Sarov

Nizhni Novgorod Region

Gymnasia № 2

The topic of project:

Nuclear Renaissance: Benefits vs. Risks

Student: Teacher:

Sergei Fadeev Tatiana Satyukova

Grade 10 Gymnasia # 2

Gymnasia # 2 Sarov

Sarov

2007-2008

Nuclear Renaissance: Benefits vs. Risks

Benchmark II

In Benchmark I, I tried to examine the objectives from the point of view of different domains to gain a comprehensive understanding and comparison of conventional energy, and nuclear energy in different countries in the world. I also began to define issues related to nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism.

In Benchmark II, I will try to investigate the spread, proliferation, of nuclear energy in the world today, and some of the issues involved with the use and spread of nuclear energy.

Part 1.

I would like to start with the organizations that monitor nuclear energy in my country, Russia. Looking through various sites and books I have found out that Rosatom (Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation), is a State Corporation in Russia, the main center of the Russian nuclear complex. We may compare it in function to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation was established on the 29 th of January in 1992 as an assignee of the Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry of the USSR.

It is situated in Moscow. It was reorganized as the Federal Agency on Atomic Energy on the 9 th of March, 2004. According to the law, adopted by the Russian parliament in November of 2007 and signed by our president Vladimir Putin in December, the agency was reorganized to Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation.

“Rosatom controls nuclear power holding Atomenergoprom, nuclear weapons companies, research institutes and nuclear and radiation safety agencies. It also represents Russia in the world in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and protection of the nonproliferation regime.” (www.wikipedia.org)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission( NRC) is a United States government agency that was established by the Energy Reorganization Act in 1974, and was opened on the 19 th of January in 1975.

The NRC has the role of tending of nuclear energy matters and nuclear safety from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

“The oversight of nuclear weapons, as well as the promotion of nuclear power, was transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration by the same act, thereby eliminating the AEC (in 1977, ERDA became the United States Department of Energy). Like its predecessor, the AEC, the NRC oversees reactor safety, reactor licensing and renewal, material safety and licensing, and waste management (storage and disposal).The NRC's mission is to regulate the nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and to protect the environment.” (www.wikipedia.org)

As we see both agencies have similar aims: to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and to find new ways of using nuclear technology in different spheres of science. For example, “Nuclear diagnostics in medicine” in Russia is one of the basic directions of a modern science. (www.rusenerg.ru)

As soon as the nuclear era started it became evident that there was need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, on the 15 th of November in 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes."

(www.iaea.org ). The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, looked for prevention of nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control.

But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament, as we know, failed. In 1949 the Soviet Union became a nuclear-weapon state and after it, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the Peoples Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear-weapon states as well.

Other developments and prospects further underlined the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear reactors were operating or under construction in five countries already. It was estimated that by 1985 more than 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating, under construction, or on order. As nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium (a fissionable material), which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it was estimated that the quantity of plutonium being produced worldwide would make possible the construction of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily(!), depending upon the level of the technology employed.

It was believed that the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security.

A sequence of initiatives beginning in the 1950-s by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers sought to check proliferation.

Indeed, the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban, crowning in the Treaty of 1963, had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But much before that, in 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, the UK and the US) submitted a "package" of measures in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," (http://zaki.ru ) except for self-defense.

The Soviet Union sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

In 1961 the UN General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition to this, the general disarmament plans which had been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 -1962 included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The United States, on the 21 of January, 1964, outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race in a message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This program included a nondissemination and nonacquisition proposal , which was based on the Irish resolution and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by the major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly the same inspection they recommend for other states.

An issue that was to be the principal stumbling block for the next three years was the proposed multilateral nuclear force then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies.

The Soviet Union in its turn strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on nonproliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These arrangements would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons.

On the 17th of August,1965, the United States submitted a draft nonproliferation Treaty to the ENDC. This draft said that the nuclear-weapon powers were obliged not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

A Soviet draft Treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on the 24th of September . In an accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF). The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly through third States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons. It also barred nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command.

In 1966, the U.S. representative stressed that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination.

Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, the interest of non-nuclear powers in such a Treaty was increasingly manifest. It was shown in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that nuclear non-proliferation receive priority attention.

Lets go further: in autumn of 1966 the United States and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by the end of the year they had reached an agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions of a Treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects.

Then there was a long series of consultations between the United States and its allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the Treaty on NATO nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. “The United States considered that the Treaty covered nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, but not delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, nor ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members. It would not "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members”. www.iaea.org The allies questions and the United States answers were provided to the Soviet Union, which did not challenge the U.S. interpretations.

In August, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to submit separate but identical texts of a draft Treaty to the ENDC. Other ENDC members proposed numerous amendments, largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear states. In response to these, the drafts underwent several revisions, and the co-chairmen tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968.

Later, with additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, where it was extensively debated. Further a suggestion for strengthening the Treaty was made, and in the light of these, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a new revised version, the seventh already, to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31.

In June the General Assembly approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depositary governments (the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union) to open it for signature. France abstained in the General Assembly vote, saying that while France would not sign the Treaty, it "would behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty." (www.iaea.org)

The Treaty was opened for signature on the first of July in 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. Later in July “President Johnson transmitted it to the Senate, but prospects for early U.S. ratification dimmed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. The Senate adjourned without voting on the Treaty. In February, 1969, President Nixon requested Senate approval of the Treaty, and in March the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification on March 5, 1970.

In 1982, then-ACDA Director Eugene Rostov reaffirmed the assurance in the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament. It is the U.S. view that this formulation preserves U.S. security commitments and advances U.S. collective security, as well as enhances the prospect for more effective arms control and disarmament.” (www.iaea.org)

This declaration has been reaffirmed by every successive Administration, most recently at the 1990 NPT Review Conference.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the single most important legal tool that the world has to try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It was conceived in the 1960s, when many world leaders feared that nuclear weapons would spread to as many as 25 nations. And, as we know, the treaty has helped to limit their spread. But nuclear weapons have proliferated nevertheless. Three states with the bomb remain outside the treaty, and several of those states that signed it have cheated.

In 1968 the NPT was negotiated, with the United States becoming one of the first to sign.

In 1970 it was ratified and went into force, initially with a term of twenty-five years.

In 1995, all the signatories of the treaty came together at the United Nations in New York.

188 nations have now signed the treaty. It divides the world into nuclear weapons haves and have-nots, based solely on the world that existed in 1968. Then only the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China had acquired nuclear weapons.

The treaty recognizes them as the only legal nuclear weapons states. The rest of the signatories were required to pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. But in exchange, the treaty acknowledges their right to peaceful nuclear energy. And the nuclear weapons states pledge that at some future point, they will give up their nuclear arsenals.

There are different opinions about how NPT should prevent proliferation: “To compel Iran to abide by its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which includes submitting to full inspections and safeguards, the Security Council must be prepared to impose the entire range of sanctions - diplomatic, economic, and military. ” (Sen. Richard Lugar, speaking to the Press Club). (www.iaea.org)

Three nations possess nuclear weapons and are outside the treaty, that is, they have never signed it. They are India, Pakistan and Israel. The NPT requires its signatories to refuse civil nuclear cooperation with states that have refused to sign.

In 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency was created in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy. Its fortunes are uniquely geared to this controversial technology that can be used either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool.

The Agency's genesis was US President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953. These ideas helped to shape the IAEA Statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956. The Statute outlines the three pillars of the Agency's work - nuclear verification and security, safety and technology transfer.

In the years following the Agency's creation, the political and technical climate had changed so much that by 1958 it had become politically impracticable for the IAEA to begin work on some of the main tasks foreseen in its Statute. But in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the USA and the USSR began seeking common ground in nuclear arms control.

In 1961 the IAEA opened its Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, creating a channel for cooperative global nuclear research. That year the Agency signed an agreement with Monaco and the Oceanographic Institute headed by Jacques Cousteau for research on the effects of radioactivity in the sea, an action that eventually lead to the creation of the IAEA's Marine Environment Laboratory.

As more countries were mastering nuclear technology, concern deepened if they would sooner or later acquire nuclear weapons, particularly since two additional nations had "joined the club",at first it was France (in 1960) and then China (in 1964). The safeguards prescribed in the IAEA's Statute, designed chiefly to cover individual nuclear plants or supplies of fuel, were clearly inadequate to deter proliferation. There was growing support for international, legally binding, commitments and comprehensive safeguards to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons and to work towards their eventual elimination.

