Critical Issues Forum
2008-2009

Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges, Opportunities, and Next Steps

Benchmark II

Students: Lapshina Evgenia

Tyryshkin Artyom

Glazkov Maxim

10 Grade, Lyceum

Teacher: Novikova Elena

Lyceum

Lesnoy

Sverdlovsk Region

Russia

2009

Introduction

The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil,

but by those who let them do and refuse to intervene.

Albert Einstein

The human race has been plagued by war throughout all its history. In the 20^th century the violence and bloodshed of the warfare reached staggering levels as weapons became more sophisticated and devastating. Nuclear weapons technology is the most destructive ever developed. The discovery of the fission in 1938 was made in the world convulsed by war and totalitarian cruelty which hastened the translation of theoretical possibility of creation of new weapons into reality. Since that time the problem of controlling this technology has been of central importance to the mankind.

Today we are facing many urgent questions relating to nuclear weapons. What practical steps should be done to major reduction of nuclear arsenals? How to deal with potential nuclear weapons states such as North Korea and Iran? What measures should be taken to provide protection of existing stockpiles and materials? How to prevent their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands? There is a vital need to address the challenges posed by these questions.

[9]

Objective I

Our task is to demonstrate an understanding of national and international controls of nuclear weapons; to investigate treaties, unilateral measures to reduce nuclear arsenals, and international organizations dealing with nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Additionally, I am to focus on the national organizations that govern nuclear weapons in some countries.

During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union created immense nuclear infrastructure dealing with development, manufacture and potential use of nuclear weapons. Born in war, the subject was highly classified from the very beginning. Although both powers were motivated by the natural desire for self-protection, much that occurred within their secret enclaves was far from noble. The expenditure of public funds on armaments reached staggering amounts; millions of people were exposed to risk and injury; nuclear arsenals were created that could destroy the world dozens of times and burden future generations.

In the age of global confrontation between two world systems deterrence played an important role in the prevention of wide-scale armed conflicts. At the same time nuclear deterrence has been constantly promoting nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons are seen by the states as highly effective tools for ensuring national security. This is the reason why non-nuclear states seek to acquire these weapons.

Further proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the current threats to international security. Preventing the spread of WMD is a complex task which requires international cooperation at bilateral, regional and global levels. Today, more than 60 years after the destructive power of nuclear weapons was first demonstrated a number of international political and legal mechanisms are used to help to achieve nuclear non-proliferation objectives. They include political commitments, treaties and agreements, export control and nuclear security measures and the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The centerpiece of global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It entered into force in March 1970 after being ratified by 40 states. The NPT represents a balance of rights and obligations regarding nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1995 another positive milestone was reached when the NPT was extended for an indefinite period in a Conference of States party. The NPT has become the most universally applied international agreement. Its members now include 189 states, and only 3 nations abstain from joining it, namely Israel, India, Pakistan; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used to be its party but withdrew from the Treaty in 2003. All of these holdouts now possess nuclear weapons and cannot sign and keep their arsenals.

This treaty declares that only five nations (the USA, Russia, France, the UK and China) may lawfully possess nuclear weapons, but that all other nations may not be prohibited from acquiring peaceful nuclear technology. It also specifies that the five nuclear powers must seek to reduce and eliminate their arsenals as quickly as possible.

It is obvious that in the recent 20 years nuclear non-proliferation has achieved considerable success. A group of authoritative U.S. specialists from the Carnegie Endowment noted in their report, “Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security”: “There are positive trends to build upon. Since the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, many more countries have given up nuclear weapon programs than have started them. There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapon programs than there were twenty years ago. The United States and Russia continue to work cooperatively to dismantle and secure nuclear weapons and materials left over from the Cold War.”[33]

The history of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has seen a number of breakthroughs.

These concern international treaties about nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

I have tried to display the major treaties in the following table.

