NUCLEAR ENERGY: BENEFITS VERSUS RISKS

BENCHMARK II

Student Anastasia Gorbunova

Teacher Olga Cherepanova

Seversk Gymnasia

Seversk 2008

CONTENTS

1. Introduction.

2. IAEA

3. A system of legal measures aimed at ensuring nuclear and radiation safety.

- Minatom

4. Nuclear Accidents.

5. Closed towns. Seversk.

6. Conclusion.

INTRODUCTION

Radioactive substances pose enormous dangers to humans, animal and plant life. Nuclear disasters and other accidents, including Chernobyl, have had an extremely negative impact on the health of human beings, as well as on the environment and economies of the countries affected. Breaches of regulations on the mining, processing, manufacturing, use, storage, transport, and disposal of radioactive substances also pose a serious risk to the health and life of human beings. The risk of future nuclear accidents or legal violations makes it clear that it is extremely important to ensure radiation and nuclear safety in the world.

Nuclear and radiation safety form an integral part of environmental safety, which involves state protection of the population, animal and plant life, a region or an entire country against the impact of man on the environment or against natural disasters. Radioactive materials must be handled and used in such a manner as to preclude any chance of harmful effects (disasters, accidents, radiation contamination, and exposure to human beings). In other words, environmental safety must be ensured when handling radioactive materials.

An array of legal, technical, economic, and other measures are used to ensure nuclear and radiation safety, i.e., to ensure that the general population, personnel working at nuclear facilities, and the environment (land, subsoil, water, air, plant and animal life, and man- made facilities and structures of all kinds) are adequately protected from the risks posed by nuclear and radioactive materials.

Accidents at nuclear reactors and other similar facilities, resulting in the release of radioactive materials into the environment, the contamination of facilities and other structures, and human exposure, are usually caused by inadequate observation or a breach of nuclear and radiation codes or legal provisions by officials or personnel. /www.bellona.org/

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The IAEA is the world’s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies.

Organizational Profile

The IAEA Secretariat is headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational liaison and regional offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto, Canada; and Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA runs or supports research centers and scientific laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Monaco; and Trieste, Italy.

The IAEA Secretariat is a team of 2200 multi-disciplinary professional and support staff from more than 90 countries. The Agency is led by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and six Deputy Directors General who head the major departments.

IAEA programs and budgets are set through decisions of its policymaking bodies - the 35-member Board of Governors and the General Conference of all Member States. Reports on IAEA activities are submitted periodically or as cases warrant to the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly.

IAEA financial resources include the regular budget and voluntary contributions. The Regular Budget for 2007 amounts to Euro 283 611 000. The target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund for 2007 is $80 million.

IAEA Mission & Programs

The IAEA’s mission is guided by the interests and needs of Member States, strategic plans and the vision embodied in the IAEA Statute. Three main pillars - or areas of work - underpin the IAEA’s mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification.

Relationship with United Nations

As an independent international organization related to the United Nations system, the IAEA´s relationship with the UN is regulated by special agreement. In terms of its Statute, the IAEA reports annually to the UN General Assembly and, when appropriate, to the Security Council regarding non-compliance by States with their safeguards obligations as well as on matters relating to international peace and security. /www.iaea.org/

ARTICLE I: Establishment of the Agency

The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.

ARTICLE II: Objectives

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

ARTICLE III: Functions

A. The Agency is authorized:

1. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another; and to perform any operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes;

2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world;

3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic energy;

4. To encourage the exchange of training of scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;

6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property (including such standards for labor conditions), and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operation as well as to the operations making use of materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its control or supervision; and to provide for the application of these standards, at the request of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;

7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities, plant, and equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory.

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

1. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies;

2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes;

3. Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing in mind the special needs of the under- developed areas of the world;

4. Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII;

5. Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs of the United Nations on matters within the competence of these organs.

C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements concluded between a State or a group of States and the Agency which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign rights of States.

History of the IAEA

After the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 the USSR and Great Britain also worked on the nuclear weapon programs. Meanwhile there started to form the idea of international control of atomic energy. At the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA in Moscow in 1945 it was decided to propose a project at UN General Assembly about the atomic energy committee.

In 1946 in the USA there was developed a project of nuclear international control. The idea was to establish an institution on atomic energy development which would possess nuclear plants, world uranium stocks, etc. But the USA and the USSR tried to change the project caring only for their interests. This resulted in nuclear arms race. Several years passed and at last such an institution was created. [“Nuclear nonproliferation”, PIR-center, Moscow, 2002]

The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy.

US President’s Eisenhower’s "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953 was the last event which helped to the IAEA appearance.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Atoms for Peace

delivered 8 December 1953, United Nations General Assembly

/www.americanrhetoric.com/

Fifty years ago this month President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his Atoms for Peace proposal at the United Nations. This seminal event laid the groundwork for much of the nuclear enterprise that we see around the world today.

“I … decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates, and on mine, for a great many months -- thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all.” /www.americanrhetoric.com/

“… if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today’s world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to everyone of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today’s existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world’s first atomic explosion.

Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs today are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total [explosive] equivalent …”/www.americanrhetoric.com/

“In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use. But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, Great Britain and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic advices - devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions. If at one time the Unites States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago.

Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance.

First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression. The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and expanded. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.”/www.americanrhetoric.com/

“…My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life.” /www.americanrhetoric.com/

“…I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps now.

The United States and its allies, Great Britain and France, have, over the past months, tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table…” /www.americanrhetoric.com/

Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-Power meeting. Along with our allies, Great Britain and France, we were pleased to see that his note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions previously put forward. As you already know from our joint Bermuda communiqué, the United States, Great Britain, and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening international tension. We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs. We will never say that the people of Russia are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the West - the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.” /www.americanrhetoric.com/

“…The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored. There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not yet been well explored - an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the Unites Nations.

In its resolution of November 18th, 1953 this General Assembly suggested - and I quote - “that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than September 1, of 1954.”

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be “principally involved,” to seek “an acceptable solution” to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life of the world. We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now. I therefore make the following proposals:

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures, and other details would properly be within the scope of the “private conversations” I have referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special, safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing - it would be proud to take up with others “principally involved” the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those “principally involved” the Soviet Union must, of course, be one. I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they [the investigators] had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress toward peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace…” /www.americanrhetoric.com/

The ideas Eisenhower expressed in his speech helped to shape the IAEA Statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956. The Statute outlines the three pillars of the Agency’s work - nuclear verification and security, safety and technology transfer.

In the years following the Agency’s creation, the political and technical climate had changed so much that by 1958 it had become politically impracticable for the IAEA to begin work on some of the main tasks foreseen in its Statute. But in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the USA and the USSR began seeking common ground in nuclear arms control.

In 1961 the IAEA opened its Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, creating a channel for cooperative global nuclear research. That year the Agency signed a trilateral agreement with Monaco and the Oceanographic Institute headed by Jacques Cousteau for research on the effects of radioactivity in the sea, an action that eventually lead to the creation of the IAEA’s Marine Environment Laboratory.

As more countries mastered nuclear technology, concern deepened that they would sooner or later acquire nuclear weapons, particularly since two additional nations had "joined the club", France in 1960 and China in 1964. The safeguards prescribed in the IAEA’s Statute, designed chiefly to cover individual nuclear plants or supplies of fuel, were clearly inadequate to deter proliferation. There was growing support for international, legally binding, commitments and comprehensive safeguards to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons and to work towards their eventual elimination.

This found regional expression in 1968, with the approval of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT essentially freezes the number of declared nuclear weapon States at five (USA, Russia, UK, France and China). Other States are required to forswear the nuclear weapons option and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA on their nuclear materials.

The 1970s showed that the NPT would be accepted by almost all of the key industrial countries and by the vast majority of developing countries. At the same time the prospects for nuclear power improved dramatically. The technology had matured and was commercially available, and the oil crisis of 1973 enhanced the attraction of the nuclear energy option. The IAEA’s functions became distinctly more important. But by the early 1980s, the demand for new nuclear power plants had declined sharply in most Western countries, and it shrank nearly to zero in these countries after the 1986 Chernobyl accident.

In 1991, the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine weapon program sowed doubts about the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, but also led to steps to strengthen them, some of which were put to the test when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became the second country that was discovered violating its NPT safeguards agreement. The Three Mile Island accident and especially the Chernobyl disaster persuaded governments to strengthen the IAEA’s role in enhancing nuclear safety.

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the consequent improvement in international security virtually eliminated the danger of a global nuclear conflict. Broad adherence to regional treaties underscored the nuclear weapon free status of Latin America, Africa and South East Asia, as well as the South Pacific. The threat of proliferation in some successor States of the former Soviet Union was averted; in Iraq and the DPRK the threat was contained.

In 1995, the NPT was made permanent and in 1996 the UN General Assembly approved and opened for signature a comprehensive test ban treaty. While military nuclear activities were beyond the IAEA’s statutory scope, it was now accepted that the Agency might properly deal with some of the problems bequeathed by the nuclear arms race - verification of the peaceful use or storage of nuclear material from dismantled weapons and surplus military stocks of fissile material, determining the risks posed by the nuclear wastes of nuclear warships dumped in the Arctic, and verifying the safety of former nuclear test sites in Central Asia and the Pacific.

In recent years, the Agency’s work has taken on some urgent added dimensions. Among them are countermeasures against the threat of nuclear terrorism, the focus of a new multi-faceted Agency action plan. /www.iaea.org/

Early Nonproliferation Efforts

the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and others, began providing research reactors that used weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium (though usually in lesser amounts than needed for a weapon) to non-nuclear-weapon states around the world. These transfers and the training that accompanied the reactors helped scientists in many countries learn about nuclear fission and its potential uses.

As these scientists moved up the nuclear learning curve, global support increased for controlling the spread of the new technology in order to prevent its use for weapons. Soon, debate about nonproliferation in the UN General Assembly produced a 1961 consensus Irish resolution saying that countries already having nuclear weapons would “undertake to refrain from relinquishing control” of them to others and would refrain “from transmitting information for their manufacture to States not possessing” them. Countries without nuclear weapons would agree not to receive or manufacture them. These ideas were the basis for the NPT.

The United States submitted a simple draft treaty based on this resolution to the Soviet Union when a new 18-nation Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva in 1962. The Soviet response was to insist on a treaty that would prohibit the arrangements that the United States then had with NATO allies such as West Germany for deployment, in their countries, of U.S. nuclear weapons under the control of U.S. soldiers - weapons to be used to protect these countries, if necessary, in the event of an attack on them by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet proposal and U.S. plans for a “multilateral force” of naval vessels with nuclear weapons - vessels manned by sailors from participating NATO countries and under NATO command - became major obstacles to agreement. By then, the multilateral force plan was strongly supported only by West Germany. However, for the United States to agree that an NPT should prohibit U.S. allies not having nuclear weapons from joining in control of U.S. nuclear weapons in peacetime required meetings with President Lyndon Johnson at Camp David, further negotiations with Soviet representatives, recommendations to the president from an important committee of distinguished advisers, lengthy discussions with West Germany and other allies, a congressional resolution urging negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, and bureaucratic maneuvering to gain Johnson’s approval for proposed treaty language.

In the compromise, the United States gave up on the multilateral force; the Soviets gave up on a prohibition against U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and other allied countries), provided the weapons remained under sole control of U.S. personnel. The non-nuclear-weapon states were asked to accept draft language which prohibited them from having nuclear weapons and which called for the IAEA to be permitted to carry out inspections to guarantee that their nuclear programs were limited to peaceful uses. In addition, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed to provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to conduct future negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

Negotiations then began for gaining acceptance of these provisions by important non-nuclear-weapon governments and their parliaments and for prescribing the inspections that would be conducted by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT. India, which had participated actively in the NPT negotiations as a country without nuclear weapons, refused to join. It wanted to retain the option to produce its own nuclear weapons as its then-adversary, China, already had. Pakistan, another adversary of India, refused to join because India would not. Israel, which the United States had tried to restrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in separate negotiations during the 1960s, also refused to join. China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations but had acquired nuclear weapons before its negotiation was completed. The NPT draft permitted them to join the treaty with the same rights and duties as the other nuclear-weapon states—the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. They did so later.