This found regional expression in 1968, with the approval of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT essentially freezes the number of declared nuclear weapon States at five (USA, Russia, UK, France and China). Other States are required to forswear the nuclear weapons option and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA on their nuclear materials.

The 1970s showed that the NPT would be accepted by almost all of the key industrial countries and by the vast majority of developing countries. At the same time the prospects for nuclear power improved dramatically. The technology had matured and was commercially available, and the oil crisis of 1973 enhanced the attraction of the nuclear energy option. The IAEA's functions became distinctly more important. But the pendulum was soon to swing back. The first surge of worldwide enthusiasm for nuclear power lasted barely two decades. By the early 1980s, the demand for new nuclear power plants had declined sharply in most Western countries, and it shrank nearly to zero in these countries after the 1986 Chernobyl accident.

In 1988 the IAEA and UN Food and Agricultural Organization joined forces with other agencies to eradicate New World Screwworm - which spreads a deadly livestock disease. The radiation-based technology to eradicate the worm was developed at the Agency's Seibersdorf Laboratory.

In 1991, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine weapon programme sowed doubts about the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, but also led to steps to strengthen them, some of which were put to the test when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became the second country that was discovered violating its NPT safeguards agreement.

www.usatoday.com/tech. www.sheppardsoftware.com/Europeweb/factfile The Three Mile Island accident and especially the Chernobyl disaster persuaded governments to strengthen the IAEA’s role in enhancing nuclear safety.

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the consequent improvement in international security virtually eliminated the danger of a global nuclear conflict. Broad devotion to regional treaties underlined the nuclear weapon free status of Latin America, Africa and South East Asia, as well as the South Pacific.

The threat of proliferation in some successor States of the former Soviet Union was prevented; in Iraq and the DPRK the threat was contained.

In 1995, the NPT was made permanent.

In 1996 the UN General Assembly approved and opened for signature a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In recent years, the Agency's work has taken on some urgent added dimensions. Among them are countermeasures against the threat of nuclear terrorism, the focus of a new multi-faceted Agency action plan.

Now the IAEA works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Its main role is to contribute to international peace and security, and to the World's Millennium Goals for economic, social and environmental development.

http://www.ruvr.ru http://www.ictp.it/pages/mission/ “The IAEA helps countries to upgrade nuclear safety and to prepare for and respond to emergencies. Work is keyed to international conventions, standards and, guidance. The main aim is to protect people and the environment from harmful radiation exposure. The IAEA is the world's focal point for scientific and technical cooperation in nuclear fields. The work contributes to fighting poverty, sickness, and pollution of the earth's environment, and to other global "Millennium Goals" for a safer and better future. The IAEA is the world's nuclear inspectorate, with more than four decades of verification experience. Inspectors work to verify that safeguarded nuclear material and activities are not used for military purposes. The Agency is additionally responsible for the nuclear file in Iraq as mandated by the UN Security Council.” (www.iaea.org)

Speaking about the role of the IAEA we may say that it performs two safety-related functions, which are laid down in its Statute (Article III.A.6). They are:

— establishing standards of safety for the protection of health against the effects of radiation, and

— providing for the application of those standards at the request of a Member State.

The IAEA is devoting considerable efforts to nuclear safety activities world-wide by:

— facilitating the development of international legal agreements;

— developing safety standards which represent international consensus;

— offering international expert review and safety services and training; and

— nurturing scientific research, technical co-operation and information exchange.

The IAEA has developed a comprehensive order of safety standards in the fields of nuclear energy, radiation protection, radioactive waste management and the transport of radioactive materials. At times, this has been done together with other international organizations. The standards are updated from time to time to ensure they can provide guidance on up-to-date methods for achieving a high level of safety.

In providing for the application of its safety standards the IAEA makes safety review and advisory services available upon request to nuclear power plants and research reactors. A central element of these services are peer review missions conducted by international experts, who provide independent advice, based on IAEA safety standards and best international practices in the areas of Legislation and Governmental Infrastructure, NPP and Research Reactor Design and Operation, and various Safety Assessments. Some 50 safety review missions are conducted by the IAEA every year dealing with the various areas of nuclear installations safety.

www.wilsoncenter.org On the 4 th of December, 2003,the united States are commemorating the 50th anniversary of the "Atoms for Peace" proposal in December 1953 that led to the IAEA's creation. The conference in 2003 brought together a distinguished group of international experts to reassess the legacy of the proposal and the nuclear nonproliferation regime elements it underlies, and to look ahead to assess the relevance of Atoms for Peace for dealing with nuclear energy, nonproliferation, arms control and terrorism issues over the next 50 years. The US Government is donating to the IAEA a bust of former US President Dwight Eisenhower, who voiced the historic proposal before the UN General Assembly 50 years ago. US Ambassador Kenneth Brill will present the bust to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.

In the runup to the anniversary, States have reaffirmed support for peaceful nuclear uses and the IAEA's roles for nuclear safety, safeguards, and technology.

In its December edition, the IAEA Bulletin, the Agency's magazine, will take a closer look at the atoms for peace concept's legacy and future.

"Much has changed since that time," says IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. "I believe it is appropriate for us to take stock of our successes and failures - and to resolve to take whatever actions are required, including new ways of thinking and unconventional approaches, to ensure that nuclear energy remains a source of hope and prosperity for humanity, and not a tool for self-destruction." (www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/atoms20031203)

But, the actual legacy of Atoms for Peace was far darker than the optimistic projections of its early cheerleaders. For example, under the guidance of the program, the United States and other nuclear weapon states supplied hundreds of research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU) www.nuclearfuelservices.com to dozens of countries, including Iraq, Iran, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia.  Because HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons of a relatively simple design, it is highly attractive to terrorists. The United States recognized this dangerous situation and eventually began to take steps to address it by developing alternative fuels made from low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used directly to make nuclear weapons.

www.nnsa.doe.gov

Today, however, HEU remains at dozens of poorly secured research reactors worldwide, where it is vulnerable to theft.

Following are excerpts from statements at the IAEA General Conference earlier this year.

The United States: “The Atoms for Peace initiative established the principles that all nations must work to stem nuclear proliferation and that all responsible nations should enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear power and technology under sound non-proliferation conditions. Since 1957, the IAEA has been the center of international efforts to turn these principles into practice. Though the world has changed, and the roles of IAEA Member States have changed with it, the ideas of non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear power remain unchanged.

"The work of preventing nuclear proliferation has taken on a sense of great urgency. Today, as some States are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, we must uphold our great responsibility to ensure full compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. With cooperation and strong leadership, we can combat the threat of nuclear proliferation and advance safety and security for people throughout the world." ( US President George Bush, a message to the General Conference delivered by US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham)

The European Union: "The IAEA's indispensable role, as the competent authority for the verification of compliance with safeguards agreements covering the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has proven to be worthy of the trust of the international community. At the same time, the Agency plays an essential role in promoting the safe usage of nuclear technology for peaceful applications in those Member States which use that technology. The EU and its acceding States reiterate their full support to the Agency and their commitment for the realization of its statutory functions." -- Mr. Roberto Antonione, Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy, on behalf of the European Union.

The Russian Federation: "US President Eisenhower came up with a proposal to establish a special international agency to deal with the peaceful use of atomic energy and play an important role... it became the starting point for creating the IAEA... It is necessary to note the ever-growing role and importance of this international organization in ensuring an international regime of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, in rendering assistance to Member States to gain the benefits of peaceful uses of the atom's energy, and for the safe development of nuclear power.

"We are pretty far away from the end of the Cold War period; however, many issues of peace strengthening and strategic stability are still pending decisions. Unfortunately new risks and challenges have emerged in addition to existing ones. Today we have to address the situation, when mass destruction weapons, relevant materials and technologies can be obtained by international terrorists, as a reality. We are convinced that both existing and new challenges can be met through active cooperative efforts of all countries based on international law as well as adherence to and strengthening of the international treaty regime." ( Mr. A. Yu. Rumyantsev, Minister of Atomic Energy, Russian Federation, who noted that in 2004 the world will mark the 50th anniversary of Russia's first nuclear power plant at an IAEA international conference in Obninsk).

China: "With 50 years of experience and continuous technological improvement, nuclear power has been acknowledged as a clean, safe, and economic energy source, and has been playing an important role in the energy mix around the world. China, too, is witnessing stable development of nuclear power... to meet the demands on power in the process of economic development up to 2020...