The name of the treaty	When the treaty was adopted	Contents of the treaty	Countries, which have ratified the treaty
Antarctic Treaty	4 August 1963	Forbids placing and testing of the nuclear weapon in Antarctica.	46 nations
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	4 August 1963	Forbids tests of the nuclear weapon except underground. It was necessary to slow down race of arms between the USA and the USSR, and also to reduce quantity of nuclear deposits in the atmosphere.	USA, USSR, UK
Outer Space Treaty	27 January 1967	Forbids placing and testing of the nuclear weapon in an orbit of the Earth, on the Moon and other astronomical bodies.	99 nations, but 26 haven’t finished ratification yet.
Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean)	1967	Forbids testing, use, manufacture or acquisition of the nuclear weapon.	33 nations(USA and all of South America)
Limited Test Ban Treaty	1968	Forbids nuclear testing above ground, under water, or in space.	120 nations (1994)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)	Adopted 1 July 1968, in force 5 March 1970, renewed indefinitely 11 May 1995	Non-nuclear countries are forbidden to have, make and get the nuclear weapon. The main objective of the subscribed states is a full nuclear disarmament.	189 nations except Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba
Seabed Treaty	1971	Forbids placing of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone.	84 nations
SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I)	26 May 1972	Allows to keep the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels.	USA, USSR
Threshold Test Ban Treaty	1974	Defines a nuclear "threshold," prohibiting nuclear tests of devices having a yield more than 150 kilotons.	USA., USSR
SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II)	18 June 1979	Forbids realization of new rocket programs. The USA and the USSR have been compelled to suspend prompt development of rocket production.	USA, USSR, UK
South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone (Roratonga) Treaty	1985	Forbids use, testing and possession of the nuclear weapon within this zone.	13 nations
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	8 December 1987	Objective of the treaty is elimination ballistic and cruise missiles.	USA, USSR
START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I)	1991 (went into effect 5 December 1994)	Forbids to have in the arsenal more than 6000 nuclear warheads. Because of this treaty, the amount of the nuclear weapon had been reduced by 80% by 2001.	USA, USSR
START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II)	1993	The USA and Russia have agreed to reduce quantity of warheads to 1700-2200 by 2012	USA, Russia
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	10 September 1996	Forbids all nuclear explosions in environment, both in the military and in the civil purposes.	Signed by 180 states and ratified by 146 except USA, People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea (13 other states have not signed).
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	13 April 2005	Calls for prevention of illegal using of the nuclear weapon by the not state (terrorist) organizations.	22 nations

Made by Evgenia Lapshina

The recent positive changes in the US-Russian relationships inspire hope that we will see new breakthroughs on the horizon of disarmament and nonproliferation as far as bilateral and multilateral measures and treaties are concerned.

In the news:

Russia yesterday set out its demands for a comprehensive new nuclear weapons agreement with the US to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start I) of 1991.

The last few days of diplomacy mark the most visible signs of effort to break a decade-long stalemate in advancing nuclear disarmament.

"The arrival of the new US administration and President Obama changes the situation because now the question of multilateral disarmament has become a priority, which was not seen under the previous administration," said Lavrov.

Setting out Russia's vision for the future, Lavrov read out a statement from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev calling for far-reaching agreements that would go beyond nuclear warheads and would include strategic delivery systems. Russia wants a prohibition on the "weaponisation of outer space", deployment of weapons outside national territories, and is also calling for moves to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East by way of a nuclear weapons-free zone. [25]

The central element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is represented by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The idea of providing international oversight over atomic energy appeared even before the development of nuclear weapons. It was born in 1943 and 1944 among atomic scientists, the people who knew better than anyone what kind of destructive force the new weapons would possess. The pioneers of this idea were: N. Bohr, L. Szilard, R. Oppenheimer, and other specialists from the Manhattan Project. In 1945-46 the Soviet academics P. Kapitsa and

D. Skobeltsyn also supported this idea. The main point of international control over atomic energy was to eliminate or at least maximally limit the harm to mankind caused by the application of this controversial discovery, which could throw the world into unforeseen disaster.

The United States and the Soviet Union advanced the original plans for international control in the UN Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 and 1947, but both states deviated from them for the obvious reason: they aspired to possess atomic weapons. As a result, an unprecedented nuclear arms race began, which was soon joined by other large powers, namely Great Britain, France, and China.

The world community reversed to the idea of international safeguards only in the 1950s, when expansive proliferation of atomic technology began, and many states started developing programs to use atomic energy not just for civil, but also for military purposes. The basic idea behind creating the International Atomic Energy Agency was to assist in the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. And thus a provision was made for the establishment of an international system of safeguards. The IAEA Statute, unanimously approved by 81 nations in October 1956, outlines the three pillars of the Agency’s work: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification.

The IAEA has an essential role under the NPT. Under Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon state is required to make an agreement with the IAEA so that the Agency is able to verify the fulfillment of its obligation not to develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Some countries (Iraq, Libya, the DPRK and, possibly, Iran and a number of other states) apparently joined the NPT to get political cover for their nuclear programs and an easy access to information, specialists, technologies and materials to achieve their military goals. The IAEA’s control was not effective enough to prevent the transfer of peaceful programs, technologies and materials into military-related projects.

The main motives for the leaderships of non-nuclear countries to develop nuclear weapons include considerations of international security, political prestige, domestic popularity and receiving concessions from other countries.

Let’s consider the countries that have conducted unsanctioned nuclear activities and thus violated their NPT and safeguard obligations.

