MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Critical Issues Forum 2008-2009

“Nuclear Disarmament:

Challenges, Opportunities and Next Steps”

BENCHMARK III May 19, 2009

Submitted by

Redwood Christian High School

Evan Choy, Kent Ha, Naomi Han, Keith Holmlund,

Alex Mattson, Eric McPherson, Richard Wang,

Jeromie Scholten, Abigail Wallen, Olivia Wu, Tim Yee

Mr. Sugimura

CIF Nuclear Disarmament

May 19, 2009

Stand on Nuclear Disarmament

The human race has an excess of nuclear weapons, enough to destroy the earth many times over. It would take a mere 400 nuclear warheads to put the world into a nuclear winter and kill off the human race. (Babst 2). Although, in no way, does the world need to get rid of all its nuclear weapons, it does need to be brought down to a more reasonable number. The United States (US) does need nuclear weapons for defense but not to the extent in numbers that we have today.

Although there are nine countries with known or assumed nuclear weapon arsenals, the US and Russia are the only two with a number greater than 400. (Younger 3). These two countries combined have more than 12,000 nuclear weapons. (Younger 3). It is Russia's and America's responsibility to bring the number of nuclear weapons down. A good number is that which is presented in the Treaty of Moscow, also known as the Treaty of Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), that was signed in 2002 by President Bush and Putin. It is an agreement between the US and Russia to reduce each country's stockpiles to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed strategic weapons by 2012. (Younger 3). But at a closer look, there lies three key words in this agreement that present a problem; "deployed strategic weapons." In 2008 the US had less than 3,800 operationally deployed strategic weapons. (Porth 2). At that exact same time the complete US nuclear arsenal contained 5736 nuclear weapons. (Younger 3). The "deployed strategic weapons" only represented about two thirds of all Americas arsenal in 2008. Although the Treaty of Moscow was a step in the right direction it is not the end to the problem.

Although we are trying to move in the direction of lessening our nuclear weapons count, this does not mean that we need to get rid of all our nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we need to have enough to present a legitimate threat of destroying the world if a nuclear war was to break out. Although we can not un-invent this technology of nuclear weapons, we have to possess a means of keeping any terrorist group with the capability of making a nuclear weapon at bay.

There is the very veracious possibility that terrorist groups can obtain the materials and the knowledge needed to create a nuclear weapon. One device that has continually hindered these groups from obtaining such knowledge and materials is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1970 by 190 different countries. (Younger 1). This treaty controls the spread of nuclear weapons, as it does not allow countries who have nuclear weapons to obtain any, while in the same sense the countries who do have nuclear weapons are not allowed to gain any more. This makes it increasingly more difficult for terrorists to obtain essentials for nuclear weapons.

The necessary task which needs to be taken is for Russia and US to reduce their complete stockpiles to less than 2,000 nuclear weapons each. An indefinite extension on the NPT would limit any further nuclear weapons from coming into existence. Also what is needed is the implementation of entirely new treaties.

In lieu of President Barack Obama’s recent attempts at nuclear arms control treaties, we decided to weigh the role of nuclear treaties such as those proposed by

Mr. Obama. Our ultimate conclusion was that the effectiveness of any future nuclear arms control and/or anti-proliferation treaties would ultimately depend upon the structure of the document. Considering that, we believe that for Mr Obama’s treaty and other future endeavors to be successful, they need to create a flexible, multilateral framework to decrease nuclear weapons stockpiles, prevent the dissemination of nuclear technologies to unscrupulous parties, and enforce and verify the cooperation of said treaties’ signatories.

For any future nuclear weapons treaty to be successful, it must have an emphasis on multilateralism. If any nuclear weapons treaty seeks to remain relevant in the long term, it must actively include other Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatories that currently possess nuclear weapons in addition to the United States and the Russian Federation. In order successfully pursue an eventual, complete eradication of nuclear arms, nuclear weapons treaties cannot afford to allow nuclear weapons states outside of said treaty to expand their own arsenals, which would not only negate any advances, but also potentially yield global geopolitical instability. An effective nuclear arms control treaty must immediately involve at least all five NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France) and should later attempt to include non-NPT signatory weapons states. It is our opinion that for any meaningful strides to be made towards a nuclear-weapon free world need to be cooperative on a scale broader than the predominantly bilateral agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union during and immediately following the Cold War.