"China, as a developing country, has gained much technological assistance from the Agency in nuclear power, safety, and nuclear applications. Such assistance positively promoted the country's rapid development of nuclear power and technology... We are convinced that the Agency will yield greater achievements through joint efforts, as long as it follows the principles of the Statute and keeps balanced development of its two objectives, the promotion of peaceful nuclear uses and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation." ( Mr. Zhang Huazhu, Chairman, Atomic Energy Authority, China, who noted that 2004 will mark the 20th anniversary of China's membership of the IAEA)”.(www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/atoms20031203)

Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched them home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.

Nowadays there are several countries that have given up their nuclear weapons programs because of different political and economical reasons. For example Japan. "Japan is the only country to have suffered nuclear devastation, and...firmly adheres to the long-standing policy that we shall not possess or produce nuclear weapons, nor permit the introduction of such weapons in Japan... This policy will not change.

"The peaceful, appropriate use of nuclear energy will greatly contribute to the welfare of mankind and to social and economic development worldwide. It will also minimize the burden on the environment. Therefore, I believe that the nuclear energy option is of vital importance for mankind. Under circumstances in which challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards have surfaced, the IAEA's activities to strengthen and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation are all the more important and noteworthy now." ( Mr. Hiroyuki Hosoda, Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, Japan.(www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News)

An important step in the international oversight of nuclear safety was taken in 1994, with the adoption of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, first international legal instrument dealing directly with the safety of nuclear installations. The Convention is essentially an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure that obligations are met by control and sanction. It is based on a common determination to develop, promote and achieve higher levels of safety through regular meetings of the parties.

The Convention obliges the parties to draw up reports on the implementation of their obligations and to submit these documents for 'peer review' by all countries, which are part of the correction at meetings, held every 3 years.

Part 2.

We know that some countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have recently indicated their interest in nuclear energy as well.

There is no simple or reliable way to characterize Iran's ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Iran is clearly attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, but it has never indicated that such weapons would have chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) warheads. Iran has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown.

There have been strong indications of an active Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear weapons since the time of the Shah, and that Khomeini revived such efforts after Iraq invaded Iran and began to use chemical weapons. There is, however, no reliable history of such efforts or "smoking gun" that conclusively proves their existence.

The Iranian leadership has consistently argued that its nuclear research efforts are designed for peaceful purposes, although various Iranian leaders have made ambiguous statements about acquiring weapons of mass destruction and Iranian actions strongly suggest that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Whether such Iranian deniability is plausible or not is highly questionable, but Iran has been able to find some alternative explanation for even its most suspect activities and there is no present way to disprove its claims with open source material.

The US and EU3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) have actively negotiated with Iran to bring a halt to such suspect activities but Iran has consistently refused to reach meaningful agreements with the EU3 in spite of the incentives Tehran has been offered. At times, Iran has refused Russian offers to provide nuclear fuel on a much cheaper basis than Iran can possibly produce such fuel. The fact the US supports such negotiations could mean that Iranian compliance would eliminate the threat of US and Israeli military action or preemption.

Much more is also involved than the issue of whether Iran does or does not have the bomb. Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons interact with the ongoing struggle to prevent proliferation in the Middle East. Israel has nuclear weapons, Syria has a chemical and biological weapons program, and there is uncertainty regarding Egyptian WMDs program. In addition, Pakistan and India are both nuclear powers. The region as a whole is drifting into further proliferation and a nuclear Iran may expand the efforts to go beyond the usual suspects. It remains uncertain how key countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey respond to a nuclear-armed Tehran.

It is also impossible to deny the fact that Iran is being judged by a different standard because its regime is associated with terrorism, efforts to export its Shi'ite revolution, and reckless political rhetoric. There is nothing wrong with a "dual standard." Nations that present exceptional risks require exceptional treatment. The fact remains, however, that Iran was under missile and chemical attack from Iraq, and seems to have revived its nuclear programs at a time that Iraq was already involved in a major effort to acquire biological and nuclear weapons. Iran has major neighbors- — India, Israel, and Pakistan- — that have already proliferated. It must deal with the presence of two outside nuclear powers: Russia near its northern border and the US in the Gulf.” (www.csis.org/burke)

It is clear that Iran already has the technical base to make fission weapons, and have received substantial Chinese weapons design data for a moderately advanced fission weapon from North Korea. That information does not, however, indicate the designs Iran would actually chose or be able to execute.

This makes it impossible to estimate Iran's production capabilities even if some estimate could be made of its facilities. The arms control literature often uses nominal weights of U-235 and P-239 for nuclear weapons. It also assumes that a given level of enrichment is needed for the "weapons grade" material use in such a bomb. These nominal estimates can be more misleading than useful.

Any crisis over Iranian proliferation could have a major impact on the evolving balance of power in the region. The US, the UK, Iraqi Sunnis, and many regional powers have expressed their concerns about Iranians involvement in Iraq's internal affairs. Key Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have expressed their anxiety of the creation of a new Shi'ite block to include Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and that the balance of power in the region become redefined across sectarian lines.

The other side of this story is Iran's willingness to risk deploying or using a nuclear weapon it had not tested, and what kind of weapon it can actually achieve. India and Pakistan have shown that other nuclear powers have conducted tests whose actual yield fell far short of the yield they initially claimed. There are still serious risks in not testing, or even in one-of-a-kind tests.

These risks tend to be compounded in a missile warhead, or small-to-medium sized bomb. The weapon must fit a given size, deal with considerable shock, and have highly reliable fuzing. For most purposes, the ability to select a given height of burst is critical to getting the best weapons effect. (www.csis.org/burke)

As things now stand in the Middle East and are likely to stand for the foreseeable future, a nuclear-armed Iran would change the politics and the security of the region dramatically in terms of perceptions. The point need hardly be spelled out. Further, even if regional and outside countries could in time adjust to a nuclear-armed Iran, judged from today, it is highly unlikely that Iran would be permitted to gain such a capability. The United States, Israel, or perhaps some third-party would likely use whatever means necessary to prevent Iran from ever getting into that position. (www.iranwatch.org)

The actual legacy of Atoms for Peace was far darker than the optimistic projections of its early cheerleaders. For example, under the auspices of the program, the United States and other nuclear weapon states supplied hundreds of research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU) to dozens of countries, including Iraq, Iran, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia.  Because HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons of a relatively simple design, it is highly attractive to terrorists. The United States belatedly recognized this dangerous situation and eventually began to take steps to address it by developing alternative fuels made from low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used directly to make nuclear weapons. Today, however, HEU remains at dozens of poorly secured research reactors worldwide, where it is vulnerable to theft. So still nowadays on Middle East their some countries

www.fas.org

Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such as the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor at the southern port city of Bushehr. Although Russia has pledged to provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime of the Bushehr reactor and was negotiating in 2004 with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel, Iran argues that it needs to produce its own fuel because past international pressure has led states to reduce nuclear cooperation with Iran, reducing the credibility of such promises.

During late 2004, Iran finally agreed to temporarily freeze its uranium enrichment activities. Tehran negotiated with France, Germany, and the UK—known collectively as the EU-3—on the future of its nuclear program and the nature of "objective guarantees" that would ensure nuclear resources are not diverted to a weapons program.

The IAEA in 2004 was able to resolve several outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear program, including details of Iran's laser enrichment program and uranium conversion experiments. Some unresolved issues remained, however, including the origins of highly enriched uranium contamination found in Iran, the extent of Iran's centrifuge program, and the timing of plutonium separation experiments.

Libya admitted to nuclear fuel-cycle projects that were ultimately intended to support a nuclear weapons program, including developing the capability for uranium conversion and enrichment. A Pakistani general in early 2004 acknowledged that A.Q. Khan had provided nuclear weapon-related assistance to Libya. US-UK teams were given access to key sites connected to Libya's nuclear activities, met with Libyan officials, and examined a large amount of specialized nuclear equipment. In January and March 2004, the US removed over 500 metric tons of materials and equipment, including uranium hexafluoride, centrifuge components, a uranium conversion facility, and other materials. Also in March, Libya sent highly enriched uranium reactor fuel from its Tajura Nuclear Research Center to Russia and made plans to eventually convert the Tajura reactor to operate on low-enriched uranium. Libya also signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement and committed to acting as if the protocol were in force as of December 2003 pending formal entry into force.

During 2004, North Korea continued to delay the six-party talks and warned that it would "bolster its nuclear deterrent force both in quality and quantity" if the United States did not drop its hostile policy toward the North. In late 2003, North Korea announced that it had completed the reprocessing of spent fuel previously under IAEA safeguards and would use the derived plutonium (an estimated 25-30 kilograms) to increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force. Pyongyang also indicated at the time that it plans to reprocess more spent fuel from the five megawatt-electric (5-MWe) reactor when they deem it necessary.

Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has nuclear research facilities at Dayr Al Hajar and Dubaya. In 2004 Syria continued to develop civilian nuclear capabilities, including uranium extraction technology and hot cell facilities, which may also be potentially applicable to a weapons program. Pakistani investigators in late January 2004 said they had "confirmation" of an IAEA allegation that A.Q. Khan offered nuclear technology and hardware to Syria, according to Pakistani press, and we are concerned that expertise or technology could have been transferred. We continue to monitor Syrian nuclear intentions with concern.

China's record is strongest with respect to nuclear nonproliferation, as Beijing has largely curtailed government-sanctioned assistance to most countries. China in late 2003 applied for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and became a member at the NSG Plenary in 2004. As an NSG member, China is committed to implementing NSG's policy of full scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. However, China has told the NSG that Beijing intends to "grandfather" contracts with Pakistan's safeguarded nuclear facilities as Pakistan does not have full-scope safeguards.

Al-Qaeda is not one organization, but a loose confederation of terrorist organizations with members living and operating in over 40 countries, including the United States. Recently, the head of Germany's intelligence service estimated that al-Qaeda is composed of approximately 70,000 people world-wide, with tens of thousands of these undertaking training at al-Qaeda camps in the Sudan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. The common elements among these groups include their Muslim faith, an intense disdain for anything Western, and their support for Osama bin-Laden. Bin-Laden continues to fund many of these groups. Although an estimated $120 million of his assets have been frozen, some believe bin-Laden is still worth billions. At one point bin-Laden was reported to own or control some 80 companies worldwide.

Al-Qaeda's ultimate goal may be to rid the Middle East of all American influence. In May 2003, recounting the Khobar Towers and National Guard building bombings in Saudi Arabia, a Pakistani paper wrote that "both bombings had marked a bloody gesture against U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. Indeed the U.S. presence in the Holy Land and in the Middle East in general, has been one of the primary reasons for the al-Qaeda phenomenon, as declared by Osama bin Laden himself."

There are also media reports of al-Qaeda buying or stealing up to 20 nuclear warheads from the former Soviet republics, bin Laden providing $3 million and large commercial amounts of opium to Chechens in exchange for nuclear weapons or material, and four Turkmen nuclear scientists working to create an al-Qaeda weapon. The veracity of these reports cannot be independently evaluated. In February 2005, Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss testified that al-Qaeda might possess radioactive material of Russian or Soviet origin. (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/oct03/terrorism)

All of these organizations attract a number of engineers and technicians who could facilitate their homegrown nuclear weapons programs. With considerable financial resources at their disposal, they can also recruit engineers and scientists from the thousands who have received education in related fields in Russia, the West, and the Muslim world. Such clandestine programs would be assisted by the wealth of information about nuclear matters available on the Internet.

Furthermore, radical Islamists have ideological, organizational, and operational connections to the military and intelligence establishments of Iran and Pakistan. Iran is suspected by both the Bush Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of managing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Pakistan is a nuclear power, and anti-American Islamists strongly influence its nuclear establishment and military and intelligence services. (www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity)

Part 3.

The nuclear power plant design strategy for preventing accidents and mitigating their potential effects is "defense in depth"--- if something fails, there is a back-up system to limit the harm done, if that system should also fail there is another back-up system for it, etc., etc. Of course it is possible that each system in this series of back-ups might fail one after the other, but the probability for that is exceedingly small. The Media often publicize a failure of some particular system in some plant, implying that it was a close call" on disaster; they completely miss the point of defense in depth which easily takes care of such failures. Even in the Three Mile Island accident where at least two equipment failures were severely compounded by human errors, two lines of defense were still not breached--- essentially all of the radioactivity remained sealed in the thick steel reactor vessel, and that vessel was sealed inside the heavily reinforced concrete and steel lined "containment" building which was never even challenged. It was clearly not a close call on disaster to the surrounding population. The Soviet Chernobyl reactor, built on a much less safe design concept, did not have such a containment structure; if it did, that disaster would have been averted.

Risks from reactor accidents are estimated by the rapidly developing science of "probabilistic risk analysis" (PRA). A PRA must be done separately for each power plant (at a cost of $5 million) but we give typical results here: A fuel melt-down might be expected once in 20,000 years of reactor operation. In 2 out of 3 melt-downs there would be no deaths, in 1 out of 5 there would be over 1000 deaths, and in 1 out of 100,000 there would be 50,000 deaths. The average for all meltdowns would be 400 deaths. Since air pollution from coal burning is estimated to be causing 10,000 deaths per year, there would have to be 25 melt-downs each year for nuclear power to be as dangerous as coal burning.

Of course deaths from coal burning air pollution are not noticeable, but the same is true for the cancer deaths from reactor accidents. In the worst accident considered, expected once in 100,000 melt-downs (once in 2 billion years of reactor operation), the cancer deaths would be among 10 million people, increasing their cancer risk typically from 20% (the current U.S. average) to 20.5%. This is much less than the geographical variation--- 22% in New England to 17% in the Rocky Mountain states.

Very high radiation doses can destroy body functions and lead to death within 60 days, but such "noticeable" deaths would be expected in only 2% of reactor melt-down accidents; there would be over 100 in 0.2% of meltdowns, and 3500 in 1 out of 100,000 melt-downs. To date, the largest number of noticeable deaths from coal burning was in an air pollution incident (London, 1952) where there were 3500 extra deaths in one week. Of course the nuclear accidents are hypothetical and there are many much worse hypothetical accidents in other electricity generation technologies; e.g., there are hydroelectric dams in California whose sudden failure could cause 200,000 deaths. (www.physics.isu.edu/radinf)

A criticality accident (also sometimes referred to as an "excursion" or "power excursion") occurs when a nuclear chain reaction is accidentally allowed to occur in fissile material, such as enriched uranium or plutonium. The Chernobyl accident is an example of a criticality accident. In a smaller scale accident at Sarov a technician working with highly enriched uranium was irradiated while preparing an experiment involving a sphere of fissile material. The Sarov accident is interesting because the system remained critical for many days before it could be stopped, though safely located in a shielded experimental hall . This is an example of a limited scope accident where only a few people can be harmed, while no release of radioactivity into the environment occurred. A criticality accident with limited off site release of both radiation (gamma and neutron) and a very small release of radioactivity occurred at Tokaimura in 1999 during the production of enriched uranium fuel.

Decay heat accidents are where the heat generated by the radioactive decay causes harm. In a large nuclear reactor, a loss of coolant accident can damage the core: for example, at Three Mile Island a recently shutdown (SCRAMed) PWR reactor was left for a length of time without cooling water. As a result the nuclear fuel was damaged, and the core partly melted. However, the main cause of release of radioactivity in the Three Mile Island accident was a Pilot-operated relief valve on the primary loop which stuck in the open position. This caused the overflow tank into which it drained to rupture and release large amounts of radioactive cooling water.

Transport accidents can cause a release of radioactivity resulting in contamination or shielding to be damaged resulting in direct irradiation. In Cochabamba a defective gamma radiography set was transported in a passenger bus as cargo. The gamma source was outside the shielding, and it irradiated some bus passengers.

In the United Kingdom, it was revealed in a recent court case that a radiotherapy source was transported from Leeds to Sellafield with defective shielding. The shielding had a gap on the underside. It is thought that no human has been seriously harmed by the escaping radiation.

Equipment failure is one possible type of accident, recently at Białystok in Poland the electronics associated with a particle accelerator used for the treatment of cancer suffered a malfunction. This then led to the overexposure of at least one patient. While the initial failure was the simple failure of a semiconductor diode, it set in motion a series of events which led to a radiation injury.

A related cause of accidents is failure of control software, as in the cases involving the Therac-25 medical radiotherapy equipment: the elimination of a hardware safety interlock in a new design model exposed a previously undetected bug in the control software, which could lead to patients receiving massive overdoses under a specific set of conditions.

Human error has been responsible for some accidents, such as when a person miscalculated the activity of a teletherapy source. This then led to patients being given the wrong dose of gamma rays. In the case of radiotherapy accidents, an underexposure is as much an accident as an overexposure as the patients may not get the full benefit of the prescribed treatment. Also, humans have made errors while attempting to service plants and equipment which has resulted in overdoses of radiation, such as the Nevvizh and Soreq irradiator accidents. In Japan two minor millennium bugs came to light .

In 1946 Canadian Manhattan Project physicist Louis Slotin performed a risky experiment known as "tickling the dragon's tail" which involved two hemispheres of neutron-reflective Beryllium being brought together around a plutonium core to bring it to criticality. Against operating procedures, the hemispheres were separated only by a screwdriver. The screwdriver slipped and set off a chain reaction criticality accident filling the room with harmful radiation and a flash of blue light (caused by excited, ionized air particles returning to their unexcited states). Slotin reflexively separated the hemispheres in reaction to the heat flash and blue light, preventing further radiation of several co-workers present in the room. However Slotin absorbed a lethal dose of the radiation and died during the following week.

Lost source accidents are ones in which a radioactive source is lost, stolen or abandoned. The source then might cause harm to humans or the environment. For example, see the event in Lilo where sources were left behind by the Soviet army. Another case occurred at Yanango where a radiography source was lost, also at Samut Prakarn a cobalt-60 teletherapy source was lost and at Gilan in Iran a radiography source harmed a welder. The best known example of this type of event is the Goiânia accident which occurred in Brazil.

The International Atomic Energy Agency have provided guides for scrap metal collectors on what a sealed source might look like. The scrap metal industry is the one where lost sources are most likely to be found.

Some accidents defy classification. These accidents happen when the unexpected occurs with a radioactive source. For instance if a bird grabs a radioactive source containing radium from a window sill and then was to fly away with it, returning to its nest and then the bird dies shortly afterwards from direct irradiation then it is the case that a minor radiation accident has occurred. As the act of placing the source on a window sill by a human was the event which permitted the bird access to the source, it is unclear how such an event should be classified (if is a lost source event or a something else). Radium lost and found describes a tale of a pig walking about with a radium source inside; this was a radium source lost from a hospital.

Also some accidents are "normal" industrial accidents which happen to involve radioactive material, for instance a runaway reaction at Tomsk caused radioactive material to be spread around the site. (www.wikipedia.org)

The Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred on Saturday, April 26, 1986, at 1:23:58 a.m. local time. The V.I. Lenin Memorial Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was located in Ukraine, near the town of Pripyat, which had been built to house power station employees and their families. The power station was in a wooded, marshy area near the Ukraine-Belarus border, approximately 18 kilometers northwest of the city of Chernobyl and 100 km north of Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station included four nuclear reactors, each capable of producing one gigawatt of electric power. At the time of the accident, the four reactors produced about 10 percent of the electricity used in Ukraine.

Construction of the Chernobyl power station began in the 1970s. The first of the four reactors was commissioned in 1977, and Reactor No. 4 began producing power in 1983. When the accident occurred in 1986, two other nuclear reactors were under construction.

On April 26, 1986, the operating crew planned to test whether the Reactor No. 4 turbines could produce enough energy to keep the coolant pumps running until the emergency diesel generator was activated in case of an external power loss. During the test, power surged unexpectedly, causing an explosion and driving temperatures in the reactor to more than 2,000 degrees Celsius—melting the fuel rods, igniting the reactor’s graphite covering, and releasing a cloud of radiation into the atmosphere. The precise causes of the accident are still uncertain, but it is generally believed that the series of incidents that led to the explosion, fire and nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl was caused by a combination of reactor design flaws and operator error. (www.clk.about.com)

The explosion at the power station and subsequent fires inside the remains of the reactor provoked a radioactive cloud which drifted over Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, but also the European part of Turkey, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Lithuania, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, France (including Corsica) and the United Kingdom (UK). In fact, the initial evidence in other countries that a major exhaust of radioactive material had occurred came not from Soviet sources, but from Sweden, where on April 27 workers at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant (approximately 1100 km from the Chernobyl site) were found to have radioactive particles on their clothes. It was Sweden's search for the source of radioactivity, after they had determined there was no leak at the Swedish plant, that led to the first hint of a serious nuclear problem in the Western Soviet Union. In France, the government then claimed that the radioactive cloud had stopped at the Italian border. Therefore, while some kinds of food were prohibited in Italy because of radioactivity (in particular mushrooms), the French authorities didn't take any such measures, in an attempt to appease the population's fears.

203 people were hospitalized immediately, of whom 31 died (28 of them died from acute radiation exposure). Most of these were fire and rescue workers trying to bring the disaster under control, who were not fully aware of how dangerous the radiation exposure (from the smoke) was (for a discussion of the more important isotopes in fallout see fission products). 135,000 people were evacuated from the area, including 50,000 from the nearby town of Pripyat, Ukraine. Health officials have predicted that over the next 70 years there will be a 2% increase in cancer rates in much of the population which was exposed to the 5-12 (depending on source) EBq of radioactive contamination released from the reactor. An additional 10 individuals have already died of cancer as a result of the disaster.

Soviet scientists reported that the Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor contained about 180-190 metric tons of uranium dioxide fuel and fission products. Estimates of the amount of this material that escaped range from 5 to 30 percent, but some liquidators, who have actually been inside the sarcophagus and the reactor shell itself — e.g. Mr. Usatenko and Dr. Karpan— state that not more than 5-10% of the fuel remains inside; indeed, photographs of the reactor shell show that it is completely empty. Because of the intense heat of the fire, much of the ejected fuel was lofted high into the atmosphere (with no containment building to stop it), where it spread. (www.wikipedia.org)

The Chernobyl accident cost the former Soviet Union hundreds of billions of dollars, and some observers believe it may have hastened the collapse of the Soviet government.

After the accident, Soviet authorities resettled more than 350,000 people outside the worst areas, including all 50,000 people from nearby Pripyat, but millions of people continue to live in contaminated areas.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, many projects intended to improve life in the region were abandoned, and young people began to move away to pursue careers and build new lives in other places.

"In many villages, up to 60 percent of the population is made up of pensioners," said Vasily Nesterenko, director of the Belrad Radiation Safety and Protection Institute in Minsk. "In most of these villages, the number of people able to work is two or three times lower than normal."

After the accident, Reactor No. 4 was sealed, but the Ukranian government allowed the other three reactors to keep operating because the country needed the power they provided. Reactor No. 2 was shut down after a fire damaged it in 1991, and Reactor No. 1 was decommissioned in 1996. In November 2000, the Ukranian president shut down Reactor No. 3 in an official ceremony that finally closed the Chernobyl facility.

But Reactor No. 4, which was damaged in the 1986 explosion and fire, is still full of radioactive material encased inside a concrete barrier, called a sarcophagus, that is aging badly and needs to be replaced. Water leaking into the reactor carries radioactive material throughout the facility and threatens to seep into the groundwater.

The sarcophagus was designed to last about 30 years, and current designs would create a new shelter with a lifetime of 100 years. But radioactivity in the damaged reactor would need to be contained for 100,000 years to ensure safety. That is a challenge not only for today, but for many generations to come. (www.clk.about.com)

The bulk of US-Russia nuclear security cooperation focuses on enhancing physical protection and security of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear material. Early efforts focused on providing equipment, such as cranes, trucks and cutting tools for dismantling and destruction of surplus stockpiles. With the maturing of the programs, a multitude of services have been provided by the US, such as assistance with dismantling nuclear submarines, enhancing security systems at nuclear weapons storage sites and help with consolidating and accounting for nuclear materials in central locations. (www.bitsberlin.de/NRANEU/NonProliferation/safety)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly a decade ago, the West has been concerned about the fate of Russia's vast stockpile of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise.

Specifically, the West worried that the disintegration of the Russian economy would make that nation's nuclear scientists and experts vulnerable to temptation by rogue states seeking the expertise and material necessary to develop their own nuclear weapons and missiles.

To avert or manage this threat, Western programs were begun to provide financial support and alternative employment for the skilled experts and technicians needed to maintain Russia's nuclear industries and weapons. These efforts have been successful in engaging portions of Russian weapons experts, but the risk of brain drain remains.