Iraq has been an NPT Party since 1969. However, during Saddam Hussein’s rule it determinedly began to pursue nuclear weapons. Iraq’s nuclear ambitions were driven by many factors, including external security threats, particularly from Iran, and Saddam’s belief that nuclear weapons would consolidate his power at home and help him achieve regional dominance.

By 1991 Iraq had created a robust, covert program that included a complete, although untested, nuclear weapon design and roughly 36.3 kilograms of weapons useable HEU as research reactor fuel. [13]

After Iraq’s defeat in Operation Desert Storm the IAEA inspections confirmed that it had been pursuing an extensive secret uranium enrichment programme which was later dismantled on the commission of the UN Security Council.

Now the Iraqi leadership is adhering to the nonproliferation regime (it joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2008) and shows little interest in pursuing even a civil nuclear program.

North Korea first became involved in the nuclear politics during the Korean War, when the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea and threatened to use them to stop the war. This gave a start to creating nuclear infrastructure by

Pyongyang.

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the Soviet Union. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA until 1992, although this process usually takes 18 months. During that period it brought into operation a small natural-uranium fuelled “Experimental Power Reactor”, which was well-suited to start a local nuclear reactor development. It also made a substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles. Additionally, it completed a reprocessing plant that makes spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. In October 1994 the Agreed Framework was signed in which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program and allow IAEA inspections.

While verifying the stocks of uranium and plutonium, IAEA inspectors discovered discrepancies which showed that reprocessing plant had been used more often that it had been declared.

This suggested that North Korea might have enough weapons grade plutonium for one or two devices. The DPRK’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations was reported to the UN Security Council.

In mid-2002, U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea had been receiving materials from Pakistan for a uranium enrichment facility in violation of the NPT and the Agreed Framework.

[17]

In 2003 North Korea withdrew from the Treaty and in February 2005 announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. Pyongyang used it as a trump card in its bargaining with the world’s largest powers for economic and political concessions.

In October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear device. In reaction to the test, the UN Security Council placed sanctions on North Korea.

As a result of Six-party Talks in 2007, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear facilities and give a complete accounting of its nuclear programs. However, this process has been slow and unstable so far.

There are different opinions on the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Some analysts believe that Pyongyang is dissatisfied with its place in the current international structure and wants to create a serious external threat. Other analysts consider nuclear motivations of North Korea defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats. But regardless of the motivations, there is a serious concern that Pyongyang’s leadership may be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons to state or non-state actors.

In the news:

Speculation was mounting today that North Korea is preparing to launch a long-range missile, described by the regime as an "experimental satellite", in defiance of American warnings not to provoke instability in the region.

The US has repeatedly urged the North Korean regime to abandon the launch and return to negotiations on its nuclear weapons programme.

Observers have interpreted the threat as another round of diplomatic brinkmanship aimed at winning quick concessions on aid from the US and other countries taking part in multilateral nuclear talks.

"North Korea's conventional force, its development and reinforcement of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles, and the forward deployment of its troops, are a direct and serious threat to our security," the South Korea defence ministry report said.[6]

Iran’s nuclear program has caused a great concern in the international community as it appears to be dangerously close to developing a complete nuclear fuel cycle which would enable it to produce fissile material for creating nuclear weapon. However, Iranian leadership claims that its enrichment program is part of the civilian nuclear energy program, which is permitted under Article IV of the NPT.

Iran has been suspected mostly because of its attempts to conceal from the IAEA the creation of a potential that is not formally prohibited by the NPT, for example, the secret construction of an underground enrichment facility in Natanza and the secret purchase of centrifuges on the Pakistani black market.

During the IAEA inspections at the establishment in Natanza traces of highly enriched uranium were discovered. Tehran officials didn’t contest this fact, but claimed that the equipment had already been contaminated when Iran acquired it. The IAEA inspectors weren’t able to get any convincing proof about the origin of these traces, that is why it was impossible to confirm whether Iran had produced highly enriched uranium or not.

I should also note that the IAEA inspections on Iran's nuclear program were unprecedented (more than 900 working days), and yet Agency experts failed to find any proof for officially concluding that Iran had violated or was going to violate the NPT.

And still there is a concern that if Iran secretly reserves uranium material for enrichment, it can exit from IAEA safeguards and from the NPT and fairly quickly create a nuclear weapon. The motivations include Tehran’s aspirations for political, religious, and military leadership in the region. Iran also feels insecure because of the constant threat of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

In the news:

Russia signaled that it is ready to accept a secret offer made by Barack Obama to drop US plans for a European missile defence system in return for Moscow's help in dealing with Iran.

