensor phenomenology required to address the full spectrum of potential threats. In addition, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) are candidate sensors in the event of an early NMD deployment within three years of the FY99 NMD integrated system test. SBIRS, which will provide midcourse tracking of targets, is currently managed and funded by the Air Force. The Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) is the weapon element that engages and destroys the threat. The Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3) element provides engagement planning and human-in-control management of the engagement.

The formation of the United Missile Defense Company (UMDC), a joint venture equally owned by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and TRW, was announced on April 21, 1997. The company submitted a proposal in response to an RFP issued by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to conduct an NMD Lead System Integration (LSI) Concept Definition (CD) study. The Lead Systems Integrator contractor has the responsibility to design, develop, test, integrate, and potentially deploy and sustain the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The LSI integrates all NMD element development to include the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), Battle Management Command, Control and Communications (BMC3), Ground Based Radar (GBR), Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), Forward Based X-Band Radar (FBXB), and the Spaced Based Infrared Sensor (SBIRS-Low) system when it becomes available. On 25 April 1997 the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization announced that two contracts for the concept definition study phase of the National Missile Defense (NMD) Lead Systems Integrator were awarded to United Missile Defense Company, Bethesda, MD, and Boeing North American Inc., Downey, CA. At the end of the initial contract period, one firm would be selected for award of a contract to serve as the Lead Systems Integrator for the NMD program, currently anticipated for April 1, 1998. The execution phase will include an Integrated System Test in 1999, and culminate in a Deployment Readiness Review in 2000.

In fiscal years 1996 through 1998, Congress authorized and appropriated a total of $1,174 million more than the President's budget requests for those years. The fiscal year 1999 funding estimate does not include amounts that will be needed beginning in fiscal year 2001 to develop system improvements to keep up with changes in the threat. About $765 million above the President's fiscal year 1999 budget estimate will be needed in fiscal years 2001 through 2003

[20]

Future NMD funding requirements depend on how the system is designed and when and where it will be deployed. The government and prime contractor have not yet agreed on a final system design, and the deployment schedule and location will not be known until at least the fiscal year 2000 deployment review. To provide a basis for estimating near-term funding requirements, the program office prepared four different life-cycle cost estimates, based on two locations--one at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the other in Alaska--and two capability levels--one available in fiscal year 2003 and the other in fiscal year 2006 [an initial operating capability would be established in fiscal year 2006, and the full operating capability would be achieved in fiscal year 2009.]. The life-cycle cost estimates show the total costs to develop and produce system components, construct facilities, deploy the system, and operate it for 20 years.

[21]

The 3+3 program is designed to enable a system to be deployed as early as fiscal year 2003, but a more capable system could be operational in fiscal year 2006. The primary differences between the two capability levels used in the cost estimates are in the type and amount of hardware included. The more capable system would have significantly more interceptors, fewer ground-based radars, but would also include a space-based sensor system. The higher cost for a deployment in Alaska by 2003 is due, in large part, to the fact that less infrastructure currently exists there, transportation costs are higher, the construction season is shorter, and the environment is harsher. After the space-based sensor system is deployed, fewer ground-based radars will be needed for an Alaskan deployment because of Alaska's location relative to potential threats. The requirement for fewer radars is the primary reason an Alaskan deployment by fiscal year 2006 was estimated to have a life-cycle cost slightly less than a deployment at Grand Forks in that same timeframe. With fewer radars, operating costs would also be lower in Alaska.

The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation prepared independent estimates of NMD program costs in January 1998. Costs in the independent estimates were about 10 percent higher than the estimates prepared by the program office, due primarily to the fact that the independent estimates included "pre-planned product improvements" not included in the program office estimates.[22]

Objective 4

Space debris

Joel Primack of the University of California, Santa Cruz gave a dramatic talk on the possibility of a chain reaction of space debris in Lower Earth Orbit, making impossible LEO use by communications and other satellites. This could happen if kinetic kill vehicles were tested or used in space or if some other government tried to stop US space programs with loads of rock or metal fragments. (Note: Some scientists claim Primack's findings are exaggerated; they are nonetheless plausible).[23]

Space debris or orbital debris, also called space junk and space waste, are the objects in orbit around Earth created by humans that no longer serve any useful purpose. They consist of everything from entire spent rocket stages and defunct satellites to explosion fragments, paint flakes, dust, and slag from solid rocket motors, coolant released by RORSAT nuclear powered satellites, deliberate insertion of small needles, and other small particles.

The "energy flash" of a hypervelocity impact during a simulation of what happens when a piece of orbital debris hits a spacecraft in orbit.

According to Edward Tufte's book Envisioning Information, space debris objects have included a glove lost by astronaut Ed White on the first American space-walk, a camera Michael Collins lost near the spacecraft Gemini 10, garbage bags, a wrench and a toothbrush. Sunita Williams of STS-116 also lost a camera during an EVA. Most of those unusual objects have re-entered the atmosphere of the Earth within weeks due to the orbits where they were released and their small sizes. Things like these are not major contributors to the space debris environment. On the other side, explosion events are a major contribution to the space debris problem. About 100 tons of fragments generated during approximately 200 such events are still in orbit. Space debris is most concentrated in low Earth orbit, though some extends out past geosynchronous orbit.

Space debris has become a growing concern in recent years, since collisions at orbital velocities can be highly damaging to functioning satellites and can also produce even more space debris in the process, called Kessler Syndrome. Some spacecraft, like the International Space Station, are now armored to deal with this hazard. Astronauts on EVAs are also vulnerable.

The first official Space Shuttle collision avoidance maneuver was during STS-48 in September 1991. A 7-second reaction control system burn was performed to avoid debris from a Kosmos 955 satellite.[24]

Bibliography

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3. http://www.space.com/

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_National_Space_Agency

5. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/index.html

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7. http://www.globalsecurity.org/index.html

8. http://www.state.gov/

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[14] http://www.fas.org/index.html

[15] http://www.fas.org/index.html

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[23] http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art04.htm

[24] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris