Critical Issues Forum 2008-2009
Nuclear
Disarmament: Challenges, Opportunities, and Next Steps
Benchmark II
The Author: Boris Samoilenko, Alina Chelysheva
Forms 11B & A
Linguistic Gymnasia № 164
The Advisor: Nelli Porseva
The Teacher of English
Linguistic Gymnasia № 164
Zelenogorsk
Krasnoyarsk
Region
Russia
2009
Introduction 2
Control of Nuclear Weapons 2
1. International Organizations 3
Ż UN – United Nations 3
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly 3
UNSC – United Nations Security Council 4
Ż IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency 4
Ż CD - Conference on Disarmament 5
Ż EURATOM/EAEC (The European Atomic Energy Community) 6
Ż Other Organizations 7
Ż Russian Organizations of Control of Nuclear Weapons 8
2. The Most Important Treaties 9
Ż The NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) 9
Ż PTBT & CTBT (Partial & Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaties) 10
Ż NWFZs (Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Treaties) and
Treaties Which Lead to Creating Nuclear Weapons Free Zones 12
3. Other Treaties 13
4. Conclusion. Structure oа Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. 13
Main Humanitarian Challenge to Nuclear Disarmament 14
1. Position of Nuclear Countries on Nuclear Weapons 14
2. Position of Nuclear-Free Countries on Nuclear Weapons 14
3. Conclusion. The Main Barrier. 15
More Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament 15
1. Global Threats as Challenges 15
Ż Illicit Nuclear Trafficking 15
Ż Nuclear Terrorism 15
Ż Possible Future Conflicts 15
2. Technical and Economical Challenges 16
Ż Large Cost of Nuclear Disarmament 16
Ż Barriers of Verification 16
Ż ItŐs All Business 16
3. Humanitarian Challenges 16
Ż Second Thoughts about Nuclear Weapons and National
Pride 16
Ż Doubts about the Value of Nuclear Disarmament and Arms
Control 17
Ż Nature of Nuclear Disarmament Itself 17
4. Conclusion. Connected Challenges. 17
Sources 19
Our objectives were to:
1. Demonstrate
an understanding of international and national controls of nuclear weapons.
2. Describe
humanitarian aspect of some challenges to nuclear disarmament in the world today.
3. Illustrate
the issues of modernization of the weapons now possessed by nuclear powers, and
the challenges of monitoring and verification.
It should be said the international controls of nuclear
weapons include:
international
organizations,
export
control groups
bilateral,
multilateral international
treaties.
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Image
1. UN logo. Copied from (1 p. 13)
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United Nations is one of the main promoters of the nonproliferation
& disarmament regime. It was established in 1945 for providing peace
worldwide with the help of international cooperation. There are 192 members nowadays
(2). Aim of some of the UN bodies is to
prevent spreading, producing and existence of WMD (3 p. 264). Some organizations, connected with disarmament and
nonproliferation are included into UN as bodies (UNSC, UNGA, DDA, UNDC, etc.).
Some of organizations are just connected with UN, but have their own agenda
(CD, IAEA).
Scheme 1.
UN connected disarmament and nonproliferation bodies and organizations. Made by
B.Samoilenko based on particular data from (1 p.
13), (3 pp. 259, 261, 264-266), (4 pp. 22-33).
Image 2.
Member-states of the UN displayed by time of joining the UN. Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:United_Nations_member_countries_world_map.PNG]
Based on data from (3 p. 265),
(4 pp. 27-28).
All of the members of UN are represented in UNGA. This body
creates agenda for all UN connected bodies. Especially it makes recommendations
for UNSC membership. UNGA is responsible for many resolutions on nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament. It took and initiative role while the NPT and
the CTBT creation.
The Disarmament and
International Security Committee (the First Committee) is subsidiary body
of UNGA. It works with questions of disarmament and international security. It
also makes recommendations for UNGA in the form of draft resolutions.
UNDC – United
Nations Disarmament Commission is another subsidiary body of UNGA. Earlier
it was established as subsidiary organ of UNSC. It was created as deliberative organ.