Obama's move is a bold one aimed at breaking the stalemate, which has lasted years, over attempts at preventing Iran securing a nuclear weapons capability.[21]

In all Declared nuclear weapon countries there are special agencies and laws regulating nuclear weapons. I am going to focus on operation of such agencies in Russia and the United States.

The Federal Atomic Energy Agency was formed in Russia in 2004. According to the law adopted by the Russian parliament in November 2007, the agency was transformed to Nuclear Energy State Corporation (Rosatom), the regulatory body of the Russian nuclear complex. Rosatom controls nuclear power holding Atomenergoprom, nuclear weapons companies, research institutes and nuclear and radiation safety agencies. It is responsible for:

· the production of all nuclear materials and the development, testing, and production of all nuclear weapons;

· the elimination of nuclear warheads and nuclear munitions;

· development and safe functioning of atomic power engineering, nuclear weapons complex, nuclear- fuel cycle, atomic science and technology, nuclear and radiation safety;

· nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies;

· international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy and protection of the nonproliferation regime.

The Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight (Rostekhnadzor) was established in Russia in May 2004. Its four main nuclear oversight tasks are as follows:

· the regulation of nuclear activity, including the development of regulatory guidelines for nuclear and radiation safety, material control and accounting (MC&A),

· physical protection, radioactive waste management, and industrial safety;

· inspection activities, involving the verification of compliance at facilities with set regulations;

· licensing and assessment, including recommendations to other agencies and the government.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established in 2000 as a new element within the US Department of Energy. The Department performs its national security mission involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and technology through the NNSA.

The major tasks of NNSA include:

• Improving national security through the military application of nuclear energy
• Maintaining and improving safety, reliability, and performance of the US nuclear weapons stockpile

The nuclear security strategic goals of NNSA include:

• Transformation of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure to be more responsive to the threats of the 21st century.
• Preventing the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and in other acts of terrorism.
• Providing safe, militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants to the U.S. Navy.

Objective II

Our task is to demonstrate an understanding of some of the challenges to nuclear disarmament in the world today. We are to provide the reasons for differences between nations that have nuclear weapons and those that do not.

In my paper I am going to research countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and South America that have demonstrated strong opinions on the topic of nuclear disarmament. I will also consider the special situation of Japan as the only country to have experienced the attacks of nuclear weapons. I will try to analyze the reasons for disagreements of some of these countries with the current nuclear weapons nations. I will examine the possible affect of nuclear proliferation on the stability in these regions.

Some non-nuclear-weapon countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and South America have experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities, some even succeeded in creating them, but for one reason or another gave up the pursuit, or were forced to do so.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, both Argentina and Brazil pursued ambitious programs of nuclear energy and technological development, which included construction of unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facilities in these countries. It aroused a certain concern that both countries were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and could help other states in developing them. However, since that time Brazil and Argentina became Parties to the NPT and established a bilateral inspection agency to verify both countries' pledges to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. [1]

South Africa is the first and only country to develop nuclear weapons and subsequently voluntarily dismantle its weapons program. South African government was motivated to develop a deterrence strategy out of internal and external threats resulting from its policy of apartheid.

The country constructed six gun-type nuclear weapons. In 1989 South African leadership came to a decision to end apartheid, abandon its nuclear program and dismantle existing weapons as well as production equipment. This responsible step allowed South Africa to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991. Since mid-90s SAR has been playing a leading role in non-proliferation activities in the world arena. In 1996, South Africa together with 42 other African states signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo, Egypt.

The South African experience demonstrates that at least under some conditions, unilateral disarmament is not only possible, but can improve a nation’s security. [27]

Israel was the first country in the Middle East to develop nuclear arsenal. Its motivation was driven by a deep Israeli-Arab conflict where nuclear weapons were seen as a means of deterring potential enemies. Its status as a nuclear weapons state is an internationally accepted fact, although its leadership has neither confirmed nor denied it. Unlike 2 other powers, India and Pakistan, which publicly declared their nuclear status, Israel conceals its nuclear capacity. This policy is known as ambiguity.

Obviously, it was not possible for Israel to build a nuclear arsenal without the technological cooperation with a number of Western countries. Israel has especially benefited from broad nuclear collaboration with the United States and France.

There is no doubt that in the near future Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal will most likely remain the most important factor of the strategic military balance in the region. But on the other hand it is the largest factor for the prospect of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and beyond it.

After India achieved independence, its leadership repeatedly declared that the nation didn’t intend to create nuclear weapons, and that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes. They called for nuclear nonproliferation and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, as well as for disarmament and stopping of nuclear tests. But in the process of development of its civilian nuclear program, India made a shift into an opposite direction. India’s choice of a nuclear path was supported by several factors. They include tense relationship with China, confrontation with Pakistan, break-up of the USSR which stimulated India to rely exclusively on its own military strength.

Today India is striving to become a world superpower and its leadership views nuclear potential as the most promising way to guarantee its security and sovereignty. India refuses to support any anti-nuclear proposal that doesn’t coincide with its own approach. For example, India at first supported the NPT, but later became its opponent, calling it discriminatory for the countries which are not the members of the Nuclear Club. India constantly emphasizes that the NPT can secure neither vertical nor horizontal nuclear nonproliferation.

In 1993, Delhi was one of the initiators of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and proposed to include a special article which defined clear terms for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons. Because this proposal was not accepted, India opposed the approval of the treaty at the UN General Assembly session in 1996.

After the 1998 test, India declared a moratorium on further tests and announced about the

possibility of joining the CTBT. India also expressed its readiness to take part in the preparation of the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. But then India declared that it would keep its unilateral moratorium only under the condition that other states also would not carry out nuclear explosions.

In November 1998 at the UN General Assembly, India introduced a resolution that set out measures for reducing the risk of the unsanctioned or accidental use of WMDs. India supported the proposal of increasing the effectiveness of export control over nuclear materials and technology, and also came out in favor of international negotiations on the total destruction of nuclear weapons in the world.

Like India, Pakistan shifted its civil nuclear program into military one. Pakistani leaders believed that acquiring nuclear weapons should compensate the military imbalance with India after Pakistan’s defeat in war. Additionally, it desired to strengthen its position in the Muslim world.

As Islamabad claimed the right of first use of nuclear weapons it declared that it would be impossible for it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state and took a non-committal position regarding the CTBT. At the same time, it declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests,

expressed readiness to stop the production of fissile materials for military purposes, and announced its desire to participate in the drafting of a treaty banning the production of these materials.

In the news:

Of all the security threats posed by Pakistan, the most worrying is the fate of the country's nuclear arsenal.

Western governments are worried that if the state collapses, its nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of extremists, or simply out of control of any firm hands. Independent analysts are sceptical about official Pakistani assurances.

Pakistani authorities say their nuclear weapons are not assembled, the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages and warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. The country is estimated to have enough material for 55 weapons. [7]

As I have stressed above, neither India nor Pakistan is currently a participant in the NPT, and they are not planning to join it in the future. The reasons for this policy are as follows:

1. Both countries believe that it is absolutely unacceptable for states possessing nuclear weapons to prohibit others from doing so, despite existing threats to their security.

2. They point out that the NPT obligations do not provide proper security guarantees for non-nuclear states, especially in the case of a military conflict with a nuclear power.

3. They proclaim that, in order to secure the effectiveness of the NPT, all countries must renounce nuclear weapons at one and the same time.

The appearance of new nuclear powers in the region, struck a serious blow to the nonproliferation regime as a whole, and makes the future of the NPT doubtful. The nations that have developed nuclear weapons but have not joined the NPT are located in the most unstable regions of the world. There is a great possibility that they may be involved in military conflicts which can result in using nuclear weapons. Moreover, in this part of the world, the threat of proliferation comes not only from states interested in developing military nuclear programs, but also from terrorist organizations that want to acquire nuclear weapons. That is why it is particularly important to maintain the security of nuclear materials and technology, as well as to prevent leak of knowledge from the specialists who took part in the development of nuclear programs.

Some countries of the Greater Middle East (Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia) could get interested in acquiring nuclear weapons in the case of a sharp nuclear destabilization in the region. It could happen if Israel openly declares its nuclear status, or the United States or Israel use military force against Iran, Syria or any other Islamic country under the pretext of a fight against terrorism.

In 1963, President Kennedy emphasized the extreme danger of nuclear proliferation: "I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war. [12]

Japan is the only country in the world that has been subjected to atomic bombings and experienced the deadly consequences of the nuclear holocaust. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are painful reminders of the American nuclear attacks in the end of the II World War. It is only natural that Japan as a nation has the deepest aversion to nuclear weapons and plays an active part in non-proliferation and disarmament activities in the international arena. Japan is a party to multilateral treaties and a strong supporter of non-proliferation regime.

Tokyo has put forth the initiative on cutting back nuclear arms, as well as on the comprehensive and total banning of nuclear tests. Japan is closely cooperating with the IAEA since 1957 and has been one of its most active members.

Japan is known not to have any weapons of mass destruction programs. Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country [15]

Today Japan possesses a large and well-developed nuclear industry and at present pursues a highly expensive plutonium recycling program and a closed fuel cycle program. What is more, the country’s technological and industrial achievements in the field of mechanics and electronics can be employed to create a nuclear device in a short time. That is why some experts believe that Japan is now standing at a ‘nuclear threshold’ and under certain circumstances could acquire nuclear potential.

Let’s consider aspects of Japan’s possible ‘nuclear choice’.

Factors in Favor of Developing NW	Factors Against Developing NW
Instability of the post-Cold war system of international relations: Japanese leadership is inclined to think it is not possible to maintain its present global status only by economic means	Japan is a small island state, densely populated: even a few nuclear warheads would make a colossal damage to the country.
Lack of results in the de-escalation of the DPRK’s military program and China’s military build-up: Tokyo views these facts as the most serious threats to its security.	If Japan created a nuclear potential of its own, it would provoke Japan’s neighbors to build up their arsenals in response.
The collapse of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime: Japan could review its attitude toward possessing nuclear weapons[29]	The policy of acquiring a nuclear weapon would very seriously undermine Tokyo's foreign political and diplomatic positions, not just on the regional, but also on the global level. [29]
Weakening of the American-Japanese alliance which can result in loss of confidence in the American ‘nuclear umbrella’: Japan could decide to maintain a secure balance of forces in the region.	‘Going nuclear’ could result in political, diplomatic and economic isolation of Japan
Reviving of nationalist tendencies in the country: change of the strategic situation in the region could bring nationalists to power and quicken the acquiring of a NW	Moving in the direction of ‘nuclear choice’ would be strongly opposed by the population which has a powerful anti-nuclear attitude.

Made by Evgenia Lapshina

So, there is a question: what will Japan choose? To have or not to have?

For the near future, Japan will, as before, adhere to the policy of compliance with the NPT and other international agreements directed at maintaining national security. However, it will use all available means to preserve flexibility in its “nuclear choice,” allowing the country to acquire nuclear potential, should such a necessity arise from foreign or domestic circumstances. [29]

Objective III

Our task is to demonstrate understanding of some of the challenges to nuclear disarmament in the world today. I am going to research the issues of modernization of the weapons now possessed by nuclear powers, and the challenges of monitoring and verification.

Nuclear deterrence and proliferation have always been closely interrelated like the contents of connected vessels.

On the one hand, five great nuclear powers are reducing their large nuclear arsenals , but on the other hand, they are conducting a policy of modernization of their nuclear forces at a minimal sufficiency level (the US, great Britain and France), on a moderate scale (Russia) and potentially with a considerable built-up (China).

Why may countries want to strengthen their nuclear arsenals? The reasons may be as follows:

• updating their old weapons systems and replacing them with more modern systems;
• increasing the survivability of their nuclear deterrent by making fighting capacity of weapons stronger;
• shifting towards a more aggressive nuclear policy.

In modernization programs the quality of delivery vehicles is placed above quantity and survivable second-strike potential above war-fighting capability. The weapons are modernized to gain the following characteristics:

• low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles
• mobility or other means to ensure survivability
• improved accuracy
• increased ability to penetrate defense systems

The US strategic nuclear forces were fully modernized in the 1980s and ‘90s and, in contrast to Russia, will be technologically highly effective for the next two decades or more.

Temporarily “frozen” by Congress, but most probably not dead, is the program

of “clean,” low-yield, deep-penetration nuclear warheads for destroying defensive

bunkers and other assets belonging to rogue countries and terrorists. [34]

Let’s have a closer look at Russia’s attempts to carry out a nuclear modernization.

Russian government is planning to strengthen the Armed Forces despite the lack of money in the country’s budget caused by the worsening financial crisis. The quarter of the military budget will be spent on strategic nuclear forces. The money will be used to put more than 10 new intercontinental ballistic missiles on line by the end of the year. Several dozens of new short-range Iskander missiles will be provided by the military. There also intentions to complete tests of the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile and put it into service by the end of this year. It is seen as a key part of the future nuclear arsenal because of its capability to penetrate missile defenses.

Russia is also working on anti-satellite weapons to match technologies developed by other nations, namely the US and China. It will also focus on creating high-precision weapons.

In the news:

George W. Bush's administration plan to locate missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic put it at odds with Russia, which opposed the move as a threat to its security.

President Barack Obama has signaled that he might forgo an anti-missile system in Eastern Europe if Russia helps end a standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions. The Kremlin has welcomed Washington's moves to improve ties, but Russian officials continue to emphasize the need for modernization of Russian military arsenals. [24]

Great Britain, France, and China are undertaking a systematic, long-term modernization and a build-up of their nuclear potential as they do not intend to accept any legally-binding limitations on their nuclear forces and try to reduce lagging behind the two largest nuclear powers.