States began signing the treaty in 1968, and it went into force in 1970. However, the negotiations at the IAEA among parties and potential parties on the scope of inspections for non-nuclear-weapon parties continued for several years. Many countries, including West European allies of the United States, did not ratify the treaty until these negotiations were completed to their satisfaction. There were also further negotiations every five years at NPT review conferences. These dealt with implementation of treaty provisions such as those promising assistance to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful uses and calling for reductions of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament. At an important conference in 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely from its initial 25-year term. The 1995 decision and the review conference of 2000 focused particular attention on the NPT-related promises of the nuclear-weapon states to “cease the nuclear arms race” including stopping nuclear testing, negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons, and eventually achieving nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 is the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

It obliges the nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Treaty (US, Russia, China, France, Britain) to strive for complete nuclear disarmament – in return for which non-nuclear-weapon states refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it contains an undertaking on the part of the contracting parties to cooperate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

188 states are parties to the NPT, while three are not: India, Pakistan and Israel (North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Treaty in January 2003 and North Korea's final status has been left open by the NPT community since then). Germany acceded to the Treaty on 2 May 1975. In 1995, the states parties decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

Challenges

Upholding and strengthening the NPT remain a key disarmament task. Maintaining a balance between nuclear disarmament, a strengthened non-proliferation regime and the peaceful use of nuclear energy is the central challenge facing the parties to the NPT. This also involves the universalization of the Treaty and the appeal to India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Non-proliferation must be further strengthened: this was highlighted, for example, by the case of North Korea, which declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 and carried out a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. The continued dispute about Iran's violations of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which the IAEA established in 2004, demonstrates how essential it is that the non-proliferation regime be further strengthened.

However, tighter checks on access to sensitive nuclear technology must not call into question the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes anchored in the NPT. This standpoint is also put forward forcefully by non-aligned states (Namibia, Egypt, Indonesia, South Africa and many more) which are urging nuclear-weapon states to continue nuclear disarmament and to implement concrete obligations entered into at earlier Review Conferences, for example the early ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Review Conferences

The aim of the Review Conferences is to document any progress made in implementing the Treaty and decide on further action. It is also aimed at strengthening the Treaty so that it measures up to current challenges by closing any loopholes, for instance regarding verification or the termination mechanism. During the last NPT Review Conference, held in New York from 2 to 27 May 2005, the vastly differing standpoints of the states parties (non-proliferation versus nuclear disarmament) prevented agreement being reached on a substantive final document. Thus an important opportunity to agree on concrete interim goals for further disarmament and non-proliferation was squandered.

Against this background, the first Preparatory Committee for the next NPT Review Conference in 2010 took place in Vienna in spring 2007. Despite the continued differing basic positions regarding the priorities of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this first meeting of the Committee marked a positive start to the current review process. There was a substantial exchange on all core areas of the Treaty (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful use) and the participants agreed on key organizational issues regarding the future review process. This will be continued in Geneva in spring 2008.

The position of Germany and the EU

As the holder of the EU Presidency in the first half of 2007, Germany was keen to further heighten the EU's profile in all core areas of the Treaty. For the first time, the EU put forward several joint working papers (for example on the fuel cycle, export controls, IAEA safeguards to prevent the use of civilian nuclear energy for military purposes, nuclear safety).

The Non-Proliferation Treaty calls upon every member which is a non-nuclear-weapon state to desist from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons but, at the same time, states their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran was one of the first signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to establish for certain that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively of a peaceful nature. /www.nuclearno.ru/

Countries that have violated the terms of nonproliferation treaties

Current Problems

Iraq, Iran, North Korea

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty sought to halt the ambitions of nations to get the bomb in return for the peaceful nuclear assistance. Domestic and international controls over nuclear and dual-use exports followed. Most recently, Washington gathered several nations together in a Proliferation Security Initiative to intercept nuclear contraband.

The dikes were not enough to prevent seepage. Israel used the "peaceful" atom provided by a French research reactor to develop the bomb. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq and South Africa followed. At the same time, the United States beat back the temptations of Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, West Germany and Taiwan. When regimes changed in Belarus, Ukraine, South Africa and now Iraq, nuclear weapons programs were abandoned.

As the international community reinforced its dikes against proliferation, it continued to build its peaceful nuclear infrastructure oblivious to another risk: nuclear terrorism. But when it emerged in the 1970s, terrorists seemed mindful about the political costs of taking too many innocent lives.

The terrorism of the 1970s prompted public policy groups, many driven by a phobia of all things nuclear, to demand that weapons-useable plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer fuel nuclear power and research reactors. As the 20th century ended, the absence of any serious act of nuclear violence convinced officials that nuclear terror would remain only in fiction. Then the Sept. 11 attacks occurred. President George W. Bush announced that in the caves of Afghanistan, U.S. forces had uncovered plots to attack nuclear power plants. But eliminating the risks in the short run was impossible. Enhancing protection, while imperfect, remained the only option. [By Bennett Ramberg, International Herald Tribune, 10 December 2003] /www.nuclearno.ru/

One of the most significant blows to NPT was Iraq’s demonstrated ability to hide its nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the Gulf War. With inspection authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that war - authority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification standards had given the IAEA - inspectors found previously hidden Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make nuclear weapons and even an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched research-reactor uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet Union.

These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEA’s NPT inspection authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA parties who negotiated the 1997 model for this protocol did not agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept the model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards. It is now up to each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards agreement pursuant to the model. As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards agreements; only 37, or about 20 percent, had given final approval to them through parliamentary or other ratification. Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as they perceive it, the United States rejects an important one - the CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing - and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself.

After the experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques to deal with other problem states such as North Korea.

Some evidence was produced by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s using a new technique called “environmental monitoring” - testing for small traces of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or vegetation in areas within or surrounding a nuclear site, or in streams or rivers nearby. This is explicitly authorized in the 1997 Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors that a country has declared open for inspection. Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites encouraged the IAEA to press North Korea for broader inspections in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused. A stalemate between North Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle a reactor whose spent fuel rods had apparently been used by North Korea to produce plutonium. Pyongyang was also asked to provide information about its past activities. These steps were to be in exchange for the construction of new, more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors from South Korea and Japan, as well as interim supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States. However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities at other sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003, North Korea and the United States each concluded that the 1994 agreement was not to their liking, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. /www.armscontrol.org/

Discovery of Iran’s failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered concern since last year. Using environmental monitoring and other techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that Iran permitted them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items, including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used for enriching uranium in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uranium—none of which Iran had reported to the IAEA. In negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to sign an additional protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside its uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though the IAEA director-general’s report shows that Iran had not disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-enrichment efforts or an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making weapons—to the consternation of officials in the United States. The IAEA Board of Governors then adopted, with U.S. support, a decision to order continued inspections in Iran for clandestine activities.

The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not to permit such efforts even if subject to IAEA inspection. The concern is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it might then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium to make weapons. The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants of non-nuclear-weapon states be placed under multilateral ownership and control so that the co-owners from the different countries could check on each other. However, Japan; some western European non-nuclear-weapon countries; and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and a few others, as well as all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled in the future, with each country involved being urged to check on what its partner countries are doing to make sure that the enriched uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons purposes. /www.armscontrol.org/

UN and Iran’s Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Tehran - The UN Under Secretary General for Disarmament, Jayantha Dhanapala, said on Saturday that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and until this date no report has been received that Iran has violated this treaty.

Dhanapala also told reporters in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that the peaceful nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia is within the framework of international treaties.

The UN official’s emphasis on the peaceful use of Iran’s nuclear installations is due to the clear and transparent position taken by Tehran.

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in southern Iran is open to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and they are cooperating with Iran for the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Their cooperation with Iran focuses on the use of nuclear technology in the areas of medicine, agriculture, energy, industry, and for safety measures in the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

All developing countries, which have signed the NPT, have an undeniable right to use nuclear energy. According to the Article 4 of the UN Convention for Banning the Spread of Nuclear Arms all the countries which have access to nuclear technology should help other signatories to the NPT.

Therefore, the U.S. efforts to disrupt cooperation between Iran and Russia for completing the Bushehr power plant runs counter to international conventions in this regard.

By using sanctions against the IAEA, the U.S. administration has tried to put an end to the cooperation between Iran and the agency.

Even though Iran ranks fourth in producing oil and comes as a second oil exporter within the OPEC cartel, it needs alternative sources of energy for its long-terms programs. The researches have shown that oil reserves will be depleted in the next twenty years, therefore Iran should find other sources of energy for its rising demand.

In the light of this situation, Iran is trying to meet some 20 percent of its electricity demand through nuclear power and its cooperation with Russia on the construction of Bushehr power plant is carried out under the supervision of the IAEA. /www.nuclearno.ru/

India, Pakistan

The Indian subcontinent is the most likely place in the world for a nuclear war.

The renewed concern about nuclear weapons in South Asia comes a little more than three years after the events of May 1998: the five nuclear tests conducted by India at Pokharan in the northwestern desert state of Rajasthan, followed three weeks later by six nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan in its southwestern region of Chaghai. [By M.V. Ramana, A.H. Nayyar, Scientific American, 7 December 2001] /www.nuclearno.ru/

Neighboring India and Pakistan have gone to war three times since British India was partitioned in 1947 into Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority states. Even now artillery guns regularly fire over the border (officially, a cease-fire line) in the disputed region of Kashmir. In May 1999, just one year after the nuclear tests, bitter fighting broke out over the occupation of a mountain ledge near the Kashmiri town of Kargil. High-level officials in both countries issued at least a dozen nuclear threats. The peace and stability that some historians and political scientists have ascribed to nuclear weapons - because nuclear nations are supposed to be afraid of mutually assured destruction - were nowhere in sight. Wiser counsel eventually prevailed. The end of the Kargil clash, however, was not the end of the nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The planned deployment of nuclear weapons by the two countries heightens the risks. With political instability a real possibility in Pakistan, particularly given the conflict in Afghanistan, the dangers have never been so near.

Both countries have been advancing their nuclear programs almost ever since they gained independence from Britain. Understanding this history is crucial in figuring out what to do now, as well as preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the standoff between Pakistan and India has distinct local characteristics, both countries owe much to other nuclear states. The materials used in their bombs were manufactured with Western technology; both countries’ justifications for joining the nuclear club drew heavily on cold war thinking. The continued reliance of the U.S. and Russia on thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert only adds to the perceived need for nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan.

While setting up the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, laid out his desire that the country "develop [atomic energy] for peaceful purposes." To Indian leaders, the program symbolized international political clout and technological modernity. Over the next two decades, India began to construct and operate nuclear reactors, mine uranium, fabricate fuel and extract plutonium. In terms of electricity produced, these activities often proved uneconomical - hardly, one might think, where a developing nation should be putting its resources. Politicians and scientists justified the nuclear program on the grounds that it promoted self-sufficiency, a popular theme in postcolonial India. Rhetoric aside, India solicited and received ample aid from Canada, the U.S. and other countries.

After India’s defeat in the 1962 border war with China, some right-wing politicians issued the first public calls for developing a nuclear arsenal. Many leading scientists advocated the bomb. Homi Bhabha, the theoretical physicist who ran the IAEC, claimed that his organization could build nuclear weapons "within 18 months." Citing a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report, Bhabha predicted that nuclear bombs would be cheap. He also promised economic gain from "peaceful nuclear explosions".

In November 1964 Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri permitted the commission to explore the technology for such an explosion. It turned out that Bhabha had already been doing some exploring. In 1960 he reportedly sent a young chemist, to France to absorb as much information as he possibly could about how polonium - a chemical element used to trigger a nuclear explosion - was prepared. Bhabha died in 1966, and design work on the "peaceful" device did not begin for another two years. But by the late 1960s, between 50 and 75 scientists and engineers were actively developing weapons. Their work culminated in India’s first atomic test - the detonation on May 11, 1974, of a plutonium weapon with an explosive yield of five to 12 kilotons. For comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of about 13 kilotons.

The 1974 test was greeted with enthusiasm within India and dismay elsewhere. Western countries cut off cooperative efforts on nuclear matters and formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which restricts the export of nuclear technologies and materials to nations that refuse to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including both India and Pakistan.

In 1988 India tested its first short-range surface-to-surface missile. A year later came a medium-range missile; in April 1999, a longer-range missile. The latter can fly 2,000 kilometers, well into the heart of China. Despite this ability, India is unlikely to achieve nuclear parity with China. According to various estimates, China has 400 warheads and an additional 200 to 575 weapons’ worth of fissile material. If India’s plutonium production reactors have been operating on average at 50 to 80 percent of full power, India has somewhere between 55 and 110 weapons’ worth of plutonium. The stockpile could be much larger if commercial reactors earmarked for electricity generation have also been producing plutonium for weapons. /www.nuclearno.ru/

Japan Able To Develop Nuclear Weapons

Tokyo (AFP): Japan has the ability to produce nuclear weapons but chooses not to, its foreign minister said Thursday amid debate on breaking the nuclear taboo after neighboring North Korea tested an atomic bomb. "We have the technology to develop nuclear weapons," Taro Aso, Japan's outspoken foreign minister, told a parliamentary committee. "But this doesn't mean we will immediately create nuclear weapons to possess them," Aso added.

Aso has been at the forefront of pushing for Japan - the only country to have been attacked with atomic bombs - to debate the nuclear option.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has ruled out even discussing building nuclear weapons, but the issue has caused concern in neighboring countries.

Experts have long believed Japan has the know-how to develop nuclear weapons quickly, in part because it relies on nuclear technology for nearly a third of its energy needs.

"Technologically speaking, we have the capability to develop atom bombs and we have the ability to launch satellites with rockets. We also have plutonium, under the supervision of the IAEA," or International Atomic Energy Agency, Aso said.

Aso met later in the day with IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei, who is visiting Japan in part for talks on North Korea's nuclear program.

Aso was responding to a question by the opposition, which has called on Abe to sack the foreign minister to show his commitment against nuclear weapons.

Aso reiterated the government's view that Japan has the right to nuclear weapons despite its pacifist constitution, which was imposed by the United States after World War II.

"From a purely theoretical viewpoint, possession of a necessary minimum of nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense is not banned under the current constitution," Aso said.

Japan is particularly concerned about North Korea, which launched a missile over Japan's main island in 1998. The communist regime tested its first atomic bomb on October 9.

Under a 1967 policy, Japan refuses the production, possession or presence of nuclear weapons on its soil. [Agence France-Presse, Dec 1, 2006] /www.defencetalk.com/

Relations between two countries and among many countries are regulated by not only the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA but by numerous treaties and agreements in fact. Here we have given only some of them.

Treaties, conventions and agreements

o The Antarctic Treaty (1959)

o Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT, 1963)

o Outer Space Treaty, 1967

o Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967)

o Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)

o Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 1971

o Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, ABM Treaty, 1972

o Biological Weapons Convention, 1972

o Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, TTBT, 1974

o Treaty between the USSR and the USA on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, PNE Treaty, 1976

o South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985)

o Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF Treaty, 1987

o Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 1990

o Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I, 1991)

o Missile Technology Control Regime, 1993

o Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993

o The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, 1994

o African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996)

o Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996)

o Open Skies Treaty, 1989

o Ottawa Landmines Convention, 1997

o Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention, 1980

o Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), 1993

o International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 2002

Political Antagonisms

Military doctrines of nuclear weapon states embody antagonisms of different political issues. On the one hand, nonproliferation is one of the major issues of defense policy of any country. On the other hand, new arising challenges and increasing danger when there are lots of regions with unstable political situation make states rely on their nuclear arsenal if they have any or seek support from the states that possess one. And this leads to deterioration of relations in the sphere if defense.

For example, the USA supporting Israel defend their nuclear arsenal, in fact, from Arabic countries undermine nonproliferation principles which those countries support.

New Ballistic Missile Defense built by US in Taiwan and Japan may be perceived as threat to China’ safety and will make it modernize its nuclear arsenal. This will be considered as threat in Japan and it can response by creating their own nuclear weapons (for what Japan has all the necessary possibilities and opportunities as we mentioned earlier). China’s actions may result in India making a nuclear bomb.

Moreover, countries possessing nuclear weapons reduce their nuclear arsenals rather slowly which is also not perceived positively by other states.

Perhaps now there are no reasons to say that some counties who signed the Nonproliferation Treaty may withdraw from the Treaty like India, Pakistan and Israel in 2003 but this is that stable period which should be used to strengthen nonproliferation regime.

What is more, actually there are lots of possibilities of nuclear terrorism as well. Dirty-bomb ingredients can be found almost everywhere. They are in hospitals and industry. They are transported through cities as nuclear waste to storage sites. Nuclear power plants are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Nuclear weapons derived from the peaceful atom reside in such unstable countries as Pakistan and North Korea. In more stable regions, countries insist on recycling weapons useable plutonium which can be diverted. And each country especially those possessing nuclear fuel cycle technology have their own institutions and organizations which are concerned with nuclear issues and problems. [“Nuclear nonproliferation”, PIR-center, Moscow, 2002]

A SYSTEM OF LEGAL MEASURES AIMED AT ENSURING NUCLEAR AND RADIATION SAFETY IN RUSSIA

Environmental Legislation

Russian nuclear industry authorities are obliged to accept the following legislative hierarchy:

· International agreements ratified by the Russian Federation;

· The Constitution of the Russian Federation;

· Statutes and case law;

· Statutory orders (general ministerial regulations);

· Circulars and guidelines;

· General regulations by municipalities.

Environmental Protection

Environmental protection, or the right to a clean environment, has a constitutional basis within the Russian Federation. Among the economic, social, and cultural rights stipulated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, Article 42 says that everyone has the right to a favorable environment, to have access to reliable information about its condition, and the right of citizens to receive compensation for damages to their health or property resulting from a violation of environmental law. These rights apply to citizens of the Russian Federation, stateless persons, and foreign citizens located on the territory of the Russian Federation.

By establishing that every individual has a right to a favorable environment, the state undertakes obligations to provide for this right. According to Article 58 of the Constitution, everyone is obliged to protect nature and the environment, especially natural resources. The words “everyone is obliged” concern not only individual subjects (Russian citizens, foreign citizens, and stateless persons) but also officials and organizations, including state bodies and local-government institutions, civic associations, commercial and other enterprises, etc. Since the Constitution applies directly, without the need for any other enacting legislation, regulatory authorities are obliged to take these requirements into account when preparing and passing new laws, and to enforcement authorities while removing normative acts, etc.

Conventional wisdom would dictate that norms of international law and international agreements to which Russia is a party the provisions of Article 58 also apply to the Russian state as a whole, subjects of the federation, and administrative and territorial units.

The state has a special place in this legislative system. On the one hand, it is a subject of the Constitution and therefore has the same obligations as all other subjects as established by article 42. On the other hand, it also has the right to demand that all other subjects perform their duties in accordance with this article. Moreover, it is also the guarantor of all rights regarding the environment. According to Article 72 d of the Constitution, the Russian Federation and its subjects “shall preserve the environment and maintain environmental safety”.

Access to Information

The right of every individual to free access to information through any legally acceptable means is stipulated in Article 29 of the Constitution.

Article 12 of the Law of the Russian Federation No. 24-FZ of 20 February 1995 on Information and Information Protection stipulates that access to state information forms the basis for public monitoring of the state of the environment. The right of everyone to receive reliable information about the condition of the environment is one of the main principles of environmental preservation (Article 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation on Environmental Protection). In accordance with regulations regarding visits by Russian citizens to facilities using atomic energy (authorized by Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1516 of 18 December 1996), citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to visit specified facilities in order to gain information about the level of radiation at the facilities and its effect on the health of the population and the environment; about maintaining nuclear and radiation safety to protect the population residing in the surrounding area; about the technical safety of the facility in question; and about how nuclear materials and radioactive substances are accounted for, including monitoring of their use and storage (Article 2).

“Reliable” information means full, truthful, and objective information provided by a body that has the competence to do so. The right to receive reliable information should be considered in light of Article 41 of the Constitution. This article stipulates that any official concealing facts or circumstances that create a threat to the health or life of the population shall be liable in accordance with federal law. Under the Law of the Russian Federation on Environmental Expert Review, the falsification of information, including information presented for expert review, as well as the results of an expert review, entails administrative liability (Articles 30 and 32).

According to Article 24 of the Federal Law on Information and Information Protection, a citizen has the right to appeal to a court the provision of any information that is clearly unreliable or any refusal to grant access to unclassified information. Courts may also consider claims for compensation for damages resulting from an infringement of these rights.

A System of Legal Measures Aimed At Ensuring Nuclear and Radiation Safety

Administrative reforms in the Russian Federation have seen some old state agencies reorganized, some new ones established, and yet others renamed. The federal laws, standards, and norms that govern issues of environmental safety, however, remain the same.

Laws and other legal instruments grant the Russian state the exclusive privilege to mine, use, and sell radioactive substances. They also stipulate that any person carrying out work with radioactive substances must be licensed. These legal instruments establish strict rules for the handling of radioactive substances and for the operation of nuclear reactors and similar installations and radiological devices in order to prevent possible harmful effects. The type and extent of legal responsibility to be borne by individuals and legal entities for violating these rules have been established.

Specifically, plants, institutions, and organizations may not:

· Carry out work with radioactive substances unless they have obtained the required authorization (a license or certificate of hygiene);

· Apply technologies or use equipment that does not meet requirements for nuclear and radiation safety;

· Install equipment for working with radioactive substances in residential buildings or in the proximity of child-care facilities, hospitals, etc. Areas where such equipment is installed should meet sanitary standards and regulations. Appropriate boards should be appointed to approve these areas for operation. Buffer areas and radiation-control areas should be established around radiological facilities.

Regulatory documents provide for mandatory appointment of people to be in charge of accounting for radioactive material, as well as for its storage and use; nuclear and radiation safety; radiation monitoring; and for the collection, storage, and transfer of radioactive waste. Furthermore, individuals should be appointed who will be responsible for accounting for radioactive material, as well as for its storage and transfer from one department to another. As stipulated by law, inventory committees should be established, and stock-taking (audits) should be conducted regularly to verify the availability of nuclear material, as well as consumption rates.

There are a limited number of properly trained people who are authorized to work with radioactive substances. They should be given induction training, as well as routine and extraordinary briefings, on regulations regarding the handling of radioactive materials. Those working with radioactive substances should be provided with personal protective equipment and trained in how to use it. The level of radiation in and around the radiological facility should be measured, and the exposure of personnel should also be monitored.

Stringent requirements have been established regarding the integrity of radioactive material and waste, as well as of radiological equipment. Special security arrangements should be made to safeguard areas where radioactive material and associated equipment are stored. These items should be constantly monitored. Means of communication should be installed in warehouses and other areas. Radioactive materials should be kept in special containers only in areas designed for this purpose. The containers should be marked and sealed.

There are legal instruments that contain other instructions, standards, and regulations on the stages of mining and enriching uranium and other ores, producing nuclear fuel and explosives, transporting radioactive materials, operating reactors and other radiological facilities, and eliminating the effects of radioactive contamination. Steadfast compliance with these and other regulations on nuclear and radiation safety contributes to preventing harm.

The Federal Laws on the Use of Atomic Energy and on Radiation Safety of the Population are fundamental legal instruments that comprehensively regulate social relations in the area of using nuclear energy and protecting the population from the effects of radiation.

The Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy establishes federal standards and rules applicable to the use of nuclear energy; the powers of the relevant state agencies; the legal status of entities operating in the nuclear area; and procedures for handling nuclear material, radioactive substances, and waste. The law stipulates regulations for the physical protection of nuclear installations, nuclear materials, and radioactive substances. Liability for violation of legislation on nuclear-related activities is addressed in sufficient detail.

The law stipulates that government bodies of the subject of the federation or local-government institutions where a nuclear installation, source of radiation, or storage facility is to be located must hold a discussion with organizations and citizens on this matter. In accordance with the results of such a discussion, government bodies must take decisions that are subject to official publication. Individuals and legal entities whose rights and interests are protected by law may appeal such decisions in court (Article 14).

Chapter 12 contains provisions about liability for losses or damage to the health of citizens caused by the individual or legal entity responsible for the radiation (Articles 53-60).

The organization maintaining a nuclear facility or installation bears civil-law responsibility for losses incurred by individuals and legal entities resulting from exposure to radiation while working with atomic energy in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation (Article 53).

Individuals and legal entitles suffering damages in such a manner may seek compensation through legal means (Article 54).

The Federal Law on Radiation Safety of the Population stipulates principles for ensuring radiation safety and the powers of governmental and administrative agencies, including both federal bodies and those of subjects of the federation, in the area of ensuring radiation safety. The law stipulates general requirements for ensuring radiation safety, as well as the rights and obligations of citizens and civic associations in this area. It also stipulates requirements for monitoring radiation and provides a list of priority measures to ensure radiation safety in case of a nuclear accident. The law establishes radiation-safety standards (radiation dose limits), which is essential. Under this law, the radiation-protection strategy provides that the main criterion of radiation well-being shall be the mean dose absorbed by the population (from any ionizing radiation source). Pursuant to this law, a record shall be kept of the number of individuals who have received a dose exceeding the tolerance level.

Various nuclear and radiation safety standards are contained in laws, decrees, and executive orders of the Russian president, as well as in government resolutions.

Since radiation contamination is a form of environmental pollution, a number of environmental regulations (protecting land, underground resources, water, the atmosphere, and plant and animal life) are aimed either at ensuring radiation safety or at directly governing social relations in this area. For instance, the Law of the Russian Federation on Protection of the Atmosphere stipulates requirements for observing the maximum permissible limit of harmful impact on human health and on the environment, including the maximum permissible concentrations of radioactive substances in the atmosphere.

The Russian Federation Water Code contains provisions that prohibit the discharge of wastewater if its potential effect exceeds the established standards of harmful impact (including the radiation impact). Similar regulations aimed at preventing radiation contamination of the land and forests are contained in the Land Code and the Forestry Code of the Russian Federation.

The Law of the Russian Federation on the Subsoil also contains provisions prohibiting contamination of underground resources with radioactive or other harmful substances. Under Article 9 of this law, state-owned companies are the only eligible subsoil users for the purposes of mining radioactive raw materials.

The Law of the Russian Federation on Environmental Protection is of singular importance for legal monitoring of nuclear and radiation safety issues. It contains provisions legislating the powers of governmental and administrative authorities, environmental monitoring agencies, as well as the obligations of citizens in the field of environmental protection, including nuclear and radiation safety. The law stipulates the responsibilities of environmental monitoring agencies concerning the establishment of the maximum permissible concentrations of radioactive substances in the environment, as well as the maximum permissible dose for the population. It also stipulates that these regulations should be observed by all legal entities, officials, and individuals. Responsibilities assigned to the relevant agencies include continuous monitoring (with the use of radiometric instrumentation) of radiation exposure of those involved in handling or using radioactive materials (Article 40). Under this law, nuclear and radiation safety codes and standards must be observed in the siting, design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants, research reactors, transport vehicles, and military nuclear equipment, as well as in handling radioactive substances and waste.

The Federal Law on Special Environmental Programs for the Rehabilitation of Radiation-Contaminated Areas governs the issues of ensuring environmental safety in radiation-contaminated areas and financing associated environmental programs.

Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 264 of 7 March 1997 on the Approval of Physical-Protection Regulations for Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations, and Nuclear-Material Storage Facilities governs relationships in the area of ensuring safety in nuclear operations throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation. “Physical protection” is understood as a combination of organizational arrangements, engineering features, and the actions of security units aimed at preventing sabotage or the theft of nuclear materials.

As Article 12 of this law stipulates, the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Atomic Energy’s successor organization, shall, within the limits of its authority:

· Provide for co-operation among federal executive authorities, executive agencies of subjects of the federation, and organizations involved in the physical protection of facilities posing a radiation hazard, subject to their jurisdiction;

· Act as a central government authority and a point of contact and organization in the area of ensuring physical protection; and

· Act as a competent government authority for nuclear and radiation safety with respect to the transport of nuclear materials.

The Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight shall, within the limits of its authority (Article 16):

· Carry out state supervision of the physical protection of facilities that pose a radiation hazard, subject to its jurisdiction; and

· Provide for the development and approval, in due course, of regulatory legal acts concerning state supervision of the physical protection of facilities that pose a radiation hazard, subject to its jurisdiction;

The Russian Federation Ministry of Transportation and Communication shall, within the limits of its authority (Article 18):

· Act as a competent authority in the area of transporting nuclear materials and providing for safe movement of vehicles carrying nuclear materials; and

· Ensure compliance with requirements for the physical protection of nuclear materials and participate in the development of regulatory legal acts applicable to the physical protection of nuclear materials during the transport thereof.

The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, known by its Russian acronym ass the FSB, shall, within the limits of its authority (Article 13):

· Conduct criminal investigations aimed at eliciting, preventing, suppressing, and uncovering criminal acts in relation to nuclear materials, installations, and nuclear-material storage facilities.

In accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 389 of 20 April 1995 on Additional Measures to Improve Monitoring of Compliance with Environmental Safety Requirements Applicable to Reprocessing Spent Nuclear Fuel, and pursuant to Article 80 of the Russian Constitution, in order to ensure environmental safety and protect human health from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation in the course of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, the following agencies shall provide for supervision and monitoring of compliance with requirements for radiation safety at all stages of handling spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste/materials originating as a result of the reprocessing thereof:

· The Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight;

· The Russian Federation Ministry of Natural Resources; and

· The Russian Federation Health Ministry.

As stipulated by Article 8 of Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 306 of 14 March 1997 on the Procedure for Taking Decisions Related to Siting and Construction of Nuclear Installations, Sources of Radiation, and Storage Facilities, if, at any stage of construction, any factors are discovered that decrease the level of safety at the relevant facility, damage the environment, or have other adverse consequences, the state authority that approved the construction of the facility must annul that decision and suspend or terminate construction.

Radiation Safety of Personnel, the General Public, and the Environment

Radiation safety of personnel, the general public, and the environment shall be deemed ensured if the fundamental principles of radiation safety (justification, optimization, and regulation) are adhered to and if the requirements of radiation protection, as set forth in Federal Law NRB-99 on Radiation Safety of the Population (Radiation Safety Norms) and current sanitary regulations, are met.

According to Federal Law No. 52-FZ of 30 March 1999 on the Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-Being of the Population: ‘…State sanitary and epidemiological regulations are regulatory legal acts establishing sanitary and epidemiological requirements (including safety criteria for the human habitat, as well as hygienic and other standards), non-observance of which endangers human life or health and creates a danger of disease and the propagation thereof…’ (Article 1).

· ‘Safety criteria for assessing conditions of working with sources causing physical effects that influence people’s health, including allowable exposure limits, are specified by sanitary regulations’ (Article 27).

· ‘Compliance with sanitary regulations is mandatory for individuals, entrepreneurs, and legal entities (Article 39).

· ‘Those violating sanitary legislation shall face disciplinary, administrative, and criminal liability’ (Article 55).

According to Federal Law No. 3-FZ of 9 January 1996 on Radiation Safety of the Population: ‘Radiation safety of the population is a condition whereby living and future generations are protected against the unhealthy effects of ionizing radiation’ (Article 1).

· ‘Citizens of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens, and stateless persons residing on the territory of the Russian Federation have a right to radiation safety. This right is secured through a package of arrangements aimed at protecting the human organism from the effects of ionizing radiation in excess of the established standards, regulations, and limits’ (Article 22).

Sanitary Rules SP 2.6.1.758-99 “Ionizing Radiation, Radiation Safety”. Radiation Safety Norms (NRB-99) (approved by the Chief State Health Inspector of the Russian Federation on 2 July 1999)

· Radiation Safety Norms NRB-99 shall be applied to ensure people’s safety in any conditions where they are exposed to ionizing radiation from artificial or natural sources;

· NRB-99 is a fundamental instrument establishing basic dose limits and permissible levels of ionizing radiation and other exposure-limitation requirements based on the provisions of the Federal Law on Radiation Safety of the Population. No other regulatory or procedural document may contradict the requirements contained in NRB-99;

· The requirements and standards established by NRB-99 are binding for all legal entities, regardless of who they are subjugated to or owned by, whose activities may result in exposing people to radiation, as well as for administrative authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation, local authorities, Russian and foreign citizens, and stateless persons residing on the territory of the Russian Federation.

· Article 2.6 stipulates that responsibility for compliance with NRB-99 shall be established in accordance with Article 55 of the Law on the Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-Being of the Population.

Sanitary Regulations SP 2.6.1.799-99 “Basic Sanitary Regulations for Radiation Safety (OSPORB-99)” (approved by the Chief State Health Inspector of the Russian Federation on 27 December 1999)

OSPORB-99 is not subject to state registration, as it contains only technical standards and not any new legal provisions (Letter by the Russian Federation Justice Ministry No. 4214-ER of 1 June 2000).

· The Basic Sanitary Regulations for Radiation Safety establish requirements for the protection of human beings from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation from the sources covered by NRB-99;

· The regulations are binding for all organizations involved in designing, mining, producing, storing, using, transporting, reprocessing, and disposing of radioactive material or other sources of radiation, whose activities have an impact on the level of human exposure to radiation from natural sources, as well as to organizations carrying out work in radiation-contaminated areas;

· The regulations must be observed in designing, constructing, operating, rehabilitating, converting, and decommissioning radiation facilities;

· Bodies of executive power authorized to conduct state supervision and monitoring in the area of radiation safety and special safety-monitoring agencies should follow the regulations.

Regulations for Handling Radioactive Waste

The Sanitary Regulations for Handling Radioactive Waste (SPORO-2002) SP 2.6.6.1168-02 (approved by the Chief State Health Inspector of the Russian Federation on 16 October 2002) include:

· Basic principles of radiation safety and stages of handling radioactive waste;

· Requirements for collecting, storing, and disposing of radioactive waste from an organization’s premises;

· Requirements for transporting radioactive waste;

· Dedicated transportation facilities – by highway, railroad, air, or waterway – shall be used to transport radioactive waste from an organization’s premises to another location for reprocessing, storage, and disposal;

· Requirements for the location and equipment of dedicated organizations engaged in handling radioactive waste;

· Requirements for long-term storage and/or disposal of radioactive waste; and

· Arrangements aimed at preventing and eliminating accidents in the course of handling radioactive waste.

Transportation of Radioactive Materials

Sanitary and Epidemiological Regulations and Standards SanPiN 2.6.1.1281-03 “Sanitary Regulations for Radiation Safety of Personnel and the General Public During the Transportation of Radioactive Material (Substances)” (approved by the Chief State Health Inspector of the Russian Federation on 16 April 2003):

· The regulations establish hygiene requirements for radiation safety of personnel and the general public at all stages of the transport of radioactive materials, from the moment of shipment by the consignor until the receipt thereof by the consignee;

· The regulations cover shipment, transport, transit storage, unloading, and receipt of nuclear materials, including radioactive waste, during the course of any type of transportation throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation. The regulations are binding for all legal entities (hereinafter called organizations), regardless of their departmental affiliation and ownership, and individuals engaged in activities in the area of transporting radioactive materials and storage in transit, as well as in designing, manufacturing, testing, and operating shipping packages and vehicles for radioactive materials.

The legislation in question includes decrees and executive orders of the president of the Russian Federation and resolutions of the government of the Russian Federation that are aimed at ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, preventing accidents and disasters, and protecting the general public and the personnel of nuclear plants from exposure to radiation.

Among the government resolutions, the following should be noted: on the Measures Taken by the Personnel of Nuclear Plants and Protection of the General Public in the Event of Radiation-Related Accidents at Such Nuclear Plants; on a Unified Automated System of Environmental Radiation Monitoring in the Russian Federation; on High-Priority Activities in the Area of Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel; and Regulations for Licensing Activities in the Area of Use of Nuclear Energy, among others.

A number of interdepartmental agencies, authorized by higher governmental and administrative bodies to conduct governmental monitoring of nuclear and radiation safety, have developed and approved numerous regulations, technical and sanitary rules and guidelines (national standards), and procedures of all kinds that are aimed at ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, e.g., Nuclear Safety Regulations for NPP Reactor Facilities, Nuclear Safety Standards, Sanitary Regulations, etc.

In addition to the above regulations, the activities of plants and other entities comprising the nuclear-weapons complex are governed by classified instruments issued by the president and the government of the Russian Federation and other relevant authorities.

The Russian Federation actively co-operates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA standards and technical guidelines for radiation protection of the population, nuclear and radiation safety standards, and other rules and recommendations on protection against radiation provide the basis for the relevant national regulations. Nuclear and radiation safety standards currently in force in the Russian Federation are also based on the maximum tolerance doses recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.

Russia acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and similar recommendatory documents adopted by the IAEA General Conference.

Governmental Monitoring of Compliance with Nuclear and Radiation Safety Codes and Standards

Monitoring of compliance with nuclear and radiation codes and standards is conducted by state departmental and interdepartmental agencies of various types of authority. Broad powers in this area are granted to representative and executive authorities at all levels.

The heads of ministries and departments, as well as the chief executive officers of corporations, businesses, institutions, organizations, and other entities, constantly monitor compliance with nuclear and radiation safety regulations within the limits of their authority. They do this personally, through special units (inspectorates, services, departments, divisions, laboratories, stations, etc.), and officials directly responsible for nuclear and radiation safety issues. This refers to agencies that, in one way or another, deal with radioactive material in the course of their activities, i.e., mining, processing, manufacturing, accounting for, storing, transporting, using, and disposing of nuclear materials.

Governmental monitoring of compliance with nuclear and radiation safety regulations is carried out by interdepartmental state authorities that are duly authorized and vested with appropriate authority.

Regulations for the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight were approved by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 401 of 30 July 2004, which states that the service is a federal executive body. Its functions include the following: approval of regulatory legal acts; supervision in the area of environmental protection with respect to limiting the adverse impact of technology (also in the area of handling industrial and consumer waste); safety in operations related to the use and protection of the subsoil; safety in the use of atomic energy (except for activities related to developing, manufacturing, testing, operating, and disposing of nuclear weapons and nuclear-power installations for military purposes); safety of electric and thermal facilities and grids (excluding domestic installations and grids); safety of hydraulic engineering structures within industrial production and energy facilities; safety in production, storage, and use of industrial explosive materials; and special functions in the above area.

The Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight is:

· A government agency for regulating nuclear safety related to the use of atomic energy;

· A specially authorized agency for industrial safety;

· A federal mining inspectorate;

· A specially authorized governmental agency for environmental review within the limits of its jurisdiction;

· A government agency for energy inspection; and

· A specially authorized agency for protecting the atmosphere.

As stipulated by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 26 of 21 January 1997 on Federal Executive Bodies Authorized to Exercise State Regulation of Safety in the Use of Atomic Energy, governmental authorities for nuclear, radiation, engineering, and fire safety regulation in the area of using atomic energy include: the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight; the Russian Health Ministry; the Federal Committee for Mining and Industrial Safety Supervision; and the Russian Ministry of Civil Defense Affairs, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. These federal executive bodies may enter into co-operation agreements to enhance the efficiency of governmental regulation of nuclear, radiation, engineering, and fire safety regulation in the area of using atomic energy and to avoid duplication of their functions.

Licensing

Although there is still no legislation regarding the term environmental license, it is used in literature on environmental law. An environmental license is understood to be a license covering the issue of protecting the environment or using natural resources.

Thus, an environmental license may be seen as an authorization to use natural resources or an authorization to release or discharge harmful substances (including waste) into the environment, specifying methods for environmental protection and rational management of nature and procedures for ensuring human and environmental safety. The process of preparing and reviewing documents from the perspective of protecting the environment, as well as monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit, constitute an environmental-licensing procedure.

Thus, the environmental-licensing process involves the issuing of licenses to conduct “ecologically sensitive activities” (exploitation of natural resources, in the first instance). These licenses should specify the permitted types, scope, and limits of activities related to the use of natural resources, as well as the consequences of failure to meet these requirements.

In Russia today, environmental licensing is the core process of an integrated strategy of managing environmental protection, using natural resources, and ensuring ecological safety. Environmental licenses currently serve three interrelated purposes:

· They provide a record of natural-resource users (including land, water, and a hypothetical volume of the atmosphere affected by releases, discharges, etc.);

· They help with monitoring resource consumption and environmental pollution; and

· They allow for management of natural resources and rights to contaminate, or otherwise impact, the environment.

There are two different types of environmental licenses: multi-purpose and specific licenses. The first type includes licenses for integrated use of natural resources; the second, licenses for specific activities. Forms of environmental licenses issued in Russia are determined in accordance with the extent of rights for the use of natural resources: multi-purpose and specific (specific licenses are issued for each type of natural resource), and rights to pollute, or otherwise have on impact upon, the environment (releasing or discharging waste).

An environmental license may be issued only after a state environmental-impact assessment has been completed. A multi-purpose license for use of natural resources may be issued only after the relevant specific licenses have been issued by the appropriate government agencies (for each specific resource or type of activity). Hence, a multi-purpose license combines various environmental limits and other requirements (environmental, sanitary, hygienic, emergency-prevention, etc.) into a system covering a territory or a project as a whole, as well as a combination of activities subject to licensing.

Legal Framework for Licensing

In accordance with the Russian Federation Civil Code and the Law on Licensing of Certain Activities, a legal entity may carry out certain activities as listed in the law only if an appropriate special permit (license) has been issued to that entity. The list of activities subject to licensing was established by Federal Law No. 128-FZ of 8 August on Licensing of Certain Activities. A legal entity’s right to carry out the activity that is subject to licensing begins at the moment that the relevant license is issued or at another date as may be specified therein, and it ends at the moment the license expires unless otherwise provided for by law.

The executive authorities of a subject of the Russian Federation may suspend a license issued by the executive authorities of another subject of the federation if it has not been accredited, or if the licensee has failed to comply with local legal requirements. In this case, the license may not be cancelled unless the licensing authority that issued it makes a decision to that effect.

Users of natural resources who fail to comply with legal requirements, standards, and rules for the use of the environment and natural resources as set forth in the license shall face administrative, criminal, civil, or other liability in accordance with Russian legislation and local regulations. Prosecution of the offender shall not relieve him or her of responsibility to compensate for damages caused.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy, the Russian government resolved to approve Regulations for Licensing Activities in the Use of Atomic Energy (approved by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 865 of 14 July 1997). These regulations establish the procedure and conditions related to nuclear licensing.

The process of nuclear licensing includes:

· Review of applications and preliminary appraisal of the documents submitted to obtain the license;

· Review of the submission required to obtain the license, including a package of analysis reports on nuclear and radiation safety concerning a nuclear installation, source of radiation, nuclear-material storage facility, and/or radioactive-material or a radioactive-material storage facility, or the declared activity;

· A decision to issue or refuse to issue a license;

· Issue of the license and establishment of the terms and conditions thereof;

· Follow-up of the issued license through inspections to verify compliance with the terms and conditions thereof and by amending them as appropriate;

· Change (extension) of the term of the license or suspension or termination (revocation) of the license.

Licenses are issued to nuclear facility operators and other organizations performing works and services in the area of using atomic energy.

The following is a list of activities in the area of using atomic energy that are subject to licensing by the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight:

· Siting, building, operating, and decommissioning of nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear-material/radioactive-substance storage facilities, and radioactive-waste storage facilities.

· Operations involving the handling of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, including those performed in the course of exploration or mining of uranium ore and the production, use, processing, transportation, and storage of nuclear materials or radioactive substances;

· Handling radioactive waste in the course of storing, processing, transporting, and disposing thereof;

· Design and construction of nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear-material/radioactive-substance storage facilities, and radioactive-waste storage facilities;

· Design and manufacture of equipment for nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear-material/radioactive-substance storage facilities, and radioactive-waste storage facilities;

· Expert review of design, engineering, and production documentation, and analysis reports on nuclear and radiation safety concerning nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear-material storage facilities, radioactive materials, radioactive-material storage facilities, or radioactive-waste storage facilities; or activities related to handling nuclear materials, radioactive substances, or radioactive waste.

As part of the process of reviewing submissions required to obtain a license, the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (FSETAN, formerly Gosatomnazor) arranges the verification of the data provided in documentation; expert review of analysis reports on nuclear and radiation safety concerning nuclear installations, radiation sources, nuclear-material storage facilities, radioactive materials, or radioactive-material storage facilities, or the declared activity; inspections of the applicant’s premises, as required; and maintains contact with the applicant to correct any deficiencies that may be identified.

FSETAN conducts governmental supervision of compliance by the licensee with the terms and conditions of the license and applies sanctions as prescribed by Russian legislation in case the licensee fails to comply with those terms and conditions.

FSETAN may deprive a licensee of the right to carry out the licensed activity by suspending or revoking the license. A licensee may be deprived of the right to carry out the licensed activity if:

· The licensee violates federal laws or other legal acts of the Russian Federation applicable to the use of atomic energy;

· It is ascertained that documents submitted to obtain a license provide inadequate information;

· The licensee fails to comply with the terms and conditions of the license;

· The licensee fails to comply with orders issued by FSETAN or other governmental bodies regulating nuclear safety in the use of atomic energy;

· The licensee fails to comply with orders or instructions issued by governmental authorities, or if those authorities suspend the licensee's activities in accordance with Russian legislation.

In the event that a license is suspended, the licensee must cease the activity covered by the license.

Liability for Violations in the Area of Using Nuclear Energy

The type of liability – disciplinary, administrative, or criminal – is determined by the degree of the violation committed and the extent to which its consequences pose a risk. Harming individuals or the natural environment entails liability for damages.

Disciplinary liability may apply to workers whose duties directly involve fulfillment of legal rules on the environment. Only workers who perform their duties on a full-time or temporary basis who cause damage to the environment may face disciplinary liability. In such a case, a worker may be disciplined for violating environmental legislation only if the violation occurred during working hours. Punishment for such acts is imposed by the management of the enterprise where the worker is employed (Article 192 of the Russian Federation Labor Code).

