MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Critical Issues Forum 2008-2009

“Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges, Opportunities and Next Steps”

BENCHMARK II

Control of Nuclear Weapons

And

Current Challenges

March 28, 2009

Submitted by

Redwood Christian High School

Evan Choy, Kent Ha, Naomi Han, Keith Holmlund,

Alex Mattson, Eric McPherson, Richard Nan,

Jeromie Scholten, Abigail Wallen, Olivia Wu, Tim Yee

•RCHS CIF Research Group

Mr. Sugimura

CIF Nuclear Disarmament

13 March 2009

Benchmark II

As technology advances throughout the world, the threat that comes with the production of nuclear weapons also rises. With better technology, the potential for nations to manufacture and use weapons increases. Many nations currently possess nuclear weapons that could wipe out much of the world’s population. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral treaties have been ratified and organizations and agencies have been formed worldwide in order to reduce this threat and keep the nations of the world at peace. Unfortunately, not all of the nations with weapons want to reduce their stockpiles, which creates tension and fear between those nations who have nuclear weapons and those nations that do not have them. Every attempt to successfully monitor and control the nuclear weapons of the world today reduces the threat posed by them.

One of the many treaties created to limit the spread of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, referred to as the NPT. The NPT was first opened for signature on July 1^st, 1968 and entered into force on March 5^th, 1970 (NTI, 1). Currently 189 countries are part of the NPT, and out of those countries, only five of them have nuclear weapons (NTI, 1)(UN, 1). The countries in the treaty that possess nuclear weapons are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Four countries, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea, have decided not to take part in the NPT. The NPT’s absolute goal is to eliminate the threat of the usage of nuclear weapons. The treaty consists of a preamble and eleven articles. All of the countries under the NPT must abide by these articles. The articles can be divided into three main sections or pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use.

The focus of the first pillar of the NPT is non-proliferation. Since not all members possess nuclear weapons, it is important for those who do to promise not the use those weapons. The five countries mentioned earlier that possess nuclear weapons are permanent members of the Security Council. They must agree not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country to assist, induce, or encourage non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear weapons (NTI, 1). The only exception for using nuclear weapons is in response to nuclear attack or a conventional attack in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. The countries without nuclear weapons must also maintain their status as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). They cannot acquire, or manufacture nuclear weapons or receive them as a gift from an outside party (NTI, 1).

The second and third pillars of the NPT deal with disarmament of nuclear weapons and peaceful usage of nuclear energy, respectively. Article VI of the NPT states that parties must “pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,” and toward a “treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” (NTI, 1). This does not mean that NPT members have to actually conclude a disarmament treaty, but rather take part in negotiations that agree with disarmament. Many delegations propose complete and universal disarmament, but no such treaty has been made. The third pillar, which promotes peaceful usage of nuclear energy, allows the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs as long as they are not being used for the development of weapons (NTI, 1). This portion of the treaty was intended to make it nearly impossible to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The NNWS parties of the NPT have to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to take part in the treaty. The IAEA is an organization that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibits its use for military purposes. All non-nuclear weapon states have to begin complying with the IAEA safeguards regarding fissionable materials within 18 months of signing the NPT (NTI, 1). If states do not go along with the safeguards, the IAEA board reports them to the UN Security Council, which is responsible for devising and imposing penalties on the offending nation.

States can only leave the NPT if they follows the requirements in Article X. Article X allows a state to leave if “extraordinary events have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country,” giving three months’ notice (NTI, 2). So far, the only state to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is North Korea. North Korea’s exit from the NPT caused an uproar because it did not follow the restrictions under the article. North Korea first gave notice of withdrawal in 1993, but then reached an agreement to freeze its nuclear program. When the United States accused North Korea of violating that agreement in 2002, the country announced that it was ending the suspension of is previous withdrawal notification (NTI, 2). North Korea then withdrew on January 10, 2003, nearly eighteen years after it ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985 (NTI, 2). Three years after its withdrawal, North Korea declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and refuses to dismantle its nuclear arsenal or rejoin the NPT.

In its attempts to enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency has acquired a number of tools in the battle against the dissemination of nuclear weapons technology. The IAEA employs its tools on a case by case basis depending upon the cooperation, or lack thereof, of the inspected sites.

