The INF Treaty

21 years ago, in August 1988, for the first time in history there began a real nuclear disarmament. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was signed by the presidents Gorbachev and Reagan on the 8 December came into force and began to be executed.

The Cold War is considered to have finished in November 1989 with the destruction of Berlin Wall. However, the INF Treaty was the first real step which put the end to nuclear opposition, thus marking a new epoch.  Before this, American and Soviet Intermediate-range missiles maintained political and military tension in Europe.

A number of times in the beginning of 80 nuclear war seemed real, practically inevitable.  Only after the INF Treaty coming in force peaceful unification of Germany and other dramatic changes of the end of the Cold War became real.

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 US and USSR nuclear arsenals

Possibilities of rapid increase in the number of warheads

The INF Treaty was not the first Russian American Treaty restricting nuclear armament.  But all the previous documents were not treaties in the right understanding of the word. The SALT I Interim agreement signed by Soviet General Secretary L. Brezhnev and US President R. Nixon on 26 May in Moscow aimed at decreasing the number of strategic land-based and sea-based launchers on each side. However, there was not much sense in it since both countries had already started to produce multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV).

As a result of seeming lessening of tension there began unprecedented avalanche like increase of nuclear potential.  According to sources in the government departments one can assert that by 1986 USSR Ministry of Defense had 50.000 of various explosive devices standing on arms.

In case of escalation of the world tension it would have taken Atomic Ministry a couple of months to assemble 10.000 of warheads from prepared in advance devices and fissile materials to provide the army.

American armed forces had more than 33.000 nuclear warheads and could have also increased the number of neutron and other nuclear ammunition. The potential global war would have witnessed the use of more than 100.000 various nuclear explosive devices in total. By 1986 each side of the Iron Curtain clearly understood that the forthcoming war would inevitably destroy the whole civilization, probably the whole humanity as a biological species.

 

 

 

 

 

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The elimination of ŇPioneersÓ and ŇPershingÓ ŇZero variantÓ

Aspire to disarm and to withdraw from the edge of the abyss united the ruling elite in the East and West. Despite Gorbachev and Reagan summit in Reykjavik, October 1986 broke down, intensive negotiations went on. The INF Treaty, that provided elimination of the whole class of intermediate range nuclear missiles (500-5500), was surprisingly quickly prepared, agreed on and finally signed.  If we remember, negotiations on disarmament lasted tens of years, so this term was shockingly short.

According to the treaty 809 Soviet intermediate range missiles were to be eliminated, including the most modern missiles ŇPioneerÓ (SS-20) with three nuclear warheads each, as well as 155 old missiles P-12 and P-14.
The Americans had to eliminate 440 missiles, including ŇPershing -2Ó similar to SS-20, which Soviet military considered to be extremely threatening.  It took ŇPershingÓ 8 minutes to reach Moscow and annihilate the Russian government before it could command a second strike.

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The Treaty was finally ratified in June 1, 1988.

The process of elimination of missiles, launchers and accompanying infrastructure was accomplished.

The treaty said that that the side had to eliminate within 3 years all the launchers and land-based missiles with the range from 500 to -5500 km, both on the European and Asian territory of the USSR. It was the first in the history real treaty on the reduction of armament.  The treaty also provided the system of verifications and inspections following the process of missile elimination of the opposite side.

According to Article 3 of the Treaty intermediate range missiles and ground –launched cruise missiles were to be eliminated.

By June 1991 the treaty was completely fulfilled: the USSR eliminated 1848 missile complexes (half of them produced missiles not in active state); the US – 846 complexes.

 

 

 

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The intermediate – range Nuclear Forces Treaty made death leave these sites by the middle of 80-s of the last century.

 

 

 

 

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Perspectives of the INF Treaty

On the 15th of February 2007 the Chief of Russian Military Forces General J. Baluevski stated that Russia could reconsider its whole law and contract system of the nuclear restraining in response to location of American Anti missile system in Eastern Europe.

In particular Russia could unilaterally leave the INF treaty: ŇThe treaty is for unlimited time, however one side can ignore it on condition it provides persuasive arguments to do so. Today there are many of them: many countries develop and modernize intermediate range missiles, while Russia having executed the INF Treaty lost many systems of such a weapon.Ó

Ň We could possible agree that anti-missile systems might be located on the Moon, but when we come to it, all opportunities to come to agreement may be lost, due to your realization of your own ambitions.Ó

ŇWe have to convince other participants of the international communication to take up the same responsibilities as Russia and America, - says the Russian President. – If we donŐt achieve these results, it will be difficult for us to follow the rules of the agreement with others developing the same systems of armament.