In its 2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, the U.S. Department of Defense noted that "China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic missile force," which could "provide a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent and counterstrike capability." [19]

As other countries (particularly the United States) continue to increase their military capabilities, China may feel more vulnerable. From Desert Storm through the 2003 war in Iraq, the United States has continuously demonstrated its ability to use conventional forces to destroy fixed targets with tremendous accuracy. U.S. efforts to develop a ballistic missile defense system also threaten the deterrence capability of China’s aging nuclear forces. China’s leaders may fear that their older, immobile nuclear forces are vulnerable or ineffective as a deterrent, and should be replaced by newer, road-mobile nuclear forces and ICBMs such as the DF-31 and DF-41 missiles. Finally, China’s efforts to increase its nuclear capabilities may indicate an important, yet undeclared, shift toward a more aggressive nuclear policy. [31]

At an early stage in the arms control process the leading nuclear powers were striving to stabilize mutual deterrence within acceptable limits. After the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the end of nuclear proliferation was seen as a condition for progress in nuclear disarmament. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1970) called for the nuclear-weapon states to take steps toward nuclear disarmament in return for non-nuclear-weapon states forgoing such weapons. After the NPT a number of other bilateral arms control treaties were signed: Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (1991), multilateral accords such as the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1997 Model Additional Protocol granting greater inspection powers to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The efforts of modernization of nuclear arsenals undertaken by nuclear powers greatly undermine the foundations of stable mutual deterrence and of the arms limitation and disarmament regimes. Such moves can be also regarded as not conforming to the spirit of the NPT.

The main point of international control over atomic energy was to maximally limit the danger and harm of this discovery to mankind.

The task of establishing the international safeguards was formulated by the international community in the very first resolution to be accepted by the General Assembly of the UN in January 1946. It promised, “by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States [in the realm of atomic energy] against the hazards of violations and evasions.” [5]

Article XII of the IAEA Statute states the basic safeguard principles. They include various methods and procedures for monitoring and testing, visitations of all nuclear facilities on the territory of the country by international inspectors at any moment. If a violation of the safeguard agreement is discovered, the Agency’s Board of Governors can demand from the state the immediate elimination of the transgressions.

Each state has its own system of registering and controlling nuclear materials. It provides the Agency with an initial account of all nuclear materials subject to the safeguards.

The agency conducts inspections to verify this information in order to be convinced of the completeness and correctness of the state’s account of nuclear materials. International inspectors perform a variety of activities at a facility. They include the verification of nuclear material accountancy and the verification of facility design using a range of special techniques. The inspectors count the items and measure nuclear materials with the help of radiation detectors and take samples for analysis at the Agency’s headquarters, where they are checked for quantity, isotopic composition, etc. The inspectors also must confirm that the facility hasn’t been misused to produce undeclared plutonium or enrich undeclared uranium.

IAEA safeguards inspectors verifying

fresh fuel at a nuclear power plant[11]

Technological means of control are used extensively, including the use of special seals (containment) and video surveillance. If a state is engaged in secret nuclear activities, it may try to cover a diversion of nuclear material or the misuse of a facility. Therefore, inspectors check that the installed containment and the surveillance equipment haven’t been tempered. They will also take some steps to confirm that the verified nuclear material at one facility

Recording activity within the reactor hall [11] hasn’t been ‘borrowed’ from somewhere else. It can be

achieved by simultaneous inspections at all facilities.

Inspections may be performed at short notice to prevent potential diversion.

Unattended remote monitoring systems are used in facilities to reduce inspection efforts. It is a cost effective way to transmit verification data.

One of the effective techniques for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities is environmental sampling. Samples are collected from the environment at declared or undeclared locations with the purpose of analysis for traces of nuclear materials. The IAEA safeguards Analytical laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, is responsible for processing, screening, distributing, analyzing and archiving samples. [11]

The use of satellite imagery enables the IAEA to choose the locations that need to be visited by safeguard inspectors and helps to detect secret nuclear activities.

National export control systems are important elements of the international WMD nonproliferation regime. The international trade in nuclear materials and technologies is monitored by powerful international institutions (the IAEA and export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group). These regimes draft lists of products subject to control, as well as principles governing the export of nuclear technology and equipment.

Russia’s WMD nonproliferation policy provides control over foreign trade deals involving nuclear and dual-use goods and technologies. The Law on Export Controls was passed in 1999. As defined in the law, export includes not only the transfer of goods and technologies

abroad, but also to foreign citizens or entities on Russian Federation territory.