A disciplinary offence involves an objective violation consisting of failure to meet the requirements of programs, to implement certain arrangements, to comply with environmental-quality standards, or failure to observe environmental regulations. For an offence to qualify formally for disciplinary liability, it is important that the failure to meet certain requirements or to observe regulations or laws also represent a failure to fulfill one’s duties in accordance with one’s employment contract.

Administrative liability for environmental violations may apply to individuals, officials, or legal entities that commit violations as specified in administrative regulations that cause (or may cause) damage to the environment. An administrative environmental offence is an unlawful act or failure to act that infringes environmental laws, endangers people’s health and ecological safety, causes damage to the natural environment, or presents a threat of damage.

The main elements that distinguish an administrative offence and a crime offence are established by the Russian Federation Criminal Code, including: recidivism (Article 260, para.2); premeditated malice (Article 258); or harming human health or causing damage to animal or plant life (Articles 248, 249, 252, etc.).

An administrative environmental violation involves an objective act or failure to act that violates environmental legislation or environmental requirements applicable to the planning, design, and construction of facilities; concealment or misinterpretation of ecological data; destruction of land; non-compliance with water-protection regulations; or a violation of forest-use regulations, (Articles 8.1-8.40 of the Russian Federation Administrative Code).

Criminal liability may apply if an environmental offence poses social danger, and if it is prescribed by criminal law.

Provided that all elements of an environmental offence are in place, criminal liability may apply in the case that a crime has been committed and also if there has been an attempt to commit a crime (Article 30 of the Criminal Code). The new Criminal Code, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, specifies 17 formal elements that are essential for an environmental crime to have taken place. /www.bellona.org/

MINATOM

In our country MINATOM regulates nuclear energy. Minatom was established 12 years ago and remained the most publicly criticized ministry in the history of Russia.

Applied Research and Development (R&D)

Extensive R&D conducted in the nuclear industry and based on the results of fundamental research ensures a high scientific and technological level of the output of the industry, its unique nature and quality.

The All-Russian Inorganic Materials Research Institute (VNIINM), Moscow, carries out investigations in radiochemistry, metallurgy, physical metallurgy and superconducting materials; it develops technologies for the manufacture of components in beryllium, tantalum, niobium and aluminum, and their alloys; research on the manufacture of superconductors and nuclear fuel and components embodying them, investigations related to decontamination techniques, the solidification and disposal of radioactive waste, and ways and means of decontaminating radioactive and toxic gas and aerosol emissions. The Institute has made notable progress in the development of superconducting materials for the creation of strong magnetic fields. A wide range of superconducting, multifibre composite wires (about 60 standard sizes) of both circular and rectangular cross-section, based on deformable niobium-titanium alloys and intermetallic tin-niobium compounds, have been developed for helium temperatures.

The All-Russian Chemical Technology Research Institute (VNIIKT), Moscow, conducts intensive physical and chemical investigations in the development of technologies for production of super-pure substances and compounds for microelectronics, wave optics and piezoceramics. The scientists of VNIIKT are also involved in physicochemical investigations into the leaching of radioactive, rare, dispersed, rare-earth, noble and other metals extracted from ores and ore concentrates; development of high frequency an d plasma chemical metallurgical processes for producing compact ceramic materials, precision alloys and alloying compositions, development of technologies for complex processing of phosphoric and other ores of complex composition; and development of flow sheets for the processing of liquid, solid and gaseous waste.

The Physics and Power Institute (FEI), Obninsk, is an integrated research organization involved in the development of nuclear power plants for various applications as well a diagnostic monitoring systems and instrumentation. The Institute's experimental and production facilities permit full-scale tests of demonstration models and prototypes of nuclear power plants. The FEI is a major supplier of radioactive isotopes to the world market. In addition to cyclotron isotopes, the FEI has begun to produce reactor isotopes for medical purposes.

The D. V. Efremov Research Institute of Electrophysical Equipment (NIIEFA), St. Petersburg, is a leading institute in the development and design of electrophysical equipment. The NIIEFA develops and makes linear electron accelerators for radiation techno logy, flaw detection, activation analysis sterilization, medical diagnosis and treatment. The large scientific centers of the industry and the country are equipped with various of the NIIEFA's accelerators, thermonuclear and other electrophysical devices; they include the RSC "Kurchatov Institute", IHEP, ITEP, JINR, the V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute, the Erevan Physical Institute, etc. The NIIEFA develops and manufactures equipment for the 3000 GeV accelerating storage ring which is being built in the IHEP.

The V. I. Lenin Nuclear Reactor Research Institute (NIIAR), Dimitrovgrad, is one of the largest nuclear centers of Minatom of Russia where complex scientific and technical problems in nuclear power, reactor materials science, the chemistry and physics of transuranium elements, and atomic physics are solved. The NIIAR scientists and specialists have built and successfully operated 8 research and experimental reactors designed for various applications.

The All-Russian Research Institute for Technical Physics and Automaton (VNIITFA), Moscow concentrates its efforts on the development of devices which utilize physical effects in substances. The VNIITFA scientists and specialists design self-contained power sources, radiation technology facilities, and equipment for substance analysis and product testing. Ionizing radiation gas discharge detectors, modern facilities for medical diagnosis and treatment devices for automated production equipment, and high-tech consumer goods are also developed there.

The SNIIP Scientific engineering Centre, Moscow, is the key institution of Minatom of Russia for the development and manufacture of various instrumentation and systems for nuclear-power and industry. The Institute develops instrumentation and systems for: NPP control and safety systems, monitoring of environmental radioactive contamination; process control for mines and radiochemical enterprises; and radiation monitoring of the population and food-stuffs. Instrumentation for space and thermonuclear research is also developed in the Institute.

The Chemical Engineering Research Institute (NIIKHIMMASH), Yekaterinburg, designs and manufactures highly efficient optional equipment for the enterprises of Minatom of Russia. The most important R&D areas of the Institute cover equipment and automated production systems for palletized fuel; automated fuel element assembly lines; equipment for spent fuel reprocessing and preparation of process waste for disposal. The Institute has developed large desalination plants, and equipment for producing combined mineral fertilizers from chemical waste and caustic soda from electrolytic liquors. The test benches of the Institute are used to investigate and develop a range of heat- and mass- exchange equipment, centrifuges, glandless pumps, filters, furnaces, and robotic arms.

The Research and Design Institute of Installation Technology (HIKIMT Research and Production Association, Moscow) develops the technology for the installation and repair of unique and specific nuclear facilities, designed for various purposes. The Association's basic development areas are: technologies for installation, maintenance and backfitting of all types of nuclear reactors, thermonuclear devices, accelerators and other nuclear engineering facilities; technologies and equipment for precision welding and nondestructive testing of welded joints, both under installation and operating conditions; methods, technologies and equipment for electrophysical treatment of materials (laser treatment, high-frequency current, VHF, electrical resistance, plasma treatment, etc.), polymeric and metallopolymeric compositions for corrosion resistant, decontamination and thermal protection of nuclear plant structures; design technologies, manufacture and installation of "clean rooms".

Applied research and development carried out by the enterprises of the nuclear industry are very often of a mutually beneficial, comprehensive and target oriented nature. This is a feature of R&D in the following areas: development of high-temperature superconducting ceramics; development of facilities and hardware for metal coating and hardening; production of a wide range of filters utilizing physical principles; production of ultra-dispersed metal powders; development and design of linear ion accelerators; medical uses of ionizing radiation; development and manufacture of laser facilities for research and applied purposes.

High-temperature superconducting oxide ceramics are a fact of life in modern technology. The All-Russian Chemical Technology Research Institute, the All-Russian Inorganic Materials Research Institute and the Moscow Polymetals Plant have developed and mastered original technologies for the production of yttrium and bismuth-based HTSC ceramic powders and various products thereof. Linear ion accelerators manufactured by the nuclear industry serve as the basis for the development of neutron generators, for research, medical diagnosis, activation analysis, and isotopes production, and are used in the electronics industry.

Enterprises of the nuclear industry have developed various metal coating technologies. These coatings are produced by the methods of magnetron, electron beam and plasma sputtering, electrode position, and gas phase decomposition of fluorine compounds.

The medical uses of ionizing radiation are a humane application of the achievements of nuclear physics. Specialized proton-therapeutic equipment for proton radiation therapy has been developed for the first time in the CIS in the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, which has great experience in the proton beam treatment of over 2000 cancer and other patients. A new centre for proton therapy and positron-emission tomography is under construction at the present time. National and foreign organizations, insurance companies, funds, etc. are invited to participate, on a mutually acceptable basis, in the construction and development of the centre. Lasers, developed in atomic industry and satisfying the highest international standards, ensure advanced processing and treatment of materials (precision welding and cutting of metals, ceramics, wood; surface hardening, etc.), efficient isotopes separation; perfect production of microelectronic products (photolithography, precipitation of films, including high-temperature superconductors, alloying, annealing, etching, purification, etc.); modern medicine (ophthalmology, microsurgery, etc.). /www.x-atom.ru/minatom

Nuclear Weapons and The Disarmament Problem

Nuclear centers, R&D institutes and enterprises of the Atomic Energy Ministry of the Russian Federation implement nuclear warheads development, test, production elimination and utilization. Production of nuclear warheads involves the use of explosive agents, fissile materials and compositions and is referred to a small-scale production excluding utilization of continuous production lines and intensive technologies.

Activities on nuclear warheads development, production elimination and utilization are regulated by specific rules and standards ensuring their realization safety at enterprises and population and environment protection.

The political and economic reform that has been carried out in the Russian Federation, the doctrine of the sufficient defense of Russia, and also the need for ecological rehabilitation of contaminated territories and improved operational safety have required conversion of scientific and production potential of the nuclear industry owing to reductions in the output of arms and military hardware and a significant decrease in uranium mining and processing.

The All-Russian Experimental Physics Research Institute, founded in 1946 in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region, near the town of Arzamas (ARIEP), is a major multidisciplinary Federal nuclear centre of the nuclear industry. A high level of R&D is ensured by theoretical and analytical investigations in such fields of physics as nuclear physics, gas dynamics, the theory of radiation and mass transfer, the kinetics of nuclear and thermonuclear reactions, and the properties of substances under high energy densities.

Distinguished scientists, including academicians Ya.B. Zeldovich, A.D. Sakharov, E.I. Zababakhin, I.E. Tamm, N.N. Bogolubov, M.A. Lavrentiev and G.N. Flerov have worked in the ARIEP. The present staff include such outstanding scientists as Yu. B. Kha riton, E. A. Negin, Yu. A. Trutnev, A. I. Pavlovski and S. A. Novikov. The professional skill of the employees and their broad scientific outlook enable the Institute's team elaborate methodologies for the simulation of sophisticated physical processes an d to solve practical problems requiring a multidisciplinary approach.

The Russian Federal Nuclear centre - the All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (ARITP) - is a large and unique research and design institution established in 1955 in the Urals near Chelyabinsk. The outstanding scientist K. I. Shchelkin, the closest colleague of I. V. Kurchatov, was the founder of the Institute. The Institute carries out fundamental and applied research in nuclear physics, the physics of high pressures, hydrodynamics, and mathematical computation. Design and technological st udies are conducted in the field of nuclear charges, automation systems and instrumentation, and nuclear explosion recorders. ARITP has a pool of academic talent including academician, and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 30 doctor s of science and 250 candidates of science, and thousands of highly skilled specialists.

The Institute played a leading role in the development of the country's "nuclear shield" and methods for the verification of international agreements on the limitation of nuclear explosions. Great attention is paid to scientific and design support for the elimination of phased-out nuclear warheads. 15 per cent of all employees of Minatom of Russia are engaged on military projects. At present, every third of them works in the civilian industry, and by 1995 every other worker will be employed in that field, i.e. only 7% of the personnel will be engaged in the military area.

The best possible use of this scientific, design and production potential for the revival of Russia is the principal task of the nuclear industry.

