CRITICAL ISSUES FORUM 2008-2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Disarmament: Control of Nuclear Weapons and Current Challenges

 

BENCHMARK II

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                         

                                                    Students:: Antonina Shaymaer,

                                                            Nikita Popov,

Aleksey Yabbarov,

Irina Ludvikovskaya     

Grade 10
The School for Cosmonautics

                                                       English teacher: Irina Artemova

        

The School for Cosmonautics

 

 

 

 

 

 

Zheleznogorsk

 Krasnoyarsk Region

 Russia

2009

Table of Contents

 

Objective I                                                                                            Page

Current Treaties                                                                                                       3                                                                   

Importance of the Treaties                                                                                       6

Bilateral Disarmament Treaties between the USA and Russia                              7

Countries Violated Non-Proliferation

& Disarmament Treaties and Agreements                                                             7

Possible Future Treaties                                                                                           8

National and International Сontrols of Nuclear Weapons                                   9

Nuclear Weapons Control, Organizations                                                            10

 

Objective II

Nuclear Disarmament, Opinions, Challenges                                                        14

 

Objective III

Challenges in Nuclear Disarmament in the World Today                                   16

Modernization of the Nuclear Weapon Arsenal                                                    16

Nuclear Weapons Protection, Control, Accountability                                        18

Safety & Security of Nuclear Weapons in Russia                                                 22

Challenges of Monitoring and Verification                                                           25

Bibliography                                                                                                             25

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OBJECTIVE I

                In the first part of the second benchmark I tried to investigate current and possible future treaties, measures to reduce nuclear weapons, organizations both governmental and non-governmental which deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Besides I tried to understand national and international laws regulating nuclear weapons.  

 Positions held by nations on nonproliferation and disarmament are very complicated. Cooperation and understanding between nations on this topic are two important things to succeed. Lack of knowledge and understanding leads to disagreements and conflicts. There is no morality in international relations and there is  not any difference between moral norms for states. So the only way to solve international problems is treaties. Treaties have been written to address issues surrounding the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. These include FMCT, NPT, START, CTBT and others that create nuclear weapon free zones or no first use policies.

Treaties can be hard to enforce. Accountability and verification of compliance to treaty agreements presents a difficult and awesome task for the nations of the world. Several major international organizations deal with nuclear issues including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and some other activist organizations.

Current Treaties

NPT

There are different ways to control nuclear weapons. They are treaties, national and international laws, organizations. One of the treaties is the NPT. It was offered by Ireland in 1958 and in 1961-1968 was prepared by the UNO. The Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force. It became an international law on March 5 in 1970 when 43 governments ratified the text. Nearly every government in the world (187 states) had ratified the treaty by 2000. Israel, India and Pakistan refused from the NPT and China left it..  The treaty was perpetually prolonged in 1995. 3 main goals of the NPT are: non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy support. The tasks of the NPT are: 1) to prevent existence of Ònuclear competitorsÓ,2) non-nuclear states must stay non-nuclear. Here are the ways the NPT promotes nuclear disarmament:

The Ways the NPT Promotes Nuclear Disarmament.

á      Signing the CTBT

á      Stopping Testing

A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

á       Negotiation

á       The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

á      Abolishing Nukes

á      Stop Producing Plutonium

á      Upholding Existing Treaties

á      Implementing Existing Treaties

á      Excess fissile materials under IAEA control

á      To arrange all nuclear-weapon no longer required for military purposes for peaceful purposes.

á      General and Complete Disarmament

á      Verifying [1]

 

            In 2000 there was a conference to consider the NPT actions and there were 13 steps to promote disarmament and nuclear elimination (some of the steps I have mentioned). Israel was called to join the NPT and to become a nuclear weapon free state. It was decided not to give the status of a nuclear weapon state to India and Pakistan despite of nuclear tests. The problems with IAEA verification  of North Korea and Iraq (how they fulfil the NPT ) were confessed.

In my opinion, to promote nuclear weapon disarmament the following conditions are necessary:

The basic parts of the NPT regime are as following:

 

                                 NWFZÕs Treaties

 a) Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America)

Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
Entered into force: October 23, 2002
States-parties: 33 total; Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
 Picture:  Treaty of Tlatelolco <www.bits.de>

Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: Protocol II (negative security assurances) ratified by China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.[2]      

b) South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Treaty of Rarotonga (Southern part of The Pacific Ocean)

Opened for signature: August 6, 1985
Entered into force: December 11, 1986
States-parties: 13 total; Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Picture: <www.opanal.org> [3]  

 

 

 

 

c) The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)

Opened for signature: December 15, 1995
Entered into force: March 27, 1997
State-parties: 10 total; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: None

Picture: Treaty of Bangkok www.nti.org

d) The Treaty of Pelindaba (African Nuclear-weapon-Free Zone Treaty)

Opened for signature: April 11, 1996                                                                                                        

The treaty has not entered into force, but it will once 28 signatories have completed ratification. Eighteen of the 50  signatories have completed ratification.

States-parties: 0; Signatories that have ratified the treaty are Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: Protocol I (negative security assurances) ratified by China, France, and the United Kingdom. Protocol II (ban on nuclear testing in the nuclear-weapon-free zone) ratified by China, France, and the United Kingdom. Protocol III (territories) ratified by France, Spain didnÕt sign Protocol III.  [4]

Picture: Pelindaba Treaty www.cns.miis.edu

 

Verification

Each state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which verifies that state-parties are not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly.[5]

 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

CTBT opened for signature in September 24, 1996 at the UN General Assembly

This International Treaty prohibits all nuclear explosions. Banning nuclear explosions places direct constraints on other states' ability to acquire and improve nuclear weapons. The treatyÕs primary role is to curb the development and creation of new nuclear weapons.

This Treaty places on nuclear weapon development

 

Picture: www.federalspace.ru/.../ ChildPicts/DSC01550.jpg Ò Éinvolving the vertical progression from first-generation fission designs and more advanced fission weapons; to second-generation thermonuclear designs with increasingly

sophisticated yield-to-weight ratios; to exotic "third-generation" technologies, such as nuclear explosion-pumped x-ray lasers and enhanced radiation weapons.

A ban on nuclear explosions would also place technical constraints on countries that already have nuclear weapon capabilitiesÉÓ [6]  

 

ÒÉ The Treaty establishes the CTBT organization (CTBTO) to verify compliance with the Treaty through a global monitoring system once it enters into force.

Entry into force is contingent on the ratification of 44 states with nuclear reactors on their territories. As of August 2001, there were 89 parties to ratify the Treaty (including 31 and 44 states enumerated in the Article XIV), and 76 states signed the Treaty onlyÉÓ [7]

 

 

a) Verification and Monitoring

The CTBT calls for a verification regime, which consists of the International Monitoring System (IMS), International Data Center (IDC), and On-site Inspection (OSI), and will bring this verification regime into force.          

Picture CTBT - The International Monitoring www.seismo.ethz.ch



b) CTBT Challenges

á      Requires 44 states to ratify                                               

á      Significant nuclear capable states, including India, North Korea, and Pakistan havenÕt signed

á      US walked away-questions continued value

á      Possible US testing (budget allows for shorter term notice)

á      Significant nuclear capable states still outside

á      Expensive verification [8]

Political & Technical Resources help to strengthen monitoring and verification

á      Additional steps to increase transparency regarding the nature and purpose of activities at   known nuclear test sites                      

á      Sending observers to each otherÕs test site.                                             

á       On-site inspections.

á      Partnership between government state officials and other experts.

á      Not proliferation treaties.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

á      Seismic stations.                                                             

á      Neutron detectors inside tunnels.

Importance of the Treaties

Bilateral Disarmament Treaties between the USA and Russia

The largest nuclear powers today are the US and Russia. Since the 1970s these states have entered into some significant disarmament treaties

Year

Treaty

Objectives

1970s

SALT I and II

to reduce their arsenals and reduce the threat

1972

ABM

to establish no more than one ABM site on their territory

1987

INF

to eliminate the US and Russia's land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles

1991

START I

to limit the number of heavy bombers

 

ICBMs, and SLBMs

to limit launchers and warheads

1995

START II

to limit strategic arsenals to 3000-3500 warheads on delivery systems, limit the number of warheads deployable on submarine-launched ballistic missiles to 1,700-1,750 (has not entered into force)

2003

The Moscow Treaty (SORT)

to limits the nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each

[10]

There is an opinion among people that the laws and rules exist to break them, so there are some states which have a strong opinion that the treaties exist to violate them. This opinion is confirmed by the following facts:

Countries Violated Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Treaties and Agreements

North Korea was developing an enriched uranium weapons program, which led to North Korea leaving the NPT, had overstated or misread the intelligence.[11]

      In November 2003 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet with its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program.  After about two years of EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran temporarily suspending its enrichment program, the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran resumed its enrichment program after being referred to the Security Council. The United States concluded on this basis that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards obligations, and further argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment program was for weapons purposes and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation obligations.[12]