Since 1990 UNDC improved their functioning basing on the next principles:
á
ŇLimit the working agenda to a maximum of 4 substantive items for
in-depth consideration,
á
Not to maintain any subject in the agenda for more than three
consecutive years,
á
Not to establish more than four subsidiary bodies for the consideration
of substantive issues.Ó(4 p. 28)
Based on data from (3 p. 265),
(4 p. 26).
ItŐs is the main decision-making body of the UN on
international peace and security. UNSC consists of 15 members. Five of them are
the first nuclear powers: Russia, the USA, Great Britain, France and China. Ten
of them are elected by UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) for two-year
terms. This body works permanently. ThatŐs why it is necessary for representatives
of all the members to be constantly in UN HQ in New York.
UNSC took part in the NPT creation in 1968. In 1992 it
defined its aim as preventing form spreading technologies connected with creation
of WMD. In some agreements UNSC also can plays role of judge who can help to
deal questions, complaints connected with breakings of obligations.
UNSC is responsible for Ňformulating plans to regulate weaponsÓ
(4 p. 26). But unfortunately Ňthe Council
is not the centerpiece of the non-proliferation regimes, though its contribution
may help in some circumstancesÓ (5 p. 9).
It also cooperates with other UN bodies and international
organizations such as IAEA.
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Image
3. IAEA Flag. Downloaded from
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_IAEA.svg]
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In 1953 the US President proposed a plan ŇAtoms for PeaceÓ
which promoted peaceful usage of nuclear energy and preventing military
application. In addition one of the main ideas of this plan was to create a
special international atomic organization (3 p.
74). After Joseph Stalin death Soviet Union was ready to discuss a
possibility of IAEA creation with American administration.
On 23 October, 1956 the Statue of IAEA were accepted at
New-York Conference. It came into force on 29 July, 1957. The USA is the
Regulations Depositary (6 pp. 118, 120, 131-132).
According to the Article II of IAEA Statue the main objective
of Agency is achievement of more fast and wide usage of nuclear energy for
peace, health and prosperity maintenance all over the world: ŇThe Agency shall seek to accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not
used in such a way as to further any military purposeÓ (7 p. 13), (8).
According to the Article III.B.4 of IAEA Statute Agency
should notify UNSC about the questions, which are within the competence of the
UNSC (4 p. 26).
Nowadays IAEA works within three main fields: Safety and Security, Science and Technology,
and Safeguards and Verification.
Safeguards, established and applied by IAEA, cover nuclear
activities of non-nuclear weapon states as it the NPT, CTBT and other nuclear
weapon-free-zone treaties require. According to data of 1999, 224 safeguards
were in force in 140 states (3 p. 261).
IAEA Secretariat headquarters are situated at Vienna
International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational liaison and regional
offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto, Canada; and
Tokyo, Japan. Also there are laboratories and research centers supported or
organized by IAEA in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Monaco; and Trieste,
Italy. (9).
IAEA is a special agency of the UN. But it isnŐt directly
obeyed the UN bodies It only makes reports to UNGA and UNSC. IAEA has three
main policy making bodies: the Board of Governors, the General Conference (GC)
and the Secretariat. The Board of
Governors is consists of 35 members: 22 elected by the GC and 13 designated by
the Board of Governors itself. It examines program, reports and budget of IAEA
and assembles 5 times per year. Also it can make recommendations to the GC. The
GC consists of all the member states of IAEA. The GCŐs main functions are to
accept program, reports and budget of IAEA and to discuss main directions of
IAEA work and questions offered by the Board of Governors. Also it has a right
to accept director general, appointed by the Board of Governors. IAEA
Secretariat has more than 2000 of employees and it implements programs approved
by directive bodies of IAEA (9), (10), (11).
Structure of it can be seen below.
Scheme 2.
Brief Structure of IAEA Secretariat. Made by B.Samoilenko based on data from (12).
Many of the UN members are parties of IAEA. There are 145 member
states in IAEA nowadays (13).
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Image 4. Member states of IAEA.
Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:IAEA_members.svg]
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██ Member ██ Withdrawn
membership (Cambodia and North Korea) ██ Non member ██ Ineligible
(Taiwan and Western Sahara)
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Based on data from (3 pp.
259-260), (4 pp. 31-32).
CD was established in 1979 by UNGA
(after the first Special Session on Disarmament of UNGA in 1978) as
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum (14).
The number of members increased from 38 to 66 since the moment of establishing.
CD makes reports to the UNGA, but has its own agenda. CD is independent from UN,
but its secretary is assigned by UN Secretary General.
Image 5.
Member states of CD. Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CDMembers.png]
This
institution was changing during last years and was known under different names:
á
1960 – Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
á
March, 1962 – Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC);
á
1969 – Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament (CCD) – 30 members;
á
1978 –
Conference on Disarmament (CD) – 38 members
Members of CD tend to join into groups:
á
The Western Group;
á
The Non-Aligned Movement (G21);
á
The Group of Eastern European States and Others
á
The P5 (5 permanent members of UNSC) or
á
The P4 (5 without China) and the Group of One
(China);
Members of CD negotiated both the NPT and the CTBT. Usually
during the session (which holds 3 times per year) CD adopts a strict list of
questions which should be discussed from the following areas:
á
ŇNuclear
weapons in all aspects
á
Chemical
Weapons
á
Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction
á
Conventional
Weapons
á
Reduction
of Military Budgets
á
Reduction
of Armed forces
á
Disarmament
and Development
á
Disarmament
and International Security
á
Collateral
measures, confidence building measures, Disarmament verification measures
á
Comprehensive
programme of disarmamentÓ. (4 p. 32)
The CD always makes annual reports, documents, and records
of the conference for publishing. The CD is situated in Geneva, Switzerland.
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Image 6. Europe flag. Downloaded
from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Europe.svg]
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EAEC is an international organization of the European Union
(EU). It was established on 25 March 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. According to
this treaty at the tame European Economic Community (EEC) was also established.
Treaty of Rome came into force on 1 January 1958 (6 p. 146), (15).
The main aim of EURATOM is to Ňcoordinate the Member States' research programmes for the peaceful use
of nuclear energyÓ (16).
While Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was developing
(1966-1968) states-members of EURATOM, supported by the USA, were insisting on
in these states EAEC (not IAEA) safeguards to be applied. But the USSR and many
other countries didnŐt agree with it. Finally, IAEA safeguards were applied and
accepted worldwide (6 p. 147).
EURATOM covers all the questions connected with civilian
nuclear activities, provides a market in nuclear materials, and guarantees a
supply of nuclear fuels (3 p. 260).
Firstly EAEC inspectors were doing their job under the IAEA
inspectorsŐ oversight. But this was expensive and useless. ThatŐs why in 1992
new partner approach was applied. Now EAEC is doing inspections by itself on
territories of EURATOM states-members.
There were 6 initial member states in EURATOM. But there are
27 EU members nowadays.
Image 7.
Member states of EURATOM. Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:European_Union_map.svg]
There are far more international organizations, which are
parties of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The list below
contains both regional and international organizations, connected with
important treaties and export controls.
Table 1. Other International Organizations. Based on
particular data from (3 pp. 257-259, 263,
266-267).
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Image 8. OPANAL Logo
[http://opanal.org/assets/images/BolaEN.gif]
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Agency
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(OPANAL)
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Established: February, 1967
HQ: Mexico City, Mexico
Description: Created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits usage,
production of nuclear weapons in the region and sections of the Pacific and
Atlantic Ocean. Agency seeks to ensure that the parties follow treaty obligations
and IAEA safeguards.
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Image 9. CTBTO Logo
[http://www.ecmwf.int/assets/images/orgs/ctbto_logo.gif]
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
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HQ: Vienna, Austria
Description: Created by the CTBT, this makes illegal all the nuclear explosions
for both military and civilian purposes. The aim of CTBTO is to ensure that
all the states are following this treaty. There were 320 monitoring stations
created for realizing this aim.
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Image 10. NEA Logo. Downloaded from
[http://accapp05.infm.it/Img/logo_nea.jpg]
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Nuclear Energy Agency
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Established: 1 February 1958 as ENEA (European Nuclear
Energy Agency)
Description: NEA defines itsŐ mission as Ňto assist its Member countries in
maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the
scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally
friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposesÓ (17).
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Image 11. NSG Logo [http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/]
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Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG)
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First met: November, 1975
HQ: Vienna, Austria
Description: NSG tries to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling nuclear
exports and making sure that exports are made under safeguards, protection
and nonproliferation conditions. Also NGS aim covers the export of
nuclear-related items and technologies.