Now I am going to consider how domestic controls in my country are supposed to maintain the safety and security of nuclear weapons.

Physical protection of nuclear munitions, nuclear weapon complexes and their control points is an important task of Russia’s national security. It should exclude intrusion to the sites, leak of information on nuclear munitions and prevent incidents with nuclear munitions and the combat control and security systems.

The network computer control system is intended to provide computer-aided solution of the tasks to control site monitoring and physical protection processes.

The purpose of the intrusion detection and prevention system is to record the attempts of unauthorized access to security areas and into buildings and storage facilities, generate and issue information on the situation to the site control points, transmit warning signals to security troops and detain intruders using engineered features and intrusion control facilities. The system uses the principle of multi-barrier protection to enable as reliable detection of the intrusion to the security area as possible. The detection boundary on the surveilled area perimeter is Security fencing of the guarded site [23]

based on combinations of different physical detection

principles (acoustic, capacitive vibration, radio engineering, electric contact, magnetometric, spectrometric, optic and others) [23]

The access monitoring and control system is responsible for computer-aided personnel and vehicle access control and monitoring tasks. Different types of physical barriers are used to rule out unauthorized access to the security area. Apart from representing physical obstacles, the barriers have a psychological affect on the intruder. The physical barriers are the

site’s civil structures including gates, doors and

Human access control devices [23] special facilities such as fences, anti-ram devices,

locking cabins, turnstiles, bars, reinforced doors and

other physical obstacles. [23]

The video surveillance system provides direct visual monitoring of the situation along the site perimeter, within the detection areas, structures and buildings.

The smuggling prevention system is intended for detecting forbidden things, materials or substances smuggled to or from the site. The most efficient way to detect such smuggling is special radiation monitoring at the personnel and vehicle entrances to the monitored, guarded and vital areas. Practically all radiation monitors are used to detect small quantities of fissionable and radioactive materials.

The radar monitoring system for movable land-based targets and targets in the surface air layer enables to locate the intruder not only throughout the security site, but also at the approaches to its perimeter, as well as in attempts of intrusion by air (on a helicopter, a parachute). It is important that radar detection is possible in any weather conditions and at any time of the day. [23]

The 8 RB Thomson radar [23]

Recent years there have seen a number of safeguard challenges which demonstrated the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguard system. In 1991, after the war in the Persian Gulf, it was established that even though Iraq was a party to the NPT and the IAEA safeguard agreement, it had been secretly developing nuclear weapons. These concealed facts showed that the IAEA’s system of safeguards was not sufficiently reliable. In 1997 an Additional Protocol was adopted which included measures substantially strengthening the international system of safeguards. The protocol allows examinations on short notice and the extensive use of unannounced inspections. It was signed by 107 states, but it became official law or is actually applied in practice in only 72 states.

Some IAEA countries that had only small quantities of nuclear materials or didn’t have any at all signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as well as the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). However, this protocol does not give the Agency sufficient opportunity to get information on the safeguards or to conduct the necessary measures of verification. In 2005 the Board of Governors approved measures leading to the presentation of an initial account by SQP states and the timely direction of information about the construction of planned nuclear power plants, which would allow on-site inspections. The negotiations with nations that have signed the Safeguards Agreement and the Small Quantities Protocol are to be held which will strengthen the safeguards in SQP states.

Conclusion

In doing my research I have come to the following conclusions:

• The end of the Cold War brought the end of the strategic confrontation on the world stage of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had threatened one another mutual destruction. But despite the hopes of many people that nuclear weapons would disappear from current politics, they did not become the lot of historians.
• There is no doubt that nuclear nonproliferation has achieved considerable success. The majority of nations in the world (189) have joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which was extended indefinitely in 1995. A few nations have abandoned their military nuclear programs. New treaties on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation have been adopted.
• But at the same time, the nonproliferation regime is under threat because of the new serious challenges. Peace is far from being stable because the process of globalization has caused the spread of ideas, knowledge and technologies across borders. The existing mechanisms of control and deterrence proved to be ineffective in the light of new reality. The examples of Iraq, North Korea and a number of other states have shown that the safeguards of the IAEA have to be improved.
• Another challenge is participation of some NPT member countries in the black market of nuclear materials and technologies. It provides fertile ground for the elevation of international terrorism.
• The five Nuclear Weapons States continue to modernize their nuclear armaments and strengthen their nuclear deterrence strategy. These activities violate the NPT. The policies of these nations are at the center of the world’s attention and the future of nonproliferation depends to a large extent on their political influence.
• Despite these challenges, today there is a unique opportunity to unite international efforts and move forward together to confront existing problems of WMD proliferation, terrorism and global instability. I believe there is no other way!

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