The INF
Treaty
21 years ago, in
August 1988, for the first time in history there began a real nuclear
disarmament. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was signed by the
presidents Gorbachev and Reagan on the 8 December came into force and began to
be executed.
The Cold War is
considered to have finished in November 1989 with the destruction of Berlin
Wall. However, the INF Treaty was the first real step which put the end to
nuclear opposition, thus marking a new epoch. Before this, American and Soviet Intermediate-range missiles
maintained political and military tension in Europe.
A number of times in
the beginning of 80 nuclear war seemed real,
practically inevitable. Only after
the INF Treaty coming in force peaceful unification of Germany and other
dramatic changes of the end of the Cold War became real.
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US and USSR nuclear arsenals
Possibilities of rapid
increase in the number of warheads
The INF Treaty was not
the first Russian American Treaty restricting nuclear armament. But all the previous documents were not
treaties in the right understanding of the word. The SALT I Interim agreement
signed by Soviet General Secretary L. Brezhnev and US President R. Nixon on 26
May in Moscow aimed at decreasing the number of strategic land-based and
sea-based launchers on each side. However, there was not much sense in it since
both countries had already started to produce multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV).
As a result of seeming
lessening of tension there began unprecedented avalanche like increase of
nuclear potential. According to
sources in the government departments one can assert that by 1986 USSR Ministry
of Defense had 50.000 of various explosive devices standing on arms.
In case of escalation
of the world tension it would have taken Atomic Ministry a couple of months to
assemble 10.000 of warheads from prepared in advance devices and fissile
materials to provide the army.
American armed forces
had more than 33.000 nuclear warheads and could have also increased the number
of neutron and other nuclear ammunition. The potential global war would have
witnessed the use of more than 100.000 various nuclear explosive devices in
total. By 1986 each side of the Iron Curtain clearly understood that the
forthcoming war would inevitably destroy the whole civilization, probably the
whole humanity as a biological species.
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The
elimination of ŇPioneersÓ and ŇPershingÓ ŇZero variantÓ
Aspire to
disarm and to withdraw from the edge of the abyss united the ruling elite in
the East and West. Despite Gorbachev and Reagan summit in Reykjavik, October
1986 broke down, intensive negotiations went on. The INF Treaty, that provided
elimination of the whole class of intermediate range nuclear missiles
(500-5500), was surprisingly quickly prepared, agreed on and finally signed. If we remember, negotiations on
disarmament lasted tens of years, so this term was shockingly short.
According
to the treaty 809 Soviet intermediate range missiles were to be eliminated,
including the most modern missiles ŇPioneerÓ (SS-20) with three nuclear
warheads each, as well as 155 old missiles P-12 and P-14.
The Americans had to eliminate 440 missiles, including ŇPershing -2Ó similar to
SS-20, which Soviet military considered to be extremely threatening. It took ŇPershingÓ 8 minutes to reach
Moscow and annihilate the Russian government before it could command a second
strike.
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The
Treaty was finally ratified in June 1, 1988.
The
process of elimination of missiles, launchers and accompanying infrastructure
was accomplished.
The treaty
said that that the side had to eliminate within 3 years all the launchers and
land-based missiles with the range from 500 to -5500 km, both on the European
and Asian territory of the USSR. It was the first in the history real treaty on
the reduction of armament. The
treaty also provided the system of verifications and inspections following the
process of missile elimination of the opposite side.
According
to Article 3 of the Treaty intermediate range missiles and ground
–launched cruise missiles were to be eliminated.
By June
1991 the treaty was completely fulfilled: the USSR eliminated 1848 missile
complexes (half of them produced missiles not in active state); the US –
846 complexes.
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The
intermediate – range Nuclear Forces Treaty made death leave these sites
by the middle of 80-s of the last century.
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Perspectives
of the INF Treaty
On the 15th
of February 2007 the Chief of Russian Military Forces General J. Baluevski
stated that Russia could reconsider its whole law and contract system of the
nuclear restraining in response to location of American Anti missile system in
Eastern Europe.
In
particular Russia could unilaterally leave the INF treaty: ŇThe treaty is for
unlimited time, however one side can ignore it on condition it provides
persuasive arguments to do so. Today there are many of them: many countries
develop and modernize intermediate range missiles, while Russia having executed
the INF Treaty lost many systems of such a weapon.Ó
Ň We could
possible agree that anti-missile systems might be located on the Moon, but when
we come to it, all opportunities to come to agreement may be lost, due to your
realization of your own ambitions.Ó
ŇWe have
to convince other participants of the international communication to take up
the same responsibilities as Russia and America, - says the Russian President.