One major component of the IAEA’s arsenal of instruments includes the tools that it uses to carry out on-site inspections and observation. One of the most rudimentary tools used is the organization’s tamper-proof metal seals which are placed on containers holding fissile materials (NTIP, 2). The seals have the dual purpose of protecting the containers they are placed upon and making identification of attempted theft of fissile materials easier (through destroyed or missing seals). Although they are somewhat crude, the IAEA’s seals create the first line of defense against nuclear proliferation. The IAEA also routinely installs video cameras and microphones at nuclear facilities in order to constantly monitor their activities (NTIP, 1). Unlike the seals, the surveillance equipment provides a constant stream of information in the absence of IAEA inspectors. Like the seals, the video cameras and microphones installed by the IAEA are specifically designed for durability and tamper-resistance, making the only means for circumventing the IAEA’s authority in this case to forcibly remove the surveillance equipment. During the unannounced inspections the IAEA organizes, inspectors also employ portable radio nuclide detection systems such as the Ranger Plus (The Globe and Mail, 4). These devices are able to identify the presence of various fissile samples. The information the Ranger Plus and its counterparts provide is instrumental for the IAEA to determine whether or not a facility is being used to enrich fissile materials such as uranium for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons. The above instruments are those that are the most commonly utilized in the IAEA’s verification of its members’ compliance with the NPT.

In more hostile circumstances, the IAEA employs tools which are focused primarily on long-range surveillance. In the immediate prelude to the 2003 Iraq War, the IAEA used RQ-1 “Predator” Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with mounted cameras in their search for nuclear materials in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (The Globe and Mail, 4). The aircraft provided a mobile, long-range, and inconspicuous means for the IAEA inspectors to scan the Iraqi countryside for alleged secret or mobile nuclear weapons laboratories. Vehicles such as the RQ-1 provide the IAEA with ranged surveillance capabilities in nations with spotty compliance records. In situations where member nations are noncompliant and will not tolerate surveillance aircraft such as the RQ-1 in their airspace, the IAEA makes use of photo and radar-based surveillance satellites (The Globe and Mail, 3) These instruments hold the dual advantages of having the capacity to observe a broader area than that which vehicles such as the RQ-1 would and are virtually impossible for a noncompliant nation to destroy. These satellites have proven immensely effective in the IAEA’s observation of North Korea and Iran, both noncompliant IAEA members. These tools provide the necessary ability for the IAEA’s verification regime to keep track of its member nations’ activities even without their support or consent.

Although the current problems the IAEA has with enforcing the NPT are predominantly related to the organization’s inability to use force or levy sanctions directly against noncompliant members, technology still remains a complicating factor. The advent of mass communications, particularly the internet, has allowed for rogue parties to readily contact sources for equipment needed to assemble nuclear weapons (Kim, 1). In the cited source, it is demonstrated how all the components needed to produce and test a crude nuclear device (barring fissile materials) could readily be purchased through the internet (Zimmerman and Lewis, 3-4). While noncompliant national entities tend to acquire most of their equipment through diplomatic channels (ergo the alleged connection between the Iranian nuclear weapons program and Russian suppliers), the internet provides a dangerous degree of access to nuclear weapons technology to non-governmental entities. The shortcomings of the IAEA’s present verification technology provide a much more dangerous boost to potential nuclear proliferation (Kim, 1)(Doyle, 1). IAEA installations in nuclear sites can be relatively easily removed, as demonstrated by the IAEA’s removal of its seals and cameras from North Korea’s Yongbyon facility last year, giving the unscrupulous a distinct advantage in developing nuclear weapons. Satellite imagery can also be fooled by attempts by noncompliant parties to disguise nuclear facilities as more innocuous structures, as Syria is alleged to have done with a supposed nuclear reactor destroyed by the Israelis in the summer of 2008. Overall, technology has proven to be an exacerbating force in nuclear weapons proliferation, though not the primary cause.

One of the most significant developments and shortcomings of the international community’s battle against nuclear proliferation lies in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996. The CTBT was proposed by the then-current UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as a modernization and expansion of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, and sought to indefinitely ban all nuclear weapons testing while establishing a regime with which to verify the compliance of its signatories, which included the use of seismological, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic, and infra-sound monitoring technology in 321 monitoring stations, as well as on-site inspections which would have had to have been approved by at least 30 out of 51 members on an executive council, which would have held power to levy sanctions on non-compliant members (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1-2). Other significant provisions of the CTBT included the permitting of amendments to the treaty, the ability for signatories to withdraw, and the establishment of a CTBT Organization subdivided into a 260-member, 65-nation Provisional Technical Secretariat (develops and operates the monitoring stations) and the Preparatory Commission (which would have developed a regime to determine member compliance) (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1-2). The treaty was an attempt by the United Nations to curb the further development of nuclear weapons technology. While the CTBT has proven highly successful in attracting signatories (currently 179) its structure has prevented it from entering force. The CTBT is set to enter force 180 days after the date all 44 listed Annex 2 nations ratify the treaty, of which only 35 have ratified (6 of the remaining countries have actually signed the CTBT, the United States being one of them) (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1-2). Due to the rigidity of the structure of the CTBT and the reluctance of several of its key nations to ratify it, the CTBT currently has no power to prevent nuclear proliferation. The CTBT is an illustration of both the significant advances as well as an embodiment of the significant shortcomings of contemporary anti-proliferation policy.