Bearing these conditions in mind and taking into account the relations established in the industry, complex studies were carried out in 1988 - 1990 to choose cost-efficient targets and approaches to conversion of the nuclear industry, most adequate to the accumulated scientific, technical, production and personnel potential.

The assigned targets and objectives of the development of Minatom of Russia in 1991 - 1995 and by the year 2000 provided the basis for a number of targeted comprehensive national programs which envisaged the development and manufacture of high-tech civilian products. The targeted programs are largely focused on the priority development of dual-purpose technologies, selected from the key basic technologies of scientific and technical progress. The Russian nuclear weapons institutes have carried out large amount of forward research and development in anticipation of civilian industry in the area of fundamental and applied physics, gas dynamics, electrodynamics, quantum electronics and mathematical computation.

The conversion process has increased the interest in other countries for cooperation with Russian scientific and technical centers concerned with the development of nuclear weapons, and to the turning of their potential towards the design of peaceful technologies with corresponding external funding.

When elaborating the conversion programs, the Ministry paid special attention to increased output of consumer goods by enterprises of the nuclear weapons complex in 1990 -1995 (by a factor of 3.6 times).

In 1990 the Ministry's enterprises manufactured consumer goods to a value of 390 million dollars, in 1991 the figure was 766.3 million dollars. The emphasis was placed on the production of essential and high-tech commodities.

Conversion of the enterprises of nuclear weapons complex is proceeding along three main lines:

• instrument making
• electronics;
• mechanical engineering.

All enterprises are actively involved in eight out of eleven comprehensive nuclear industry conversion programs.

The institutes make the following proposals for mutually beneficial international cooperation:

1. Research into high energy density physics for the purposes of inertial thermonuclear fusion and other promising developments using powerful pulsed lasers, magnetocumulative generators, gas dynamic cumulative systems.
2. Improvement of devices and equipment for nuclear medicine: various types of radiation diagnostic and therapeutic systems, equipment for radiation sterilization of medical instruments, materials and equipment.
3. Research and development for greater safety with nuclear power, analysis and simulation of possible emergency situations and their aftereffects; establishment of a safe nuclear fuel cycle. Elaboration of the best methods of using fissile materials mad e available by the process of nuclear disarmament.
4. Development of various explosion technologies for synthesis, modification and processing of materials and parts.
5. Development of algorithms and programs for mathematical modeling of 2D and 3D gas dynamic, electrodynamic and thermal processes in continuous media.
6. Studies in the field of ecological radiation and hydrogasochemical monitoring, development of sets of mobile ecological diagnostic equipment and computer ecology data banks for specific regions and entire countries. Study and modeling of ecological y hazardous releases and spreading of gaseous and aerosol products.
7. Exchange of experience and joint works on improvement of the safety, transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear weapons. Design of shipping containers for nuclear weapons and fissile materials, design and construction of plutonium and HEU storage facilities.

Nuclear Fuel and Reactor Materials

The enterprises of Minatom of Russia fabricate nuclear fuel for various types of reactors; they also produce structural materials, including zirconium, niobium, hafnium, tantalum, graphite, etc.

Minatom of Russia provides a uranium enrichment service for many foreign companies, using the customer's feedstock, and also sells enriched uranium produced from its own feedstock. The application of centrifugation technology, developed by the scientists and specialists of the nuclear industry, yields enriched uranium whose isotope and chemical composition meets the highest world standards. Centrifugation facilities are also used to produce various stable and radioactive isotopes.

Minatom of Russia supplies Russian-made power, propulsion and research reactors with fuel assemblies, absorbing rods, control and safety systems, which are manufactured on the basis of the most advanced technologies available, with a high level of automation of production processes.

The metallurgical plants of Minatom of Russia offer a wide choice of materials for reactor engineering and other industries. These materials feature unique physiochemical properties, ensuring their competitiveness on world markets.

Reactor Engineering

Minatom of Russia is the country's leader in research, design, development, construction, manufacture, operation and maintenance of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including the manufacture of the basic types of equipment, control and safety systems for power, transport and research reactors.

Minatom of Russia has 40 years of experience in the design and manufacture of equipment, and the construction, installation and operation of the following categories of nuclear reactors:

• pressurized-water power reactors (WWER),
• boiling-water reactors (WK),
• uranium-graphite channel reactors (RBMK),
• fast breeder reactors (BN);
• various research reactors;
• nuclear-propulsion reactors.

The specialists of the industry are widely engaged in the development of more reliable, efficient and safer nuclear reactors, applying fundamentally new concepts based on the principle of the physical inherent safety of nuclear reactors in case of severe accidents. The production associations and plants of Minatom of Russia are major suppliers of the basic equipment for NPPs, nuclear district heating plants and propulsion systems.

The research centers and enterprises of Minatom of Russia are known abroad as designers of nuclear power plants with WWER-type reactors and of research reactors for a variety of purposes.

Instrument Making

The establishment of the nuclear power industry and its nuclear fuel cycle, accompanied by fundamental and applied research, the solution of environment protection problems, and utilization of the achievements of nuclear physics in various spheres of hum an activity greatly stimulated the development of nuclear instrument making.

The ionizing radiation detectors and detector units manufactured by the enterprises of the industry compare favorably with similar devices made by well-known foreign companies, with regard to their reliability, convenience and ease of use. Probes based on these detectors are used at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium mining and processing, fabrication of fuel elements and assemblies, reprocessing, etc.).

Semiconductor detectors based on super-pure germanium, silicon, cadmium telluride and diamond permit rapid, efficient analysis of environmental contamination, elementary analysis of substances, spectrometry of nuclear fuel materials, and approximate analysis of hard rocks.

Many of the devices that incorporate semiconductor detectors, have passed international evaluation trials and have been accepted by the IAEA as an official technical system. The enterprises of Minatom of Russia are leaders in the development and manufacture of various dosimetric monitoring devices, from the simplest personal dosimeters to sophisticated automated complexes. Powerful X-ray sources and neutron generators manufactured by the nuclear industry are considered to be of top quality by international standards.

The accumulated scientific and technical potential enables the enterprises of the industry successfully to develop and manufacture a range of radioelectronic, diagnostic and therapeutic medical equipment and tools.

The SEVER Production Association manufactures semiconductor laser radiators for NC machine tools, laser printers, laser video player heads and approximate analysis devices.

The industry is carrying out an extensive program of the production of optical fiber cables from quartz and fluoride fibers. The main principle is to provide customers with a complete sophisticated complex of terminals, dividers, multiplexers, receiver s, etc. complete with instruction manuals and specifications, as well as to train personnel and provide full maintenance and servicing.

Instrument making enterprises are actively developing and designing research equipment and instrumentation.

The instrument making complex of Minatom of Russia features:

• a high level of integration of scientific and technological achievements in the products of world class;
• wide experience in nuclear power engineering, physics, chemistry and radiation technology;
• the ability to form teams of highly skilled specialists at short notice to carry out specific orders.

International Cooperation

Minatom of Russia cooperates actively in the international sphere in many areas of nuclear science and technology with numerous countries in all the continents and with the various international organizations concerned. The matters covered include:

• nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle;
• radioactive waste management;
• controlled thermonuclear fusion;
• research on fundamental properties of matter;
• nuclear physics and nuclear data;
• solid-state physics and high-temperature superconductivity;
• reactor physical metalurgy;
• accelerator technology and electrophysical equipment;
• multicomputing system design for data processing;
• seawater desalination;
• isotopes;
• environmental protection;
• study of public opinion and public awareness regarding of nuclear energy and its uses.

One highly significant aspect of international cooperation is the part played in maintaining and improving the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. The coordination and organization of international cooperation concerned with monitoring the implementation by Russia of its obligations under the agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapon tests and the conversion activities connected with the reduction of nuclear arms is a new aspect of the activities of Minatom of Russia, which is employing the military research personnel thus made available on the solution of a wide range of technical and scientific problems in Russia, including, in particular, safety in the use of nuclear power and environmental protection.

Bilateral scientific and technical cooperation in its various forms, including joint research, scientific seminars and reciprocal training arrangements, is conducted on the basis of intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements. Minatom of Russia participates in the multilateral cooperation including activity at of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Standards Organization (ISO).

Minatom scientists are widely engaged in the activities of the world's leading nuclear research centers: the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the German Electron Synchrotron Institute DEZI, the National Acceleration, Laboratory of the Superconducting Supercollider, and the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research.

Russia is a member of the quadripartite intergovernmental project on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).

Minatom scientists participate actively in international and national conferences, symposia and seminars. There is extensive exchange of scientific and technical information both bilaterally and through the International Nuclear Information System (INIS).

Minatom of Russia has its own Central Research Institute of Management, Economics and Information (Atominform) that centralizes all information on scientific and production activities and protects the rights of Minatom in the sphere of intellectual and industrial property over projects financed by the Ministry, and legal regulation of the transfer of these rights to third parties.

The International Relations Committee of Minatom of Russia (IRC) coordinates technical and scientific cooperation and some types of economic cooperation. It is also responsible for the implementation of Russia's obligations under the international conventions on the physical protection of nuclear materials, on the rendering of assistance in case of nuclear or radiological accidents and early notification of nuclear accidents.

The Ministry exports a wide range of products materials, equipment and services, including, in particular, products and services for the nuclear fuel cycle, materials for nuclear industry, nonferrous metals, fertilizers, timbers, etc. /www.x-atom.ru/minatom

Russia and the United States have come to terms on the problem of direct supply of US power companies with Russian low-enriched uranium

During a meeting in Washington on Feb 1 2008 the head of Rosatom Sergey Kiriyenko and US Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez signed an amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium from the Russian Federation.

The amendment was initialed in Nov 2007.

It lifts discriminatory restrictions on the import of Russian uranium into the US market.

On October 30, 1992, the US Department of Commerce suspended the antidumping duty investigation involving uranium from Russia on the basis of an agreement by its government to restrict the volume of direct or indirect exports to the United States in order to prevent the suppression or undercutting of price levels of U.S. domestic uranium.

The adoption of the amendment paves the way for Russian and US companies to direct contacts for supply of low-enriched uranium at market prices starting from 2011. By 2014 (when HEU-LEU agreement expires), Russia is expected to supply 20% of US real fuel, i.e. each fifth of the operating US nuclear power plants will be working on Russian uranium.

Besides, from now on, Techsnabexport OJSC will be able to make contracts for supplying uranium to new NPPs to be built after 2011.

The amendment specifies the date of termination of the antidumping investigation and the relevant agreement – Dec 31 2020. /www.rosatom.com/

The Ministry imports equipment, technology and materials for conversion programs and the creation of consumer goods industries, as well as for the processing of agricultural produce.

The above activity is carried out through Techsnabexport, a joint stock company with government participation.

The Ministry carries out construction projects abroad for the erection of nuclear power plants, heat supply stations and district heating plants, as well as nuclear research centers and laboratory on the basis of low-power research reactors. These projects are carried out on a technical assistance or "turnkey" basis. The general contractor for this type of activity is the Zarubezhatomenergostroi Russian Industrial Association (RIA), which provides the whole range of services including planning and surveying, construction, installation, start-up and alignment. This association provides also delivery of basic and auxiliary equipment and spare parts, and technical assistance on the operation of installations, and on the reconstruction and modernization of installations in use. /www.x-atom.ru/minatom

CLOSED TOWNS

Closed towns started to appear and develop during the post-war period, at the beginning of the Cold war between the USSR and the Western countries. The “oldest” of them were founded about half a century ago but were made public not so long ago. They did not have their own names but had code ones like Sverdlovsk-45 or Chelyabinsk-70, etc. In 1994 Council of Ministers of Russian Federation adopted a regulation about giving all those towns their official geographical names. The citizens of those settlements had not “existed” officially. And in 1995 the amount of population of 19 closed towns 18 of closed settlements was announced in public.