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Zangger
Committee (ZAC)
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First met: 1971
HQ: not permanent (Vienna, Austria)
Description: ZACŐs is also known as Nuclear Exporters Committee. It is created to
ensure nuclear material and equipment under safeguards after export to a
non-nuclear state.
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Also it is worth paying attention to the fact that there are many
local nongovernmental nonproliferation organizations (NGOs) in different
countries worldwide. Even its number is the fact of nonproliferation regimeŐs
high development level. A combined list of them includes 127 NGOs (3 pp. 267-280) and (18). There are just few of them:
á
Arms Control Association
á
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
á
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute
á
of International Studies
á
Ecodefense! Russian Environmental Group
á
Hague Appeal for Peace
á
International Peace Bureau
á
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
á
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
á
Nuclear Control Institute
á
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International
Safeguards System
á
Peace Depot
Russian Federation is party of many international
organizations, which are connected with nuclear non-proliferation (such as
IAEA, UN, CD, etc.) and treaties (such as NPT, CTBT, etc.).
National nuclear non-proliferation regime in Russia can be
connected with state corporation ŇRosAtomÓ (before 2008 it was known as
ŇFederal Atomic Energy AgencyÓ or ŇMinAtomÓ), Federal Service of Ecological,
Technical and Atomic Supervision ŇRosTechNadzorÓ.
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Image 12. RosAtom Logo. Downloaded from [http://www.annews.ru/
upload/iblock/5b5/rosatom_fn.jpg]
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RosAtom – is
the main state corporation which was created for nuclear development of Russia (19). It has 22 departments, which covers many
of the nuclear fields in the country. There some of them (20):
á
Department of International Cooperation (responsible
for following international treaties, agreements and conventions in the field
of atomic energy);
á
Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (provides
nuclear and radiation safety in Russia);
á
Department of General Inspection (responsible
for checking all nuclear objects and energy companies).
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Image 13. RosTechNadzor Logo. Downloaded from (21)
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RosTechNadzor – federal service which controls
negative technogenic effect on environment and questions, connected with
ecological, industrial and nuclear safety. Of course, it is rather brief
interpretation of RosTechNadzor activitites. The full list of it can be seen in
Russian there: (22). It was created in
2004, when Federal Service of Nuclear Supervision and Federal Service of
Technological Service were combined into one organization (21).
There is a state nuclear and radioactive safety service as
a part of this organization which is responsible for safe usage and utilization
of nuclear and radioactive materials.
It is worth to know, that RosTechNadzor has obeyed organizations,
which also works in field of peaceful usage of nuclear technologies. There:
á
Federal State Unitary Enterprise VO ŇSafetyÓ
á
Federal State Agency ŇScientific-Technological
Center of Nuclear and Radioactive SafetyÓ
There is a special scheme of export control in Russia. The
national system of export control in Russia in nuclear field includes (6 p. 360):
á
Legislation and regulation;
á
Licensing export of products and technologies,
included into control lists;
á
Interagency cooperation;
á
Customs regulation;
á
Preventing violations and punishment for it.
The simplified process of making export decisions is as follows (6 p. 370):
1. Exporter
makes an application for getting license.
2. Application
goes to the Ministry of Economical Development of Russia for materialsŐ
preliminary analysis.
3. If
step 2 succeeded application goes to the stage of interagency processing. If
subject of export is connected with nuclear technologies, many ministries and
national organizations including RosAtom and RosTechNadzor take part in this
stage.
4. If
step 3 succeeded, a special decision about accepting the possibility of export
is made.
1.
2.
The NPT is the most
important treaty in the nonproliferation regime history. The final text of it
was approved by UNGA on 12th of June 1968. In July in it was signed
by 63 states. It became effective on 5th of March 1970. It became
termless on 11th of May 1995 (6 p.
486). According to NPT all the nuclear powers were engaged to complete
nuclear disarmament. The brief history and the map of states-parties you can
see in Benchmark I.
Three main pillars of NPT include (23):
á
Nonproliferation;
á
Disarmament;
á
Peaceful usage of nuclear energy.
They are all based on 11 articles, which are in the NPT(7 pp. 23-29), (24
pp. 273-275):
á
Articles
I & II make any direct or non-direct efforts or help in acquiring
nuclear weapons/explosive devices or its control in any non-nuclear state illegal.