Another element necessary for the success of a future nuclear arms control regime is the presence of a broad verification regime with power to oversee any future treaties it may so concern. To achieve this, the signatories to our hypothetical regime have to openly field inspectors to the concerned facilities of the other signatories, a measure which has proven successful in a number of past nuclear arms control treaties including the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. In the vein of START I and II, the signatories should disclose information regarding their nuclear weapons stockpiles or other pieces of treaty-relevant information to each other. A verification regime that embraces these two components will promote a mutual trust and understanding necessary for a nuclear arms treaty to succeed, as has currently been the case in the START Treaties. For those reasons, we believe that a verification regime that allows for unhindered inspections and open exchange of relevant information is key to the success of any future nuclear weapons treaties.

Future nuclear weapons treaties should take a focus on the current threat of broader nuclear weapons proliferation in addition to the reduction of national nuclear weapons stockpiles. To achieve this goal, the signatories of our hypothetical treaty need to establish a mutually-shared “blacklist” of states (particularly withdrawing states from the NPT) that will be barred from further accessing different articles of military and / or civilian nuclear technologies from the signatories in the interests of broader global security. To enforce this goal, we propose allowing signatories to monitor transfers of nuclear technologies to non-signatory states in order to ensure the recognition of the embargoes on disseminating nuclear technologies to states which are deemed to pose a credible threat to global geopolitical stability were they to possess nuclear weapons. By including a focus on anti-proliferation, this hypothetical treaty will more adequately ensure success and broader global stability in an effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In order to combat the evolution of the nuclear weapons threat from that of total war to that of proliferation-fueled regional nuclear conflicts and nuclear terrorism, some effort to control the dissemination and sharing of nuclear technologies is necessary.

For any future nuclear arms control treaties to be optimally effective, they should possess a suitably flexible structure, as have previous nuclear weapons treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These treaties should enable the later inclusion of other signatories, and be subject to periodic review to allow for potential revisions or expansions of the treaty’s components. A nuclear arms treaty that allows for later revision of its articles will be more adept to adapting to constantly changing geopolitical circumstances. This adaptability would allow our treaty to remain relevant as it seeks to push the world further on to the ultimate end goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The flexibility of a future nuclear weapons treaty’s structure will play a large role in determining its long-term usefulness.

Lastly, there needs to be a construct within future nuclear weapons control treaties with which to enact punitive measures against uncooperative signatories. To achieve this, the signatories of this pact have to utilize punitive sanctions against signatory nations who violate the terms of the treaty that they agree to. These measures will ensure the long-term stability of any future nuclear weapons treaty by preventing the free violation of the treaty’s articles by its signatories, a problem that has recently afflicted the NPT in its dealings with North Korea. By preventing “cheaters” under the treaty from prospering, the said treaty will be able to command the respect among its members needed for its success. Any future nuclear arms treaties must embrace some sort of punitive framework if they hope to be effective in ensuring the long-term cooperation of its members.

While there is undoubtedly a role for nuclear arms control treaties in the future, they must shift from the Cold War-era framework that previous nuclear arms treaties have utilized. Without flexibility, a multilateral nature, and a means to enforce its articles, any future nuclear weapons treaties will prove ineffectual in yielding a world free from the nuclear scourge. Whether the United States and Russia decide to reduce their stockpiles or an entirely new treaty is created, nations are taking steps toward achieving nuclear disarmament. Our ultimate goal is to combine the two ideas of partial disarmament and a new treaty. By doing this, we will reduce the wasted materials used on excess nuclear weapons and achieve a safer world with more treaties that maintain world order.

Work Cited Page

Babst, Dean. "Preventing an Accidental Armageddon." Wagingpeace.org. Feb. 2002. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. 17 Jan. 2009. <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2000/02/00_babst_armageddon.htm>

Porth, Jacquelyn. “United States Reducing Nuclear Weapons at an Extraordinary Pace.” America.gov. 25 April 2008. America.gov. 17 Jan. 2009. <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/April/20080425125108sjhtrop0.993374.html>

Younger, Stephen. “Taming the Nuclear Dragon.” WSJ.com. 10 Jan. 2009. The Wall Street Journal. 17 Jan. 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123154631955669739.html>.