Closed administrative territorial units were founded to carry out special governmental programs to strengthen the defense capability of Russian Federation. Nuclear closed towns are: Sarov, Zarechny, Trekhgorny, Novouralsk, Lesnoy, Snezhinsk, Seversk, Zelenogorsl, Zheleznogorsk. [Children’s encyclopedia, Russia: Physical and Economical Geography, Moscow, ”Avanta”, 2000]

TOMSK-7 / SEVERSK

Combine 816 / Siberian Chemical Combine

The Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK), located in Seversk (formerly known as Tomsk-7), is one of the principal nuclear materials production sites in the MINATOM complex, with uranium processing facilities, production reactors, a spent fuel reprocessing plant, a uranium enrichment plant, and a variety of other processing and storage facilities. Tomsk-7 was established in 1949 to produce and process fissile materials for the nuclear weapons program. The Siberian Chemical Combine (originally the Combine 816) is Russia’s largest plutonium production and fissile material management complex. /www.map2.spaceimaging.com/

Tomsk-7 is located on the Tom’ river in Tomsk oblast, about 12 km northwest of the city of Tomsk. The Tomsk-7 sanitary protection area is approximately 200 km². The industrial areas are located north-east of Seversk and include: the fuel complex and a fossil fuel plant, a UF6 conversion and enrichment plants, two reactor areas, chemical and metallurgical plant, a reprocessing plant, waste injection wells (sites 18 and 18a), and support and storage areas.

Tomsk-7 has a population of 119,000. Of them, approximately 15,000 work at the nuclear complex.

The production of plutonium took place in the reactors I-1, EI-2, ADE-3, ADE-4, and ADE-5, which were brought into operation in the period from 1955 to 1967. The first three reactors were shut down between August 1990 and August 1992. The ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors are still in operation and produce heat and electricity for the nuclear complex, as well as provide heat to Seversk and the nearby oil and chemical complex.

Irradiated reactor fuel is reprocessed at the radiochemical plant, which was brought into operation in 1956.

Until recently, plutonium was transferred to the chemical and metallurgical plant where it was converted to metal and fabricated into warhead components. Since October 1, 1994, newly produced plutonium is converted to plutonium dioxide and is placed in storage.

The chemical and metallurgical plant also was designed to manufacture HEU warhead components. In 1994, the plant began to convert HEU weapons components into HEU oxide that is subsequently downblended to low-enriched uranium reactor fuel under the U.S.-Russian HEU agreement. In 1996, an HEU fluorination and downblending facility was brought into operation in Tomsk-7 as well.

The Tomsk-7 enrichment plant was built and brought into operation in 1953 and was USSR’s second enrichment facility. Presently, the plant accounts for 14 percent of Russia’s total enrichment capacity. It also is involved in HEU downblending under the U.S.-Russian HEU agreement. In addition, Tomsk-7 operates one of Russia’s two large conversion facilities producing UF6, the feed material for enrichment facilities. (There might have been no conversion plant in Tomsk-7 during the Corona program period.)

In 1994 the US and Russia signed a 20-year $12-billion covering the purchase of 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) recovered from Russian weapons. The uranium will be blended down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and shipped to the US for use in commercial power reactor fuel. The transparency protocols for the HEU purchase are intended to confirm for the US that the shipped material is derived from Russian weapons material, and to confirm for Russia that the LEU is not used the US weapons program. This requires access to the uranium processing facilities of both sides. US monitors are allowed access to the three principal Russian plants involved in the conversion of HEU to LEU. At the plant in Seversk, HEU metal is processed into an HEU oxide before being shipped to the electrochemical plants in Novouralsk or Zelenogorsk. In these facilities, the oxide is fluorinated and combined with a slightly enriched blending material to turn it into LEU suitable for civilian power reactor fuel. Monitoring at Seversk and Zelenogorsk is confined to periodic visits, but monitors have continuous access to the Novouralsk plant through the US Permanent Presence Office there, which Lawrence Livermore manages for DOE. At all three plants, US monitors have access to relevant documentation and accountability records.

The Russian Reactor Core Conversion project will stop Russian production of weapons grade plutonium and improve operational safety by converting the reactor core design configuration of the reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Currently, each of the three reactors can produce up to a total of 1.5 metric tons of plutonium per year. These reactors also provide critically needed district heat and electricity to Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Total project costs including the value of the uranium is estimated in October 1998 to be $310 million. Due to the financial situation in Russia, the DoD intends to request additional funding for the design of converting the cores; improvements in safety systems; and infrastructure and materials needed to assure the actual conversion of the reactors; acceptance testing; and, regulatory approval.

The Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) joined the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC&A Program) in the Summer of 1995, with the signing of a contract to begin technical cooperation on portal monitors. In October 1995, the scope of the portal monitoring work was expanded to include equipping the entire Combine with new portal monitors, specifically pedestrian radiation monitors, metal detectors, and handheld radiation monitors. As of July 1996, all of the pedestrian radiation monitoring equipment had been delivered; most of it had already been installed, with the rest to be completed within a few months. Twenty-seven metal detectors had been ordered from Eleron, a Russian vendor, and were delivered and installed. Vehicle monitors (a total of twelve) were also part of this project, but because of the need to assure their performance under Siberian winter weather conditions, the schedule for their installation was later than for the pedestrian monitors. All of these portal monitoring enhancements were scheduled for completion in 1996.

Additional work on MPC&A enhancements was planned at several facilities. The first of these was the Radiochemical Plant, i.e., the reprocessing plant, which was also the focus of an International Science and Technology Center Project (ISTC-40) on materials control and accounting. The Laboratory-to-Laboratory work, which complements the ISTC project, started with a plutonium storage facility at the Radiochemical Plant, and then proceeded to other locations at the Radiochemical Plant and eventually to the entire Combine. The cooperation encompassed bar codes, computerized accounting, seals, measurement methods (neutron counting, gamma spectroscopy, and others), enhanced access control (e.g., an upgraded badge system), physical protection upgrades, MPC&A system effectiveness assessments, video surveillance systems, statistical analysis of inventory data, and transportation security. Because of the scale and complexity of the SKhK's nuclear operations, this joint work was expected to continue for several years.

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has awarded a total of $466 million to US firms Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services to begin work to shut down the last three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in Russia. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the contracts at a May 27, 2003, press conference with Russian Ambassador to the United States Yuri Ushakov at DOE Headquarters, Washington, DC. On March 12, 2003, in Vienna, Austria, Secretary Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev signed an agreement to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction by stopping plutonium production at the Russian reactors. As part of the agreement, DOE, working with its partners in Russia, will provide replacement fossil-fuel facilities to produce energy for heat and electricity currently produced by the reactors serving the cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.

At Seversk, the US will assist in refurbishing an existing fossil fuel plant. Major work will include refurbishing or replacing existing coal-fired boilers, providing one new high pressure coal-fired boiler, replacing turbine generators, completing construction of the fuel supply system, and refurbishing the industrial heating unit and ancillary systems. The refurbishment work is estimated to take five years, at which time the plutonium production reactors will shut down. /www.map2.spaceimaging.com/

/www.map2.spaceimaging.com/

CONCLUSION

Thermal Risks versus Nuclear Benefits

Two nuclear reactors of ADE type as being energy sources were put into operation in 1964 (ADE-4) and 1965 (ADE-5) correspondingly.

In 1973 heat main conduit was run to Tomsk city that allowed supply of cheap heating to the region center and to take out of service the local coal boiler rooms which polluted environment.

In 1993-1994 reconstruction of the Reactor Plant boiler room and a heat supply system was performed in order to supply heating to Seversk heat supply system. Now the reactors produce 35% of the heating required for Tomsk housing district, more than 50% - for Seversk and industrial areas of the Enterprise.

A long-term operation of the ADE-4, ADE-5 reactor and electric power plant complex justified the reliability of heat and electric power nuclear source.

A number of measures were fulfilled on the reactors in order to increase reliability and safety of their operation in the future.

Comprehensive engineering inspections justify efficiency of the Reactor Plant equipment for the period at least till 2008. [Siberian Group of chemical Enterprises brochure, 1999]

For more than 25 years SKhK's nuclear power stations had been supplying Seversk and Tomsk with heat and electricity. They provided Tomsk with 30% of heat. After closing them both Seversk has only one source of heat and electricity: the Thermal power plant which works on gas. This will mean that Tomsk will have to solve their energy lack problem by its own.

For 25 years of a thermal power plant working that has the same heat capacity as the Siberian nuclear power plant it would be necessary to transport and burn 59mln. tons of coal. This amount of coal would be loaded in 980 thousands railway carriages. If all those carriages were places after one there would be a train 12000 km long which is equal to the distance between Vladivostok and Berlin.

To burn that coal there would be necessary to burn 137mln. tons of oxygen and a great deal of poisonous substances would be emitted into the atmosphere:

• 234mln. tons of carbon dioxide
• 177000 tons of sulfur oxide
• 64000 tons of nitric oxide.

There would be 5mln. tons of soot and 90000 tons of soot would go to the atmosphere. The soot would contain 1 mln.677000 tons of heavy metals and 53 tons of toxic elements.

After burning coal on thermal power plant there are wastes: slag and soot. A special territory is needed for them. Plants and animals cannot exist there. From the surface of ash-disposal areas wind raises soot forming dust storms. This way ecological damage caused by thermal power stations cots much more than electricity it produces. SKhK's specialists calculated that ADE-1 for its exploitation term saved 1,2bln. ecological dollars and ADE-2 – 13,6bln. dollars. An ecological dollar is a sum of money spent on nature-conservative measures after the thermal power plant work. Scientists counted that all the nuclear power stations in the world for 40 years produced half less wastes than one thermal power station during a year. It also contributes to greenhouse effect because to burn coal or other resources oxygen is used and carbon dioxide is emitted into the atmosphere. [Light and Heat ABC, Tomsk Publishing, 2000]

What concerns nuclear power stations and their disadvantages we think that the main drawback is the ignorance of the population. It is very difficult without special knowledge to understand where this huge amount of energy comes from and usually when people do not understand something they are afraid of it and most often do even want to see the reason why.

Thus, we are sure that nuclear power stations (nuclear wastes are also not an easy thing to deal with) have more advantages which cannot be taken into account:

1. Nuclear power stations do not emit combustion products into the air;
2. Nuclear power stations do not use oxygen;
3. Nuclear power stations have less quantity of refuse;
4. Modern nuclear power stations have reliable protection methods and systems.
5. All the reactors have now concrete barriers which could prevent physical intrusion from the outside.

6. When using 34 tons of plutonium 196469, 28 GW/h can be generated.

To generate the same amount of energy on a thermal power plant we would need 85800000 tons of coal, 57,2bln.m³ and 48400000 tons of black oil. During this process 121bln.m³ of oxygen would be burned. [Light and Heat ABC, Tomsk Publishing, 2000]

Energy problem is one of the most urgent in the world now. Unfortunately, nuclear power stations cannot solve the problem of fuel as well but if they help to solve the problem of generating electricity and heat it would be it would already be enormous help to the mankind.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Children’s encyclopedia, Russia: Physical and Economical Geography, Moscow, ”Avanta”, 2000
2. Light and Heat ABC, Tomsk Publishing, 2000
3. “Nuclear nonproliferation”, PIR-center, Moscow, 2002Light and Heat ABC, Tomsk Publishing
4. Siberian Group of chemical Enterprises brochure, 1999
5. www.americanrhetoric.com
6. www.armscontrol.org
7. www.bellona.org
8. www.defencetalk.com
9. www.iaea.org
10. /www.icem.org/
11. www.map2.spaceimaging.com
12. www.nuclearno.ru
13. /www.nuclear-world.org/
14. www.rosatom.com
15. www.rus-stat.ru
16. /www.threemileisland.org/
17. www.x-atom.ru/minatom