While few have actually fled their country or tried to profit by stealing fissionable material, fewer still are being attracted into the field. The net result poses a new danger for Russia: that there will be no one left with the requisite skills needed to maintain the safety and security of its nuclear materials.

A new study shows this to be especially true among those living in what were once known as "secret cities." In these isolated communities, the economic strain has been so severe that it's nearly impossible to attract new scientists and experts to fill the necessary positions. (www.nyu.edu/globalbeat)

There is a great deal of international cooperation on nuclear safety issues, in particular the exchange of operating experience under the auspices of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) which was set up in 1989.

The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety was drawn up during a series of expert level meetings from 1992 to 1994 and was the result of considerable work by Governments, national nuclear safety authorities and the IAEA Secretariat. Its aim is to legally commit participating States operating land-based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which States would subscribe.

The obligations of the Parties are based to a large extent on the principles contained in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals document The Safety of Nuclear Installations. These obligations cover for instance, siting, design, construction, operation, the availability of adequate financial and human resources, the assessment and verification of safety, quality assurance and emergency preparedness.

The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction, but is based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety. These levels are defined by international benchmarks developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to report on the implementation of their obligations for international peer review. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention.

The Convention entered into force in October 1996. As of April 2007, there were 65 signatories to the Convention and 60 contracting parties. All countries with operating nuclear power plants are now among the 41 parties to the Convention.

In relation to Eastern Europe particularly, since the late 1980s a major international program of assistance has been carried out by the OECD, IAEA and Commission of the European Communities to bring early Soviet-designed reactors up to near western safety standards, or at least to effect significant improvements to the plants and their operation. The European Union has also brought pressure to bear, particularly in countries which aspired to EU membership.

Modifications have been made to overcome deficiencies in the 12 RBMK reactors still operating in Russia and Lithuania. Among other things, these have removed the danger of a positive void coefficient response. Automated inspection equipment has also been installed in these reactors.

The other class of reactors which has been the focus of international attention for safety upgrades is the first-generation of pressurised water VVER-440/230 reactors. These were designed before formal safety standards were issued in the Soviet Union and they lack many basic safety features. Some are still operating in Bulgaria, Russia and Armenia, under close inspection.

Later Soviet-designed reactors are very much safer and the most recent ones have Western control systems or the equivalent, along with containment structures.

In 1996 the Nuclear Safety Convention came into force. It is the first international legal instrument on the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide. It commits participating countries to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which they subscribe and against which they report. It has 65 signatories and has been ratified by 41 states.

To achieve optimum safety, nuclear plants in the western world operate using a 'defence-in-depth' approach, with multiple safety systems supplementing the natural features of the reactor core. Key aspects of the approach are:

• high-quality design & construction
• equipment which prevents operational disturbances developing into problems
• redundant and diverse systems to detect problems, control damage to the fuel and prevent significant radioactive releases
• provision to confine the effects of severe fuel damage to the plant itself.

The safety provisions include a series of physical barriers between the radioactive reactor core and the environment, the provision of multiple safety systems, each with backup and designed to accommodate human error. Safety systems account for about one quarter of the capital cost of such reactors.

The barriers in a typical plant are: the fuel is in the form of solid ceramic (UO2) pellets, and radioactive fission products remain bound inside these pellets as the fuel is burned. The pellets are packed inside sealed zirconium alloy tubes to form fuel rods. These are confined inside a large steel pressure vessel with walls up to 30 cm thick - the associated primary water cooling pipework is also substantial. All this, in turn, is enclosed inside a robust reinforced concrete containment structure with walls at least one metre thick.

But the main safety features of most reactors are inherent - negative temperature coefficient and negative void coefficient. The first means that beyond an optimal level, as the temperature increases the efficiency of the reaction decreases (this in fact is used to control power levels in some new designs). The second means that if any steam has formed in the cooling water there is a decrease in moderating effect so that fewer neutrons are able to cause fission and the reaction slows down automatically.

Beyond the control rods which are inserted to absorb neutrons and regulate the fission process, the main engineered safety provisions are the back-up emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to remove excess heat (though it is more to prevent damage to the plant than for public safety) and the containment.

Traditional reactor safety systems are 'active' in the sense that they involve electrical or mechanical operation on command. Some engineered systems operate passively, eg pressure relief valves. Both require parallel redundant systems. Inherent or full passive safety design depends only on physical phenomena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high temperatures, not on functioning of engineered components. All reactors have some elements of inherent safety as mentioned above, but in some recent designs the passive or inherent features substitute for active systems in cooling etc.

The basis of design assumes a threat where due to accident or malign intent (eg terrorism) there is core melting and a breach of containment. This double possibility has been well studied and provides the basis of exclusion zones and contingency plans. Apparently during the Cold War neither Russia nor the USA targeted the other's nuclear power plants because the likely damage would be modest.

Nuclear power plants are designed with sensors to shut them down automatically in an earthquake, and this is a vital consideration in many parts of the world. (see paper on Earthquakes)

The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 demonstrated the importance of the inherent safety features. Despite the fact that about half of the reactor core melted, radionuclides released from the melted fuel mostly plated out on the inside of the plant or dissolved in condensing steam. The containment building which housed the reactor further prevented any significant release of radioactivity. The accident was attributed to mechanical failure and operator confusion. The reactor's other protection systems also functioned as designed. The emergency core cooling system would have prevented any damage to the reactor but for the intervention of the operators.

Investigations following the accident led to a new focus on the human factors in nuclear safety. No major design changes were called for in western reactors, but controls and instrumentation were improved and operator training was overhauled.

By way of contrast, the Chernobyl reactor did not have a containment structure like those used in the West or in post-1980 Soviet designs. (www.uic.com.au)

Used fuel assemblies taken from the reactor core are highly radioactive and give off a lot of heat. They are therefore stored in special ponds which are usually located at the reactor site, to allow both their heat and radioactivity to decrease. The water in the ponds serves the dual purpose of acting as a barrier against radiation and dispersing the heat from the spent fuel.

Spent fuel can be stored safely in these ponds for long periods. It can also be dry stored in engineered facilities, cooled by air. However, both kinds of storage are intended only as an interim step before the spent fuel is either reprocessed or sent to final disposal. The longer it is stored, the easier it is to handle, due to decay of radioactivity.

There are two alternatives for used fuel:

• reprocessing to recover the usable portion of it
• long-term storage and final disposal without reprocessing

Storage pond for spent fuel at UK reprocessing plant (www.world-nuclear.org)

Spent fuel still contains approximately 96% of its original uranium, of which the fissionable U-235 content has been reduced to less than 1%. About 3% of spent fuel comprises waste products and the remaining 1% is plutonium (Pu) produced while the fuel was in the reactor and not "burned" then.

Reprocessing separates uranium and plutonium from waste products (and from the fuel assembly cladding) by chopping up the fuel rods and dissolving them in acid to separate the various materials. Recovered uranium can be returned to the conversion plant for conversion to uranium hexafluoride and subsequent re-enrichment. The reactor-grade plutonium can be blended with enriched uranium to produce a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, in a fuel fabrication plant. MOX fuel fabrication occurs at facilities in Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Russia and Japan, with more under construction. There have been 25 years of experience in this, and the first large-scale plant, Melox, commenced operation in France in 1995. Across Europe about 30 reactors are licensed to load 20-50% of their cores with MOX fuel and Japan plans to have one third of its 54 reactors using MOX by 2010.

The remaining 3% of high-level radioactive wastes (some 750 kg per year from a 1000 MWe reactor) can be stored in liquid form and subsequently solidified.

Reprocessing of spent fuel occurs at facilities in Europe and Russia with capacity over 5000 tonnes per year and cumulative civilian experience of 90,000 tonnes over almost 40 years. (www.world-nuclear.org)

The Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy (Minatom) lobbied the bills through the Russian legal system. According to the scheme developed by Minatom, Russia could import around 20,000 tonnes of foreign spent nuclear fuel in the next 20 years and earn around $20bn on such operations. Around $7bn of the earnings will be spent on various environmental and social programmes, Minatom's officials say.

Russia's stock of spent nuclear fuel amounts to around 15,000 tonnes. More than half of the fuel is stored, often in unsatisfactory conditions, in onsite storage facilities at ten operational nuclear power plants. The naval spent nuclear fuel is stored in appallingly unsafe conditions at the bases of the Northern and the Pacific fleets.

