Critical Issues Forum
2008-2009
BENCHMARK II
Cathedral City High School
Student Participants:
Joanne Esteban
Emily Willoughby
Faculty Advisor:
Kimberly Robinson
Table of Contents
Objective 1
The Non Proliferation
TreatyÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 3
Objective 2
Overseas Struggle for Nuclear
EqualityÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ......... 4
Works
CitedÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.................................................... 7
Objective 1
From
the very beginning of the nuclear arms race to today, the possibility of an
accidental detonation or even an intentional detonation of a nuclear weapon has
remained a very real threat to not only the United States, but the rest of the
world as well. Following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became
clear to the United States that the consequences were much more devastating
than originally thought and to ensure safety for all, an agreement, between all
nuclear weapon possessing countries and countries that felt it necessary to
also possess nuclear weapons, needed to be put in place.
By
1968, a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been signed by three of the
five major powers which are the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom
with the remaining two, China and France, signing not long after. One major
condition of the NPT is that all other signatories are Òprohibited from
acquiring or even pursuing a nuclear weapons capabilityÓ. While most nations in
the world have complied with this condition, some, including Pakistan, Israel,
India, have refused to sign at all because they oppose the ÒfavoritismÓ given
to certain countries. They make the argument that all nations should then be
required to give up their nuclear weapons. This poses a problem however because
now that the nuclear genie has been let out of the bottle, it canÕt be put back
in. If nuclear weapons were to be completely destroyed, there would no way for
a country to protect itself from a nuclear terrorist attack.
The
Non Proliferation Treaty has three main conditions designed to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. According to articles one and two of the treaty, the
five nuclear powers are prohibited from Òtransferring to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or
control over such weapons or explosive devicesÓ. Article two focuses on the non
nuclear state end of the deal:
ÒEach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devicesÓ.
The treaty also aims to
promote peaceful use of nuclear energy for non militaristic purposes through
international monitoring of the nuclear materials.
Objective 2
ÒI believe that we, in our own small way, have
illustrated that long-term security can be far better assured by addressing the
root causes of conflict, rather than by taking shelter behind weapons of mass
destruction.Ó They are utilized for defensive and offensive strategy, and that
is why the disarmament of nuclear weapons is so difficult to embark upon.
Countries that do carry nuclear weapons hold them in order to pose a threat on
the rest of the world, maintaining their own superiority in order to quell attacks
by other countries. Countries that do not harbor nuclear weapons do so for
either two reasons. The first, they do not wish to provoke the rest of the
world, sustaining positions of neutrality. The second, they do desire nuclear
weapons; the only factor separating them from their goal is that they do not
have access to them.
On
September 8, 2006, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed a treaty which established a Central Asian
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ). By joining the other zones covering Latin
America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa, these
countries represent the main difference between countries with nuclear weapons
and countries without. Their example of nonproliferation serves as the
counterpart of their neighboring countries—Russia, China, Pakistan,
India, and Israel—each of whom harbor their own nuclear weapons, and
especially the instance of the internal nuclear-armament between Iran and North
Korea. The treaty imposed the impression on the countries holding nuclear
weapons that nonproliferation is the best institution of weapons; it is as
though they laid down their weapons, raised their empty hands, and stated Òwe
come in peace.Ó
The
Republic of South Africa, as well, found themselves straying away from nuclear
weapons as the first African country to do so. After decades of securing
several nuclear reactors and weapons, the Republic of South Africa voluntarily
dismantled its weapons program for the same motives that Japan exercises. They
realize the effects a nuclear weapon bombing on their country would create, and
they do not wish for a world-demonstration of another Hiroshima or Nagasaki on
their own soil. As in the case with Japan, carrying nuclear weapons would
suggest provocation, and provoking is the greatest method for getting attacked.
Thus, the basic description of willingly disarmed countries is this: they do
not want fighting, war, etc., and the simplest manner of neutrality is not carrying
weapons so as not to be attacked.