 Libya in October 2003 was caught in violation of it when the United States intercepted the illegal transport of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia as part of A. Q. Khan's proliferation ring. Libya then admitted to possessing an illegal nuclear weapons program in violation of the treaty and simultaneously announced its intention to end it and dismantle all existing weapons of mass destruction to be verified by unconditional inspections.[12]

Possible Future Treaties

FMCT

                An FMCT would help prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation, making it harder for new states to acquire nuclear weapons and harder for states already possessing nuclear weapons to develop new weapons if production of the material for them is prohibited. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has not yet been negotiated, but is widely discussed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

FMCT is aimed to

          Most of the non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to comprehensive safeguard agreements associated with the NPT will already satisfy the requirements of an eventual FMCT. These states have undertaken not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify this. The states that will be most affected by such a treaty are the nuclear weapons states: the United States, Russian Federation, China, France, and the United Kingdom, and the nuclear weapons possessing states that are not parties to the NPT: India, Pakistan, and Israel. Other states that also will be affected by such a treaty are the states that produce the greatest amount of fissile material for non-military purposes, like Canada, Australia, and Japan.[14]

 

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

  Since 2003, the Control Arms Campaign has been calling for a strong and effective Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), aimed

o   to stop weapons being used to fuel conflict, poverty and human rights abuses.

o   to draw together and consolidate statesÕ current obligations under international law.

o    to reduce the human cost associated with the proliferation of conventional arms

o    to prevent unscrupulous arms suppliers finding the weakest point in the supply chain

o     to ensure that all arms exporters and importers are abiding by the same high standards regarding the use, management and transfer of arms, leading to a more secure world

 

The idea of a global ATT was inspired by Nobel Peace Laureates and developed by lawyers, human rights organisations, and humanitarian NGOs. It now enjoys the support of a growing number of governments (153 States), as well as more than 800 civil society organisations worldwide.[15]

Nuclear Weapons Convention

A Nuclear Weapons Convention would provide for the elimination of nuclear weapons in much the same way comparable treaties have banned land mines and chemical and biological weapons, prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat, or use of nuclear weapons[16]

The purposes:

á      demonstrating the feasibility of a framework approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons

á      encouraging governments to enter into nuclear disarmament negotiations

á      education and engagement of the public in the progress towards nuclear disarmament[17]

National and International Сontrols of Nuclear Weapons

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency was set up in 1957 to monitor the development of nuclear technology. The agency is based in Vienna and has representatives around the world.

The International Atomic Energy Agency began an effort in 1993 to better constrain NPT member-states' ability to illicitly pursue nuclear weapons after secret nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea exposed weaknesses in existing agency safeguards. That effort eventually produced a voluntary Additional Protocol, designed to strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty only use nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes.

Picture Source: The International Atomic Energy Agency www.theodoresworld.net/ pics/0506/IAEA_image.jpg

       IAEA has been entrusted with the specific role as the international safeguards inspectorate and is generally recognized as the multilateral channel for the transfer of technology for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

IAEA Duties & Responsibilities

á      validating that NPT states-parties are complying with the treaty, which bars all states except China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States from acquiring nuclear weapons. [18]

 e.g. routine inspections (according to a defined schedule or unannounced), ad hoc- inspections (to verify a StateÕs initial report of nuclear material or reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in international transfers), 

 special inspections.

e.g.  The IAEA helps countries to upgrade nuclear safety and security, and to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

 The IAEA is the world's focal point to mobilize peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for critical needs in developing countries.

The IAEA helps countries assess and plan their energy needs, including nuclear generation of electricity, supports research and development on critical problems facing developing countries.

[19] [20]

 

Nuclear Weapons Control, Organizations

Russia

Governmental Organization

ROSATOM

           Rosatom State Nuclear Power Corporation (abbreviated GK Rosatom) was founded according to the Order of the President of Russia in December of 2007 and is intended to replace Federal Nuclear Power Agency (Rosatom). Rosatom ensures carrying out the state policy and maintains the unity of management of nuclear power usage, stable functioning of nuclear power and industrial complex and nuclear weapons complex, nuclear and radiation safety. Rosatom is charged with the tasks of observing RussiaÕs international obligations in the area of peaceful use of nuclear power and nuclear materials non-proliferation regime. [21]

Picture Source: www.iftp.ru/images/rosatom

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Law on Defence and Military Order by the State
 
Laws to Regulate Nuclear Weapons in Russia

The laws are aimed

 

Non-Governmental Organizations

          Presently, many research centres and non-governmental organizations have been working in the area of non-proliferation of WMD and the means of their delivery, as well as arms control and disarmament. Their numbers are constantly growing.

  CENTER FOR EXPORT CONTROLS

The Centre for Export Controls is a non-profit, non-governmental organization created in 1994 at the initiative of the Federal Service for Currency and Export Control and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Objectives:

CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (PIR)

Objectives:

 

INTERREGIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL ENERGY COMMISSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Objectives:

 

MOVEMENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY (MNS)

Objectives:

 

NON-PROLIFERATION ASSOCIATION

Objectives:

 

UNION OF NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING TERRITORIES AND ENTERPRISES

Objectives:

The United States

Governmental Organization

The Department of Energy

An agency of the U.S. government created in October 1977 is responsible for long-range, high-risk research and development of energy technology, power marketing at the federal level, the promotion of energy conservation, oversight of the nuclear weapons program, regulatory programs, and the collection and analysis of energy data.[25]

 

Table Source: Department of Energy Organization Chart <http://www.energy.gov/organization/orgchart.htm>

 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for securing thousands of nuclear weapons and components, and hundreds of tons of special nuclear material in all forms, shapes and sizes.

US Non-Governmental Organizations

Organizations

Aimed

The Federation of American Scientists Biological and Chemical Weapons

To control all aspects of chemical and biological weapons, concentrates on researching and advocating policies that balance science and security without compromising national security or scientific progress[26]  

 

The Arms Control Association

to promote public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies, to provide policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues.[27]

 

The Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

to seek the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons as a significant tool of U.S. national security policy, to develop working papers, reports, recommendations and briefings on technical and policy issues for the Congress, the media and public, and international community. [27]

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, [27]

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies

to combat the spread of WMD by training the next generation of non-proliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis

 

 

Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations. Interaction.

In my opinion, it would be very difficult to succeed in disarmament and non-proliferation areas if only governmental organizations were active, because non-governmental organizations

 

Objective II

Nuclear Disarmament, Opinions, Challenges

          Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament canÕt exist without each other. The goal of non-proliferation is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to further states and to establish nuclear disarmament conditions.

Nuclear disarmament needs a stable strategic environment where the nuclear-armed states are confident that no new nuclear-armed states will emerge.

Picture: Memo to the UN: A Little Disarmament Diplomacy, Please

by Michael Landweber | November 10th, 2008 <http://img469.imageshack.us/img469/8086/toughdove8qc.jpg>

 

         The internаtional nuclear non-proliferation regime appears to be unravelling, because nuclear weapons states are losing interest in disarmament and non-proliferation.  In the early part of the 1990s there were significant positive steps on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, but todаy there are more negative trends.  Moreover, there is a general worsening of the international security environment, including relations between the major powers.

Challenges in East Asia mirror those that exist at the global level - threats posed by terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.

Some of the countries have little support for strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

India and Pakistan are examples in the category of ÒneutralsÓ might decide to acquire nuclear weapons.

The prospect of new states acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities is the possibility that the erosion of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime could lead to a more competitive, multipolar international security system in general. [28]

Proliferation in South Asia is the consequence of three classes of motivations: security, domestic political considerations, and particularly in the case of India—concerns and frustrations about international equity. The non-proliferation regime can affect the first of these issues, and provide support to domestic constituencies opposed to proliferation insofar as the second is concerned.[29]

 

In China the procession of nuclear disarmament is closely linked to the international security situation and the national security environment of various States. It is necessary to have a new concept of common security based upon mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperationÉ

The complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world will remove forever the menace of nuclear weapons facing humankind, thus greatly enhancing international peace and security [30]

In Africa the Disarmament Programme suffers from challenges on mobilisation of funds, establishing the criteria for differentiation, the amount to be paid, financial management education, and dealing with corruption.

South Africa is the only state to have developed nuclear weapons indigenously and then abandoned them.

In spite of the challenges South Africa came to disarmament successfully. The following factors influenced it:

According to these factors I may say that South Africa demonstrates a strong opinion on nuclear disarmament, but due to inconclusive results of the IAEA verification of its initial declaration in 1991 I have some doubts. [32]

Middle East

Among the threats to the stability of the Middle East, nuclear weapons are the most dangerous. Although Israel has signed two peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, many other countries remain outside of the so-called Middle East piece process, leaving the region far from stable. Israel stated that nuclear weapon is necessary for defence, because ÒÉ it is a small state surrounded by many states that want to destroy it. ÉÓ Defence is one of the reasons why Iran and Iraq started their nuclear programmes.