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A new step – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – Start – I.  A Treaty on 50% offensive armament reduction.

Strategy of restriction

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty term comes to end in 2009. It can be prolonged for five years any number of times.  Each side has a right to withdraw from the Treaty, with preliminary notice of 6 months.

Equal limits for both sides established the total number of missiles to 1600 with 6000 warheads on them.

The fulfillment of the treaty, elimination and modernization of START I is supervised by the joint committee on monitoring and inspections. Inspections are held in groups of 10 right on the military objects and testing sites. Each side uses its national technical means of control as well as relevant information.

 

31 July 1991

In Moscow presidents Gorbachev and Bush signed Start – I.

23 May 1992

Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and USA signed Lisbon protocol to Start – I. It marked joining of Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Start – I and NPT.

5 December 1994

Start – I  came in force.

6 December 2001

Russia and USA fulfilled the obligations on Start – I.

Each side canŐt have more than:

6000 warheads, from which:

110 located on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

1540 located on heavy ICBM for USSR (USA donŐt have heavy ICBM)

4900 located on ICBM or Ballistic Missiles (BR) on submarines

880 Sea-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) with the range more than 600 km

1600 located on ICBM, Ballistic Missiles (BR) on submarines and Strategic bombers

One unit warheads

 

31 July 1991 in Moscow presidents George Bush and M. Gorbachev signed Start – I on nuclear strategic armament reduction.  On 27 September Bush announced unilateral decision to eliminate American tactical nuclear weapon, located in other countries, destroy all American artillery nuclear shells and short-range warheads. USA announced about closing their programs on Railway-launched ballistic missiles and on short-range missiles for strategic bombers. At the same time ready-to-launch degree of all USA strategic nuclear bombers and strategic nuclear missiles subjected to elimination by Start – I was reduced.

On 6 October 1991 Moscow also eliminates its tactical nuclear land- and sea- based tactical nuclear weapon, declines the development of mobile small-size ballistic missile ŇCascadeÓ as well as short-range nuclear missiles for heavy bombers. 503 ICM subjected to elimination on Start – I, and all Soviet strategic aviation were removed.

There was a set of restrictions on the number of unallocated ICBM of mobile basing and launchers of these missiles. ItŐs allowed to have 250 such rockets, including 125 for railway missile complexes, 110 launchers. At the same time the number of unallocated Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

According to article VI of NPT mobile launchers with ICBM (only ŇTopol – MÓ in fact) were to be based on limited areas (the territories were defined) not more than 5 km2 within the limits of the region of dislocation whichŐs not more than 125 000 km2. Not more than 15% of launchers with ICBM could leave these areas (and only to change their position for 25 days maximum). Russia must notify USA which have right to inspect territories after any movement.

Russia is to display all ICBM on the open air within the restricted areas defined by the USA, the roofs of any constructions must be opened within the period of inspection.

Similar restrictions applied to railway-launched missiles which must be dislocated on the base stations and they couldnŐt withdraw from them on more than 20 kilometers.

Start – I gives same rights to Russia but it canŐt use them, because the USA donŐt have any mobile ICBM.

These procedures make possession of ICBM completely useless. Moreover, these ICBM are simply ballast for Russian strategic nuclear forces because they lose mobility and in this case their military durability much lower than that of underground ICBM because of higher vulnerability to nuclear and precision-guided munitions, and to sabotage.

All in all, Start – I was completely profitable for the American side.

Nowadays the treaty has been formally executed by both sides.

The USA Congress ratified Start – II in 1996, Russian Duma – in 2000. However after the USA withdrawal from the ABM treaty Russia refused to fulfill the Start – II.

Instead of it in May 2002 a treaty on strategic offensive potentials restriction was signed. According to this treaty, the number of warheads on deployed strategic carriers of USA and Russia must not exceed 2200 by 2012. However, the number of warheads in stockpiles is not limited. The fulfillment of the treaty is to be provided by national intelligence service, there are no on-site inspections.

Russian Federation benefited from allowing to have multiple-warheads, but absence of restrictions on undeployed and on-site inspections, fully devaluates it.