á
Article
III makes states-parties: accept IAEA safeguardsŐ system; not provide fissionable/source
materials, technologies, equipment with the help of which nuclear weapons can
be created; realize all these safeguards in a way not to prevent states-parties
from developing and cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities.
á
Article
IV makes states-parties exchange equipment, materials and technologies to
provide the most effective peaceful usage of atomic energy.
á
Article V
makes all potential benefits from all peaceful nuclear explosions available
for non-nuclear states-parties.
á
Article
VI makes states-parties Ňpursue negotiations in good faithÓ on preventing
nuclear arms race at an early date and providing complete worldwide
disarmament.
á
Article
VII makes clear that this Treaty doesnŐt affect the right of any group of
states to conclude regional treaties in order to assume absence of nuclear
weapons in their territories.
á
Article
VIII gives states-parties a right to offer, accept, and discuss amendments
to this Treaty and describes mechanisms of all of these processes. Also it
fixes 5-year interval between conferences which are in order to review the
operation of the Treaty and assure all states-parties still follow these
regulations.
á
Article
IX makes this Treaty open for signatory and ratification to all the states
all over the world and sets rules of these processes.
á
Article X
allows states-parties to withdraw from the NPT and sets 25-year interval
for organizing conference in order to decide if it is necessary to prolong the
treaty or not.
á
Article
XI makes the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of the
Treaty legal and provides them to be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments.
PTBT can be
unofficially called a predecessor of CTBT. It was open for signing on 5 August,
1963 and came into force on 10 October, 1963 (6
p. 485). It bans all the nuclear tests in atmosphere, under water and in
space, but not underground ones, except underground explosions, that lead to
"radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the
State " (25).
PTBT is also known as LTBT – Limited Test Ban
Treaty.
This treaty is termless and there are 123 states-parties,
who acceded to the treaty nowadays. There are 10 states, which signed, but not
ratified it (26).
Image 14. Participation in the Partial
Test Ban Treaty as of July 2008. Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PTBT_Participation.svg]
██ Signed and
ratified ██ Acceded
or succeeded ██ Only
signed
CTBT is a more
complex treaty than PTBT is. It was negotiated by Conference on Disarmament
since January 1994 until August 1996. It was open for signing on 24 September,
1996 by UNGA. It came into force on 19 November 1996 (6 p. 485), (27). CTBT is a
continuation of non-proliferation policy, which began developing with PTBT and
NPT.
CTBT bans all the nuclear tests and explosions worldwide.
The treaty's verification regime includes (27):
á
international monitoring;
á
consultation and clarification;
á
on-site inspections (OSI);
á
confidence building measures (CBMs).
CTBT functioning is provided by CTBTO. Monitoring
technologies of CTBTO are very high-developed. They include (28):
á
Seismic
monitoring;
á
Hydro
acoustic monitoring;
á
Infrasound
monitoring;
á
Radionuclide
monitoring.
Monitoring system includes 337 facilities,
including stations, laboratories, etc.
Image 15.
Map of CTBT International Monitoring System. Screenshot from [http://www.ctbto.org/map/#ims]
There are 180 CTBT member states in the world (29).
Image 16. CTBT participation.
Downloaded from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CTBT_Participation.svg]
██ Annex 2, signed
and ratified ██ Annex
2, only signed ██ Annex
2, non-signatory
██ Not Annex 2, signed and ratified ██ Not
Annex 2, only signed ██ Not
Annex 2, non-signatory
CTBT has become Ňa necessary condition for any further really
serious progress towards eliminating the nuclear threatÓ (30 p. 4).
Based on (24 p. 301), (31),
(32).
NWFZs treaties is a group of regional treaties which ban acquisition,
stockpiling, deployment, and testing nuclear weapons in the given area. This
group of treaties also can fulfilled with treaties, which are not officially at
NWFZs Treaties group, but also lead to freeing the world from nuclear weapons.
The role of these treaties began growing after the end of the Cold War. This
fact was reflected on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Regional
meaning of each of NWFZs treaties help to provide more accurate non-proliferation
regime.
Image 17.
NWFZs Treaties. Made by B.Samoilenko, based on data from (31).