Bellona believes the import of spent nuclear fuel will contribute to environmental degradation in Russia. It may also contribute to the proliferation of nuclear materials. The activity of Minatom, promoted recently to the ranks of Russia's state policy, is merely commercial. The import of spent nuclear fuel will first of all help Minatom to sustain Russia’s vast nuclear military complex, which is falling apart after the end of the cold war. It will also aid the survival of Minatom. The funds earned are unlikely to be spent on environmental programmes advertised by Minatom. Such a statement can be supported by the fact that the laws provide no effective control over import activities by an independent body. The Russian Nuclear Regulatory, GAN, has been stripped of its authority considerably over the past years.

By promoting the cheap solution to manage spent nuclear fuel, Minatom will divert nuclear power plants operators worldwide from seeking long-term spent nuclear fuel storage solutions.

The project will create incentives for other countries to follow Minatom's example. Kazakhstan has started to promote the idea to accept foreign radioactive waste for storage. Thus, the project may create competition among inadequately developed countries, which would lower the price of fuel-related services. This will undermine the security surrounding the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

Finally, public opinion polls show the Russian population is firmly opposed to Minatom's plans — up to 90% oppose the import project. In 2000, Russian NGOs attempted to hold a national vote against the import of spent nuclear fuel. They collected around 2.5 million signatures in support of holding a referendum on the issue. But one third of the signatures were scrapped by Russia's Central Electoral Commission on the grounds that they were false. The decision of the committee is said to be of political rather than technical nature.

The amendments to article 50 of the Law on Environmental Protection split the notion of radioactive materials into radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The latter became legible for import. In particular, the new paragraph says: "The import of irradiated fuel assemblies of other states into the Russian Federation for provisional storage and/or reprocessing is allowed in case a public environmental impact study and other public review of the relevant project, required under the laws of the Russian Federation, is conducted and an overall reduction of the risk of radiation impact and increase in the level of environmental safety and security as a result of the implementation of the relevant project is substantiated."

The amendments to the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy define the procedures under which Russia can lease spent nuclear fuel to other countries. The law stipulates that the leased fuel can be returned back to Russia after it has been burned in other countries' reactors.

The third bill is named the Special Environmental Programs for Remediation of the Radioactively Contaminated Areas. The bill is a pure propaganda move undertaken by Minatom in gaining support Duma votes for the whole law package. It stipulates the procedures of using financial resources gained from the import of foreign-origin spent nuclear fuel for environmental issues. The bill has very void legal binding that the funds earned shall be used on environmental programs and creates numerous holes for misuse of the funds.

In addition, Russian President when signing the bills said a commission, chaired by the Nobel Prize winner and academician Zhorez Alferov, would be established to supervise each importation. Putin said that he would also control personally each importation. The commission was set up in early 2002, but so far no meetings have been conducted. Academician Alferov is a known supporter of nuclear industry. (www.bellona.org)

Academician Zhorez Alferov

http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2000/alferov.jpg

Nuclear power:

Decommissioning is the final phase in the lifecycle of a nuclear installation, covering all activities from shutdown and removal of fissile material to environmental restoration of the site. At present, over 110 nuclear facilities within the Union are at various stages of the decommissioning process and it is forecast that at least a further 160 facilities will need to be decommissioned over the next 20 years (within the present 15 Member States). Enlargement of the Union would contribute to a rapid increase in the number of nuclear facilities to be decommissioned (at least a further 50 facilities).

Since 1979, the European Commission has conducted four successive five-year research and development programmes on the decommissioning of nuclear installations, performed under cost sharing contracts with organisations from the European Union. The main objective of these programmes was, and is, to establish a scientific and technological basis for the safe, socially acceptable and economically affordable decommissioning of obsolete nuclear installations

After 20 years of EU research and development programmes on decommissioning, with the process having reached industrial maturity, the time is now ripe to review the environmental and regulatory related issues.

The issues surrounding the distribution of responsibilities connected with decommissioning; the management policy of materials and waste; radiation protection; the impact on the environment; public perception; the technical approach and the financial aspects should be addressed.

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management of their waste involves environmental, technical, social and financial responsibilities. It is not always clear who will bear these different responsibilities for the decommissioning of existing nuclear installations up to the final stage. Until now, decommissioning projects have often been regulated on a case-by-case basis and on the initial build-up of experience in this field. There is a marked difference in decommissioning strategies between individual Member States.

The development of common approaches based on a "Code of Conduct" within the EU on the decommissioning of nuclear facilities should result in improved protection of the population and of the environment and in a more standardised technological approach resulting in, inter alia, a reduction in the volume of waste produced. Harmonisation of decommissioning practices in the Member States and the development of specific regulations covering decommissioning should make regulatory decisions easier, more efficient and transparent. This would facilitate public involvement in the decision making process.

At present, there are numerous gaps in the third party nuclear liability and environmental liability regimes dealing with decommissioning. This is a particular problem in the light of the enlargement of the EU and the increased number of decommissioning operations foreseen for the near future.

Decommissioning costs might represent up to 50% of the discounted investments made for the nuclear part of a power plant. They must be fully taken into account in generating costs. Sound financial provisions for decommissioning should reduce the potential burden on future generations. An environmental threat could exist if adequate financial provisions have not been built up in good time. This may be the case in some applicant countries.

Large volumes of material are produced during decommissioning activities and the environmental and financial costs of disposal of this material as waste can be very significant. Consequently, the minimisation of waste is important in the management of these projects.

Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) includes the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors in the list of projects to be subjected to an EIA. Formally, the Directive sets out the broad principles of the environmental assessment system. At first sight, the existing decommissioning plans in most of the countries inside and outside the EU focus only on radiological impact assessments rather than the wider EIA covered by the Directive.

The final decommissioning of a nuclear installation as part of a global environmental restoration strategy is of great concern to the public. Public concerns may include aspects such as what will happen to the waste and the potential lengthening of decommissioning time-scales. In addition, there is concern about leaving the waste to be dealt with by future generations. Even if the existing decommissioning regulations and procedures protect workers and the general public, people still need to be informed of the preventive measures taken. Decommissioning operations and the related strategy decisions should be undertaken in a spirit of transparency and openness, with the involvement of the public and an understanding of their concerns. (www.ec.europa.eu)

It would make strategic and environmental sense to pour more resources into the research and development of alternatives to fossil fuels. Fossil fuel-dependent industries cry foul of such suggestions, but governments poured billions into fossil fuel development (before privatizing those industries). Perhaps in a similar way, given those industries are now mature, they do not need such support, but other industries in renewable and alternatives could be created.

Dr. Hermann Scheer is a Member of the German Parliament since 1980 and was given the title “Hero for the Green Century” in 2002 by Time Magazine. He argues in a short video clip that the reason why many still think renewable energy cannot replace fossil and nuclear power is because those working in these industries have made efforts to propagate the notion.

The higher prices at petrol pumps in recent months may be a blessing in disguise if it makes consumers also think more about energy conservation and alternatives, for the market may respond to that.

Nuclear power is one alternative to fossil fuels that many nations are considering, given their efficient and environmental friendliness during operation. Many (not all) environmentalists fear the consequences and costs of accidents and radioactive waste and say it is not worth it, and that other renewable alternatives should be invested in, instead.

Despite environmental concerns, “demand for nuclear power plants is on the increase, and the International Energy Agency estimates that more than $200bn will be spent by 2030 on harnessing the atom for energy output”, notes the BBC. As an example, by 2050, India expects to have 25% of its energy provided by nuclear power, compared to the current 3%, according to another BBC article.

India and China are some of the countries that have recently made deals with providers of nuclear power plants, while others, such as Iran are criticized and obstructed from having such capability based on the fear that they may want to create nuclear weapons.

Many have called for a massive infusion of funds by leading governments and companies to invest in alternatives such as solar, wind, and wave power. Governments encouraging and even funding investment in these areas would be no different to the past where development of fossil fuel-based energy required a kick-start.