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Role and place of strategic nuclear forces providing RussiaŐs security

-in peaceful time

To prevent of a full-scale non-nuclear and nuclear aggression against Russia and its allies itŐs essential to keep strategic nuclear forces in ready-to-launch condition and to show their abilities.

-in a war

To force an enemy to stop war on favourable for Russia conditions by singular or multiple strikes by means of strategic nuclear forces, including low-tension conflicts using strategic non-nuclear forces.

-in a nuclear war

To defeat (eliminate) objects of military and economical infrastructure of the enemy during strategic operations strategic nuclear forces provide the first strike, massive strike and subsequent singular or multiple strikes.

The share of strategic nuclear forces in the arms of Russian Federation

По численности личного состава

По расходам в военном бюджете

По военному потенциалу

The main reason for all military reductions is aging of its missile complexes, part of which was produced in Soviet time in Ukraine.

A number of highly-qualified Russian military experts donŐt share thesis about renaissance of Russian military power. A well-known in the end of 2007 analytical report of the National Strategy Institute, the Institute Of Military and Political analysis and the Center of Military Forecast says that Russian Federation Armed Forces are still in crisis, moreover some unfavorable tendencies in the army and navy life and the whole defense-industrial complexes have taken an irreversible character.

Strategic nuclear forces as the main guarantee of stateŐs sovereignty is of the greatest concern. Missiles made 20 -25 years ago are the basis of Russian nuclear potential. They, of course, should be replaced by more modern ones. But a replacement is not equal. During 2000-2007 Missile strategic troops lost 405 carriers and 2498 warheads while received only 27 one-warhead missiles. Authors think, that if the same low rates of production of new missiles will maintain, then during the next 10 years Russia will have not more than 100-200 one-warhead ICBM.

In the beginning of 2008 Russia had 682 strategic carriers capable to carry 3100 nuclear warheads. In comparison with 2007 the number of carriers has reduced by 39 units (5,3%); the number of warheads – by 177 units (5,3%). There are 430 missile complexes capable to carry 1605 nuclear warheads. Nowadays there are 75 heavy missiles Р-36МУТТХ and Р-36М2, 100 missiles УР-100НУТТХ, 201 ground mobile complexes ŇTopol - MÓ, 48 mine-based complexes ŇTopol - MÓ and 6 mobile complexes ŇTopol-MÓ.

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3081 warheads - itŐs still too many.

If modern tendencies will g on by 2012 Russia will Ňautomatically fulfill Start – IIÓ and itŐs likely to occure much earlier. The USA at present  exceed the highest level of the treaty more than twice.

We irreversibly lose our multiple ballistic warheads of both land and sea deployment. Land based missiles used to be produced in the Ukraine; and production of promising sea-launched missiles Р-39М, and  Р-29 has been ceased.

One-warhead ŇTopol-MŇŐs replace multiple-warhead missiles. By the way, the number of destroyed multiple warheads isnŐt compensated by one-warhead ŇTopol-MÓŐs. Moreover, first ŇTopol-MÓŐs produced in 80-s have also become outdated and are being rapidly eliminated. All in all, the number of carriers is quickly decreasing and a number of war parts is reducing avalanche-like.

If the situation remains, in the nearest future we will have less than 1000 warheads on sea- and land-based ballistic missiles.

Thus the process of reduction of nuclear weapons isnŐt influenced by treaties with the USA. Russian strategic nuclear forces will include ŇTopol-MÓ the number of which will gradually come to 80-100. The rest part will include less old ICBM of various types and bombers Ту-95МС. The introduction of SLBM seems to be improvable.

The destruction of this potential with the help of Precision-Guided Weapons or ŇmicronuclearÓ will be practically real for any enemy. And the remaining ICBM and SLBM will be initially destroyed by sea-launched anti –missile defense. Moreover, Russian ABM is likely to disappear in the nearest future.

Nowadays Strategic Nuclear Forces of Russia are the only factor which makes it an influential and not giant half-empty territory with a great deal of natural resources. All in all, if we donŐt take radical actions, Russia will not be able to save Nuclear Strategic Forces on acceptable level.

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Перспективы сокращения боевых ядерных зарядов

In the beginning of 2009, the new USA administration initiated rapid reduction of American and Russian nuclear potential  which was shown to the world as an example of ObamaŐs Ňnew thinkingÓ.