Current treaties cover all the Australia, Latin America,
Antarctica, Central and Southeast Asia and some particular states. Seabed Arms Control
Treaty and Outer Space Treaty ban any military nuclear activities on the ocean
floor and in the space.
Image 18. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
Map. Downloaded from
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nuclear_weapon_free_zones_worldwide_may2007.png]
Five
"nuclear weapons states" from the NPT Other known nuclear
powers States
in security alliance with nuclear weapons states (under nuclear umbrella) States that
are members of an NWFZ which is in force States
that have ratified an NWFZ treaty which is not yet in force States
that have signed but not ratified an NWFZ treaty which is not yet in force States
suspected of nuclear weapons development
This part of works is based on (33).
SALT I & SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I & II – 1972&1979)
– SALT II replaced SALT I and it limited Soviet and US to an equal number
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers, placed limits on Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).
ABM (Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty - 1972) - the USA and USSR could deploy ABM interceptors at
two sites, which are with up to 100 ground-based launchers for ABM interceptor
missiles. In Protocol of 1974, the USA and USSR agreed only to deploy ABM
system to one site.
INF (Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty – 1987) – banned all short- and
long-range nuclear weapons systems.
START I (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty I – signed in 1991, ratified in 1994) –
limited long-range nuclear forces in the USA and states of the former USSR to
6000 warheads on 1600 ballistic missiles and bombers.
START II (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty II – signed in 1993, never came into force)
– attempted to commit both the USA and Russia to deploy not more than
3000-3500 warheads by December, 2007; prohibited deploying MIRVs on ICBMs.
SORT/Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty – signed in 2002, came into
force in 2003) – Russia and the USA came to an agreement to reduce
their "strategic nuclear warheads" (undefined term from the treaty)
to 1700-2200 by 2012.
Nuclear non-proliferation regime consists of many connected
parts:
á
Treaties and agreements:
o
International
o
Regional
á
Organizations:
o
International
o
Regional
o
National
o
Non-governmental
o
Export control groups
Many organizations were created to provide following nonproliferation-connected
treaties.
Nowadays not
every country wants to have nuclear weapon. However, that country, which has
it, thinks that disarmament is unnecessary, because people feel themselves out
of danger. It is like the warranty that other countries wonŐt attack this
country. Here the dispute between nuclear-free countries and countries with nuclear
weapons appear. It leads to protest: why do that countries have nuclear weapon,
but we have not? Besides, we shouldnŐt forget that increasing number of
countries with nuclear weapon begins because of the influence of one country,
which made nuclear weapons. It is like a chain. For instance, one state creates
nuclear weapon; another state finds it out and creates weapon, too, not to be
behind. Then, some other countries begin to create nuclear weapons, because
they are afraid of being attacked by those countries which have already created
it. After that, another nuclear-free country wants to make its own nuclear program;
however, the first country persists on refusal of this program. So, it is
perceived as aggressive pressure and the program begins just to speed up in
purpose of protection.
Position of nuclear countries can be shown judging by the
positions of such big and powerful countries as Russia and the USA:
á
not to permit the transference of nuclear weapon
or a control on it to nuclear-free countries;
á
not to help to the nuclear-free governments in
development or acquisition of nuclear weapon;
á
to aspire to the nuclear disarmament up to full
nuclear weapons destruction.
However, these countries donŐt make haste with disarmament,
because they think if they have nuclear weapons it will prevent all world wars,
as there is no winner in the nuclear war (34 p.
7). This is one of the reasons nuclear countries donŐt hurry up with
disarmament. Though, there is an inside contradiction in such a position. On
the one hand, such countries want to use nuclear materials only in peaceful
purposes. On the other hand, these governments are worried about their nation
safety. If they donŐt have nuclear weapon it will reduce their safety and political
pressure on the nuclear-free countries (34 p.
137). For instance, two nuclear-free countries have come into armed
conflict, which can lead to the large-scale war. So, nuclear country can
influence on them and threaten to use nuclear weapon on them if they donŐt stop
their conflict.