A major and recently-defunct international nuclear weapons treaty is the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The treaty, made between the United States and the Soviet Union restricted the number of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems in each country to two (one for the capital city and one for the signatory nation’s missile silos) with no more than 100 missiles with a range no greater than 150 kilometers (NTI, 2). Other provisions of the treaty prohibit the further development of ABMs, restrict the number and type of each nations’ phased-radar arrays: up to six large arrays for the capital defense network, up to two large and eighteen smaller arrays for the missile silo defense network, and the prohibition of further construction of outward-facing radar installations along national borders; signatories are permitted to withdraw if they deem it in their best interest (NTI, 2-4). The original intent of this treaty was to defuse a then-current defensive arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the ABM Treaty has been null since 2002, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1). Since its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the United States has been actively researching and developing ABM technology which it currently hopes to deploy in Eastern Europe (National Missile Defense, 1-12). Unfortunately, the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has chilled relations with Russia, complicating mutual efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. The 1972 ABM Treaty, despite its seeming lack of importance in the present day continues to impact modern geopolitics and along with it the prospects of halting the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Another notable nuclear weapons treaty of the 1970's was the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I Treaty, which was the product of 3 years of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty was characterized by its explicitly defining the term Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles which was stated to be a missile capable of traversing the distance between the northwestern-most corner of Soviet Union to northeastern-most corner of the United States (SALT I Interim Agreement, 4). SALT I also attempted to cap the number of ICBM and nuclear missile silos as well as the number of nuclear missile submarines, which was an action intended to limit overall weapons numbers (SALT I Interim Agreement, 1-3). The primary function of SALT I was the establishment of an end to the United States’ and Soviet Union’s arms race. However, SALT I was also susceptible to”realpolitiks”, as SALT I prevented the signatories from inspecting each other’s facilities and allowed both signatories to continue the building missile silos that were not completed at the time of SALT I’s signing, and allowed for existing missile bases to be expanded in size by up to 15% (SALT I Interim Agreement, 2-4). This lack of idealism, coupled with a political cooling in the late 1970s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impaired the strength of SALT I’s successor SALT II, which sought to equalize the number of nuclear-weapons capable missiles the United States and the Soviet Union had, failed to ratified by the United States Congress in 1979 (though was temporarily honored by the United States and Russia until 1986) (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1). The victory of SALT I was highly imperfect and it did not ultimately yield an end to the nuclear arms race as hoped. Despite its inability to bring a lasting cessation of the nuclear arms race, the SALT I treaty stands out as one of the most significant nuclear weapons treaties of the Cold War.

A more recent and significant set of nuclear weapons treaties between the United States and the former Soviet Union is that of the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which are in many ways a continuation of the SALT Treaties. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (or START I) was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1991 and was an agreement to limit both signatories to an individual total of 1600 deployed ICBMs and 11540 total warheads (with other quotas established for other types of military equipment such as launchers) within 7 years, with lesser quotas at different points after ratification and allows both signatories to hold detailed data exchanges, extensive notifications, and 12 types of inspections to verify compliance (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 1-2. Its successor START II in 1993 (ratified by both parties since 2000) built upon those quotas by imposing a second 7-year regime, mandating a limit of 8500-9500 nuclear warheads each for Russia and the United States and the removal of all MIRV-capable ICBMs from deployment (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), 1). START I and II marked an era of limited nuclear disarmament, as the United States and Russia began to dismantle the dangerous fruits of their arms race. However, like SALT, START has itself come to a standstill with START III, which seeks to limit the United States and Russia to 2000-2500 strategic nuclear weapons each (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), 1). Since 1999, START III has been languishing due to nuclear weapons disputes between the United States and the Russian Federation (a prominent one being Russia’s insistence on lowering the warhead cap to 1500 per signatory) (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), 1). START represents both the successes and failures of nuclear weapons negotiations of the modern day. What is arguably the most politically significant series of nuclear treaties has exhibited a mixed record in its attempts to lessen the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

In response to nuclear non-proliferation, the nations of Africa are in agreement with the disarmament of nuclear weapons. As far as we know, Africa is a nuclear free continent. In April 1996 African nations joined together in Cairo, Egypt and formed the basis for the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba (DFA, 1). This treaty states that all countries under it must not create, obtain, or use any nuclear explosive equipment. It also disallows the dumping of radioactive wastes and outlaws any offense opposing nuclear installations in the African zone (DFA, 1). Nations that take part in the treaty are also required to abide by the IAEA.