No doubt, that announced Ňyet not officially proclaimedÓ suggestions to reduce SNF up to 1000 warheads seem revolutionary. It is the first time the reductions have been so radical. The realization of the new American presidentŐs initiative, if it will be really proclaimed by USA and finally adopted by Russia, will create a new balance of powers on the international arena.

Thanks to huge superiority above all other countries in the question of Precision-Guided Munitions the USA can achieve the majority of military aims very effectively with low loses, and without global ecological catastrophe. In this respect SNF are burdensome, expensive  to exploit,  besides, they canŐt be used in an ordinary war. Meanwhile, the presence of SNF in other countries is the only outer threat to the USA. Respectively their reduction is favourable for the USA from any point of view, so any reduction increase their superiority in Precision-Guided Munitions.

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Leave the bomb to the people!

Conclusions:

25% - evaluate the reduction and evaluation of NW positively

75% - evaluate the process negatively

This proportions show specific attitude of the population of closed towns to the problems of reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon, since social prosperity of the citizens still depends on economic prosperity of their nuclear plants. If there is no state demand – industry stops – the stuff is unemployed – income of the citizens cuts down – the town infrastructure ruins down – the whole attitude towards life becomes pessimistic.

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Leave the bomb to the people!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Leave the bomb to the people!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Bet on strength

The presence of nuclear weapon poses another important issue: the crisis of modern states facing contemporary global challenges. Today the nuclear weapon is the most important instrument to maintain global stability and equilibrium by means of retribution and unacceptable damage. But only a number of states and governments possesses this instrument. Thus the exceptional right to have nuclear weapon donŐt meet morality, natural right and justice. They are based only on force. We canŐt but agree this wonŐt last forever. There is every reason to believe that the acquiring of nuclear weapon should go alone with corresponding level of political culture.

The present political institutions including international donŐt suggest appropriate mechanisms of obtaining political culture. Iraqi war showed that world leaders rely on military power in solving such conflicts. ItŐs but natural that one day youŐll get the same back.

The break-up of bipolar world which brought about nuclear weapon and which was formed by it makes us face new challenges thus tempting to find simple solutions to complicated problems. ThereŐs an opinion that America will strive for establishment of world nuclear monopoly. In fact it will lead to creation of global government, and it wonŐt contribute to stability in the world. ItŐs common knowledge that variety of a system is the main provision of its existence.

All in all, on the one hand, we canŐt greet the creation of the global government with its monopoly on information, resources, and nuclear weapon. On the other hand, danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons among states with their low level of political culture and responsibility really exists.

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MY OPINION

1.    Nuclear weapon isnŐt effective against the enemy or its military-industrial center.

2.    The efficiency of nuclear weapon in big cities equals massive use of common bombs.

3.    Real samples of nuclear weapon are technically many times complicated than ordinary armament.

4.    The danger to own troops from nuclear weapons is comparable to the application of chemical weapon, which was used in WWI last time.

5.    Because of polonium in nuclear weapon, it is to be used within three months. Otherwise, the weapon will fall into disrepair.

6.    Then the only possible strategy is to use all available warheads in the first strike hoping that the second strike will be weakened.

7.    Nuclear weapon exists into historical epoch along with modern means of massmedia and itŐs inseparable from it. ItŐs likely to be the first weapon in human history the presence of which must be known by potential enemy. Otherwise, this weapon wonŐt fulfill itŐs main function to prevent  the use of any weapon by means of threat.

8.    In this way, nuclear weapon is a terroristic weapon suitable only for threatening enemy and its peaceful population.

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WhatŐs then?

1.    Russia vitally needs to construct completely new SNF. Only this will provide ability to defend itself and be full-fledged partner in negotiations not being objected to military political blackmail. If Russia could exclude the possibility of disarming strike it will mean that the USA and NATO wonŐt be seen as potential military rivals.

2.    Thus, in the perspective nuclear weapon remains to be the weapon of restraining but not the real military instrument as well as the last reason, as a grenade while being surrounded by enemies: itŐs not clear how many of them will be killed, but you wonŐt survive for sure.

3.    The already created nuclear weapon should be placed in the Kremlin on the honorable place between Tsar Bell which doesnŐt ring, and Tsar-cannon, which doesnŐt shoot.

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