Speaking about it we can remember the recent situation in North
Korea. This government has never had nuclear weapons, but it aspired and
aspires to develop and have it. They say: ŇWe need nuclear weapon, because we
are worried about our national safety. We are afraid of the attack from South
Korea or China. ThatŐs why we need nuclear weapons to use it and political
pressure in the case of dangerÓ. On the one hand, nuclear-free countries come
out in a mass disarmament. ŇIf we donŐt have it why others should have it?Ó On
the other hand, nuclear-free countries want nuclear materials to be used only
in peaceful purposes as they want to have political pressure as well as nuclear
countries. There is an interesting situation in Iran. Judging by the news from
2007, leadership of Iran has declared that they have nuclear materials to
develop and use it in peaceful purposes (35).
However, the USA has doubts about it and is afraid, that Iran will make nuclear
weapon. In this connection the president of the USA G.Bush has declared about
the necessity of tightening regime of sanctions against Iran and that he will
discuss it with Russian president Vladimir Putin and China president Chu
Zsintao. ŇThese leaders should understand that Iran with nuclear weapons would
be incredibly dangerous for the world and itŐs in their interests to work
together on the on continuation of the insulation of
this regimeÓ – George Bush said. In spite of this, Iran ignores such
positions and doesnŐt want to abandon to the nuclear program.
The differences in positions of nuclear and nuclear-free countries
and contradictions inside these positions make the process of disarmament very
slow and difficult. On the one hand all of countries want to conduct mass
nuclear disarmament, but on the other hand all of them want to have nuclear
weapon and the control on it to provide their own national safety. This is the
main challenge of nuclear disarmament today.
Controllable nuclear disarmament is a multilateral process. It
requires participation of all the states. But, unfortunately, agreement between
them is an objective, which is very hard to achieve. There is a complex of
challenges, which prevents nuclear disarmament. They include humanitarian,
political, technological and financial aspects.
It is illegal
trafficking nuclear materials, highly enriched uranium especially (>20%). This
challenge was officially recognized as a global threat, which is needed to
fight with. Since 1993 to 2003 there were 175 registered cases of illicit
nuclear trafficking, including 18 with HEU and Pu. Materials can be used for the following aims:
á
Commercial. Sell
materials for getting profit.
á
Terrorism. Using
materials for terrorism and blackmail.
á
Developing national
nuclear program without NPT verifying.
Potential clients for buying materials can be:
á
Terrorists;
á
Threshold states;
á
Transnational organized criminal communities;
á
Separatist movements on ethnic basis;
á
Extremist religious movements. (6 pp. 380-386)
Nuclear terrorism can be classified as one of the results
of the previous threat, but it is the most dangerous one. Terrorism itself is
politically motivated violence, the aim of which is to influence the state,
society or its opinion. Nuclear terrorism includes following acts:
á
Using or threat of using of nuclear materials,
fuel, radioactive waste or other dangerous explosive materials.
á
Using or threat of using of any nuclear weapons
or devices or radiation dispersive devices.
á
Illegal getting or theft of nuclear devices, its
components or materials.
á
Actions with purposes of illegal getting or
theft of nuclear devices, its components and materials (6 pp. 389-391).
Nuclear terrorism is a less predictable danger, because terrorists
can follow their purposes even with self-sacrifice. Also terrorist communities
are not monitored or verified by any international organizations, their
activity is invisible.
Possible future conflicts as a challenge are of two-side
nature:
á
Fear of potential war conflicts => not being
too initiative with disarmament
á
Real threat for disarmed state in war conflict
Historical facts show, that being feared by potential
conflicts, governments tend to increase their military forces. For example, the
US created a new generation of very-small-yield nuclear weapons dubbed mini-nukes after 9/11 events (36 p. 356). Another well-known example is arms race during the Cold War.
It is well-know that nuclear disarmament is a rather expensive
process (6 p. 33). That slows disarmament
tempos. Especially, itŐs very important to decrease enrichment of Uranium, to
make nuclear materials safe. Again it makes governments and organizations spend
more money on nuclear reprocessing. It is possible that nuclear materials can
became an object of illicit nuclear trafficking. In the situation of economical
crisis a necessity for nuclear bombs eliminating can become a problem and lead
disarmament to a full stop for a long time. There is also a danger that
government in this situation can begin selling their nuclear material to other
countries or non-state actors.