While the confrontation between these countries exist there is no a chance of nuclear disarmament.[33]

 

To sum up I can say that in the cases with Iran, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea           disarmament challenges mirror proliferation motivations (see benchmark I). It is clear for me that only those countries have strong opinions on the topic of nuclear disarmament which signed the NPT.

 

 

 

 

 

People Say

 

Unfortunately I am not much into the topic, but I believe that the system of non-proliferation and disarmament works, cause we donÕt feel that nuclear plutonium and nuclear warheads fall onto our heads. But I also think that if the Nuclear World War begins, the treaties wonÕt stop the states (which possess nuclear weapons) using their nuclear weapons.  

My Dad (Anatoly Shaymaer), driver.
 

I donÕt believe that the treaties can be followed honestly. They are created by the people and you know that not all the people are honest. Some of the countries are trying  to make or have already made nuclear weapons secretly and are increasing their nuclear stockpiles secretly too for self-safety.

 

My cousin, Dimitriadi Dmitry,                student.

 
 

 

 

 

 

 


                                                                                          

 

 

 

 

 

 

We need to cut back to zero nuclear weapons, and no one is willing to do that. As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear war will happen, it is guaranteed. There's only one thing we can do now. We have to eliminate the problem right at the source.

We have two choices. We can get rid of all nuclear weapons, which I'm sure you can agree is not going to happen. Or we can eliminate all wars.

                                               UkraineTony Bondhus

                           Community Organizer, Engineer [34]

 

 

 
 

 

I believe that future progress of disarmament and non-proliferation requires much greater willingness of the nuclear weapons states to cooperate.             

                                       Antonina Shaymaer

                                          10th grade student

 

 

 

 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Objective III

Challenges in Nuclear Disarmament in the World Today

 

       There are two types of proliferation, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal is the proliferation which refers to nuclear weapons states which transfer nuclear weapons, technology or materials to nuclear or non-nuclear states. As for vertical proliferation, so it refers to nuclear weapons states which research and develop new types of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and even means of deliver. But only horizontal proliferation has been treated as illegal under the NPT. In my opinion, any comprehensive and successful non-proliferation regime must imply vertical and horizontal proliferation.

 

It is necessary to have perfect information about what exists to control nuclear weapons and materials. Therefore, a global accounting of all nuclear weapons and materials must exist without any exceptions. All states must provide international inspections with transparent information.

All countries should enter into a treaty to stop nuclear weapons material production. Otherwise it is impossible to control nuclear weapons.  But what is happening in the world nowadays? What countries are busy modernizing their nuclear arsenal and are there any technologies to control nuclear weapons – IÕll try to tell about all these points.

 

Modernization of the Nuclear Weapon Arsenal

              In recent years, nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. Virtually all are extending or modernizing their nuclear weapon arsenals. Others have tried to develop illegal nuclear programmes. Extremist groups have shown interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear materials have become more difficult to control. A new phenomenon of prohibited trade in nuclear technology has emerged. Energy security and climate change are driving many countries to think of another nuclear power option. But the growing interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - seen by some countries as an implicit deterrence or insurance policy - raises the prospect of a steadily increasing number of nuclear-weapon-capable states.

 95 percent of nuclear warheads are in the hands of the United States and the Russian Federation. Strategic reliance on these weapons by these countries motivates other countries to do the same. And naturally, plans to replenish and modernize these weapons create a feeling of cynicism among many states.[35]

Picture Source: Two Views on Nuclear Weapons <http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2008/10/two-views-on-nuclear-weapons.html>

China is modernizing its conventional military forces and nuclear systems. China continues to develop more robust, survivable nuclear-armed missiles as well as conventional capabilities for use in a regional conflict.

The United States are also modernizing its forces and improving its capabilities and are years ahead of  China. [36]

ÒÉOne of the factors fuelling China's military modernization is concern about an economically powerful Japan becoming less closely tied to the U.S. and more militarily capable in the region," said Shannon Selin, a research associate for the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia. "The prospect of a North Korean nuclear capability has probably already been factored into Japanese security planning."[37]

Two other reasons for ChinaÕs modernization are updating old weapons systems and replace them with more modern systems; and probably seeking a stronger fighting capacity to increase the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. [38]

"É No one has designed a new nuclear weapon in the United States since the 1980s, and no one has built a new one since the early 1990s,È Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates said. The older and less reliable the nuclear arsenal is, he added, the more difficult it will be to make sharp cuts in the U.S. stockpile and reduce the number of nuclear weaponsÉÓ The reasons are: Òto add modern security systems to the weapons and improve their safety É.

É safety, security and reliability." [39]

Only South Africa has voluntarily given up this ultimate power. Several other countries —the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus —agreed to relinquish their portion of the Soviet arsenal in exchange for compensation. A third group, which includes South Korea, Egypt, Brazil, and Libya, has stopped their quest for a nuclear weapon either as a result of pressure or incentives.[40]

 

Russia

Budget increases will help Russia to create a professional military by replacing conscripts with volunteer servicemen and focus on maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational life of its strategic weapons systems, including its nuclear missile force.

Besides, due to the Ministry of Defence nowadays we are developing entirely new arms forces. As a result weÕll have more soldiers and fewer officers. Because improved modern technologies will need less personnel to control them. [41]

Iran would not give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly they can use it to produce fuel for power reactors. We are more concerned about the dual-use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a nuclear weapon.

 Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3 MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-range SCUD missiles it already has.[42]

[43]

North Korea continues to pursue a uranium enrichment capability drawing on the assistance it received from A.Q. Khan before his network was shutdown.

North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy, and sell ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication, augmenting Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and No Dong class missiles. North Korea could resume flight-testing at any time, including of longer-range missiles, such as the Taepo Dong-2 system.[44]

 

Nuclear Weapons Protection, Control, Accountability

Monitoring Tools

weapon container with an external radiation source; permit identification without revealing sensitive weapon design information.

and storage rooms for weapons to check their status.

 

      Visual inspection supplemented by simple radiation measurements is one of the ways to suspect weapons. This method is not foolproof, however. It might not be able to detect weapons that do not contain plutonium, because the rate of neutron emission from highly enriched uranium (HEU) is very low. Moreover, some non-weapon objects that may be stored in bunkers (e.g., weapon components, radioisotope thermal generators, or nuclear-explosive-like objects) might emit enough neutrons to be mistaken for a weapon.

Visual Inspection is for concealing a nuclear test on land is underground deployment

á      documents the geology of the testing media (crystalline rock vs. alluvium) and for tamped shots the degree of likely seismic coupling.

á      guides radionuclide and seismic aftershock detection by locating surface ground zero (SGZ) and identifying permeable pathways for gas escape.

 Visual inspection can be achieved through simple means, primarily geological in nature.

 Visual inspection procedures must be defined for uniform CTBT implementation.

 Presently there are no general procedures for visual inspection, no bounds on activities it encompasses, and no standardized approach. [45]

The Remote Sensing Program

The Remote Sensing Program consists of research projects to detect signatures associated with the development of weapons of mass destruction. The research areas in the Remote Sensing program include sensor development, image processing and digital signal processing technique for characterization of observed phenomena.

 

Detection

The nuclear detection technology is based on gravimetric sensing techniques, detecting the presence of Plutonium-239 and Uranium-235 by responding to minute gravitational gradient anomalies produced by these high-density nuclear materials used to make weapons.

Detection Techniques

Passive

 

Radiographic

 

Active

 

Signal emissions generated by target itself

Relatively simple and inexpensive

 Most familiar and deployed form of radiation detection

 Affected by shielding and masking

E.g:

Plastic Scintillation Detectors,

Cooled, High-Purity, Germanium Detectors,

 

X-ray and gamma-ray transmission imaging

 CBP currently deployed 150 units to search for contraband

 Can be expanded to detect high-Z material, including SNM

 

 External stimulation needed to generate measurable signal

 Effective against shielded and masked targets

 Usually involves irradiating target with gammas, neutrons, or other radiation

 Complex, expensive, with potential health effects

 Not yet deployed

 

 

Global Nuclear Detection Opportunities

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Picture Source: Homeland Defence Against Nuclear Weapons January 25, 2007 <http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2008cbrn/Gallaway.pdf>

 

      By the way, on Sept. 29, former Senator Sam Nunn, the co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), announced the creation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), which would bring together nuclear technicians, security personnel, governments, and international organizations to foster better security practices at nuclear facilities worldwide. The NTI and the Department of Energy have each committed $3 million to the organization, while the government of Norway has pledged $100,000 to begin to bring personnel from developing countries into the program.[46]