They
do not wish their countries to be the targets of terrorism; a nuclear reactor
would be the easiest and most efficient target available. Once a treaty to join
the nuclear free zone is enacted, their country would become safer from attacks
by nuclear strikes. The race to join these free zones is evident in the efforts
of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (PNND)
Council member Hon. David Coltart and Hon. Dr. Raphael Chegeni from Zimbabwe
and Tanzania respectively. They are urging other African countries to ratify
the Pelindaba Treaty, which requires twenty eight of the fifty one African
States who have signed to ratify that treaty. They are intent on the treaty
becoming entirely effective, so as to join with other weapons-free zones to
create a Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
South
Africa, as well, struggles to improve the disarmament of African countries and
even countries outside of their continentÕs borders. As countries such as
India, Pakistan, and North Korea violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons by producing nuclear supplies, the treatyÕs validity comes into
question. South Africa, though respecting the rights of these countries to
produce nuclear energy, actively works to obligate them to the TreatyÕs nuclear
weapons restrictions.
Yet
so many countries believe armament is essential to survival. Occasionally,
countries attack other countries that do not even have military power. It is
possible that an unprovoked attack on their country could very well be
imminent, and if they are attacked, and are not well-equipped to counterattack,
then they will be lost. They would become a sitting duck for those nations who
wish to conquer.
Other
countries fall into the same position that the former Soviet Union was in. They
feel threatened by opposing countries who still harbor weapons of mass
destruction, resulting in an arms race to impose a threat from impending
attack. Yet to do so, these
countries too harbor a budget large enough to afford a stockpile. These become
the irresolute motives of the thirty African states who have signed the Treaty
of Pelindaba, but have not ratified it.
And
thus, the major divergence between armed countries and disarmed countries is
established. Armed countries, such as the United States, Russia, Great Britain,
and Israel, know all too well of the threat abroad. They are countries who have
throughout history, found themselves threatened, invaded, or attacked by
countries with larger militaries. These are the past memories that hold these
countries to their weapons; they cling on to them, fearing that if they lose
that shield, they will be attacked as the vulnerable ones who were foolish
enough to get rid of that only barrier. The countries who do not have nuclear
weapons do not feel the same threat that the more developed countries feel. The
danger that they know is not from abroad, but within their borders. These
countries, such as the Republic of South Africa, realize that their focus needs
to be upon their own people. This is why most disarmed countries do not have
weapons; they do not have the funding to buy them, and they do not have money
to direct upon their own people. Their concentration is diverted to their
peopleÕs well-being, not to weapons that do nothing for the immediate help of
their homeless and hungry.
This
is another reason why the armed, poor countries do have access to nuclear
weapons. The people are in need, and because their government does not have the
ability to aid them, they find themselves turning to the help of terrorists,
terrorists who wish to be armed. The citizens of these countries become the
terroristÕs support, and their country is ultimately deviated away from the
moderate qualities of neutrality. The people need to eat. The terrorists need
support. The terrorists feed the people.
The people give the terrorists their support. A country with a nuclear
program is born.
The
countries that demonstrate for nuclear free zones are aware of this contrast.
They realize that other countries have Òmany pressing issues which demand the
attention of African governments and that nuclear disarmament might not be at
the top of the agenda.Ó This statement originates from the PNND representatives
from New Zealand, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania to the prime ministers and presidents
of those countries that have not yet ratified the treaties. The statement indicated that although
nuclear disarmament is a top priority for some states, others have more pressing
issues to deal with. These issues—economic and domestic—demonstrate
the difficulties of obtaining ratification from these countries. They do not
see the impending danger of a nuclear holocaust, but that of their starving
poor. The domestic issues become the main concern for these countries and it
becomes difficult for those countries bent on disarmament to achieve the
necessary attention.
Works Cited
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"CNS - Central Asian States Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) Despite U.S. Opposition - September 8, 2006 - CNS Research Story." James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). 31 Mar. 2009 <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/060905.htm>.
Consequences of the Atomic Bomb. 31 Mar. 2009 <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty20.shtml>.
"Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)." Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page. 31 Mar. 2009 <http://www.nti.org/db/china/fmctorg.htm>.
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"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] Chronology." Federation of American Scientists. 31 Mar. 2009 <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm>.
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