ŇThe problem is simple:
Countries suspect that others will cheatÓ (36
p. 358). The atmosphere of mutual distrust between states affects
nuclear disarmament. This challenge can be traced to both humanitarian and
political groups. Even when CTBT was created some of the leaders characterized
it as ineffective and didnŐt really believe that it would stop other nations
from nuclear testing.
Verification system of CTBTO covers all the Earth
nowadays. This includes two main components:
á
On-site inspections (OSI);
á
National technical means (NTM).
Both require a lot of labor and financial resources. Even
NTM include such verification means as: satellites, seismic monitoring
stations, etc. (See CTBT section).
But the problem of weapons modernization leads to
warheadsŐ size decreasing. For example, if mini-nukes are developed it can make
nuclear weapons nearly invisible and very easily hidden. That, of course, would
make OSI and NTM less effective.
So, absolute verification is impossible, but necessary. And
thatŐs the point. (36 p. 358)
Military requests can bring really great profit worldwide.
Those companies and governments who sell weapons and military technologies get
money for that, because their goods always have a customer. Cities, which are
situated near military industries benefit from jobs, provided by activities of
these bases.
There is a special term iron triangle which means military-industrial-congressional complex
consisted of participants of this symbiotic business:
á
Interest groups;
á
Bureaucracies;
á
Legislators. (36
pp. 359-360)
Governments have their own different thoughts about nuclear
weapons. It is strongly connected with motivations of states on acquiring
nuclear weapons (see Benchmark 1). Anyway,
understanding of nuclear weapons in each nuclear and non-nuclear state is
different. This is, of course, the main humanitarian barrier to nuclear
disarmament and this was covered in Benchmark
2, Main Humanitarian Challenge to Nuclear Disarmament.
Unfortunately, some of the states (the USSR, 1949; India and
Pakistan, 1998, etc.) believe that nuclear weapons can become a symbol of
strength and prestige. Even if they donŐt want to use it, they get a real
potential strength and more respect on the political stage. Some governments
think that itŐs really worth spending resources on this privilege (North Korea,
2006). (36 p. 359)
This barrier is strongly connected with the previous one
and, speaking generally, they can be combined into one.
The meaning of it is as follows: those governments who have
doubts about value of nuclear disarmament donŐt and canŐt see benefits from it.
They think that arms decreasing can create insecurity and lead to war. Their
theory is explained by realistic motivations: the world is dangerous and states
should be well-protected.
Scheme 3.
Theory of Arms Control Enemies about Relationship between Arms, Tension, and
War. Remade by Boris Samoilenko based on (36 p.
357).
There is another theory – theory of liberals, who
believe that Ňthe blade itself incites to violenceÓ.
Scheme 4.
Theory of Liberals about Relationship between Arms, Tension, and War. Remade by
Boris Samoilenko based on (36 p. 357).
But the theory, which appeared as a result of modern empirical
research, shows a different situation. According to it, the level of arms in
states mostly depends on its local and international factors and far less on
arms race.
Scheme 5.
Empirical Research Result Theory about Relationship between Arms, Tension, and
War. Remade by Boris Samoilenko based on (36 p.
357).
But, anyway, arms control skeptics tend to think that more
arms lead to more strength. Logically, more nuclear weapons can lead to more
security (36 p. 357).
The ideal aim of it is full absence of nuclear weapons everywhere. This
aim is rather difficult to realize. Nuclear disarmament is a multilateral
process, which requires simultaneous realization of statements of this policy
by all countries (not only states-parties!). States with nuclear weapons are
not ready to abandon their power while another nuclear state still has nuclear
weapons. The solution is simultaneous one-moment disarmament. But it is
physically impossible at this period of time. Even if it were, it is impossible
to control and verify it in an independent way. ThatŐs what critics of arms
control say (3 p. 50). Forces misbalance
(and fear of this misbalance) and mutual distrust among states make disarmament
and non-proliferation processes less effective and more complicated.
Nuclear disarmament has a complex of challenges, which are connected
and dependent on each other. ItŐs kind of a network. Changes in these
challenges can define further nuclear nonproliferation policy developing. This
system isnŐt static. It always leads to a decreasing of arms worldwide or to a
nuclear technologies modernization. The root of these challenges is mostly
hidden in the humanitarian problems and international relations, which are main
definers of politics worldwide.
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