– If we donŐt achieve these results, it will be difficult for us to
follow the rules of the agreement with others developing the same systems of
armament.
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A
new step – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – Start – I. A Treaty on 50% offensive armament
reduction.
Strategy
of restriction
Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty term comes to end in 2009. It can be prolonged for five
years any number of times. Each
side has a right to withdraw from the Treaty, with preliminary notice of 6
months.
Equal
limits for both sides established the total number of missiles to 1600 with
6000 warheads on them.
The
fulfillment of the treaty, elimination and modernization of START I is
supervised by the joint committee on monitoring and inspections. Inspections
are held in groups of 10 right on the military objects and testing sites. Each
side uses its national technical means of control as well as relevant
information.
31 July
1991
In Moscow
presidents Gorbachev and Bush signed Start – I.
23 May
1992
Russia,
Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and USA signed Lisbon protocol to Start –
I. It marked joining of Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Start – I and NPT.
5 December
1994
Start
– I came
in force.
6 December
2001
Russia and
USA fulfilled the obligations on Start – I.
Each side
canŐt have more than:
6000
warheads, from which:
110
located on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
1540
located on heavy ICBM for USSR (USA donŐt have heavy ICBM)
4900
located on ICBM or Ballistic Missiles (BR) on submarines
880
Sea-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) with the range more than 600 km
1600 located on ICBM, Ballistic
Missiles (BR) on submarines and Strategic bombers
One unit
warheads
31 July
1991 in Moscow presidents George Bush and M. Gorbachev signed Start – I
on nuclear strategic armament reduction.
On 27 September Bush announced unilateral decision to eliminate American
tactical nuclear weapon, located in other countries, destroy all American artillery
nuclear shells and short-range warheads. USA announced about closing their
programs on Railway-launched ballistic missiles and on short-range missiles for
strategic bombers. At the same time ready-to-launch degree of all USA strategic
nuclear bombers and strategic nuclear missiles subjected to elimination by
Start – I was reduced.
On 6
October 1991 Moscow also eliminates its tactical nuclear land- and sea- based
tactical nuclear weapon, declines the development of mobile small-size
ballistic missile ŇCascadeÓ as well as short-range nuclear missiles for heavy
bombers. 503 ICM subjected to elimination on Start – I, and all Soviet
strategic aviation were removed.
There was
a set of restrictions on the number of unallocated ICBM of mobile basing and
launchers of these missiles. ItŐs allowed to have 250 such rockets, including
125 for railway missile complexes, 110 launchers. At the same time the number
of unallocated Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
According
to article VI of NPT mobile launchers with ICBM (only ŇTopol
– MÓ in fact) were to be based on limited areas (the territories were
defined) not more than 5 km2 within the limits of the region of
dislocation whichŐs not more than 125 000 km2. Not more than
15% of launchers with ICBM could leave these areas (and only to change their
position for 25 days maximum). Russia must notify USA which have right to
inspect territories after any movement.
Russia is
to display all ICBM on the open air within the restricted areas defined by the USA, the roofs of any constructions must be opened within
the period of inspection.
Similar
restrictions applied to railway-launched missiles which must be dislocated on
the base stations and they couldnŐt withdraw from them on more than 20
kilometers.
Start
– I gives same rights to Russia but it canŐt use them, because the USA
donŐt have any mobile ICBM.
These
procedures make possession of ICBM completely useless. Moreover, these ICBM are
simply ballast for Russian strategic nuclear forces because they lose mobility
and in this case their military durability much lower than that of underground
ICBM because of higher vulnerability to nuclear and precision-guided munitions,
and to sabotage.
All in
all, Start – I was completely profitable for the American side.
Nowadays
the treaty has been formally executed by both sides.
The USA
Congress ratified Start – II in 1996, Russian Duma
– in 2000. However after the USA withdrawal from the ABM treaty Russia
refused to fulfill the Start – II.
Instead of
it in May 2002 a treaty on strategic offensive potentials restriction was
signed. According to this treaty, the number of warheads on deployed strategic
carriers of USA and Russia must not exceed 2200 by 2012. However, the number of
warheads in stockpiles is not limited. The fulfillment of the treaty is to be
provided by national intelligence service, there are no on-site inspections.
Russian
Federation benefited from allowing to have multiple-warheads,
but absence of restrictions on undeployed and on-site
inspections, fully devaluates it.