 RussiaÕs nuclear command and control system consists of early warning satellites and sensors, radars, PPS Command and Control System, Closed-Circuit Television System, Intrusion Detection Equipment (Interior and exterior), Rapid Deployable Sensor Systems, Access Control Systems, Vehicle/Personnel Barrier and access delay systems, Hazardous/Prohibited, Material Detection Systems (metal, explosive, nuclear), Fire and Safety System, Guard Force [47]

 

Picture Source: Russian Roulette <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/russia/debate/>

 

Current Nuclear Detection Programs

 

SLD-Core Program was initially created to assist Russia in its efforts to safeguard against nuclear and fissile materials smuggling and trafficking. The U.S. officially began working with the Russian Customs Service in 1998 in an effort to equip Russian border crossings, airports, and other strategic feeder ports with handheld and fixed radiation detection equipment and the specialized training required to use the detectors. Since it began working with the Russian Customs Service in 1998, the SLD-Core program has equipped 88 sites with detection related technologies.

 

Megaports Initiative was initiated by the Department of EnergyÕs NNSA in 2003 to work with designated partner countries to equip large international seaports with radiation detection equipment to detect, deter, and interdict nuclear materials. The main goals are:

á      to deter terrorists from using the worldÕs seaports to ship illicit materials,

á      to detect nuclear or radioactive materials if they are shipped via sea cargo,

á       interdict harmful material before it is used against the United States and its allies.

The Megaports Initiative is operational in Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Spain, and NNSA personnel are at various stages of implementing the Megaports  program in 13 other countries: Belgium, China, Dubai, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Israel, Oman, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and Taiwan. NNSA is engaged in negotiations with approximately 20 additional countries.

 

Container Security Initiative was initiated on January 17, 2002. The strategic goals of the CSI are to:

á      to secure U.S. borders against terrorists and weapons by evaluating all containers

bound for the United States for terrorist risk before lading at CSI ports,

á      to build a robust CSI cargo system that will withstand a terrorist incident and ensure a continuous flow of trade or prompt resumption of trade through CSI ports in the event of a terrorist incident

á      to protect and facilitate legitimate trade by maintaining effectively operating CSI ports, working with host nations to inspect all containers identified as a possible

 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was established in April 2005.

It is the only Federal organization and dedicated to nuclear detection and the development of a nuclear detection architecture

DNDO is aimed to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the United States. [48]

   

      Samples of Detectors

ARGONNE, Ill. (June 21, 2002) – is a small, portable detector for finding concealed nuclear weapons and materials has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory. This  tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials. The heart of the Argonne device is a small wafer of gallium arsenide (GaAs), a semiconducting material similar to silicon. When coated with boron or lithium, GaAs can detect neutrons, such as those emitted by the fissile materials that fuel nuclear weapons. Patents are pending on several detectors and their components.

Picture Source:  ArgonneIII http://www.anl.gov/Media_Center

 

 

A radiation detection system that measures radiation (e.g., signature energy-level gamma radiation and neutrons) is employed aboard a ship or other transport vehicle. It simply detects radiation that is emitted from surrounding sources and that impacts on the detector—rather than actively directing radiation into containers to stimulate emission. [49]

Picture Source: Representative Image http://images.google.ru/imgres?imgurl

THOR series Advanced Explosives Detection Systems

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: THOR series Advanced Explosives Detection Systems www.caravan-ny.com/th_thor.html

 

 

 

 

Portable sensing equipment is used to detect radioactive sources.

Source: Nuclear Detection Devices http://www.espionageinfo.com/Nt-Pa/Nuclear-Detection-Devices.html

 

 

 

Nuclear Protection and Control Budget

           The Material Protection Control and Accounting program > $3 million in the FY1993

 $11 million in FY1994

 $73 million in FY1995

 $99 million in FY 1996

$115 million in FY1997

$137 million in FY1998

$152 million in FY1999

$145 million in FY2000

$145 +30 million in FY2001

Abbreviation FY means Fiscal Year

The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program in FY2000 - $25 million

$35 million in the FY1994

$10 +20 million in FY1996

 $30 million in FY1997

 $115 million in FY1998 to 435 projects

$30 million for the IPP program for FY2000

$22.5 million in FY2001

$22.1 million in FY2002

Nuclear Cities Initiative

$17 million for FY2004 and $23 million to IPP [50]

 

Department of Defence Cooperative Threat Reduction Spending in FY 2005 (numbers are in millions)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Department of State Non-proliferation Spending in FY 2005 (numbers are millions)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Drawn by Antonina Shaymaer from tablesÕ source: Non-proliferation and the FY 2005 budget request Feb. 20, 2004 <http://www.cdi.org/news/nuclear/FY05-nonproliferation.pdf>