The treaty declares Africa a “zone free of nuclear weapons, thus constituting an important step towards the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, the promotion of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, general and complete disarmament and the enhancement of regional and international peace and security“ (DFA, 1). This treaty is one of the few that covers such a vast area. Despite its wide scale, only eleven African countries have ratified it and thirty-nine countries have signed it. In total, the treaty has been ratified by twenty-six countries, but this is not enough to be enforced. In order for it to enter into force, twenty-eight signatures are required. South Africa is concerned with this issue and has attempted to do something about it. In an effort to correct the situation, South Africa together with other interested countries within the United Nations, has participated in drafting a bi-annual resolution in the First Committee (Disarmament) on the Pelindaba Treaty which inter-alia calls on the African countries to sign and /or ratify the Treaty (DFA, 1).

The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty has three protocols which have been signed by all the nuclear weapon-states. The first protocol states that the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China are not to utilize a nuclear explosive resource to any Treaty association or to any area of a Protocol III party inside Africa (DFA, 1). It is important for these nations to follow this aspect of the treaty. If they don’t, nations without nuclear weapons would be in constant danger since there is a possibility that nuclear weapons may be used against them. Protocol II requires the United States, France, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, and China to promise not to experiment or promote the testing of nuclear explosives anywhere in the boundaries of the zone of Africa (DFA, 1). In order for Africa to remain nuclear free, they have to take every step in keeping anything to do with nuclear weapons out of the country. The final protocol, which is accessible to states with reliant districts in the zone, requires them to examine specific groundwork of the Treaty in relation to the districts (DFA, 1). This means that the nations which have districts in the zone of the treaty need to know everything about the treaty that relates to their district.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, countries have taken steps toward non-proliferation. In February of 1967, nations of this area met in the Tlatelolco district of Mexico City to devise a treaty in order to remain free of nuclear weapons (OPANAL, 1). The treaty created, commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is called the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. It was applied on April 25, 1969 and since then has been signed and established by 33 nations (OPANAL, 1). The nations subject to the treaty, agree to prohibit and prevent the “testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” and the “receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons.” (OPANAL, 1). In addition, members of the treaty must also follow the two protocols of the treaty. Protocol I binds countries overseas with areas in the region of Latin America to the entitlement of the treaty. The countries this protocol refers to are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands (OPANAL, 1). They also have to agree to nuclear non-proliferation and remain harmless toward the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Protocol II requires the world’s nuclear weapons states to abstain from undermining the nuclear-free status of the region (OPANAL, 1). The nations who have confirmed and approved this are the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (OPANAL, 1). The Treaty of Tlatelolco is still in effect today and remains active in the fight against the dangers of nuclear weapons.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a time of terror for Americans and Soviets alike, but it resulted in better relations between the two nations. "The confrontation started when the Soviet Union began covertly shipping into Fidel Castro's Cuba, 72 nuclear armed missiles, capable of wiping out U.S. cities from Florida to the Pacific Northwest,"(Nelan 48) and ended when Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's deal that the United States would move its nuclear missiles out of Turkey if Khrushchev moved his missiles out of Cuba (Samuel 67). The crisis lasted thirteen days.

During those thirteen days, one slip up or misunderstanding could have caused a full-fledged nuclear war. President Kennedy and the Soviet President, Nikita Khrushchev, worked together to reduce the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The leaders agreed that a “hot-line” between them was a good idea. Teletype machines were installed in the Kremlin and in the Pentagon so that the Presidents could communicate with each other easier (Thomas, 9). The ability for them to communicate would reduce the chance of a misunderstanding causing a conflict. They were attempting to work together and provide reassurance to each other that peace was needed, and President Kennedy commented on this in the speech he gave at the American University in June of 1963 when he said, “If we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is the fact that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.... Confident and unafraid, we labor on - not toward a strategy of annihilation, but toward a strategy of peace” (Thomas, 9).

Although they were striving for peace, the United States and the Soviet Union were still locked in a nuclear standoff. Both sides relied on the idea of deterrence, preventing a nuclear attack by the fear or threat of retaliation, and mutually assured destruction, the strategy in which a full-scale nuclear attack would result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender (Thomas, 9).