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Role
and place of strategic nuclear forces providing RussiaŐs security
-in
peaceful time
To prevent
of a full-scale non-nuclear and nuclear aggression against Russia and its
allies itŐs essential to keep strategic nuclear forces in ready-to-launch
condition and to show their abilities.
-in a war
To force
an enemy to stop war on favourable for Russia conditions by singular or multiple
strikes by means of strategic nuclear forces, including low-tension conflicts
using strategic non-nuclear forces.
-in a
nuclear war
To defeat
(eliminate) objects of military and economical infrastructure of the enemy during
strategic operations strategic nuclear forces provide the first strike, massive
strike and subsequent singular or multiple strikes.
The share
of strategic nuclear forces in the arms of Russian Federation
По
численности
личного
состава
По
расходам в
военном
бюджете
По военному потенциалу
The main
reason for all military reductions is aging of its missile complexes, part of
which was produced in Soviet time in Ukraine.
A number
of highly-qualified Russian military experts donŐt share thesis about
renaissance of Russian military power. A well-known in the end of 2007
analytical report of the National Strategy Institute, the Institute Of Military
and Political analysis and the Center of Military Forecast says that Russian
Federation Armed Forces are still in crisis, moreover some unfavorable
tendencies in the army and navy life and the whole defense-industrial complexes
have taken an irreversible character.
Strategic
nuclear forces as the main guarantee of stateŐs sovereignty
is of the greatest concern. Missiles made 20 -25 years ago are the basis
of Russian nuclear potential. They, of course, should be replaced by more
modern ones. But a replacement is not equal. During 2000-2007 Missile strategic
troops lost 405 carriers and 2498 warheads while
received only 27 one-warhead missiles. Authors think, that if the same low
rates of production of new missiles will maintain, then during the next 10
years Russia will have not more than 100-200 one-warhead ICBM.
In the beginning of
2008 Russia had 682 strategic carriers capable to carry 3100 nuclear warheads.
In comparison with 2007 the number of carriers has reduced by 39 units (5,3%); the number of warheads – by 177 units (5,3%). There
are 430 missile complexes capable to carry 1605 nuclear warheads. Nowadays
there are 75 heavy missiles Р-36МУТТХ and Р-36М2, 100 missiles УР-100НУТТХ, 201 ground mobile complexes ŇTopol - MÓ, 48 mine-based
complexes ŇTopol - MÓ and 6 mobile complexes ŇTopol-MÓ.
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3081 warheads - itŐs
still too many.
If modern tendencies
will g on by 2012 Russia will Ňautomatically fulfill Start – IIÓ and itŐs
likely to occure much earlier. The USA at present exceed
the highest level of the treaty more than twice.
We irreversibly lose
our multiple ballistic warheads of both land and sea deployment. Land based
missiles used to be produced in the Ukraine; and production of promising
sea-launched missiles Р-39М, and Р-29 has been ceased.
One-warhead ŇTopol-MŇŐs replace multiple-warhead missiles. By the way,
the number of destroyed multiple warheads isnŐt compensated by one-warhead ŇTopol-MÓŐs. Moreover, first ŇTopol-MÓŐs
produced in 80-s have also become outdated and are being rapidly eliminated.
All in all, the number of carriers is quickly decreasing and a number of war
parts is reducing avalanche-like.
If the situation
remains, in the nearest future we will have less than 1000 warheads on sea- and
land-based ballistic missiles.
Thus the process of
reduction of nuclear weapons isnŐt influenced by treaties with the USA. Russian
strategic nuclear forces will include ŇTopol-MÓ the
number of which will gradually come to 80-100. The rest part will include less
old ICBM of various types and bombers Ту-95МС. The
introduction of SLBM seems to be improvable.
The destruction of
this potential with the help of Precision-Guided Weapons or ŇmicronuclearÓ will be practically real for any enemy. And
the remaining ICBM and SLBM will be initially destroyed by sea-launched anti
–missile defense. Moreover, Russian ABM is likely to disappear in the
nearest future.
Nowadays Strategic
Nuclear Forces of Russia are the only factor which makes it an influential and
not giant half-empty territory with a great deal of natural resources. All in
all, if we donŐt take radical actions, Russia will not be able to save Nuclear
Strategic Forces on acceptable level.
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Перспективы сокращения боевых ядерных зарядов
In the beginning of
2009, the new USA administration initiated rapid reduction of American and
Russian nuclear potential which was shown to the world as an example of ObamaŐs
Ňnew thinkingÓ.