Those favoring a strict neoliberal economic ideology will argue that the state should not interfere in markets, yet history shows that the market has hardly ever functioned without the state, and indeed the state has often been the major reason a market has even appeared. For democratic countries, governments subsidizing renewable and alternatives could reflect the desires of many of that nation’s constituents. If fossil fuel companies fear competition, they should (and many are) become more active in this area, but not stifle important and urgent debate and research. (www.globalissues.org)

There are several reasons why countries want to have nuclear weapons:

When a state acquires nuclear weapons, the cost of invading that state increases, making it more difficult and expensive for the invader to gain a military edge. For example, in the early 1980s Iraq was developing a nuclear reactor for, at least in part, energy purposes; however, the only nuclear-armed state in the region, Israel, feared that Iraq's reactor would be used to develop nuclear weapons. Israel correctly assumed that if Iraq were to acquire nuclear weapons, Israel would lose its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and thus likely lose foreign-policy leverage with other countries in the region. Therefore, since Iraq did not yet have nuclear weapons, in 1981 Israel was able to launch a successful military strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor without the fear of a powerful retaliation.

After that strike, according to Iraqi nuclear scientists, Iraq hastened its mission to develop nuclear weapons. The Iraqis realized that the only way to increase their leverage with their rivals - such as Iran and Israel - was to acquire such weapons, knowing full well that this would make it much more difficult for rival states to threaten or attack Iraq. This same reason may be why the Ba'ath Party leadership was unwilling to allow United Nations weapons inspectors complete access to every part of Iraq: the ambiguity surrounding its weapons program could have theoretically increased Baghdad's foreign-policy negotiating power.

This ambiguity can also be seen in current North Korean foreign policy. Ever since the election of US President George W Bush, whose administration publicly considers North Korea a threat that may require "regime change", Pyongyang has sent out a dizzying amount of confusing signals regarding its nuclear program. The purpose of such dubious statements is likely to create the perception that North Korea is possibly a nuclear-armed state. As long as powerful rival states, such as the United States and Japan, are unclear about North Korea's nuclear program, they will have to be careful before deciding to take military action against the country.

As these two examples illustrate, nuclear-armed states work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in order to preserve their power and increase their foreign-policy leverage. States without nuclear weapons, on the other hand, may strive to acquire nuclear weapons in order to increase their power and foreign-policy leverage, while also protecting their own country from military attacks by outside major and minor powers.

There are diverging opinions over which state of affairs is better for world order: more nuclear-armed states, or fewer nuclear-armed states. In theory, if every state had nuclear capability, countries would be unwilling to attack one another out of fear of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). It is unlikely that states would be willing to use their nuclear weapons if they knew they would be a victim of a retaliatory nuclear attack. This reality caused former US defense secretary Robert McNamara to say that nuclear weapons "are totally useless - except to deter one's opponent from using them". In addition to preventing nuclear attacks, if all states were nuclear-armed it could theoretically limit the amount of conventional conflict, as there would be much more risk to take into account before deciding to attack a rival nuclear-armed state.

For others, the ideal situation would be to limit the spread of nuclear weapons until they could finally be phased out altogether. However, this goal is unrealistic, as states without nuclear weapons will continue to try to acquire them in order to increase their foreign-policy leverage. Furthermore, if nearly all nuclear weapons were eliminated, one state could possibly develop a global nuclear monopoly and thus become extremely powerful on the world stage. Since the development of nuclear weapons in 1945, the only country that has had such a monopoly was the United States during the brief period of 1945-49. However, by no means did the United States have nuclear superiority during this time, as it lacked adequate delivery capabilities in addition to having an extremely limited quantity of nuclear weapons.

Current US foreign policy basically follows the latter approach. The United States, along with its allies and other powerful nuclear-armed states, has worked to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, while also attempting to coax rival nuclear-armed states into relinquishing their nuclear weapons. Despite its attempts, Washington has been careful to leave some of its important allies with nuclear weapons in order to preserve the balance of power in certain regions. Israel, for example, is a state that has nuclear weapons with the sanction of the United States. Since Israel is the only nuclear-armed country in the Middle East, it is able to keep the current balance of power in the region tilted toward Israel and its ally, the United States.

The fear of losing control of the Middle East explains why both the United States and Israel have been carefully monitoring Iran's nuclear program. Both the US and Israel fear that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States and Israel would lose much of their power and foreign-policy leverage in the oil-rich region. It also explains why Washington has warned Pyongyang against developing nuclear weapons, albeit with weaker rhetoric because East Asia is currently not as high a priority as the Middle East.

In conclusion, in the current conditions of world order it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed state would use nuclear weapons against its rivals. In fact, the only time that nuclear weapons have been used in combat were the initial attacks launched by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Since then, nuclear weapons have merely acted as balancing devices used to deter aggression from rivals, and not as actual weapons. It is for this purpose that non-nuclear states seek to acquire nuclear arsenals.

There are signs, however, that this state of affairs may change. The Bush administration has been flirting with the idea of developing a new generation of "tactical" nuclear weapons, often referred to as "mini-nukes". Officials in the Pentagon and the US Energy Department have argued that "mini-nukes" could be effective in destroying hardened bunkers or other underground targets. If the Bush administration were to approve the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons, it would be an attempt to erase much of the stigma associated with the use of nuclear weapons. If such a policy were pursued, the distinction between "mini-nukes" and other nuclear weapons could quickly dissolve.

Furthermore, if the foreign policies of countries such as the United States continue to become more aggressive, the rush by non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons for protective purposes will increase. Even more daunting, if Washington opens the door to nuclear-weapon use for offensive purposes, non-nuclear states will also seek nuclear weapons for offensive purposes in addition to protective purposes, possibly igniting a new arms race.

Transport is an integral part of the nuclear fuel cycle. There are some 430 nuclear power reactors in operation in 32 countries but uranium mining is viable in only a few areas. Furthermore, in the course of over fifty years of operation by the nuclear industry, a number of specialized facilities have been developed in various locations around the world to provide fuel cycle services. It is clear that there is a need to transport nuclear fuel cycle materials to and from these facilities. Indeed, most of the material used in nuclear fuel is transported several times during its progress through the fuel cycle. Transports are frequently international, and are often over large distances. Nuclear materials are generally transported by specialized transport companies.

The term 'transport' is used here only to refer to the movement of material between facilities, for example, through areas outside such facilities. Most transports of nuclear fuel material occur between different stages of the cycle, but occasionally a material may be transported between similar facilities. When the stages are directly linked (such as mining and milling), it is sometimes advantageous to construct facilities for the different stages on the same site and no transport is then required.

Since nuclear materials are radioactive, it is important to ensure that radiation exposure of both those involved in the transport of such materials and the general public along transport routes is limited. Packaging for nuclear materials includes, where appropriate, shielding to reduce potential radiation exposures. In the case of some materials, such as fresh uranium fuel assemblies, the radiation levels are negligible and no shielding is required. Other materials, such as used fuel and high-level waste, are highly radioactive and purpose-designed containers with integral shielding are used. To limit the risk in handling of highly radioactive materials, dual-purpose containers (casks), which are appropriate for both storage and transport of used nuclear fuel, are often used.

As with other hazardous materials being transported, packages of nuclear materials are labeled in accordance with the requirements of national and international regulations. These labels not only indicate that the material is radioactive, by including a radiation symbol, but also give an indication of the radiation field in the vicinity of the package.

Personnel directly involved in the transport of nuclear materials are trained to take appropriate precautions and to respond in case of an emergency.

www.nnsa.doe.gov/img/SecureTrans.jpg www.greenpeace.org.uk

Packages used for the transport of nuclear materials are designed to retain their integrity during the various conditions that may be encountered while they are being transported and to ensure that an accident will not have any major consequences. Conditions which packages are tested to withstand include: fire, impact, wetting, pressure, heat and cold. Packages of radioactive material are checked prior to shipping and, when it is found to be necessary, cleaned to remove contamination.

Although not required by transport regulations, the nuclear industry chooses to undertake some shipments of nuclear material using dedicated, purpose-built transport vehicles or vessels. (www.uic.com.au)

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Bibliography I also used while working on Benchmark II:

1. “Nuclear Power: Current Status, Plans for the Near Future, and Proliferation Implications” (Cristina Chuen, CNS Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program (NISNP) director)
original Powerpoint file.

2. "Nuclear Power Technologies" (Speaker: Craig Smith, Naval Post Graduate School/Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory)
original Powerpoint file.

3. "Nuclear Terrorism" (Cristina Chuen, CNS Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program (NISNP) director)
original Powerpoint file.

4. History of Nuclear Energy/Risks and Benefits including Past Incidents (Sonja Schmid, CNS Post Doctoral Fellow)
original Powerpoint file.

5. V.P. Maksakovsky, Geography, text-book for secondary schools, Moscow, Prosvesheniye, 2007.

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