The Cuban Missile Crisis motivated both countries to focus on arms control to limit the danger of a nuclear war. The first agreement on this issue was the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The treaty said that there could be no nuclear testing above ground, under water, or under ground. The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom signed the treaty, whereas France and the republic of China refused to sign it (Thomas, 10). This treaty started the United States’ efforts to control the dangers of nuclear weapons by using arms control agreements and treaties (Thomas, 10). Another treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This treaty limited the number of ground-based missile interceptors each side could have. Both sides thought that this was necessary to preserve the deterrence provided by mutually assured destruction (Thomas, 10). SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, was also signed by the Soviet Union and the United States. It prevented the increase of the number of ballistic missiles that a country obtained, meaning you could not manufacture any more of them (Thomas, 11). The Cuban Missile Crisis had a positive effect on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, even though, for thirteen days, one wrong move would have caused a nuclear war.

The nuclear policies of the United States have been around since the time of the Cold War. Before the Cold War, the United States believed that “rogue” states, which are states violating international law, should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Following the Cold War, the policy did not change immediately. During Clinton's presidency, his administration even supported the idea of preventing those states from developing a nuclear force at all (Woolf, 5). The United States also stands firm in the belief that it may attack if it is against a state not in compliance with the NPT, or if it is in retaliation from an attack by a weapon of mass destruction. Although the United States still has the ability to attack an opposing nation, the number of weapons it has is dropping. In the 1990s after the adoption of the START I Treaty, United States arsenal fell from over 12,000 warheads to a little over 8,000 (Woolf/CDI, 9). START I limits the United States to 6,000 warheads, which was eventually met in 2006 (Woolf/CDI, 9). Arsenal also shrunk, and will continue to, because of the Moscow Treaty. This treaty, signed by the United States and Russia, limits the amount of weapons in each country to a maximum of 2,200 (Woolf, 16). Even with this current reduction, the United States plans to retain all the current types of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers for any issue that may present itself in the near future. It has agreed to reduce the stockpiles of each weapon slightly, but not completely.

When President George Bush came into power in 2001, the United States policy toward nuclear weapons dramatically changed. The first shift came with the changing the definition of a rogue state to a state that seeks to possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As of June 2002, the United States has the right to prevent these states from obtaining nuclear weapons by force (Woolf, 5-6). The intention of nuclear weapons is for them to be used against the valuable targets which conventional weapons can not reach. War plans/games are played out by the pentagon even today in case of a needed strike. There are multiple plans designed for the United States in reaction to any sudden movement by a competitor of the U.S. on the world stage.

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is another treaty that controls and monitors nuclear weapons in many ways. Key components of this treaty are elimination, inspection, and understanding. The signatories of the treaty, which include the US, Soviet Union, and ex-Soviet republics, are obligated to eliminate all missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead with a range under 1,000 kilometers and corresponding launchers within 18 months of treaty coming into force, along with all missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead with a range between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers and corresponding launchers within 3 years of treaty coming into force (INF, 1-2).

The INF Treaty verifies that nations follow these qualifications through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. With these centers, parties must notify each other about eliminations of deployment areas, missile bases or missile support facilities, and changes in the number of elimination facilities (INF 1-2). Both the United States and Russia are entitled to conduct on-site inspections on each others’ missile sites. The reason these inspections are carried out is to verify data exchanged regarding treaty-related items, the cessation of INF-related activities, and the destruction of missiles, launchers and related equipment (INF 1-2). If there weren’t any on-site inspections, neither party could insure that the other party was following the treaty. Measures have to be taken to ensure that nations are abiding by the treaties that they have agreed to obey.

In order to keep the nations of the world at peace, we have to agree on a solution of what to do with the nuclear weapons in existence today. A solution that would essentially end the threat completely is to eliminate weapons in general. This seems like it could be an easy decision, but because every culture is different, not everyone agrees with the resolutions that are made. Scientist and writer, Samuel P. Huntington, stated that “Cultures are relative; morality is absolute”(318). This statement is evident in the decisions made about nuclear weapons. Nations often ground their ideas in their culture, instead of morals. Everyone has a sense of right and wrong, but not everyone chooses to live by moral concepts of truth and justice. Jesus was once asked which of the commandments of God was the greatest. Jesus replied in Matthew 22:37-39, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself.” If every nation was brought together to find one ideal morality, a decision about nuclear weapons could be made to change history forever.

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