No doubt, that
announced Ňyet not officially proclaimedÓ suggestions to reduce SNF up to 1000
warheads seem revolutionary. It is the first time the reductions have been so
radical. The realization of the new American presidentŐs initiative, if it will
be really proclaimed by USA and finally adopted by Russia, will create a new
balance of powers on the international arena.
Thanks to huge
superiority above all other countries in the question of Precision-Guided
Munitions the USA can achieve the majority of military aims very effectively
with low loses, and without global ecological catastrophe. In this respect SNF
are burdensome, expensive to exploit,
besides, they canŐt be used in an ordinary war. Meanwhile, the presence
of SNF in other countries is the only outer threat to the USA. Respectively
their reduction is favourable for the USA from any point of view, so any reduction increase their superiority in Precision-Guided
Munitions.
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Leave the
bomb to the people!
Conclusions:
25% - evaluate the
reduction and evaluation of NW positively
75% - evaluate the
process negatively
This proportions show
specific attitude of the population of closed towns to the problems of
reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon, since social prosperity of the
citizens still depends on economic prosperity of their nuclear plants. If there
is no state demand – industry stops – the stuff is unemployed
– income of the citizens cuts down – the town infrastructure ruins
down – the whole attitude towards life becomes pessimistic.
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Leave the
bomb to the people!
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Leave the
bomb to the people!
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Bet on
strength
The presence of
nuclear weapon poses another important issue: the crisis of modern states
facing contemporary global challenges. Today the nuclear weapon is the most important
instrument to maintain global stability and equilibrium by means of retribution
and unacceptable damage. But only a number of states and governments possesses this instrument. Thus the exceptional right to have nuclear weapon donŐt meet morality, natural
right and justice. They are based only on force. We canŐt but agree this wonŐt
last forever. There is every reason to believe that the acquiring of nuclear
weapon should go alone with corresponding level of political culture.
The present political
institutions including international donŐt suggest appropriate mechanisms of
obtaining political culture. Iraqi war showed that world leaders rely on
military power in solving such conflicts. ItŐs but natural that one day youŐll
get the same back.
The break-up of
bipolar world which brought about nuclear weapon and which was formed by it
makes us face new challenges thus tempting to find simple solutions to
complicated problems. ThereŐs an opinion that America will strive for establishment
of world nuclear monopoly. In fact it will lead to creation of global
government, and it wonŐt contribute to stability in the world. ItŐs common
knowledge that variety of a system is the main provision of its existence.
All in all, on the one
hand, we canŐt greet the creation of the global government with its monopoly on
information, resources, and nuclear weapon. On the other hand, danger of
proliferation of nuclear weapons among states with their low level of political
culture and responsibility really exists.
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MY OPINION
1.
Nuclear
weapon isnŐt effective against the enemy or its military-industrial center.
2.
The
efficiency of nuclear weapon in big cities equals massive use of common bombs.
3.
Real
samples of nuclear weapon are technically many times complicated than ordinary
armament.
4.
The danger
to own troops from nuclear weapons is comparable to the application of chemical
weapon, which was used in WWI last time.
5.
Because of
polonium in nuclear weapon, it is to be used within three months. Otherwise,
the weapon will fall into disrepair.
6.
Then the
only possible strategy is to use all available warheads in the first strike
hoping that the second strike will be weakened.
7.
Nuclear
weapon exists into historical epoch along with modern means of massmedia and itŐs inseparable from it. ItŐs likely to be
the first weapon in human history the presence of which must be known by
potential enemy. Otherwise, this weapon wonŐt fulfill itŐs main function to prevent the use
of any weapon by means of threat.
8.
In this
way, nuclear weapon is a terroristic weapon suitable only for threatening enemy
and its peaceful population.
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WhatŐs then?
1.
Russia
vitally needs to construct completely new SNF. Only this will provide ability
to defend itself and be full-fledged partner in negotiations not being objected
to military political blackmail. If Russia could exclude the possibility of
disarming strike it will mean that the USA and NATO wonŐt be seen as potential
military rivals.
2.
Thus, in
the perspective nuclear weapon remains to be the weapon of restraining but not
the real military instrument as well as the last reason, as a grenade while
being surrounded by enemies: itŐs not clear how many of them will be killed, but
you wonŐt survive for sure.
3.
The
already created nuclear weapon should be placed in the Kremlin on the honorable
place between Tsar Bell which doesnŐt ring, and Tsar-cannon, which doesnŐt
shoot.
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