 

 

Safety & Security of Nuclear Weapons in Russia

 

        The topic on nuclear weapons security has existed since development of nuclear weapons, and it will exist as long as there are nuclear weapons. The security system has been constantly developed and improved due to nuclear stockpile quantity and structure changes, to upgrading and development of new delivery means, and to the operational readiness requirements. The major evidence of Russia's nuclear weapons security system's effectiveness is that during its entire history there have been no nuclear/radiation accidents involving nuclear weapons at any stage of its life cycle, except for specific cases caused by emergency submarine submerges. The extreme efficiency of the developed security system is evident given the fact that for decades it has been embracing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and ammunition articles, and that the efforts related to nuclear weapons and their components has been involving many tens of thousands of people.

           Many analysts in the United States and Russia have expressed concerns about the safety, security, and control over these weapons. The Soviet Union had a security system for nuclear material that worked for 40 years. It was built for a world of pampered, well cared for nuclear workers, in a closed society, with closed borders, and everyone under surveillance by the KGB. Now the situation is different.

But Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2002 assures that ÒÉthe nuclear weapons available in Russia are under reliable control. Higher effectiveness of this control is made through the adoption of organizational and technical measuresÉ.Ó

All non-strategic nuclear munitions have been transferred to the central storage facilities of the Ministry of the Defence. It allowed to concentrate all the financial resources on providing for nuclear safety and secured safeguarding of nuclear munitions storage sites by using modem technical means of protection.Ó

á      The warhead assets are located in fewer numbers at more locations in order to decrease their vulnerability to pre-emptive strikes or capture. By structuring the storage system this way, the designers inherently sacrificed security, which is more efficiently achieved through consolidation.

á      The warheads are stored in an unknown number of sites. The warheads have traditionally been stored in regions of concern.

á      The warheads are continually monitored electronically; are enclosed in highly secure silos, submarines at sea, or bombers in hangars or in the air; and are surrounded by external security systems.

á      Warheads are often shrouded with bullet-proof blankets and placed inside large metal containers, which provide ballistic and thermal protection

á      Over shorter distances – for example, from a bunker to be mated to a delivery system, or  from a bunker to a railhead – warheads are transported in specially designed trucks.

á       Over longer distances, most warhead transport is conducted by train. Guard cars are dispersed

á      During their transit, warheads may be temporarily stored in warship and submarine docking areas, maintenance facilities, delivery system mating/demating areas, rail trans-shipment areas and railheads, and weapon transportation vehicles.

There are few technological security systems, and those that are in place are not integrated. The security perimeters around most facilities are obstructed, and the fences themselves are degraded. Minimal supporting infrastructure exists around most facilities, including power, lighting, and guard force training and operating facilities. Moreover, there exist minimal inter- and intra-site communications capabilities.

Perhaps most concerning is the Russian practice of a paper-based warhead inventory control system. Each warhead is assigned to the responsibility of a single officer. Attached to each warhead is a Òpassport,Ó a set of records that contains the entire history of that individual warhead: production; maintenance records; transfer records; deployment assignments; storage conditions; etc. Warheads are inventoried on paper, and then aggregated through a series of regional commands up to the headquarters level.

[51]

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Weapons Storage Security Projects

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WMD Physical Protection System Stages

á      Security Assessment and Training Facility (SATC) - Test PPS equipment

á      Security Enhancements - used for MOD immediate security needs

á      Urgent Quick Fix PPS - used to secure individual bunker perimeters

á      Rapid Deployable Sensors - used to satisfy temporary security needs

á      Controlled Area Fence - used to secure stockpile site outer perimeters

á      Comprehensive PPS - additional tested and selected PPS equipment

used to improve PPS security enhancements (example: CCTV & Interior Sensors)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Urgent Quick Fix PPS - used to secure individual bunker perimeters and Rapid Deployable Sensors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[47] 

 

Challenges of Monitoring and Verification

To succeed in monitoring and verification it is necessary to avoid the following challenges:

 

         In conclusion, IÕd like to say that nowadays the best way to stop nuclear proliferation is to avoid existing double standards and fulfil a more impаrtial universal regime which includes a strict schedule for nuclear disarmament, the criminalization of both horizontal and vertical proliferation, effеctive international enforcement meсhanisms and enough funds to gain these goals.

It is necessary to intensify work with leaders of the countries which posses WMD in order to turn the international goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.

 

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